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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In consequence of nature protection schemes (species protection and reintroduction, 
establishment of nature protection areas) and significant socio-economic changes (populari-
zation of environmentalist ideas, rural exodus and land abandonment) several species of 
wild animals are currently recolonizing Europe. As they do so, our commitment to nature 
protection is challenged, as instead of saving vanishing and fragile species, for the first time 
in several decades (if not centuries) we have to develop ethically acceptable ways of living 
with numerous, powerful, and resilient animals, which very often prove to be a nuisance or 
even a threat. This forms a relatively novel issue for environmentalist movement, requiring 
illumination of the conditions and possibilities for coexistence. In this thesis I carry out 
three tasks. First, I critically analyze the existing ways in which people think about prob-
lematic aspects of coexistence, showing the limitations of these existing perspectives but 
also suggesting directions of improvement. Second, I expand on the most promising, 
though currently underappreciated, ways of making sense of discomforting presence of 
wildlife in humanized places. Finally, I show how such philosophical work consisting in 
clarification and elaboration of implicit ways of thinking can help us improve the practices 
through which we are already trying to organize the coexistence with wildlife. 
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 1. 
Introduction: the return of wildlife 
 
 
A wolf walks into a Dutch town… A couple of decades ago these words could have 
announced a beginning of a joke. Not so today. In 2015, on the 9th of March to be precise, 
the first wolf in almost 150 years was seen in the Netherlands. As if the surprise was not big 
enough, rather than conventionally lurking in the woods, the young wolf was seen parading 
in broad daylight through the streets of a Dutch town. The animal was not an escapee from 
a zoo, nor a wolf-dog hybrid abandoned by its owner. It was a genuine wild wolf, identified 
as a juvenile member of a German wolf pack established near Hamburg. 
 Though surprising, its appearance in the Netherlands was not a freak incident, but 
rather an instance of a well-established trend. This visit by the wolf is just one example, 
though perhaps the most startling, of a much broader process of wildlife return throughout 
Europe. In the wake of nature protection regulations, agricultural land abandonment, and 
significant social, cultural and economic changes, Europe has become witness to a massive 
recolonization of the continent by wildlife1 (Boitani and Linnell 2015). A recent report 
(Deinet et al. 2013) has documented growth in distribution and numbers of nearly 40 wild 
mammal and bird species across Europe. The significance of these recoveries has often 
been noted. 
 This is surely a success story for environmentalism, illustrating the possibility of 
ecological recovery and as such bringing hope for the future of European nature. It is true 
that in the context of an ongoing plight of many species, runaway loss of biodiversity, and 
the continuing destruction and fragmentation of ecosystems, one might doubt the im-
portance of such recoveries. Many of the species involved are after all hardy and adaptable 
generalists who never entered red lists, even if they became locally rare or extinct. The 
small, fragile, rare and specialized species, precisely the ones that are seen as most in need 
of protection, continue to lose the battle for survival. However, many of the recolonizing 
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 Very similar processes have been taking place in the US (see e.g. Sterba 2012). This work, however, will focus 
largely on Europe, though stories, experiences, and individuals from outside of Europe will feature quite often as 
an inspiration, counterexample, or comparison. 
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and recovering species have been characterized as keystone species, having disproportional 
influence on the functioning of ecosystems and an impressive power to shape landscapes2. 
Their reappearance might thus be a first step to a much wider recovery of European 
ecosystems. 
 Such returns are also an impressive political achievement. Given the extinction 
threats large fauna had faced in Europe up to the late twentieth century (Deinet al. 2013), 
and the perilous position of megafauna on other continents (Ripple et al. 2016), the capacity 
to garner social support, enforce necessary legal frameworks, and establish international 
cooperation illustrates the strength and efficacy of the environmental movement. This is 
especially so for predator species who for many centuries, and even up to the middle of the 
twentieth century, have been actively persecuted (Lopez 1978). Today, with a broad change 
in attitudes and moral sensibilities, more and more people see the need to protect wildlife 
and give animals place to roam. 
 But perhaps the greatest significance of these recoveries can be found in the new 
spatial configurations of human-animal relations that recolonization creates. As many have 
observed, the dominant trend of the last several decades, if not centuries, has been that of 
separating humans from animals: 
 
The 19th century, in western Europe and North America, saw the beginning of a process, to-
day being completed by 20th century corporate capitalism, by which every tradition which 
has previously mediated between man and nature was broken. Before this rupture, animals 
constituted the first circle of what surrounded man. Perhaps that already suggests too great a 
distance. They were with man at the centre of his world. (Berger 1991, 3) 
 
Many parallel processes have catalyzed this separation. In Europe and large parts of North 
America, intensive hunting led to drastic diminishing of populations of wild ungulates 
while most predators were eradicated or pushed to distant refuges deep in forests and 
mountains (Deinet et al., 2013). Ongoing habitat loss due to anthropogenic causes like 
urbanisation, agriculture, and resource extraction, have led to a drastic diminishing of 
wildlife populations and extinctions (Hanski 2005; Gordon 2009). Industrialisation of 
agriculture has meant the loss of the earlier extensive cultivation methods that actually 
promoted biodiversity and created habitats for many wild creatures (Bignal and McCracken 
2000; MacDonald et al. 2000). The varied landscapes created by place-specific, extensive 
farming practices have since been largely replaced by homogenous monocultures (Jongman 
2002; Halada et al. 2011), the ‘green deserts’ as they are sometimes called. Automation and 
                                                          
2
 This refers to both top-down influences of predators (Terborgh and Estes 2010) and bottom-up effects of grazers. 
In terms of grazing, a popular but controversial theory of the impact of large grazers on landscapes motivating 
much of European rewilding is that of Frans Vera (2009). According to Vera, the pre-agricultural European 
landscape was a patchwork of open grassland, shrubs, and forests, with the open areas being kept open by large 
grazers. 
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mechanisation of agricultural production had initiated a rural exodus as a consequence of 
which more and more people have been spending their whole lives in artificially construct-
ed urban environments. Already in the early days of urbanization, city walls were erected 
not only to protect citizens against human enemies, but also to keep wild nature out, thus 
providing a material and symbolic separation between the wild world and that of civilised, 
ordered human life3 (Hughes 2001, 34). The modern era saw a systematic exclusion of most 
domesticated animals from cities, leaving well-behaved pets as the only acceptable non-
human neighbours (Philo 1995). Nature protection has largely proceeded through estab-
lishment of nature reserves often located far from peoples’ dwellings, further diminishing 
opportunities for contact (Soga and Gaston 2016). The only major remaining sources of 
information and contact with wild nature for urban citizens have been zoos, occasional 
excursions to distant national parks, and TV nature programs locating wildlife in an exotic 
far-far-away (Wolch et al. 1995; Clarke 1998). 
 Thus, the return of wild animals comes at a time when the majority of European 
population has had practically no direct experience with wildlife, and certainly none in 
actually living with it. Some have characterised this progressive alienation from nature and 
the near-total disappearance of nature from peoples’ daily lives as the ‘extinction of 
experience’ (Pyle 1993; Miller 2005; Stokes 2006; Samways 2007; Finch 2008), or the 
‘nature deficit disorder’ (Louv 2005). 
 Somehow ironically, some of the processes catalysing this alienation are also 
precisely the ones that have contributed to the recovery of many species. First, intensifica-
tion of agriculture, policy changes, international competition, and rural exodus all have 
contributed to the abandonment of agricultural land of low productivity (Pointereau et al. 
2008). Although it is difficult to make precise estimates, careful assessments for the EU 
suggest as much as 3 to 4% of total land area (126,000 – 168,000 km2) is expected to go out 
of cultivation (Keenleyside and Tucker 2010). This land, left to itself, is overtaken by wild 
vegetation and eventually becomes a habitat for wild animals (Prach 2003; Bowen et al. 
2007; Gordon 2009). Some conservation organisations try to harness this trend by propos-
ing to transform the abandoned farmland into nature protection areas4 (see: Navarro and 
Pereira 2012; Monbiot 2013). Secondly, urbanisation has been associated with significant 
changes in the meanings, values, and attitudes related to wildlife, replacing utilitarian 
attitudes with moral concerns (Manfredo et al. 2003; Patterson et al. 2003; Buller 2004). 
Separation from wild animals might actually have had an important role to play here, as 
living far from wildlife populations has been associated with more positive attitudes to 
                                                          
3
 An example that encapsulates the greatest fears linked to the breakdown of such borders comes from 15th century 
Paris, where, in the winter of 1450, a wolf pack exploited holes in the defense walls caused by recent warfare to 
get into the city. Before the man-eating pack was killed, supposedly 40 citizens had fallen prey to the animals. 
4
 E.g. Rewilding Europe has been openly arguing about making use of land abandonment. Rewilding advocate 
George Monbiot (2013) goes even further, arguing we should in fact promote abandonment of low-productivity 
farmland. 
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animals (Williams et al. 2002; Karlsson and Sjöström 2007; Dressel at al. 2015). Following 
these changing attitudes, meanings, and values, there is a growing pressure on rural areas to 
transition from agricultural production and domestication to making more and more space 
for wildness (Buller 2004). 
 Beyond these, the other important reasons behind animal recoveries are linked to 
direct protective measures like limits on hunting harvests, legal protection of species and 
specific areas, changes in management regimes, and intentional reintroductions (Deinet et 
al. 2013). 
 In the wake of all these changes, wild animals previously pushed to remote refuges 
more and more often enter not only agricultural areas, but also suburbs and cities. Deer 
herds walk the streets, boars, badgers and foxes visit gardens, wolves scout pastures, bears 
feed from trash bins... Wild nature makes a very visible reappearance in the places we live 
and work in, and this brings many features that depart significantly from the kinds of 
engagements with animals we have been familiar with for the last several decades. 
 In contrast to protection of fragile and rare animals or plants, here we are forced to 
confront wildlife that is powerful, numerous and widespread. Where we previously sought 
to protect distant populations and control ourselves from infringing on the little habitat that 
is left to them, today, recolonizing animals appear in spaces we have been thinking of in 
exclusively human terms. Different from living with domesticated animals, here we are 
dealing with independent creatures, whose lives have not been bent into harmony with ours 
through years of selective breeding. Finally, these are animals that in accordance with some 
of the most fundamental cultural distinctions do not belong in civilized quarters. It is not a 
mere historical contingency that wild animals do not share living spaces with us. As many 
scholars argue, such separation is predicated upon a fundamental binary – that between 
wild and civilized, nature and culture – along which our culture thinks and shapes its world 
(MacCormak and Strathern 1980; Plumwood 1993; Linnell et al. 2015). 
 These differences problematize the image of recolonization as a purely positive 
process. While there may be many reasons to rejoice at the return of wildlife, recolonization 
is also associated with many commonly recognized difficulties and confronts us with a 
novel situation we are largely unprepared for. Conservationist and wolf expert John Linnell 
captures the ambivalence connected with the return of wildlife quite well, focusing on the 
example of wolves and bringing together some of the most important and recognizable 
aspects of our experience of these predators: 
 
The more I learn about how these animals live their lives the more I appreciate them as 
masterpieces of evolutionary adaptation. They also trigger some emotional responses deep 
inside. The combination of grace, power, silence, resilience and adaptability in such a beau-
tiful packaging can only induce a sense of awe. These animals demand your respect simply 
by looking at you. They are also truly wild. Completely independent of us humans, unapol-
ogetic about their actions, their persistence in our modern urbanised world provides a re-
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freshing reminder that there is still some wildness left in nature. Predators above all other 
species remind us that nature is still something of a dynamic process and made up of inter-
actions rather than just being static scenery. The idea that nature is something bigger than us 
humans and that it [is] still not tamed provides a refreshing tonic to human arrogance and 
egotism. However, many of these characteristics are also the source of conflicts. The 
sources of my fascination can easily become another person’s frustrations or fears. Preda-
tors don’t always make easy neighbours, and many rural people living in their proximity 
experience very real problems.5 
 
Ambivalence is part of an experience not just among environmentalists and conservation-
ists, but also among those who find themselves living with such difficult neighbors. 
Research shows that even those who identify themselves as anti-wolf openly recognize the 
wild and charismatic nature of these animals: 
 
Even though there have been strong antagonisms between Norwegian wolf supporters and 
wolf adversaries, our interview data show that people with opposing views on carnivore 
protection also seem to share a basic understanding of wolves as superior, social, wild and 
pure. […] They frequently used words and expressions such as ‘genuine’, ‘pure’, ‘unpollut-
ed’, ‘smart’, ‘socially intelligent’, ‘strategic’, ‘dominating’ and ‘beautiful’ to describe the 
wolves and their behaviour, and this was done independently of their position in the debate. 
Even those who classified themselves as ‘anti-wolf’ were openly impressed by the large 
carnivore. (Figari and Skogen 2011, 322) 
 
Consequently, very few people today argue for a total eradication of these creatures, not 
even those opposing recolonization due to the difficulties it brings. Most people recognize 
the animals’ right to life and living space, and many admit to being moved by their magnif-
icence. But at the same time they are deeply worried over the specifics of coexistence, 
including numbers and distribution of wildlife, and management regimes (Blekesaune and 
Rønningen 2010). 
 The problem with wolves, and many other wild creatures, begins precisely with 
the way that their admirable qualities play out in situations of coexistence. So while wolves, 
bears, and other wild animals might be seen as pure, smart, and charismatic, problems start 
precisely when a smart, independent, and social predator comes to live nearby one’s sheep 
herd, chicken coop, or home. This is the moment when living with nature becomes truly 
challenging. As the recently popular phrase has it, we have to learn to ‘live with success’ 
(see e.g.: Swenson et al. 1998; Primm and Murray 2005; Linnel et al. 2011; Trouwborst 
2014). We cannot simply reap the benefits of the success – though success means achieve-
ment of a desirable state, this state is not without its own difficulties that require further 
learning and adjustment. In some strange way we might even be happy with the difficulties: 
“the apparent vigour with which wild nature reasserts itself in interstitial wilderness spaces, 
                                                          
5
 https://www.iucn.org/content/boldly-go-where-no-continent-has-gone, accessed: 13.03.2017. 
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in the face of unbelievable human depredation, seems strangely comforting” (Jorgensen 
and Tylecote 2007, 454) (emphasis added). This ability of nature to reassert and reinvigor-
ate itself is ‘strangely comforting’ because while we are overjoyed at the hope this brings 
for the future in terms of nature’s recovery, it is associated with awareness of how difficult 
life with such unruly and opportunistic nature may be. The challenge we are facing here is 
then to learn to live with such problematic sides of wild nature. Dutch environmental 
philosopher Martin Drenthen summarizes the task ahead as follows: 
 
It is easy to feel love and care for cute, fluffy animals. It is quite another thing to give room 
to animals that can be inimical to us. To co-exist with predators, we need to tolerate that 
they can be dangerous to us, which means that we will need to develop an environmental 
culture that helps us to adapt and reconcile our wishes and aspirations with the needs of 
these other beings. (Drenthen 2015, 322) 
 
While predators might constitute the clearest example of such challenge, the difficulties 
extend over a much broader range of animals. Recolonization creates a situation in which 
we are forced to reflect on coexistence with sometimes disruptive, problematic, threatening, 
or discomforting animals as a possible model for inhabiting our landscapes. In this context 
we need to understand how this disruptive presence will shape our lives, and our relations 
with human and non-human others. This involves reflecting on what role the ambivalent 
experiences of nature, as those presented above, might come to play in shaping our rela-
tions with nature in the wake of recolonization. This thesis aims at providing a philosophi-
cal input for developing an environmental culture which takes seriously the difficulties 
arising from recolonization and explicitly considers their impact on various aspects of our 
lives. 
 Before specifying how exactly we can approach these difficult aspects of coexist-
ence in the most productive way we need first to understand the environmental and cultural 
context of current recolonization. In this Introduction I will first present the process of 
recolonization and its historical background. Secondly, I will present the most salient 
elements of the present situation in terms of our responses to this return. These will include 
the perception of the return of animals as desirable, the moral concerns commonly at play 
in the debates about animal resurgence, and finally the problematic aspects of coexistence. 
Once we have a better idea of the current shape of the situation, I will propose that recolo-
nization and coexistence are primarily an ethical challenge, and will present an ethical 
approach that I think is best suited to address it. 
 
1.1 RECOLONIZATION 
 
We cannot understand the significance of the recolonization without becoming familiar 
with the often bloody history of Western culture’s relations with wild animals. Their revival 
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comes after centuries of persecution and exploitation and wolves are once again a good 
example of the drastic change that has taken place to allow for animal resurgence, and of 
the surprising character their reappearance has taken. 
 For hundreds of years wolves have been considered dangerous, were treated as 
varmint, and were actively persecuted through systems of bounties, communal hunting, 
poisoning, and even intentional habitat destruction (Lopez 1978; Emel 1995; Musiani and 
Paquet 2004). As a consequence, by the end of the nineteenth century wolves had been 
eradicated from most of Western, Northern and Central Europe, with only small, isolated 
populations remaining in the Baltic countries, Iberian Peninsula and the Italian Apennines6. 
Fairly large populations survived only in Eastern Europe (Deinet et al. 2013). 
 In the 1970s, wolves were placed under legal protection in conservation agree-
ments such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of the Wild 
Fauna and Flora (1973), and the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and 
Natural Habitats (1979). Since then their populations have been growing and expanding 
into new areas from the refuges in the Apennines and the East. 
 In 1992, wolves from the Apennine population reached the French Alps, and in 
1996 they arrived in the Swiss Alps. Population estimates for 2016 set the amount of 
wolves in France at around 3007. Individuals from the same population have also been 
identified west of the densely populated and highly trafficked Rhône valley, even as far as 
the Pyrenees (Louvrier 2017). This shows that wolves are perfectly capable of crossing 
cultural landscapes, and that natural corridors might in fact not be of much importance for 
their movements (Valiere et al. 2003). In Scandinavia, wolves were extirpated by the 1960s. 
In 1983, a single pack was discovered in south Sweden (Vila et al. 2003). Presently, the 
whole Scandinavian population is estimated at around 460 individuals, the majority of 
which live in Sweden (Hindrikson et al. 2016). According to genetic analyses all these 
animals are of eastern descent (Vila et al. 2003). The Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia) and North-east Poland share between them about 900 to 1400 wolves (Hindrikson 
et al. 2016). Though wolves never went extinct in these areas, their numbers were greatly 
reduced in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany has been repopulated by wolves crossing over 
from Eastern Poland (Andersen et al. 2015b). Individuals from established German packs, 
in turn, have moved to Denmark, with the first sightings in 2012 (Andersen et al. 2015a; 
Madsen et al. 2015). An individual wolf recently ventured into the Netherlands, reaching as 
far as Eemshaven, the northernmost part of the Netherlands, before returning to Germany. 
 This first wolf spotted in the Netherlands in over a century did not shy away from 
crossing densely inhabited areas, causing a stir among the locals who could observe it 
leisurely strolling along a sidewalk8 (Drenthen 2015). Many professed their disbelief that a 
                                                          
6
 Extirpation of wolves in the U.S. has been carried out on a similar, if not greater scale (see e.g. Lopez 1978). 
7
 http://www.ferus.fr/loup/le-loup-biologie-et-presence-en-france, accessed: 30.01.2017. 
8
 The event is particularly poignant, as a year before a dead wolf found on a side of a road proved to be a morbidly 
elaborate prank by still unknown culprits. After examination, it turned out that this animal had not been hit by a 
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wolf arriving in the Netherlands could be a ‘real’ wolf, pointing out its ‘strange behavior’, 
like walking through villages and using roads (Drenthen 2015). Such disbelief is common 
in places where wolves have recently returned. For instance, stories commonly circulating 
in Scandinavia and France claim that wolves appeared there only as an effect of clandestine 
reintroductions9, or that the animals are wolf-dog hybrids (Skogen et al. 2008). Such 
narratives reveal how shocking it is for people to find wild animals entering human-
dominated landscapes, even when GPS tracking, genetic profiling, and scat analyses 
confirm that such dispersals are spontaneous10 (Valiere et al. 2003). Recolonizations stand 
in stark opposition to the common imagery which links these animals to wilderness areas 
(Lescreux and Linnell 2010), revealing that wolves are in fact very well capable of living in 
proximity to humans (Linnell et al. 2001). In this context, their survival and dispersal are 
significantly dependent on human attitudes and management regimes (Mech 1995; Linnell 
et al. 2001; Boitani and Linnell 2015; Behr et al. 2017). 
 The return of wolves is not as exceptional a case as it might seem, and the recent 
decades have seen the resurgence of a variety of animals. Another good example, illustrat-
ing the possibility of recolonization reaching all the way to urban centres, are foxes. 
 It seems that foxes, with the long cultural tradition of seeing them as sneaky, 
cunning, mischievous tricksters (Wallen 2006, 39), have been quite well prepared not only 
in biological but also in ‘mythological’ terms to become the avant-garde of urban wildlife: 
“More than any other urban species, foxes are identified as a part of real wildlife. There-
fore, foxes can be perceived as a symbol of urban nature” (Bontadina et al. 1998, 17). It is 
commonly held that foxes first appeared in British cities in the 1930s, and for some time it 
was believed that this is a specifically British phenomenon (Wandeler et al. 2003). There 
are, however, sources illustrating that the phenomenon of urban foxes is older still and did 
not necessarily start in Britain. One study shows that in Copenhagen foxes were present as 
early as the 1840s and in the 1860s they were so common in one of the large city gardens 
that they threatened to undermine the foundations of a Chinese pavilion that formed one of 
the park’s attractions (Pagh 2008). By now urban foxes are commonly present through 
North America, Australia and Europe, where they exist in many cities and suburbs  
(Wandeler et al. 2003). To give examples of the scale of the phenomenon, assessments 
evaluate fox populations at around 500 in Zurich (Wandeler et al. 2003), a number which 
                                                                                                                                                    
car, as was initially thought, but rather that the wolf had been shot, probably somewhere in south-east Poland, and 
then transported to the Netherlands and dumped on the side of a road (Gravendeel 2013). 
9
 In fact, there have indeed been documented cases of clandestine reintroductions by environmentalists. One 
example is a secret reintroduction of beavers in western Pyrenees, carried out by an environmental organization 
(Vaccaro and Beltran 2009). Such cases make the conspiracy theories more credible. 
10
 The spontaneity of such return must, however, be qualified. Recolonization would not be possible without the 
strict protection of the species involved. The decreasing interest in hunting also plays a part. Thus, following 
James Feldman, professor of history and environmental studies, who analyzed the rewilding of the Apostle Islands 
(2011), one must note that the spontaneity of natural processes is often deeply enmeshed in social and cultural 
processes and changes. 
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appears modest in comparison with the all-time records of 10.000 foxes living in London, 
and another 20.000 inhabiting other cities in the UK11. 
 Given that these returns are to a large extent dependent on human actions and 
decisions, but at the same time involve undeniably spontaneous animal behaviors, it is 
important to underline the hybridity of recolonizations, where it is impossible to see them 
either as fully spontaneous or fully orchestrated processes. The example of recolonization 
that best illustrates the intertwining of human agency and spontaneous processes of nature 
is the return of beavers and boars to the UK. Wild boars have been extinct in the UK since 
the seventeenth century (Goulding et al. 1998) and beavers since the sixteenth century 
(South et al. 2001). The British Islands, separated as they are from the mainland, obviously 
cannot be spontaneously recolonized by land-bound creatures. 
 And yet, surprisingly enough, several wild-living populations of boars (Goulding 
et al. 2003) and one population of beavers (South et al. 2001) have recently been found in 
the UK. Eventually it became clear that the animals were escapees from commercial boar 
and beaver farms that exist throughout the UK. It is not quite clear how the animals 
acquired freedom – perhaps they broke through the fences, exploited naturally occurring 
damages, or have been ‘liberated’12 by animal activists. Whatever the case, the animals are 
doing well, grow in numbers, and are free of diseases. Genetic analyses attest that the 
animals are related to European populations13, and are without any domestic genetic 
additions14. While the animals are for all practical purposes wild and are well capable of 
dispersing across the country, given the significant human involvement, it is difficult to 
exactly define the status of their recolonization. 
 Irrespective of the definitional troubles, many people currently welcome these, and 
many other, recolonizations. Given the long absence of animals from our lives and land-
scapes, and considering our role in their disappearance, the return of these animals is often 
experienced as hopeful and beneficial. 
 
1.2 WELCOMING THE WILD 
 
Despite the lack of direct familiarity with wildlife in terms of everyday encounters, recent 
years have seen a surge of interest in nature. This growing attention to the relations between 
humanity and the wider natural world is associated with a growing awareness of our 
perilous environmental situation and the losses that separation from nature involves. Since 
                                                          
11
 For reviews describing adaptation to urban life by several predator species and the issues this brings see: Gehrt 
et al. (2010); Bateman and Fleming (2012). 
12
 This is in reference to the common term for a strand of animal ethics which aims at cessation of all use of 
animals for human purposes: ‘animal liberation’. 
13
 This is especially important in case of beavers, as American beavers are larger than European ones and have 
different behavior. 
14
 This applies mainly to wild boar due to the possibility of crossbreeding with domestic pigs. 
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the publication of such environmental classics as Silent Spring (Carson 1962), and Limits to 
Growth (Meadows 1972), environmental issues play a central role in research and public 
discussions. While strong opposition to serious tackling of environmental issues still exists, 
processes such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity decline, extinction of species, and 
habitat destruction, to name just a few, are high on the public agenda. This general concern 
with the natural environment translates also into more immediate concerns for individual 
contacts with nature, and the issues pertaining to our relations with wildlife. 
 One of the dimensions in which contact with nature has been shown to be of 
importance is personal health and wellbeing. Studies have been carried out assessing the 
benefits of being in nature for psychological and physical health (for reviews see: Maller et 
al 2006; Bowler et al. 2010; Hartig et al. 2014). Among these positive effects we can count 
developmental benefits (Moore and Young 1978; Moore 1989; Louv 2005), stress reduc-
tion (Kaplan and Peterson 1993), and support in recovery from disease (Ulrich 1984; Park 
and Mattson 2009). 
 Beyond these considerations regarding individual wellbeing, contact with nature 
has also been considered important in relation to the current environmental crisis. Studies 
strongly suggest that direct contact with nature is an important determining factor in the 
development of positive environmental attitudes (Chawla 1988; Chawla and Hart 1995), 
and the emergence of moral concern for nature (Palmer et al. 1998; Chawla 1999). Lack of 
contact with nature in this context has been associated with motivational difficulties in 
terms of the ‘value-action gap’ in ethics, where positive attitudes to nature do not lead to 
pro-environmental behavior (Van de Noortgaete and De Tavernier 2014). Interestingly, 
especially contact with wild nature has been identified as crucial in developing the kind of 
deep moral engagement with non-human world that motivates pro-environmental behavior 
(Van de Noortgaete and De Tavernier 2014). 
 These ideas on the importance of nature in our lives chime well with the rich 
environmentalist tradition which identifies contact with wildness15 as one of the things that 
make us complete humans, something without which we cannot reach a fullness of our 
being. Henry David Thoreau, one of the forefathers of modern environmental movement, 
was among those who so singularly included wildness as an element of the good life: 
 
The most notable fact about [Walking] is that Thoreau virtually ignores our current concerns 
with the preservation of habitats and species. His question, which he got from Emerson, is 
about human life: “How ought I to live?” Thoreau is unique because part of his answer to 
this old question involves wildness. (Turner 1996, 82) 
 
                                                          
15
 The quality of wildness has to be differentiated here from wilderness as a place. Commonly, wilderness is 
defined as a place lacking constant human presence, and where that presence is temporary and ephemeral. 
Wildness, on the other hand, is seen as a quality which can be to a larger or smaller extent present in all places. I 
will return to this distinction in chapter 2, where I will explain it in greater depth. 
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Those who follow in his steps obviously no longer ignore the issues of environmental 
degradation. But they continue to regard wildness as an essential part of a good life, and see 
its rehabilitation as part of our rehabilitation: “by enhancing wildness where it exists and 
reintroducing wildness where it is absent, we enrich our personal lives, our communities, 
and our culture, now and far into the future” (Partridge 2001, 200). 
 Beyond the aspects of recolonization that are clearly important for human wellbe-
ing and self-realization, there are also ethical concerns with our treatment of nature, where 
nature itself is seen as the object of moral concern. Ethicists and activists have been striving 
to articulate the moral significance of nature and natural entities, attempts which since have 
acquired an important influence on our society. 
 The strand of ethics concerned with these issues which has had the broadest reach 
is animal ethics. Animal ethics attempts to extend our moral concern to include also 
individual animals. The general public has proven fairly receptive to these ideas and as a 
consequence concern with animals has taken an important place in law, policy, politics, 
research, and everyday life (Garner 2006; Rollin 2011). The two most significant strands in 
animal ethics are the animal welfare movement, of which utilitarian ethicist Peter Singer 
(e.g. 1975) is perhaps the best-known representative; and the animal rights movement, 
developed among others by Tom Regan (e.g. 1983). Animal welfare ethicists argue that the 
good of animals, conceived usually in terms of maximization of pleasure and minimization 
of pain, matters morally and should be taken into consideration in our engagement with 
these creatures. Animal rights ethicists argue that animals have inalienable rights which 
should lead to cessation of all animal use. Consequently, in responding to disruptive animal 
behaviors, what today is by many taken into consideration are not just human interests, but 
also the entitlement of animals to a good life. 
 Beyond this concern with individual animals, many environmentalists, nature 
writers, and environmental philosophers have been arguing for the need to save rare 
species, protect disappearing habitats, and respect nature at large. Today, the plight of polar 
bears, or the logging of rainforests are topics of general public interest. And while people 
might never see a polar bear in their life, or walk through a rainforest, the concern with 
their survival and support for actions directed towards their protection are widespread. 
Many of the animals that today are experiencing a revival across Europe used to be rare. 
The concern with their recovery we see today has often little to do with human self-interest 
or even with concern for individual animals, instead being motivated by a sincere moral 
concern for the survival of species and ecosystems of which they are an integral part. 
 These are just few of the ethical concerns that have become important aspects of 
our present attitudes towards nature. While the precise importance of recolonization and the 
focal point of ethical concern might differ, ranging between concern for individual animal 
wellbeing all the way up to the maintenance of the harmony of nature, most of those who 
are ethically concerned with nature see in the return of these animals an opportunity for 
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restitution after centuries of exploitation and persecution, and an opportunity to develop 
more appropriate relations with the non-human world. 
 The social impact of these ideas can be seen in studies assessing attitudes towards 
wildlife and recolonization. Sociological studies show how general attitudes towards 
animals have become more positive (Kellert and Westervelt 1983; Manfredo et al. 2003; 
Manfredo et al. 2009) and how values have moved away from the focus on human instru-
mental use of nature towards a ‘new biophilia’ characterized by the non-instrumental 
valuation of nature (Van den Born 2001). Consequently, in many European countries, large 
segments of the population – usually the urban, young, educated and affluent – are positive-
ly predisposed towards the return of wildlife, including predators (Williams et al. 2002; 
Kaczensky et al. 2004; Røskaft et al. 2007; Bauer et al. 2009; Natuurmonumenten 2013; 
Dressel et al. 2015; Van Heel et al. 2017). 
 In response to these social and ethical changes resulting in a growing public 
interest in nature, initiatives all across the Continent aim at reconnecting people with the 
natural world. Wildlife tourism is currently a fast growing industry creating opportunities 
for people to come in touch with nature and particularly wildlife (Curtin and Kragh 2014). 
Programs like Wild in the City!16, Oerrr!17, and RSPB’s Every Child Outdoors project18 
attempt to reestablish nature as an integral part of everyday life. Conservation organizations 
like Rewilding Europe try to harness and further extend the interest in wild nature, envi-
sioning a future in which wildness becomes part of our everyday lives, and an essential part 
of our identity: 
 
By 2023, wilderness, wildlife and wild nature have become essential elements of Europe’s 
identity and are seen as a reflection of a new, modern society in the 21st century. The new, 
liberated relationship with nature creates increasing health and happiness at a personal level 
for many people – young and old, urban and rural – throughout our continent. […] Whales, 
seals, wolves, eagles, bears, beavers, otters, bison, deer, tuna, salmon, sturgeon, cod and 
many other species are experiencing a renaissance and provide joy, excitement, inspiration 
and new income opportunities for all facets of society.19 
 
Such a vision of coexistence of humans and wild animals is not limited to wilderness areas 
or nature reserves, but is envisioned as extending over all kinds of landscapes, from the 
                                                          
16
 http://wildinthecity.org.uk/, accessed: 13.03.2017.The motto states: “Making nature a meaningful part of 
everyday life.” 
17
 https://www.natuurmonumenten.nl/kinderen/oerrr/wat-is-oerrr, accessed: 13.03.2017. Oerrr! Is a program of a 
Dutch nature organization Natuurmonumenten aimed particularly at children. 
18
 http://www.rspb.org.uk/forprofessionals/policy/education/research/every-child-outdoors.aspx, accessed: 
13.03.2017. Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) is a conservation charity founded in the 19th century 
and currently being the largest nature conservation charity in the UK. 
19
 A Vision for a Wilder Europe http://rewildingeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/A-Vision-for-a-Wilder-
Europe-Oct-2013.pdf, accessed: 13.03.2017. 
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wildest and most remote ones to the most domesticated and intimate spaces. Rewilding 
Europe hopes that in the future: “Rewilding has become the new conservation mantra and is 
applied in the green areas of cities as well as the wider countryside, in all kinds of protected 
areas, on land as well as in wetlands, rivers, and the coastal and marine environment.”20 
Recently, Rewilding Britain, in a bid to prepare guidelines for small-scale rewilding, 
developed a questionnaire which is meant to help this organization tailor the guidelines to 
the needs of prospective rewilders. They introduced the questionnaire and the whole idea of 
small-scale rewilding as follows: “We believe that rewilding is something that should 
happen at multiple scales, engaging people at every level. That’s why we’re keen for 
everyone to have a go at rewilding somewhere, whether that’s your garden, field or local 
park!”21 
 One of the most vocal proponents of this view is journalist and environmental 
activist George Monbiot. In an introductory chapter of his bestselling Feral: Searching for 
Enchantment on the Frontiers of Rewilding (2013) he proposes a constructive vision for 
environmentalism, which, next to curtailing our appetites and destructive practices, offers 
new freedoms and expands, rather than limits, human life. This expansion is predicated 
precisely on the possibility of engaging with wild, unconstrained nature that supposedly 
brings joy, wonder and richness to human lives. In a phrase that has become his motto for 
rewilding, and that refers to the famous title of Rachel Carson’s book about the dangers of 
DDT use22, he claims that by adopting rewilding “our silent spring could be followed by a 
raucous summer.”23 
 From the picture painted above it might seem as if the return of wildlife is an 
unambiguously positive development, and that it is welcomed by the majority of the 
population. However, there are important issues that complicate this image. First of all, 
though in many ways beneficial, the return of these animals often also entails difficulties; 
secondly, the positive attitudes towards animals are not unconditional and may change in 
confrontation with problematic aspects of coexistence; and thirdly, there are ethical issues 
that might be raised against recolonization. I will now discuss these problematic aspects of 
recolonization in more detail. 
 
1.3 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF RECOLONIZATION 
 
One of the most striking features of the current situation is how badly prepared we are for 
recolonization of human spaces by the returning wildlife. I do not mean here merely the 
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 A Vision for a Wilder Europe http://rewildingeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/A-Vision-for-a-Wilder-
Europe-Oct-2013.pdf, accessed: 13.03.2017. 
21http://us10.campaign-archive2.com/?u=0e536fd9cf797106c905024e6&id=4eaeccd289&e=55998ea073, 
accessed: 12.10.2016. 
22
 That book is Silent Spring (1962). In it, Carson painted a chilling picture in which due to pesticide use related 
die-off no birds welcome the coming of spring. 
23
 http://www.bbc.com/earth/bespoke/story/20141203-back-to-nature/, accessed: 09.01.2017. 
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infrastructural shortcomings, but a general sense of understanding of what coexistence 
could entail: 
 
How, practically and morally, are we going to bring humans and nature together in a viable 
and ongoing regional and global future? Humans and nature too often and for too long have 
been kept apart in philosophical and scientific explorations and ethics and social policy de-
liberations. As a result, we are inadequately prepared for the crucial task before us. (Don-
nelley 2001, 191) 
 
Consequently, many of the problematic aspects of coexistence catch us unawares. We do 
not expect them, and often we do not know what to make of them. In this section, I will 
summarize the most conspicuous problems that we are faced with as recolonization unfolds. 
To refer to the various problematic aspects of animals’ presence I will use the term ‘ecolog-
ical discomforts’. I take this term to be broad enough to include a wide variety of problem-
atic issues, irrespective of their severity. 
 
1.3.1 Material difficulties 
 
The most obvious difficulties brought about by wildlife are the material ones. Wolves, 
bears, lynxes, wolverines and foxes predate on domestic livestock (e.g. Linnell et al. 1999; 
Pedersen et al. 1999; Stahl et al. 2001; Treves et al. 2004), kill pets (Timm et al. 2004; 
Bateman and Fleming 2012; Plumer et al. 2014), and even attack humans (Linnell et al. 
2002; Löe and Röskaft 2004; Timm et al. 2004), which makes them one of the greatest 
conservation challenges (Chapron et al. 2014). Boars eat or damage crops (Deinet et al. 
2013), gardens, and other green leisure areas (Kotulski and König 2008). Deer eat crops 
(Gordon 2009) and over-browse forests reducing their regenerative capacities (Gill 1992). 
Boars, deer and moose get into car accidents (Kotulski and König 2008; Gordon 2009). 
Stone martens damage cars by chewing through cables and wires24 (Herr 2008; Herr et al. 
2009). Beavers damage tree plantations, flood fields and block drainage ditches (Bhat et al. 
1993; Nolet and Rosell 1998). Finally, most wild animals are vectors in the spread of 
diseases, some of which are lethal to humans or domestic animals 25 (Daszak et al. 2000; 
Deplazes et al. 2004; Jansen et al. 2007; Anthony et al. 2013). 
 In the conservation community there is a wide-spread awareness of such difficul-
ties, leading many to worry that negative impacts will diminish public support for conserva-
tion (Deinet et al. 2013, 293). Environmental ethicists, including those committed to ideas 
of coexistence with wildness of nature, are also acutely aware of difficulties that obtain 
specifically with certain animals: 
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 In Germany alone, this habit causes around 20 million euros of losses per year and affects 160 000 cars (Herr et 
al. 2009). 
25
 For an extensive review of different damages caused by wildlife in the U.S. see: Conover et al. (1995). 
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Examples abound of past human cultures that lived in harmony with their non-human 
neighbors. On the other hand, some species – most obviously large predators – do not coex-
ist well with Homo sapiens. If members of such species are to have a place to live, then sus-
tainable inhabitation and use of most places must be complemented by setting aside some 
places in which human inhabitation and use are either prohibited or severely restricted. 
(Callicott 1996, 33) 
 
Consequently, far from meeting the promises of enhanced well-being and quality of life, 
one sees reports of their decrease in the face of everyday difficulties of sharing spaces with 
some of the wild animals (Ericsson and Heberlein 2003; Mangerund et al. 2009 – discussed 
in Blekesaune and Rønningen 2010). In some cases of restoration, the newly created nature 
areas are not only a source of pleasure and ecosystem services, but can also be a source of 
disservices (Willott 2004). 
 Many of these difficulties are amplified by a lack of familiarity with the issues and 
of appropriate infrastructure. One example is the storage of garbage (Lewis et al. 2015). 
Trash is often a source of food for animals that is more nutritious and easier to get than 
anything they can find in the wild, and garbage that is not properly stored in animal-proof 
containers attracts animals like bears, foxes or badgers. Loss of certain cultural practices 
and traditional knowledge is another serious issue. An example is the transformation of 
sheep herding practices in the absence of predators (Breitenmoser et al. 2005). While 
predators were still a common part of rural landscapes, livestock on pastures were regularly 
attended by people and guarded by dogs. After wolves were killed off the need for these 
practices disappeared and the practice of assisted herding was abandoned. Today, livestock 
continues to graze unattended in the Alps and Scandinavia, becoming easy prey for the 
returning predators. Although attempts are being made to reinstate the old herding practic-
es, this is often difficult because of the costs, the amount of work involved, and lack of 
local know-how regarding the use of adequate protection methods (Smith et al. 2000a; 
Musiani and Paquet 2004). Even where such attempts are successful, people continue 
sharing landscapes with powerful and threatening newcomers. Such coexistence, whether it 
involves direct encounters or only an awareness of predatory presence, often remains a 
troubling experience even when the material impacts are minimized. This brings us to the 
less material, but no less troubling, discomforts of cohabitation. 
 
1.3.2 Negative emotions and attitudes 
 
The ‘Biophilia hypothesis’ is a well-known theory holding that humans have an innate 
affinity towards life, expressed e.g. in human preference for natural landscapes over 
artificial ones, or in seeking contact with animals (Wilson 1986). However, the reverse, and 
lesser known, side of such innate comportment is ‘biophobia’ – a predisposition to fear 
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natural entities more than human artifacts (Ulrich 1993). This is often illustrated by 
examples of phobias of such predominately harmless creatures as insects, in contrast with 
virtual lack of phobias when it comes to dangerous human inventions, like guns. Studies 
show that for many people contact with wild nature is associated with anxiety, fear, and 
disgust, rather than admiration, wonder or appreciation (Bixler et al. 1994; Bixler et al. 
1997). 
While large mammals, including predators, rarely become objects of phobias (Jo-
hansson and Karlsson 2011), negative emotions like anger, fear or disgust do play a 
significant role in peoples’ responses to these animals. These emotions have significant 
impact on the quality of life and on the decisions regarding how to respond to the arrival of 
wildlife. Fear of predators has been one of the most studied emotions in Human Dimen-
sions of Wildlife research. Many respondents express fear of predators (Flykt et al. 2013; 
Hiedanpää et al. 2016), and psychological and sociological studies have attempted to 
understand this emotion in terms of its causes and effects. Studies show that fear is influ-
enced by factors such as gender, age, occupation, or risk perception (Johansson and 
Karlsson 2011). Fear also differs depending on the threatening species (Flykt et al. 2013), 
and whether the threat is to humans or to domestic animals (Frank et al. 2015). The 
perceptions of animals might also influence fear levels, for instance when animals are 
perceived to be unpredictable or uncontrollable (Johansson et al. 2012a). 
Studies have also explored the consequences of fear. It has been suggested that 
fear negatively impacts the quality of life and the ability to carry out daily tasks (Johansson 
et al. 2016). Studies show that people who fear predators are less willing to pay for preda-
tor-related conservation actions (Johansson et al. 2012b), and are more prone to engage in 
and accept illegal killing of predators (Pohja-Mykrä and Kurki 2014). 
While fear might be a troubling aspect of living with wild animals, it does not nec-
essarily lead to negative attitudes. People who are scared might still accept carnivores’ 
reappearance (Zimmermann et al. 2001), which alerts us to complex relationships between 
emotions, attitudes, and behaviors. And yet, several studies document changes in attitudes 
that are already taking place in consequence of more contact with disruptive, dangerous or 
simply annoying wildlife (Williams et al. 2002; Butler et al. 2003; Ericsson and Heberlein 
2003; Jonker et al. 2006; Heberlein and Ericsson 2008; Leong 2009; Blekesaune and 
Rønningen 2010; Dressel et al. 2015; Treves et al. 2013; Eriksson et al. 2015). It seems that 
part of the rise in positive attitudes comes precisely from lack of direct contact with animals 
and when people become exposed to negative impacts their attitudes to troublesome 
wildlife might again become negative. This shows up e.g. in growing acceptance of lethal 
management methods with rising experience of animal nuisance (Zinn et al. 1998; Loker et 
al. 1999; Coluccy 2001), or higher level of fear (Jacobs et al. 2014; Lute et al. 2014; Frank 
et al. 2015). Some longitudinal studies suggest that as predators become established and 
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people get used to the situation fear might diminish leading to more positive attitudes26 
(Zimmermann et al. 2001). This, however, still illustrates that the moment of recolonization 
is a sensitive period that might be a particularly unsettling experience. 
 
1.3.3 The symbolic dimension 
 
Another source of discomforts can be found in symbolic significance of animals and their 
actions, and much attention has been given to the symbolic status of different animals in 
our culture. Many of the animals currently recolonizing Europe have traditionally carried 
negative or at least ambivalent symbolic connotations. Even though many of these symbolic 
associations are rooted in folktales, they still carry currency and shape contemporary animal 
representations: wolves are still perceived by many as ravenous and bloodthirsty (Lopez 
1978; Scarce 1998), foxes as cunning and mischievous (Wallen 2006), or badgers as dirty 
(Cassidy 2012). 
 Negative symbolic representations of animals have often been connected to their 
anomalous position with respect to established cultural categories. Anthropologist Mary 
Douglas in her studies of categorizations and transgressions (Douglas 1966), famously 
claimed that ‘dirt’ is a consequence of cultural categorizations of the world and it can be 
understood as ‘matter out of place’. Her insights have been applied in studies of symbolic 
constructions of animals, where it has often been noted that hated, feared or persecuted 
animals are often precisely the ones which are also anomalous with respect to the estab-
lished cultural categories. Perhaps the most common anomaly has a spatial character, where 
wild animals transgressing into domesticated spaces are seen as ‘out of place’, which often 
aggravates the unease experienced during an encounter (Knight 2000b). 
 A good example illustrating spatial anomaly is a recent case in London, where a 
fox attacked a baby sleeping in its cot, inside a house. Studies analyzing the media response 
to this incident revealed the importance of boundary breaching which has been particularly 
glaring in this case: “the human fear that accompanies the urban fox is one reliant on 
assumptions about space; it is precisely the fox entering the home – a resolutely non-wild 
place – which engenders the fear and surprise in the narrative of the event” (Cassidy and 
Mills 2012, 500). 
 Another anomaly is associated with the behavior of animals. Urban deer are one 
example of such challenge to our categorizations of animals. When these animals begin to 
appear in urban environments with regularity and eventually lose their fear of humans, 
people find it hard to classify them as either wild or tame. Such confusion aggravates the 
annoyance at the damages that deer cause (Leong 2009). Another common example are 
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 But see Dressel et al. (2015), whose longitudinal meta-analysis of attitude studies for bears and wolves suggests 
that for wolves the attitudes become more negative in proportion to the extent of time the wolves are present. Such 
discrepancies in studies suggest we should perhaps be weary of drawing too strong conclusions. 
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wolves which by recolonizing rural areas and coming in proximity of human dwellings are 
seen as behaving differently than wolves are expected to. The appearance of animals in 
human-dominated areas, while a perfectly natural behavior for opportunistic wildlife, is 
taken to signify that there must be something wrong with these animals. In such situations 
people often (mistakenly) assume that these animals must have been domesticated or are 
wolf-dog hybrids. This existence between the wild and human worlds (which is only spatial 
but is also suspected of being linked to training and genetic hybridity) is often a cause of 
deep unease and is presented as the main reason for opposing the presence of these animals 
(Skogen et al. 2008). Thus the mixing of categories (civilized/wild) and transgression (of 
wild animals into anthropogenic habitats) are an additional source of unease arising 
precisely from unsettling of the cultural structures of the symbolic order. 
 Animals themselves can also function critically in our interpretations of places, 
landscapes and identities, expressing a sort of agency (Wolch 2002). When a wild animal 
appears in a domesticated space, this might have an impact on the meaning of this space. 
Consequently, fields and forests which were seen as domesticated areas might appear in 
different light after the arrival of wildlife. Violaine Berot, a French author who was born in 
a shepherding family in Pyrenees, wrote a pamphlet that attempts to voice the concerns of 
farmers in relation to the plans to reintroduce bears to the mountain range. She begins her 
account precisely with her reactions to the release of one of the bears: 
 
The second Slovenian bear has been discreetly released this morning on the mountain of 
Bagnères-de-Bigorre. The Upper Bigorre is my country. I was born there. I have my roots 
there. I immediately called my father who still lives there. His only answer was: ‘And do 
you know where they released it? On Aya!’ On Aya… On Aya, the pasture where my 
grandfather spent his nights as a child, alone with the cows. The pasture of my grandpa at 
the age when children of today leave for the sea or summer camp. (2006, 1) (my translation) 
 
In such instances it is not only the transgression that is problematic, but also the fact that by 
appearing in a specific area, animals like wolves and bears change the meanings of those 
places. In such cases as described by Berot, the presence of wild animals directly clashes 
with the existing meanings and is experienced as disrespectful of the stories associated with 
the place. The importance of all these symbolic meanings of recolonization cannot be 
underestimated: 
 
The importance of [wolves’] ‘recovery’ must not be understated. The wolf today is for 
many a potent symbol of the wild, the free, the uncommodifiable. Its reintroduction into a 
place where the myths of progress, private property, and rugged individualism reign su-
preme, is, to my view, a highly transgressive act. (Emel 1995, 709) 
 
While for those opposing the existing meanings, like feminist Jody Emel whose words I 
just quoted, such transgressions might be very much welcome and necessary, in many 
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instances and for many people they are troubling. And while in some instances a good case 
can be made that such transgressions challenge meanings we should be fighting against, 
this is not always so, as examples below will indicate. 
 
1.3.4 The cultural dimension 
 
While for many in the environmental community land abandonment and recolonization are 
seen as an opportunity, for people living in areas where recolonizations are taking place, or 
areas identified as actual and potential rewilding sites, these processes are associated with 
the progressive dissolution of their communities and the loss of their way of life. Of 
particular interest are the threats that recolonization poses to traditional hunting practices 
and extensive farming. 
 In Nordic countries, hunting has a long history and has always been central to local 
cultures (Von Essen et al. 2015a). But in the course of the 20th century hunting has lost 
much of its popularity becoming a subculture in need of constant legitimation against post-
productive use of landscapes and environmentalist discourses (Von Essen et al. 2015a). 
Having been marginalized as a group, hunters now fear that the return of predators might 
impact on their capacity to continue the practice itself. This fear is usually linked to the loss 
of game animals to predators (Bisi and Kurki 2008), and a threat that wolves pose to 
hunting dogs which have been an integral part of hunting in Scandinavia (Skogen and 
Krange 2003; Krange and Skogen 2011). 
 In farming, too, some returning wildlife species are perceived as a threat to 
existing practices. Livestock grazing and foraging are made more difficult by the appear-
ance of carnivores (Sjolander-Lindqvist 2009). Indigenous peoples, like the Sami in 
northern Sweden, also find their practices threatened by the reappearance of predators 
(Beach, 2004). In a time already insecure for traditional ways of life, the return of predators 
leads to worries over the loss of identity, heritage and a whole way of life (Skogen and 
Krange, 2003; Krange and Skogen, 2007; Buller 2008; Sjölander-Lindqvist 2008; Krange 
and Skogen 2011; Sjölander-Lindqvist 2011). 
 The crisis of these traditional practices has consequences extending beyond the 
interests of the members of those threatened communities. First, some environmentalists 
have recognized these practices and ways of life often incorporate rare and environmentally 
benign forms of engagement with the non-human world that could be an inspiring alterna-
tive to dominant exploitative attitudes towards nature: 
 
Here people live and support themselves through small-scale agriculture and husbandry. 
They wish and demand to continue with what they have done for generations. They are not 
willing to go into agribusiness or any other large-scale business in “safer” areas; they are 
not interested in living in cities, not eager to acquire power as members of the bureaucracy 
or by other kinds of “success.” These communities exemplify subcultures in danger of be-
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ing destroyed for reasons not very different from those which are bringing wolves to the 
verge of extinction: habitat deterioration and shrinkage. That is the awkward situation in the 
question of wolf policy: respect for wolves, but also respect for old ecologically unobjec-
tionable human communities. (Naess and Mysterund 1987, 25) 
 
Disappearance of such ways of life becomes especially awkward since traditional farming 
and hunting have been recently presented by some as forms of constructive contact with 
nature. In contrast to the consumptive engagement with nature present in e.g. tourism, it has 
been argued that some forms of these practices enable direct, embodied and authentic 
contact with nature, and as such provide the best opportunity for overcoming the alienation 
from nature that pervades modern society (Swan 1995; Dizard 2003; Peterson et al. 2011). 
In this context, the importance of hunting has been highlighted as one of those practices 
that provide a direct and multifaceted contact with the non-human world (Ortega y Gasset 
1986; Kowalsky 2010). Others have argued that the hunting practices even question certain 
of the boundaries that our culture establishes between humans and animals (Dahles 1993). 
Second, the disappearance of practices and communities associated with tradition-
al agriculture precipitates a profound change of traditional European landscapes. Such loss 
means the vanishing of an important historical heritage and the associated identities, 
symbolic values, diversity, and beauty which in various ways have been important for large 
segments of the European population (Council of Europe 2000; Antrop 2005; Antrop 
2008). 
Third, agricultural heritage landscapes that are the result of traditional, extensive 
farming often support unique and highly valuable biotic communities, which become 
endangered as the fate of these rural communities becomes uncertain. The importance of 
extensive agricultural landscapes in terms of biodiversity has been commonly recognized 
(EEA 2004; Halada et al. 2011) and has been the basis of European conservation movement 
for many decades (Linnell et al. 2015). The appearance of wild animals that pose a threat to 
rural ways of life, supported by the public preference for wildness, might endanger the 
future of such high biodiversity areas dependent on extensive forms of agriculture (Olsson 
et al. 2004), and the survival of rare domestic breeds that form part of the heritage and of 
local mixed (wild-domestic) biodiversity (Buller 2008). The laissez-faire approach of 
rewilding to management has also been criticized for endangering the precious species and 
habitats which might fall prey to unexpected developments. Much of conservation in 
Europe is guided by targets which specify what kinds of ecosystems are to be maintained in 
a given place (Corlett 2016). In as much as rewilding involves letting nature develop on its 
own no targets are in place, and so there is no certainty whether particular rare kinds of 
ecosystems can be saved. For this reason rewilding has attracted some criticism from 
scientific communities (Conti and Fagarazzi 2005; Moreira and Russo 2007; Corlett 2016). 
In these critiques we are confronted with questions not just about human wellbeing and the 
survival of cultures, but also about the future of rare and endangered habitats and the aims 
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of nature protection. What is at stake is, so to say, the future of our cultures of nature 
conservation (Linnell et al. 2015). 
 
1.4 THE MORAL CHALLENGE OF RECOLONIZATION 
 
We can see from the above that recolonization and the presence of wild animals close to 
human living spaces are a potentially disruptive force. Beyond enriching human life, they 
are often experienced as a threat to already existing rich forms of life. To extend Monbiot’s 
witty phrase, we might worry that soon the raucous summer, having replaced the silent 
spring, will turn into a winter of our discontent. The question that appears here is whether 
we can actually live with unconstrained, recalcitrant nature, or whether the appreciation of 
wild nature is possible only when objects of our veneration are rare, vulnerable and located 
far away. This would be a truly unsettling conclusion, potentially locking us in a vicious 
circle that some have noted as a pervasive feature of our culture: “We seem to be forever 
oscillating between demonizing and eradicating certain animals, and then, having beaten 
those creatures back, empathizing with them as underdogs and wanting to show them 
compassion” (Mooallem 2014, 66-67). To break out of this vicious circle we need the kind 
of culture that could address also the more disruptive, discomforting aspects of powerful 
nature. 
 One way this could be done would be through promotion of separation of humans 
from wildness in ways that could respect both our desire for nature-related benefits, and the 
animals themselves. After all, if we recall the positive effects of nature I have summarized 
in section 1.2, it is not clear to what extent they require coming in contact with wild nature, 
or to what extent they require that we actually coexist with it. As geographer and rewilder 
Steve Carver points out the question of reconnection is anything but obvious and answers 
are far from uniform: “Many argue that it is absolutely necessary for us to reconnect with 
nature but there is a more specific question as to what kind of nature and how and here 
answers differ” (Carver 2014, 12). Several decades of scholarly work in environmental 
philosophy and related disciplines have made it clear that nature is anything but a self-
explanatory concept and that we should rather speak about natures – natures which differ 
depending on our cultural milieu, our identity, the context, etc. (e.g. Evernden 1992). What 
nature we want (or need) to connect with, and the manner of such contact, might depend 
also on the reasons why we want to connect with nature. We can imagine that if our 
motivation is to alleviate stress, a walk in a park should suffice. We might be inclined, then, 
to make disclaimers and identify the benign, inspiring, attractive nature as the one we 
should be welcoming close to our homes. Who would object to that? This sensible senti-
ment is well captured by Elizabeth Willott: 
 
When we say we desire to experience nature (including restored environments), what most 
of us mean is that we desire to experience selected aspects of nature. We prefer not to expe-
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rience serious illness or traumatic death. [...] while recognizing the importance of predators 
in an ecosystem, we prefer that our families are not the prey. (2004, 148-149) 
 
This focus on clearly beneficial nature and exclusion of problematic wildlife would follow 
many past attempts to bring humans and nature together. Such attempts, epitomized in the 
tradition of Arcadia, often involved a very specific idea of wildness. Over the centuries, the 
Arcadian tradition has taken two main forms: the sublime wilderness (or primitive), and the 
rural idyll (or pastoral) (Van Koppen 2000; Drenthen and Keulartz 2014). The two have 
differed in many respects: “There have always been two kinds of Arcadia: shaggy and 
smooth; dark and light; a place of bucolic leisure and a place of primitive panic” (Schama 
1995, 517). While the wilderness tradition promoted contact with the unruly wild that was 
located far away from civilization and regular, daily life, the rural idyll envisages cohabita-
tion but in an idealized form that always hinges on ideas of harmony and peaceful coexist-
ence. All such Arcadias emerging in the course of human history that were meant to bring 
humans and nature together have involved exclusion of wild, unpredictable, threatening 
elements: “It had always been the mark of habitable arcadia to banish wild creatures from 
its territory” (Schama 1995, 561-562). 
 But the nature of the current recolonization of Europe makes it questionable 
whether the dual model of Arcadia remains a viable option. The first, (very pragmatic) 
challenge to this model is the feasibility of its enforcement. As John Linnell reminds us: 
 
Europe is a crowded continent, with 500 million people, and no true wilderness areas. There 
is no “over there” with more space. If we want large carnivores, they have to be “here”; in 
the same landscape where people live, work and play. Integrating these species into the fab-
ric of our modern landscape is probably the greatest example of land sharing that has ever 
been attempted in conservation.27 
 
The continent cannot be stretched to accommodate more people and more animals – we 
have to work within the bounds we are given. Even land abandonment might not provide 
sufficient space, given how highly mobile some species are, how large territories they 
require, and how close such areas are to spaces still used by humans, our crowded continent 
leaving little space for buffer zones (Chapron et al. 2014). In cases of some animals, like 
foxes, the costs of attempting to control their populations on such a scale as to remove them 
completely from cities would be prohibitive. Furthermore, the changes that we introduce to 
our cities to make them more livable for us (parks, green spaces, water features etc.) make 
them also more attractive to animals. This includes also the expansion of suburban areas 
which often come to border on nature areas (Sterba 2012). 
                                                          
27
 http://www.lcie.org/Blog/ArtMID/6987/ArticleID/60/Blog-To-boldly-go-where-no-continent-has-gone-before, 
accessed: 24.02.2017. 
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 Still, perhaps with sufficient use of resources and ingenuity we could achieve such 
separation. But what we need to be aware of is that even if this were possible, taking such a 
course would not be merely a technical matter. This is because in striving towards imple-
mentation of management schemes and in deciding to follow one or another model of 
coexistence (or indeed separation) we are still making ethical decisions, and we do so for 
two reasons. First, technical decisions and solutions will have significant impacts on 
people, animals, and nature. As we saw above, recolonization might adversely, but also 
positively affect people. Beyond that, many have been arguing for taking animals and 
natural entities, like e.g. ecosystems, into ethical consideration in their own right. This 
means that whatever course of action we might want to take this will have wide ranging 
impacts, some of which might negatively affect people, animals, and ecosystems which 
deserve respect. Therefore we need to be aware of what impacts are involved in taking 
decisions, and what ethical consequences our decisions will have. 
 Secondly, every policy, management scheme, or scientific inquiry rests upon some 
values and strives towards state of the world that rests on some normative assumptions 
(Jickling and Paquet 2005; Fox and Bekoff 2011). Rewilding as a conservation practice 
aiming at giving nature freedom of development rests upon quite different values than a 
conservation practice that aims to maintain heritage landscapes. Studying nature to under-
stand how it can benefit humans is much different than studying nature to know better how 
to protect it from human impacts. Those who want to connect to wild and unruly nature will 
be motivated by different ideas than those promoting more park spaces in the vicinity of 
schools. In this context coexistence is sometimes presented as an aim towards which we 
should be striving (Rosenzweig 2003; Boitani and Linnell 2015). Thus we are confronted 
with a wide variety of values and ethical motives that orientate people in their responses to 
recolonization. Before we decide to follow any of them, it is necessary to understand the 
commitments and moral intuitions that drive them. 
 While management and policy have often depended on social sciences to map out 
the ethical landscape of values, beliefs and interests, this seems insufficient. This is because 
while social sciences are adequately equipped to explore the values present in society, they 
lack tools to engage with them in a critical manner. In ethical reflection we want to know 
not only what people want, and what values they follow, but also whether they have valid 
reasons to do so. 
 Today critical ethical reflection is usually carried out within the context of 
normative ethical theories and in questions pertaining to the natural environment this has 
been especially carried out by animal ethics and environmental ethics. These approaches 
usually proceed by application of general ethical principles, based on specific assumptions 
about the nature of ethical questions and demands, to particular situations, and as a result 
they extend their own (often conflicting) answers as to what would be the right thing to do, 
or a desirable state of affairs to promote. However, according to critics, such normative 
approaches are often of limited value when it comes to addressing novel situations: 
24 | Introduction 
 
 
Scholars frequently assume that the moral dimension of public life is adequately mapped by 
the application of an abstract ethical system. The method here is to overlay one’s chosen 
theory onto the wolf controversy, trusting that one’s abstract deductions will produce the 
proper moral position. For this to work we assume that the abstract ethic is sufficiently 
broad and perspicuous to cover all contingencies or justifications. Formal ethical systems 
are tremendously helpful as conceptual tools, and I do not want to gainsay their use. Yet, we 
should not mistake a priori ethical theories for an inquiry into ethical self-understandings 
that inform opposition or support for wolf recovery. (Lynn 2002, 313-314) 
 
Following ethical theories might be thus too constraining to fully understand the scope of 
ethical concerns in the situation of recolonization. This is especially so given how novel 
experiences of recolonization and coexistence are. Thus to truly understand what is 
ethically at stake in recolonization and coexistence and what are the relations between 
different moral intuitions that play a role here, we need to take a broader look than that 
provided by principle-oriented ethical theories. An approach which can provide us with 
such a broad perspective, while still allowing for critical reflection on the ethical issues 
involved, is environmental hermeneutics. In the last section of this introduction I will 
present this fairly recent approach in environmental philosophy. Through this exposition I 
also hope to illustrate why I find it a particularly fitting approach in the context of the 
challenge we are facing here. Finally I will clarify what will be the main leading questions, 
or tasks, for this work, given the specific approach chosen. 
 
1.5 HERMENEUTICS OF ECOLOGICAL DISCOMFORTS 
 
Drawing upon the work of such philosophical luminaries as Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin 
Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, environmental hermeneutics sees our engagement 
with the reality as irreducibly interpretative, and this refers also to our engagement with the 
natural environment: “There is no nature that is not already interpreted. Whether we speak 
of nature as environmentalists or scientists, or from another perspective, we are speaking 
about an interpretation” (Van Tongeren and Snellen 2014, 304). Our ethical concerns and 
claims are also interpretations of the world. However, they do carry a specific weight, in the 
sense that part of the moral experience is being called up to respond in an obligatory 
manner – we cannot simply turn our back on such experience and walk away; rather we are 
forced to make sense of our experience. Ethical reflection, in hermeneutical terms, requires, 
first of all, close attention to those experiences in which we seem to be addressed by 
something that demands our attention, concern, care, or respect, spurring us to achieve a 
fuller articulation of the experience. Such articulation usually entails trying to capture in 
more precise terms something that is sensed in the experienced but not clearly enough (Van 
Tongeren and Snellen 2014). 
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 Articulation of such experiences does not aim at creation of a strict, fully con-
sistent, and objectively binding ethical theory28. Rather, the objective is to shed a light on 
all the background assumptions which made the experience possible in the first place – the 
different values, beliefs, and conceptions that give a specific shape to our experience of the 
world. Our moral concerns are thus deeply grounded in the tradition in which we stand: 
 
Moral meanings do not exist in abstractum, but only as part of moral language and within 
the constant flow of interpretation and reinterpretation that we call traditions. Without ac-
tive debates and disputes about the meaning of environments, that is without a vivid culture 
and vivid moral tradition (conversation or dispute about transmitted interpretations), moral 
meanings cannot exist and moral culture becomes numb. (Utsler et al. 2014, 10) 
 
Environmental hermeneuticists take their role as participants in the development of such 
culture and tradition by systematically engaging with interpretations, both in terms of 
revealing their sources, but also opening up and pointing towards directions which might be 
ignored in the mainstream discussions, but which nevertheless tell us something important 
about our experience of the world. Environmental hermeneutics is, then, the practice of 
“critically reflecting on our practices and our understanding of the environment, articulating 
dormant meanings that have remained hidden from view, opening new avenues of interpre-
tation” (Utsler et al. 2014, 10). The ultimate aim here is to understand and enrich the moral 
tradition in which we stand (Van Tongeren and Snellen 2014, 308). This can also be 
practiced by taking a critical stance towards this moral tradition, and indeed many of the 
moral experiences are such that they question what we have been taking for granted, and 
their articulation reveals gaps in our assumptions and beliefs. Thus, though interpretative in 
nature, and recognizing the necessary grounding of our moral sensibility in tradition, 
hermeneutics is not necessarily conservative. But neither is hermeneutic ethics committed 
to uncritically or unquestioningly endorsing all the moral intuitions uncovered in experi-
ences. 
 The critical aspect of environmental hermeneutics involves, first, a closer exami-
nation and articulation of ethical theories as interpretations, confronting them with the 
experiences to which they try to respond, and evaluating how well they capture important 
aspects of such experiences (Van Tongeren and Snellen 2014); secondly, it means bringing 
these interpretations into conversation with one another, so that they may mutually scruti-
nize each other’s limitations. Such conversation is not aimed at disproving the other or 
convincing others that we are right, but rather it is directed towards broadening our 
understanding of the subject matter under discussion. This is what philosopher and herme-
neuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer termed ‘fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer 2013). As we 
                                                          
28
 In this context, ethical theories, also within environmental and animal ethics, can be seen as ‘partial interpreta-
tions of ethical experience’ (Van Tongeren and Snellen 2014, 307). 
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perceive the subject matter in which we share interest within different horizons, we acquire 
a broader perspective on the question that is challenging us. 
 What kind of engagement with the questions raised by recolonization and the 
possibility of coexistence does this ethical perspective open? 
 First, following the exploratory part of this introduction, we need to recognize that 
discomforts are becoming an important part of our experiences of nature. Despite their 
importance such experiences remain under-articulated, especially with respect to their 
moral significance. Given that the articulation of the values and benefits of nature has been 
the main concern of animal ethics and environmental ethics so far, the problematic aspects 
of living with nature have rarely been raised in environmental thought. As environmental 
philosopher Holmes Rolston notes: “Philosophers, lately exercised about values in nature, 
have not yet much asked about disvalues there” (Rolston 1992, 250). As such the place of 
ecological discomforts in our moral tradition requires fuller articulation, particularly with 
respect to the dormant, hidden and downplayed meanings involved in it. For this reason it 
becomes of paramount importance to engage with the ways we experience and interpret 
ecological discomforts, and understand the roles they come to play in our lives and relations 
with nature. This will be my main task in this thesis. 
 The second task is to locate these interpretations with respect to the existing 
environmentalist tradition, or more broadly the tradition of western attitudes to nature, so as 
to contribute to their reinvigoration and enrichment. A broad reading of environmentalist 
discourses, which forms the background to this thesis, shows that much of the talk about 
recolonization and its problematic aspects already takes place within the confines of well-
established environmental ethical paradigms. As will become clear, from within the horizon 
of these theories discomforts are interpreted in different ways and acquire different mean-
ings. Each moral perspective thus reveals things to be differently meaningful. However, 
recolonization, in as much as it is a relative novelty, fits rather uneasily within these 
established ways of thinking. Thus the engagement with the environmental tradition and its 
reinterpretation with a view to the new situation becomes here an attempt at ‘making 
ourselves feel at home’ in our tradition (Van Tongeren and Snellen 2014, 308). 
 The third task is that of opening up a critical dialogue between all these partial 
interpretations that claim to have something important to say on the question of recoloniza-
tion and coexistence. Since these theories are partial interpretations of ethical experience, 
and the interpretations of discomforts are seen here as propositions rather than objective 
claims, the critical element of the work will arise precisely from conducting an exchange 
between these different partial interpretations, where they can mutually correct and 
complement each other. I stage a conversation between these interpretations aiming at a 
fuller understanding of the role of discomforts in shaping possible coexistence with 
wildlife. My work then is not explicitly normative, in the sense that I will not argue from a 
position of one specific ethical theory, claiming that one specific course of action is the 
correct one, or one way of defining the issue at hand most appropriate. Rather I want to 
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show with greater clarity what moral issues are at stake, how they relate to each other, and 
what they reveal about the experience of recolonization. By understanding these different 
interpretations I aim to broaden our understanding of the issue, and as such create better 
foundations for a broad social debate. 
 What can be the result of such a reflection and of our deeper understanding of the 
issue at hand? 
 Speaking in the context of the growing presence of wild animals in cities Jennifer 
Wolch, geographer and urban analyst, claims that what we are still missing are the “arts of 
coexistence” (Jennifer Wolch in Louv 2005, 250). The use of the term ‘art’ is very signifi-
cant here and quite apt for capturing what I am striving for. She does not speak about 
policy, technology, or rules, whether legal or moral. What then does it mean to develop an 
art of coexistence? We can understand this through an analogy to other contexts where we 
use the term, as in the art of conversation, or interpretation. In each of these cases the term 
suggests experience, knowledge, familiarity with conventions and traditions, keen sensitivi-
ty to nuances and details, good understanding of the different factors and meanings at play, 
skill in engaging with particular situations. The analogy with conversation and interpreta-
tion is not accidental. Conversation, indeed, the art of conservation, was one of the main 
interests of Gadamer, informing his development of hermeneutical ideas and the way he 
practiced his philosophy29. Interpretation, in turn, is a fundament of hermeneutics, being the 
technique, or indeed an art, through which philosophers engage with their subjects of study. 
Here I hope that through the philosophical arts of conversation and interpretation, we can 
contribute to the development of the art of coexistence with wild nature. I hope that through 
hermeneutical engagement with the established, traditional narratives on dangerous nature, 
and the interpretations of the encounters with such nature, we can develop necessary 
sensitivity and clarity on the subject, which could contribute to the growth of just such an 
art. The art of coexistence, in this sense of the term, would be fairly open to the question as 
to what shape the coexistence should take or what kind of particular treatment of individual 
participants it would promote. Indeed it remains open even to the question whether coexist-
ence is the appropriate answer. Rather than providing an unambiguous normative answer it 
would promote a broader understanding of the different meanings involved, an ability to 
recognize the various moral issues at stake, and sensitivity to the nuances of specific 
circumstances. As such it would form a precondition for answering the questions and being 
able to decide in concrete cases. It would also not exclude other arts, or other aspects of the 
art of coexistence. This means recognition of a need to develop more practical skills and 
actual practices, and to broaden empirical knowledge, as integral and necessary parts of 
working towards some forms of coexistence. Indeed, towards the end of the thesis I will 
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 Conversation can be perhaps considered as one of the most venerable elements of philosophy, reaching all the 
way back to Socrates and his favorite pursuit of engaging random passers-by in intense dialogues on such 
fundamentally important issues as the meaning of justice or the purpose of human life. 
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show how interpretative hermeneutic work carried out throughout this book is tightly 
connected to attempts to develop actual practices of coexistence. 
 Ultimately, this work is envisioned not only as a hermeneutical diagnostics of the 
present, but also as a contribution to the discussion over the future of European landscapes, 
both urban and rural, particularly in terms of the future scenarios of coexistence. My aim is 
to develop an approach which is relevant for academics and practitioners, environmental 
philosophers and wildlife managers, as it puts in dialogue the ethical theories, moral 
intuitions and experiences, and specific practices present in conservation and day-to-day 
life with wildlife. I hope to show how a better and broader understanding of meanings and 
interpretations can support the development of practices that give concrete shape to 
coexistence. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW 
 
In terms of structure this book is envisioned as a conversation on the subject of experiences 
of ecological discomforts. As such it will largely follow a dialectical pattern, where 
consecutive chapters confront and interrogate one another. 
 Already in Chapter 2 I will pick up some of the claims made in this Introduction 
and by questioning their validity, I will expand and further explain them. A cumulative 
conclusion arrived at through discussion of these reservations establishes that indeed 
ecological discomforts do play a crucial role in shaping our relations with the environment, 
and that the most significant impact of these discomforts involves their normative mean-
ings. Discomforting encounters with the natural world can become highly significant events 
that shape our identity, ethics and sense of place. Thus, rather than denying or obfuscating 
their importance, as is often the case in environmentalist discourses, a constructive ap-
proach would proceed by illuminating various meanings they come to have. 
 The last section of chapter 2 and the chapters 3 through 7 will each illuminate a 
specific interpretation of discomforts, which proposes a specific meaning for discomforts. 
Progressing through these interpretations, we will achieve a broader and more nuanced 
understanding of the place ecological discomforts come to take in our lives. 
 In Chapter 3 I begin by discussing the instrumental attitude to nature embodied in 
anthropocentric utilitarian calculations. This is an attitude that is not only well established 
in the Western world, but also embodies a fairly common and intuitively intelligible way of 
presenting ecological discomforts in that they are considered as costs. However, a closer 
analysis of this attitude, focusing particularly on illumination of its relation to different 
management styles and social scientific research, will show significant limitations of this 
attitude. Particularly, by radically limiting the range of meanings nature and natural entities 
may have, this interpretation still fails to give us an answer as to how discomforts can and 
do become meaningful. 
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 In Chapter 4 I will open up the discussion of meaningfulness of discomforts by 
showing how disruptive recalcitrance and even threats of nature form a precondition for 
finding meaning in nature. This discussion will show a close connection between experi-
ences of discomforts, the possibility of seeing nature as wild, and the importance these two 
have for finding meaning in nature. 
 Chapter 5 will focus on one particular instance of meaningfulness of nature, 
namely the possibility of moral experiences in contact with nature. I will discuss a set of 
narratives that for a long time promoted coming in contact with discomforting wildness and 
urged individuals to venture into nature areas devoid of human habitation. This contact with 
nature was expected to transform themselves and their understanding of the world. The 
location of these narratives in wildernesses far from cities and rural areas makes their 
relevance to cases of recolonization problematic. But through an analysis revealing that the 
core significance of these adventures is coming upon transformative moral experiences I 
will show that both the insights acquired in such experiences and the process of undergoing 
such experiences are relevant for understanding encounters with animals in cases of 
recolonization and coexistence. 
 Chapter 6 continues exploring the wilderness tradition by focusing on the 
meaning that individual vulnerability acquires in relation to the maintenance and develop-
ment of biotic communities. Here individual discomforts acquire their meaning in terms of 
how events individually experienced as painful might be necessary for the maintenance of 
some greater whole. This interpretation has been considered in environmental thought 
mainly in the context of wilderness areas, suffering and death of animals, and the flourish-
ing of biotic communities that exclude humans. Human role in this interpretation has been 
usually that of distant observes of disturbing natural processes like predation or parasitism, 
but I will reflect on the possibility of extending this interpretation to cases of direct human 
participation in discomforting processes of nature. 
 Chapter 7 turns to the recent works in animal ethics that explicitly engage with 
the issue of recolonization and coexistence with wild animals. While these move beyond 
the established universal proclamations of animal ethics, paying attention to the particular 
issues raised by recolonization, they still pay little attention to its problematic aspects. 
Indeed, when it comes to discomforts they remain within the horizon of traditional animal 
rights theory – a limitation I try to address by identifying the important ethical questions 
raised by coexistence but largely ignored by urban animal ethics. 
 Chapter 8 will take a practical turn confronting the interpretations explored in the 
previous chapters with examples of actual attempts to develop coexistence with wildlife. 
Better understanding of various interpretations and meanings that play a role in recoloniza-
tion will prove to be very helpful in illuminating what is really happening in these attempts. 
This will include identification of the failures and clarification of the reasons behind them, 
but will also allow us to make propositions for how to improve these practices. 
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 In the Conclusion I will summarize the insights acquired through the thesis. I will 
pay particular attention to the various meanings that discomforts can acquire in the context 
of recolonization, and the kinds of ambivalent experiences that we are confronted with as 
we coexist with wildlife. I will also point out some of the questions and gaps that still 
remain, thus suggesting some avenues for future research. 
 2. 
Ecological discomforts in                
environmental thought 
 
 
In this chapter I would like to substantiate further some of the choices made in the Intro-
duction. Notably, three issues might strike us as particularly problematic or controversial. 
First, is human vulnerability to threatening nature indeed a productive topic of reflection for 
environmental philosophy and ethics? Considering that the concern of this discipline has 
commonly been the human destruction and exploitation of nature, we might doubt if human 
vulnerability as such can bring up any valuable insights relevant for the discipline. Second-
ly, the novelty of the situation might be questioned – has humanity not always struggled 
with unruly nature, and are we not always already living with potentially problem-causing 
creatures like insects, mice, rats, bacteria etc.? If so, why would the current situation require 
any new reflection? Thirdly, perhaps there really are no serious threats to speak of – after 
all the level of risk and the amount of harm caused by animals is really so small in compari-
son to other threats we face daily, that we might easily disregard ecological discomforts and 
focus on more pressing issues. 
Answering these questions will be the focus of this chapter. The answers will es-
tablish, respectively, the importance of human vulnerability and ecological discomforts as 
themes for the environmental movement and environmental philosophy, the novel aspects 
recolonization brings into our modern experience of nature, and finally the importance of 
meanings in our understanding of the role wild nature comes to play in our lives. 
 
2.1 RELEVANCE OF HUMAN VULNERABILITY TO ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
 
We might wonder whether human vulnerability and experiences of discomforting nature are 
an interesting topic for animal ethics and environmental ethics, or environmental philoso-
phy more broadly. Traditionally, the disciplines have focused mainly on the vulnerability of 
nature to human activities, and on the articulation of nature’s values. Andrew Light and 
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Holmes Rolston III thus summarize the aims of environmental ethics in an introduction to 
an anthology that brings together the major scholars in the discipline: 
 
Environmental ethics is a relatively new field of philosophical ethics concerned with de-
scribing the values carried by the non-human natural world and prescribing an appropriate 
ethical response to ensure preservation or restoration of those values. This often urgent con-
cern arises especially in view of threats to nature posed largely by humans. (Light and Rol-
ston 2003, 1) 
 
From its very beginnings in the early 1970s, environmental ethics has aimed at articulation 
of the value of non-human beings, species, and ecosystems, spelling out our obligations to 
them, identifying our wrongdoings, and analyzing the conceptual roots of our mistreatment 
of nature. This direction can be found in most strands of environmental and animal ethics. 
 Environmental ethics focused primarily on concerns pertaining to species extinc-
tion, destruction of ecosystems, pollution, and global environmental issues like climate 
change. The animal welfare movement has been concerned with improving the living 
conditions of domesticated animals and reducing their suffering. Currently most of the 
welfare campaigns are directed towards the establishment of welfare norms for animals 
used in agriculture and animal experimentation (Garner 2006). Animal rights movement 
went even further aiming at establishment of inalienable rights for animals which would 
completely abolish all forms of animal use. Thus it would not be controversial to claim that 
the main focus for most environmentalism, whether popular or academic, and of the animal 
advocacy movement, are the threats posed by humans to nature, and natural entities. 
 These approaches have often been termed ‘non-anthropocentric’, as they aim at 
defining the value of nature irrespective of human needs and interests. In contrast to these, 
approaches gathered under the banner of ‘weak anthropocentrism’30 have attempted to 
anchor the need for nature protection in human concerns, interests, and wellbeing. Devel-
oped by such scholars as Bryan Norton (e.g. 1984) or Eugene Hargrove (e.g. 1992), this 
approach argues that adequate nature protection is in the interest of human wellbeing and 
flourishing, showing nature’s contribution to richness of individual and community life. 
Thus, in weak anthropocentrism the task has mostly been to show how we can value, 
esteem, love, cherish, respect, and admire nature, and how nature can in turn contribute to 
our wellbeing and self-realization. If threats to humans are considered, this is usually done 
by showing how by damaging nature we damage ourselves. 
 In this context, a focus on ecological discomforts can easily be regarded as a 
specter from the past. Over the centuries, overstating the dangers of nature to humans has 
often been used to justify the persecution of wild animals (e.g. Lopez 1978). A focus on the 
problems that nature creates for humans fits very uneasily with major environmentalist 
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 This is in contrast to strong anthropocentrism which treats nature in a purely instrumental manner as a resource 
that can be exploited in any desired manner. 
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narratives. As reporter Jim Sterba notes in the analysis of the conflicts over recolonization 
in the U.S.: 
 
The idea of wildlife overabundance is difficult for many people to accept. We have been 
trying to nurture wild populations back to health and protect them from human despoliation 
for so long that it is hard to believe we have too many of them or that people might need 
protection from them. (Sterba 2012, 271) 
 
It needs to be shown, then, that reflection on discomforting nature can produce valuable 
insights relevant for the development of praiseworthy relationships with non-human 
entities. 
 
2.1.1 Ecological discomforts as a universal human experience 
 
Philosopher Bernard Williams claims that: 
 
Human beings have two basic kinds of emotional relations to nature: gratitude and a sense 
of peace, on the one hand, terror and stimulation on the other. […] If we think in these 
terms, our sense of restraint in the face of nature, a sense very basic to conservation con-
cerns, will be grounded in a form of fear: a fear not just of the power of nature itself, but 
what might be called Promethean fear, a fear of taking too lightly or inconsiderably our re-
lations to nature. (Williams 1995, 238-239) 
 
Williams suggests that it is precisely in negative experiences of nature, like fear and terror, 
that we can find the sources of our environmental sensibilities. On this account, it is 
precisely in the fear of nature that we can ground the protection of nature and the develop-
ment of respectful dealings with non-human entities. Consequently, even if vulnerability of 
nature is our main concern, this does not exclude human vulnerability from the purview of 
animal and environmental ethics. Inasmuch as ecological threats do form part of the human 
experience of wild nature, understanding our responses to these threats might form a crucial 
part of our reflection on human relations with the natural world. Promethean fear would be 
one example of our reaction to our experience of terror in the face of nature. But we can 
reasonably assume there could be other important reactions worth exploring. 
 Indeed, in line with the general claim of Williams, several thinkers have already 
recognized the importance of discomforting experiences for shaping our interactions with 
nature and proposed articulations of their significance. Gary Snyder sees in painful experi-
ences the wellspring of our spiritual and psychological life: “Shame, grief, embarrassment, 
and fear are the anaerobic fuels of the dark imagination. The less familiar energies of the 
wild world, and their analogs in the imagination, have given us ecologies of the mind” 
(Snyder 1990, 111). Peter Steeves analyzes the moral meaning of fear in terms of its role in 
shaping cross-species relationships, ideas surrounding sex, and eating practices (Steeves 
34 | Ecological discomforts in environmental thought 
 
1999). He reflects on how fear can be an integral part of relationships, how animal sexuality 
reminds us of our own repressed carnality, and how eating can be a form of communion 
with the ingested other, whether we are the ingesting or the ingested ones. Particularly the 
theme of predation as an opening to a different form of engagement with nature has been 
explored by several scholars. Becoming (potential) prey, through entering areas where 
predators roam, can be an entry point into alternative ways of seeing oneself and the world. 
Experiencing the fear and anxiety in such places might make us think of ourselves as 
members of the ecological order, and reveal the surrounding world as wild and outside of 
our control (Peacock 1990; Turner 1996). Val Plumwood, drawing on her near-death 
encounter with a crocodile, which gave her direct access to human experience of being 
prey, engages with issues of human identity and role in the world (Plumwood 2000; 
Plumwood 2012). By seeing herself both as flesh and as a cultural human being, she 
illuminates human life as suspended between the cultural and ecological worlds, and 
provides ideas on how to navigate between these two. Similarly to Plumwood, James 
Hatley reflects on different kinds of goodness that predation reveals and involves (Hatley 
2002; Hatley 2004). In particular he asks how such different kinds of goodness can be 
appreciated and accommodated by humans living modern lives. 
 Practices that directly engage with discomforting aspects of nature have also been 
identified as crucial for shaping our relations with the non-human world. William Jordan 
proposes to recognize the tragic choices that form part of conservation and restoration 
practices, like e.g. killing of animals or selectively choosing which species belong in a 
given place, as an opportunity for a communion with nature, where we directly participate 
in the kinds of processes which have shaped the life on Earth leading to formation of the 
kind of nature we admire and cherish today (Jordan 2003). This way, he argues, we can 
give constructive meaning to certain irreducibly tragic, yet unavoidable, aspects of our life 
like death, violence, and inadequacy. Scholars writing on hunting also find in this practice a 
chance to connect with the wild on deeper levels than can be afforded by e.g. photography 
and aesthetic appreciation. In the act of pursuit and killing game we become submerged in 
wild nature, entering a sort of communion through enacting the most fundamental elements 
of ecology – killing and eating (Ortega Y Gasset 1986; Kowalsky 2014). 
 
2.1.2 Discomforts and coexistence 
 
These are several examples of scholars working within environmental philosophy who have 
engaged with ecological discomforts finding in them important meanings that contribute to 
a better understanding of our relation to the world. Articulation of the troubling aspects of 
our experiences of nature and provision of means for productively engaging with such 
difficult experiences is particularly important for situations of cohabitation with wild 
creatures, as in the case of recent recolonizations. As James Hatley reminds us, coming 
close to wild nature, though in many ways desirable, always involves a possibility of harm: 
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“Indivisible and yet at odds with nature, we must both exclude and yet include it and its 
denizens. We would feed it and be fed by it, coax it to come near for our spiritual edifica-
tion, but also object strenuously when it bites our hand” (Hatley 2002, 37). Discomforts 
seem to be, then, a necessary element of any contact with nature. Without properly under-
standing the contribution of discomforting experiences of nature to the shaping of relations 
with non-human creatures, and the means that are at our disposal in accommodating these 
experiences, our attempts to share landscapes with wild creatures entail the risk of confu-
sion and failure. 
 Destructive and discomforting experiences are also sometimes identified as 
integral elements of building a shared life, which is of particular importance in our attempts 
to live with wildlife. Indeed, sociological, psychological, and anthropological research 
suggests that discomforting experiences are at the heart of many forms of living together. 
Construction and maintenance of community involves suppression of individual prefer-
ences, (self-)control, discipline, hierarchization, and violence, some of which are ritualized 
and as such remain in the open, while others work behind the scenes, sometimes 
unacknowledged (Jordan 2003, 33-37). Lack of recognition and explicit engagement with 
these features of building a shared life might frustrate our attempts to construct functioning 
communities. 
 The constitutive role of discomforting processes in shaping coexistence is however 
hardly ever recognized today: “The idea that there is an essential link between an ultimate 
value such as community and negative feelings such as fear, horror, or shame is foreign to 
environmentalism, as it is to modern thinking more generally” (Jordan 2003, 46). William 
Jordan is particularly vocal in voicing his worries over the tendency to avoid any discussion 
of disturbing aspects involved in engagement with nature: 
 
Eager to strike an upbeat note, we focus on the appealing aspects of creation and downplay 
the “danger.” Even those who acknowledge the troubling aspects of our experience offer 
very little in the way of tools for dealing with them productively. […] I believe that an envi-
ronmentalism that fails to confront not just death, but killing and other troubling aspects of 
our experience of the world, will be able to do only very light work in the essential task of 
negotiating a healthy relationship with our environment.31 
 
2.1.3 How to study the moral significance of discomforts? 
 
If, as I have been arguing above following scholarly work by others, discomforts are an 
important part of our living with/in/from nature, than it stands to reason that we need to 
understand the place these discomforts take in our lives and in our practical engagements 
with the surrounding non-human world, including their contribution to our ethical concerns 
with nature. However, exploration of such a role would demand a much different approach 
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 http://www.humansandnature.org/bambi, accessed: 27.02.2016. 
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than the one that has been usually employed in non-anthropocentric ethics: “the grounds of 
our attitudes will be very different from that suggested by an appeal to the interests of 
natural things” (Williams 1995, 239). How should we understand this difference?  
 Major sentio-, zoo-, or biocentric theories that we can find in the works of, 
respectively, Peter Singer (1975; 1993), Tom Regan (1983), or Paul Taylor (1986), 
typically show the moral relevance of certain properties/interests of individual non-human 
creatures, or of ecological wholes like species. It is precisely these interests or morally 
relevant properties that are taken up as the sources of our moral concern. Thus, the focus is 
on properties that form the basis of moral concern shared between us and other creatures, 
and on positive sentiments that such moral concern engenders (such as sympathy, benevo-
lence, altruism or empathy). Williams suggests, however, that we can find the sources of 
our moral concerns with nature precisely in our discomfort with nature. This means that, in 
reflecting on moral concerns, we need to focus on our experiences of nature (rather than 
nature’s properties), and on experiences whose emotional valence is immediately experi-
enced as negative (so fear, dread, and terror, rather than love and sympathy). What matters, 
then, are not shared properties, but rather our human experiences. In understanding our 
experiences we should not limit ourselves to the immediate emotions felt, but rather go 
further in order to understand which meanings or values are connected to these ostensibly 
negative emotions: 
 
[I]f [Promethean fear] is something that many people deeply feel, then it is something that is 
likely to be pervasively connected to things that we value, to what gives life the kinds of 
significance that it has. […] it is not these feelings in themselves that matter. Rather they 
embody a value which we have good reason, in terms of our sense of what is worthwhile in 
human life, to preserve, and to follow, to the extent that we can, in our dealings with nature. 
(Williams 1995, 239) 
 
What seems to be needed is attention to the ways in which fearful and otherwise disturbing 
experiences of nature are linked to those aspects of our lives that we already find highly 
meaningful. On this account our vulnerability to nature, giving rise to a sense of discomfort 
or even horror, would form one of the pervasive human experiences that acquires a crucial 
place in our lives, making them worthwhile. This, in turn, means that a better understanding 
of experiences of ecological discomforts would be important for understanding how many 
of our environmental attitudes, values, and nature-oriented practices are shaped. 
 The aforementioned emotions and attitudes, particularly fear and terror, are 
brought up as examples illustrating the relevance of ostensibly negative experiences to the 
project of environmentalism. This suggests that it is not just care, love, beauty, or wonder 
that can ground concern with nature and characterize the way that nature becomes im-
portant in our lives. To understand human relations with the non-human world in their 
entirety we need to also include those more difficult experiences. The illumination of such 
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experiences and their connection to other significant aspects of our lives will form the 
major part of this thesis. 
 
2.2 ASSESSING THE NOVELTY OF THE SITUATION 
 
In his critique of the wilderness idea, William Cronon suggested that in contrast to wilder-
ness, “wildness […] can be found anywhere: in the seemingly tame fields and woodlots of 
Massachusetts, in the cracks of a Manhattan sidewalk, even in the cells of our own bodies” 
(Cronon 1996, 89). We can find a similar opinion in Snyder, who claims that 
 
wildness is not limited to the 2 percent formal wilderness areas. Shifting scales, it is every-
where: ineradicable populations of fungi, moss, mold, yeasts, and such that surround and 
inhabit us. Deer mice on the back porch, deer bounding across the freeway, pigeons in the 
park, spiders in the corners. (Snyder 1990, 14) 
 
In The Wild Places (2008), British writer Robert Macfarlane describes his journey through 
the most remote parts of Britain in search of wildness. But ultimately he discovers that 
wildness exists also very close to home. 
The purpose of these elaborations, and many similar ones, has been to show that 
precious wildness exists close to home, that we need not search for it far away, that the 
whole world is pervaded by it, and we can come in contact with it anywhere, thus enriching 
our lives. Such reappraisals of the wild in terms of location and scale have been motivated 
by a perceived need to move away from the so called “received wilderness idea” (Callicott 
and Nelson 1998b) holding that true nature, and truly wild nature, can only be found in 
remote wilderness areas. In the words of The Wilderness Act of 1964, which formalized the 
concept and established the US wilderness preservation system, “a wilderness, in contrast 
with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recog-
nized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where 
man is a visitor who does not remain.” This conception of wilderness has been criticized for 
separating humans from nature, reaffirming the ontological divide between us and the rest 
of the world, perpetuating counterproductive ethical dualisms, contributing to erasure of the 
indigenous populations and their histories from their land, and many more32. In response to 
these issues, many voices argued for abandoning the rigid understanding of what constitutes 
nature, wildness, and the appropriate human engagement with them embodied in the 
received wilderness idea. Instead, they proposed to move towards a more open and distrib-
uted idea of wildness as a quality that pervades all, or nearly all, of the world. 
                                                          
32
 For an extensive discussion of the controversies surrounding the change of focus from concern with wilderness 
to that with wildness, see two volumes edited by J. Baird Callicott and Michael Nelson, which contain the most 
extensive collection of articles on this subject (Callicott and Nelson 1998a; Nelson and Callicott 2008). 
38 | Ecological discomforts in environmental thought 
 
How to understand this wildness? What does it consist in? We can find a useful 
summary in Gary Snyder’s essay The Etiquette of Freedom (1990). Snyder acknowledges 
that “the idea of the ‘wild’ in civilized societies—both European and Asian—has often 
been associated with unruliness, disorder, and violence” (Snyder 1990, 5). These aspects of 
wildness as negation of civilization remain present today, but he also proposes a reappraisal 
of wildness. He suggests we can also understand wildness in its own right, rather than as a 
mere negation. He proposes to conceive of wildness in positive terms as “eluding analysis, 
beyond categories, self-organizing, self-informing, playful, surprising, impermanent, 
insubstantial, independent, complete, orderly, unmediated, freely manifesting, self-
authenticating, self-willed, complex, quite simple” (Snyder 1990, 10). These are all 
qualities of wildness which we can find in natural entities and processes everywhere, and 
which are not tied to any specific place. 
Such reappraisals form a starting point for this thesis. They allow us to see the 
wildlife we encounter close to our homes and places of work as an interesting subject for 
environmentalist reflection and concern. But in some way they also question the adequacy 
of the specific boundaries I have drawn for this work. The question that faces us, then, is: 
why focus on recolonizing large fauna? A recent study (Bertone et al. 2016) assessed the 
numbers and diversity of arthropods living in houses, finding significant numbers and 
diversity of flies, spiders, beetles, and wasps. Various insects, birds, and mammals have 
inhabited our cities for a long time. Rats and mice have been common companions of 
humans through the ages. There is a surprising wildness to be found in sprouting trees, 
blooming flowers and congregating flocks of birds. Infestations by bed bugs, lice, rats, or 
slugs can be just as overwhelming as those by boars, bears and wolves. It seems we have 
always already lived with wild nature and have always already been discomforted by it. Is 
there not a danger of a return to the rigid understanding of what counts as nature (and 
therefore as worthy of attention) if we focus on the fauna often characterized as ‘charis-
matic’? 
Despite these observations, intuitively, there seems to be a difference. American 
naturalist, activist and author Doug Peacock captures this sentiment in his characteristically 
radical manner: “My friend […] could find humility before nature in his backyard. I cannot: 
I need to confront several large fierce animals who sometimes make meat of man” (1990, 
6-7). Perhaps there is more to this pronouncement than just masculine bravado. I do not 
want to overstate the difference between meeting a grizzly in a national park and observing 
a butterfly in one’s garden. There might just be some continuity of wildness between the 
two. But it will not do to skip over the dissimilarities that do exist. 
An oft-quoted passage from Aldo Leopold states: “The weeds in a city lot convey 
the same lesson as the redwoods. [...] Perception, in short, cannot be purchased with either 
learned degrees or dollars; it grows at home as well as abroad” (1970, 292). Perhaps 
perception cannot be purchased – it must be developed and it might bring up a bounty of 
observations and encounters at home just as in the redwoods. Acute perception can discern 
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the workings of wildness equally in a spider weaving its web in a corner of a living room 
and a bear on a trail, a mouse in a food cupboard and a wolf in a sheepfold. Workings of 
wildness might be appreciated in both – autonomy, self-organization and an independent 
purpose can be glimpsed even in a mold growing on a forgotten slice of pizza left from last 
week’s football-watching extravaganza. But our encounters with wild nature, including 
here wild animals, involve more than such perception and appreciation. 
First, there are the different meanings the animals have acquired through the ages. 
A mouse means to people different things than a wolf. Perhaps this is a consequence of our 
culture – of the ways we classify animals and the contingent factors that have led to the way 
we perceive nature. Most probably this is true, but it makes the situation none the less real. 
The cultural significance of many of these recolonizing animals places them apart from 
humble spiders and mice. The stories we tell about wolves differ significantly from those 
we tell about mice and the cultural associations we have with each of the species signifi-
cantly change the role these different creatures play in our lives. This might have negative 
consequences, as when demonization of wolves in stories has led to continuing persecu-
tions. But on the other hand, the special cultural connotations of wolves mean that hearing a 
wolf howl on a hike in a nature reserve becomes for many people an unforgettable experi-
ence. What would it mean, then, to catch a glimpse of a wolf on the outskirts of one’s city? 
Certainly, the significance of such an event would be much different than that of seeing a 
spider in a room corner. This does not establish an impermeable cultural dichotomy, but 
merely notes that such differences in meaning are relevant to understanding our experience 
of nature. 
Secondly, if perception must be developed, it must be developed somewhere. 
Something must attract attention, direct our gaze to what we have not noticed, shake us out 
of the comfort of a routine. And there certainly is a routine in the way we deal with spiders, 
mice, snails and cockroaches. The relative novelty of boars and deer in gardens certainly 
attracts attention and might be an opening to a re-appraisal of other, already well-
established relations. As Claude Lévi-Strauss famously stated “natural species are chosen 
not because they are ‘good to eat’ but because they are ‘good to think’” (1964, 89). 
Sometimes this is paraphrased as “animals are good to think with”. Perhaps some animals 
afford for a clearer grasp of the dilemmas, ambivalences, and conflicts at play in coexist-
ence with wildness. The focus on large megafauna, and especially on predators, which will 
be dominant through this work, is therefore not to be taken as an exclusive claim that 
somehow only predators give rise to certain experiences, or that only predators are relevant 
animals for considerations of the role of ecological discomforts. Rather, I take predators to 
be particularly good animals to think with on the subject of human disquiets over nature. 
 Thirdly, there is an ethical question. In as much as we already do face multiple 
discomforts from mosquitos, slugs, cockroaches, etc., it appears we are already struggling 
with plenty of ecological discomforts. The difference is that these creatures have never 
been endangered, and by being in a constant state of conflict with us through the millennia 
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we do have firmly established and widely accepted ways of dealing with them. They do not 
pose such immediate ethical and conservation dilemmas as the larger animals do. 
Finally, there is an important issue of power. In the age of environmental crisis, 
there is a false ring to the claim that there is little difference between the unobtrusive 
wildness of flowers and that of the challenging fauna. I find a similar intuition in the 
reflections of environmental historian Paul Warde on a recent rewilding workshop he 
attended: 
 
In fact, my sense of the drift of conversation was that ‘wild’ was being used, increasingly, 
in a purely descriptive manner, and ‘wilding’ is simply finding spaces, interstices, where 
non-human nature can flourish. The mood was against the requirement that the wild 
belonged only to the ‘wilderness,’ probably remote places, people-free and grand of scale. 
[…] And I wondered – are we losing something here? And that is the emotional power of 
the wild, something that for us is unbridled, not in the sense of being disordered, but in the 
fact that we do not have control. The wild as something, whether interior or exterior, that 
overwhelms; that is not the same as taking delight in a sparrowhawk or a hedgehog that 
happens to have wandered into your garden. […] There is perhaps a lot to be said for living 
with the wild in your garden, in the sense of people becoming better at co-habiting a space 
with a range of other species, but this is very much still a garden. In fact, to use the more 
conventional language of history and the social sciences, I think the distinction I want to 
make is about asymmetries of power, and in the garden, people hold all the power.33 
 
The return to the idea of wilderness that Warde proposes is not what I have in mind. Rather, 
the point I would like to stress is that we already have these uncontrolled elements sneaking 
into our gardens, altering the balance of powers. Perhaps recolonizing animals are not fully 
overwhelming, but they are more than grass between pavement cracks. Boars and foxes are 
good examples of the kind of overwhelming wildness where the balance of powers is less 
skewed to our advantage. We can certainly find symbols and specks of wildness between 
pavement cracks. But to recognize and accept powerfully wild nature in our cities and 
farms, is an altogether different matter. It is a question of power and scale. More wildness is 
not just more of the same. More wildness brings with it very possibly qualitative shifts in 
what is demanded of us, and what we have to deal with. Different non-human entities make 
different demands on us and these differences must be given due attention. 
So even though we might accept the wildness continuity thesis, there is something 
more involved in the willingness to put up with problematic and ‘charismatic’ wildlife – 
more than is present in recognizing the wildness of grass in pavement cracks. What is 
involved here, is a serious attempt to come to terms with resistance of nature and its 
powerful agency, to reflect on the possibilities of coexistence with such agency, and to 
understand the significance it acquires in our lives and in shaping our relations with nature. 
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 http://www.environmentalhistories.net/?p=725, accessed: 13.06.2016. 
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Even while there is a continuity and all-presence of wildness, some wild creatures demand 
of us more than others. The large fauna whose arrival is a surprise to us, and whose 
presence sometimes even strains our environmental commitment, reveals in clearest relief 
various troubling aspects of cohabitation. As such, the issues brought up by the presence of 
these animals justifiably deserve attention on their own terms. 
 
2.3 IS THERE ANY REASON FOR CONCERN? 
 
There is still one more objection that could render inconsequential the above arguments. 
This is because we may ask ourselves: are the troubling aspects of coexistence with wild 
nature really worth our attention? How serious really are the threats, discomforts, or the 
nuisances that animals bring with them? In the Introduction I have presented the kinds of 
damages that wildlife causes and the threats it poses. The problem here is that for most of 
the discomforts caused by nature, we can usually find similar and much more numerous 
threats and damages that are caused by other humans or domestic animals. A good example 
is the threat of direct attack on humans. 
The possibility of lethal attack by a wild animal on a human is perhaps the most 
discomforting prospect among various troubling animal impacts. “For obvious reasons 
conservationists often deny that large predatory animals actually kill people, but there is 
ample evidence that such indignant denial is nonsense” (Kruuk 2002, 55). The obvious 
reasons are the ones that directly relate to the past of predator persecutions, which have 
been motivated at least partly by perceived dangers that predators pose to humans. Today, 
too, the possibility of a direct threat to human life is a situation in which even engaged 
animal ethicists draw the line of tolerance. However, an outright denial of predatory danger, 
as Kruuk notes, is untenable in light of the evidence available (see also Herrero and 
Higgins, 1999; Treves and Naughton-Treves 1999; Peterhans and Gnoske 2001; McNay 
2002; Löe and Röskaft 2004; Torres et al. 1996; Linnell et al. 2002; White and Gehrt 2009). 
A more interesting, widespread, and difficult to judge response is one which admits that 
predators do indeed kill people, but that the probability of this occurrence is so small as to 
not deserve the attention it receives, if any at all. Especially given that analogous but much 
more common damages raise little comparable concern: while attacks by wolves are a 
possibility, it is much more common to be attacked by a dog. There is a similar case with 
respect to wolf attacks on livestock. Although they do take place, and the losses might add 
up to a significant number for individual farmers, large losses are also attributable to feral 
dogs, these, however, rarely raise as much controversy and anger as those by wolves 
(Boitani 1983; Cozza et al. 1996; Lescureux and Linnell 2014). If so little attention is paid 
to the problems posed by dogs, it makes little sense to pay such disproportionate attention 
to the threats posed by wolves and so such concern would appear to be irrational. 
These kinds of claims can be found across a broad range of media, from newspa-
per articles, through grey literature, environmental narratives, and even scientific papers. 
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Such comparisons are almost universally employed whenever the issue of possible predato-
ry threat is addressed and there is a surprising regularity in their structure. There is usually a 
comparison to a tragic and numerically overwhelmingly more common risk (e.g. murders, 
attacks by dogs, car accidents, drowning), and/or there is a comparably rare but ‘bizarre’ 
death cause (e.g. lightning strikes at golf courses, vending machine incidents, sand hole 
collapses). A representative example can be found in George Monbiot’s Feral: 
 
The chance of being killed by a wolf in Europe, even where they are abundant, is much 
smaller than the chance of being struck by lightning, or of being slain by the wrong kind of 
bedroom slippers (the cause of a number of fatal plunges down stairs) or by a collapsing 
deckchair. (2013, 114) 
 
What do such comparisons aim to achieve? We could simply see them as an attempt to curb 
down the knee-jerk reaction that usually threatens to follow deaths caused by predators or 
even their mere appearances. But while this aim is in itself praiseworthy, the specific form 
it takes carries certain assumptions about our relations to nature and has specific conse-
quences for how we relate to animals. To illuminate the underlying assumptions and clarify 
the consequences of employing the comparison I will subject it to textual analysis. 
Looking at discourses, metaphors, and concepts has proven a productive way of 
engaging with social and philosophical dimensions of conservation and can reveal hidden 
patterns and understandings that play a role in nature protection issues. Such work included 
illumination of common narrative patterns in conservation issues (Skogen et al. 2008; Arts 
et al. 2012), the way use of metaphors and framing influences nature protection and 
restoration (Meisner 1995; Keulartz 2007; Keulartz and Weele 2008; Verbrugge et al. 
2016), and the role of language in aggravating conservation conflicts (Peterson et al. 2010; 
Peterson et al. 2013). By paying close attention to how we speak about conservation related 
issues, we can thus understand what conceptual patterns are at play, and show how often 
the very way in which we think and speak of wildlife-related issues is counterproductive to 
our aims. 
 
2.3.1 Discomforts as risks 
 
The aim of the comparison is to dispel worries over threats posed by wildlife. To under-
stand how this is achieved, we need to first understand what kind of interpretation of threat 
is present here. Threat is understood here in terms of chance. Monbiot speaks about “the 
chance of being killed by a wolf”. I think I am not misrepresenting the concern present here 
by specifying this ‘chance’ as meaning risk. The ‘chance’ or ‘risk’ is commonly defined as 
“the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may not occur” 
(Hansson 2014, no page), where the ‘statistical expectation value’ is a measure of the 
probability of the event happening and the severity of the expected outcome. Our discom-
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fort is thus dependent on the level of risk: the worry should be proportional to the probabil-
ity of the attack and its expected severity. The argumentative strategy present in the 
comparison is dependent on this interpretation of threat as risk. To dispel the worry over an 
animal attack by highlighting its low probability, is only possible if we already assess the 
danger only in terms of risk level. The comparison is thus not neutral in representing 
ecological discomforts, but depends on their reduction to risk. 
The accommodation of discomfort begins, then, with the association of our unease 
with a risk of a threat. Once this is established the risk is shown to be as small as to be 
negligible: we need not worry, because there is a very slim possibility that anything bad 
will happen. This settles our mind. But to achieve such accommodation, it is necessary to 
specify the discomfort as risk. Discomfort is than accommodated by a means of an interpre-
tation which provides a specific frame in which so specified discomfort no longer appears 
as threatening. This appears to achieve the aim of dissolving the worries over the possible 
dangers posed by predators, and as such might contribute to the development of more 
positive attitudes, even to the dangerous animals. Indeed, if the strategy is successful 
animals will no longer appear dangerous since danger is understood solely in terms of the 
probability plus severity of damage, and given that probability is vanishingly small, even 
severity will be of little consequence. 
But we must ask whether reduction of danger to risk and the employment of the 
comparison is an adequate way of addressing the discomforts we experience over the 
presence of predators. It might be inadequate, or at least limited in its usefulness, if there 
are more ways to understand discomforts and if these other ways turn out to be important. If 
we can find such important interpretation it will establish that it is worth looking into 
discomforts even if they are rare. To establish that there indeed are other ways of appraising 
danger we need to see if something beyond the probability of threat matters for our 
assessment of it. 
 
2.3.2 Comparability of dangers 
 
Certainly, dangers can differ in terms of their severity, and risk is often defined as probabil-
ity of danger multiplied by the severity of potential outcomes. But this consideration does 
not play a role here, as all dangers compared are lethal ones – we are speaking about the 
probability of death, albeit of death arriving in different forms. Perhaps, then, what matters 
are these different forms. But how would different forms of death matter in our reactions to 
dying? 
We can begin to answer this question, by reflecting on the discrepancy, noted by 
the very comparison under examination, between our responses to different kinds of risk. 
Why is it that we put up with the countless dangers that life in industrialized society brings, 
while we are often unwilling to tolerate minuscule dangers brought by animals? Why is it 
that we do disregard or tolerate (even if we do not strictly speaking accept) the high risks of 
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car crashes, dog attacks, and accidents at home? Perhaps because we live in automotive 
nations, dogs are men’s best friend, and an Englishman’s home is his castle. The risk per se 
becomes of secondary importance; what matters in our appreciation of possible threat is the 
significance that these things (cars, dogs, houses) have in our lives – the roles they play, the 
meanings they hold. Dogs, homes and cars are so tightly integrated into the very fabric of 
our lives that they hardly stand in need of an articulation of their value. Without them our 
life is quite unimaginable. At the very least, our lives without them would be so different as 
to be virtually unrecognizable. 
 Assessment of danger also has to do with the narrative we can tell about such an 
event. While death is always a tragedy, some deaths are more tragic than others. The death 
of a soldier in combat is not the same as that of a civilian war casualty. The death of an old 
person after long fulfilling life is much different from the death of a teenager. 
 In short, not all deaths are the same. On these examples, we can see that when we 
make sense of danger it is not just its probability and severity that matters, but also the way 
it fits with our identity and what kind of story it becomes a part of. Some dangers might be 
deemed more tragic than others, even if their probability and severity are the same. This 
suggests we should be looking not just at the risk of danger, but also at its narrative and 
identity-related significance. In other words, we have to pay attention to danger’s meaning. 
By ‘meaning’, I understand here the way certain items or events can be appreciated with 
respect to a larger whole, or context, like a practice or a story. As philosopher David 
Cooper defines it: 
 
Items are meaningful […] in virtue of their appropriateness to something larger than or out-
side themselves. Ultimately […] it is to Life itself that they are appropriate, even if it is 
rarely the case that, in indicating or explaining meanings, it is necessary explicitly to invoke 
that final terminus. (Cooper 2003, 132) 
 
This passage needs clarification to be fully understood. First, what does it mean to be 
‘appropriate’ in this context? I would like to explain this through a hypothetical, but not 
unlikely, example of a bear mauling. Let us imagine that in a single event an avid out-
doorsman and a shepherd were mauled by a bear. We can see how the attack could have 
been meaningful in the context of outdoorsman’s life. The man spent all his life searching 
for contact with nature, learning to face its punches, and taking them in turn. To be harmed 
by a bear would be an integral element of such life, meaningful in that it fit the story of his 
life. A real life example of such meaningfulness comes from Boulder, Colorado, where in 
January 1991 a high school student was attacked and killed by a mountain lion. Journalist 
and author David Baron notes in his book-length study of the tragedy the comments with 
which close relatives and friends of the victim tried to make sense of the event. The manner 
of death was characterized as ‘fitting’ or ‘natural,’ it was a way ‘he would have been happy 
to have gone’ (Baron 2005, 226). 
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But what if a farmer is a victim of such an attack? Given that sheep herding is a 
practice that continuously struggles against possible attacks and includes attempts to 
minimize the possible losses to nature, it would appear that a harm done to a farmer can be 
seen as distinctly inappropriate. Still, I would like to challenge this way of looking at such 
event. The point is, rather, that precisely inasmuch as the attack can be seen as opposing 
much of what shepherding stands for, the event can be still perceived in terms of appropri-
ateness to the wider context – in this case the practice of shepherding. By being a realiza-
tion of the greatest fears, the event can be considered in terms of appropriateness and as 
such is highly meaningful, but rather than being a confirmation of an identity or practice (as 
in the case of an outdoorsman) it is its denial. 
In order to understand what constitutes meaninglessness, rather than speak about 
inappropriateness, it will be better to speak about irrelevance. An example of such irrele-
vance, which would lead to meaninglessness of an event, would be a purely accidental 
tragedy. 
Now, suppose the shepherd and outdoorsman meet on the edge of the forest, tak-
ing a break and conversing on the beauty of the landscape. Suddenly they hear a shot and 
feel sharp pain in the side of their bodies facing the forest. As it turns out they have been hit 
by stray buckshot fired by a hunter at an animal that managed to escape. The event would 
be a sheer accident and very little could be said about it. It just happened and the event 
cannot be seen as fitting, neither into the actual practice, nor into the life stories of any of 
the two men – it is irrelevant, even if painful and annoying34. As opposed to such accidents 
that ‘just happen’ the inappropriate events are often experienced as a direct threat to e.g. a 
given practice. The meaningfulness of the event is of course very much dependent on the 
participants’ attempts to make sense of the event. If the hunter turned out to be a future son-
in-law of the farmer, or if the incident started the hiker on a life-long mission to delegalize 
hunting, we could perhaps come to see the event as meaningful. But in each case it is the 
ability to see the appropriateness of the event in larger context that will be important for 
finding such a meaning. What would qualify as a greater context? 
As in the above examples, we can think of this ‘something larger’ as a practice, an 
adventure, a life story, or an identity. Such larger wholes to which we relate the appropri-
ateness of the event can be embedded into one another (an adventure carried out as a part of 
practice belonging to an age-old tradition…), but ultimately they would all relate to a 
‘Life’, that ‘Life’ being the totality of practices, aspiration, and aims, and as such the 
ultimate frame of reference within which our lives acquire meaning (Cooper 2003). 
 Although this establishes the importance of meaning in shaping our attitudes to 
danger, it still does not undermine the importance of probability in case of predatory 
attacks. The meaning of such an attack might be very important, but it does not change the 
                                                          
34
 We could raise issues of responsibility or irresponsibility of the hunter in firing the shot, but let us assume for 
our present purposes that no ethical issue was at play here and the shot was fired with all possible care. 
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fact that such events are extremely rare. Consequently, one might still claim that there is no 
good reason to pay much heed to such meanings. Perhaps we should pay attention to the 
meaning of predatory attacks, but this is only in those few cases where the attack actually 
takes place. Given that the number of such events is vanishingly small, we would do better 
spending our intellectual energy on more realistic scenarios. However, the specific meaning 
that predatory danger has for us might in fact be linked to the possibility of predation as 
such. Thus, what would matter would not be the risk of predation, nor the meaning an 
actual attack acquires, but rather the meaning of a sheer possibility of something happen-
ing. If that would be the case, than rarity of events would prove inconsequential to the 
extent of attention we should pay to them. 
 
2.3.3 (Ir)relevance of numbers 
 
Sometimes it is not the actual fact of something happening that is significant, but rather the 
mere possibility of that thing happening. The possibility of a predatory attack is a case in 
point. It does not matter whether there is a big chance that I will be eaten – the very fact 
that one can get eaten is significant because it completely changes one’s status as a visitor 
to the area. That I can be categorized as a ‘prey’ is a ‘game changer’. James Hatley, in his 
treatment of predation, underlines the significance of the threat itself: 
 
In merely the threat of being eaten, one finds oneself in the situation that the very body that 
sustains one’s own life suddenly is also the body that is to be ingested, in order that anoth-
er’s life might be sustained. What was most intimate becomes most strange, and what was 
most strange becomes most intimate. (Hatley 2004, 21) 
 
Our body becomes estranged flesh when it becomes an object of another’s appetite, 
revealing ourselves as nothing more than protein and calories temporarily refusing to 
become part of another being. At the same time, this other animal which seemed so strange 
and alien becomes familiar inasmuch as we see ourselves as becoming potentially incorpo-
rated into it. Some might in fact welcome such disturbing transformation. The uneasiness, 
perhaps even the fear that is brought by the presence of predators becomes for some an 
enabling condition for experiencing places as wild: 
 
Predators are perhaps our most accessible experience of the wild. To come upon a grizzly 
track is to experience wild in the most intimate, carnal way, an experience that is marked by 
gross alteration in attention, perception, body language, body chemistry, and emotion. 
Which is to say you feel yourself as part of the biological order known as the food chain, 
perhaps even as part of a meal. (Turner 1996, 85) 
 
It does not matter here how improbable the meeting with a grizzly or a wolf is – the very 
awareness that a predator might be moving between the trees is enough to completely 
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change our perception of the landscape. The probability of an encounter is not that im-
portant for the appearance of the experience, because the experience is not associated with 
the actualization, but with the possibility, no matter how small. It relates to the change in 
self-understanding and place-meaning, and as such it does not matter whether one is 
actually physically harmed. Indeed, those who willingly expose themselves to such risks 
might still take precautions against their becoming actualized: “many who enter the 
wilderness welcome the threat of being eaten by a bear or mountain lion, even as they fear 
its occurrence and act in ways designed to keep it from happening” (Hatley 2004, 16). 
There is nothing paradoxical about such actions, precisely because they relate not to the 
actuality of attack, but to the meaning of the sheer possibility of an attack happening. 
 But while for those engaged with environmentalism experiencing some place as 
wild might be of greatest importance, for many others such challenge to their identity might 
be extremely troubling. Whether one will become food or not, the very fact that one can no 
longer see oneself as standing outside of the order of nature, as a superior or at least 
qualitatively different creature detached from the workings of ecology (at least in its more 
gritty dimensions), is not necessarily something most people would appreciate. Such a 
threat becomes inappropriate, and as such directly threatening to the established ideas of 
what it means to be human. I will speak more about such threat to identity more extensively 
in later chapters. 
 Such challenge to established meanings might be particularly disturbing in cases 
where predators appear in places of everyday life and work. There, the familiar meanings of 
a place are challenged by the arrival of predators, giving the place a wild and unfamiliar 
coloring. As such, it is not just encountering a predator, but simply moving through the 
same space as the animal, that might radically challenge our taken for granted self-
understandings, the meaning of our living and working space, and the understanding of 
one’s place in the world. Dying in a traffic accident, strange as it may sound, confirms our 
identity as citizens of an industrialized nation hopelessly addicted to cars. A mere risk of 
dying in the jaws of a shark or a bear completely overturns the common beliefs about our 
control of the earth, our special position in the natural world, and our separateness from the 
order of ecology. The risks thus stand in a different relation to the dominant narrative of our 
lives and our culture. 
This is very much aligned with what Paul Tillich writes about the way extreme 
despair appears as an important subject for reflection: 
 
Extreme situations are not reached frequently and perhaps they are never reached by some 
people. The purpose of an analysis of such a situation is not to record ordinary human expe-
riences but to show extreme possibilities in the light of which the ordinary situations must 
be understood. We are not always aware of our having to die, but in the light of the experi-
ence of our having to die our whole life is experienced differently. In the same way the anx-
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iety which is despair is not always present. But the rare occasions in which it is present de-
termine the interpretation of existence as a whole. (Tillich 1952, 56-57) 
 
The occurrence of certain threats leads to changes in our self-understanding, in the way we 
conceive of who we are and what our place with respect to other creatures is. What this 
means, is that what is in greatest need of ethical theorizing are not the individual instances 
of attacks and damage, which are after all scarce, but the general meaning of the threat. It is 
true that in the past an exaggerated sense of threat motivated persecutions of animals, and 
as such focusing on risk levels might be an important corrective to our immediate reactions. 
But focusing on risks, and foregrounding them as the main lens through which to see the 
danger posed by animals, does not help us understand why the fears are so prevalent, and 
what is at stake in cases of recolonization. From the above, we can see that at least one 
important thing, to take into consideration beyond risk assessment are the meanings of 
threats posed by animals. 
Now that we better understand what is missing from the comparison of risks pre-
sented in the beginning of this section, we can ask about the possible consequences of its 
employment. If ecological discomforts can give rise to so many meanings linked to our 
experience of wild nature, what consequences does the comparison employed to diminish 
the sense of threat has for such experiences? 
 
2.3.4 Ridicule and the loss of meaning 
 
An important part of the strategy under analysis is the comparison of the risk posed by 
predators to the risk of such incidents as a soda vending machine crushing, a sand hole 
collapsing, a deckchair incident, tripping on fluffy bedroom slippers etc. When employing 
such comparison, people always try to illustrate it with ever more bizarre forms of dying or 
being injured. What are the consequences of employing such comparison? 
There is something farcical about murderous slippers and soda vending machine 
accidents. The risk is not only rare – it is ‘silly’, ‘bizarre’, even ‘absurd’. Whenever 
somebody raises this comparison ridicule is almost palpable and an ironic smile is bound to 
follow. We do not take these examples very seriously, and it is not just because of the low 
risk of such incidents, but also because the objects are not experienced as threatening. The 
greatest rhetorical power of comparing the risk to wolves with that to fluffy slippers is not 
that it denies the presence of attacks – it does acknowledge them – but rather in that it 
renders these events trivial. The comparison takes the sting out of the event and the animal 
we are asked to compare to homicidal deck chairs is rendered harmless. How can we be 
scared of something that is comparable to a vending machine? Through witty analogy we 
take away any sense of threat, leaving the animals as objects of sympathetic appreciation. 
This, then, is another way to accommodate the sense of threat: we can disarm it through 
ridicule. 
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But this specific approach carries a serious danger in that it covertly limits the 
scope and complexity of relationships that we can build with non-humans to those that are 
easy, pleasant and beneficial. By disarming our fears and worries, we preclude the possibil-
ity of understanding better what role these affects might actually play in the development of 
relationships with animals and the wider nature. As Peter Steeves (1999) argues, in 
developing relations with non-human others the aim should be not to do away with our fear 
but to understand fear as an aspect of our relationship with animal others in all its multi-
dimensional complexity. He illustrates what is at stake in downplaying our fear of animals 
by comparing it to the attempts of behavioral therapists to desensitize people to fear of 
animals through exposure to dead animals: 
 
What does it mean that such therapy works? Why, we might wonder, does the boy lose his 
fear of living with bees through successive treatment with dead bees? Because it is being in 
the world with bees that has become problematic – a world with bees rich in agency and 
body. [...] The boy is being shown how dead bees cannot harm him, but he never was afraid 
of dead bees. [...] Through therapy the boy is learning to presence bees as objects, bee bod-
ies as things to be manipulated. [...] His sense of self changes as well. He used to constitute 
himself as being at the mercy of the agency of bees; but rather than discover that the rela-
tionship is multidimensional, he begins to remove the bees from the world. He no longer 
will see himself in relation to them. He will become a manipulator - not of Others, but of 
things. (Steeves 1999, 146) 
 
I think something similar is happening in the attempts to ridicule the threat posed by 
predators through witty comparisons. When we try to convince ourselves that the danger 
we face from predators is laughable, we work on the imaginary body of the animal in such 
a way that we strip it of its unruly agency. We no longer hunt wolves to extinction or put 
them behind a fence, but we transform their imaginary bodies, rendering them harmless. 
The focus on the positive, desirable aspects of these animals completes their objectification. 
It is true that there is value in learning to appreciate wild animals, including the dangerous 
ones. But this appreciation should not happen at the cost of the recognition of their threat-
ening agency. By doing this, we turn them into objects of admiration, beautiful and 
majestic, but still passive objects; or into ecosystem engineers, almost robotic in their 
efficiency. What we lose is the sense of these animals as independent agents that do not 
necessarily conform to our ideas and desires. Meanwhile, fear “is one way of being-with, 
one profile of a shared world” (Steeves 1999, 147). Thus when we ridicule fear and 
diminish it through rhetorical tricks, perhaps we do eliminate one emotion that historically 
has been a reason for persecutions of wildlife, but at the same time we simplify significant-
ly the relationship with these same animals. We might be losing a lot in this trade-off. 
Primarily we lose a chance to develop complex and multi-faceted relationships based on 
serious rethinking of the role of discomforts. 
 
50 | Ecological discomforts in environmental thought 
 
2.3.5 Importance of discomforts 
 
That discomforting wildness can be of great importance for humans and our engagement 
with nature has already been established in the first section of this chapter, but here I would 
like to present several claims that can give us a better grasp on this possibility and point us 
in interesting directions of research which will be pursued later on in the thesis. 
 Gary Snyder, while praising the importance of wildness, was also acutely aware of 
its more troubling aspects. But it is precisely in them that he found a source of fascination: 
 
Life in the wild is not just eating berries in the sunlight. I like to imagine a “depth ecology” 
that would go to the dark side of nature—the ball of crunched bones in a scat, the feathers 
in the snow, the tales of insatiable appetite. Wild systems are in one elevated sense above 
criticism, but they can also be seen as irrational, moldy, cruel, parasitic. Jim Dodge told me 
how he had watched—with fascinated horror—Orcas methodically batter a Gray Whale to 
death in the Chukchi Sea. Life is not just a diurnal property of large interesting vertebrates; 
it is also nocturnal, anaerobic, cannibalistic, microscopic, digestive, fermentative: cooking 
away in the warm dark. (Snyder 1990, 110) 
 
Speaking in the context of present day Europe, and directly in relation to recolonization, 
George Monbiot writes of his fascination with wolves in terms that are not too far removed 
from Snyder’s ideas: 
 
I want to see wolves reintroduced because wolves are fascinating [...]. I want to see wolves 
reintroduced because they feel to me like the shadow that fleets between systole and diasto-
le, because they are the necessary monsters of the mind, inhabitants of the more passionate 
world against which we have locked our doors. (Monbiot 2013, 118) 
 
Geographer and rewilding advocate Steve Carver claims that “we need some truly wild 
places, with truly wild and self-willed nature and, yes, with predators where we can feel a 
little unsafe and very alive!” (Carver 2014, 12). 
 In the above examples, the troubling, ambivalent experiences of nature are deemed 
in some way important to humans. They suggest that what is at stake in accepting and 
engaging with discomforting wild, is not only the protection of nature, but also maintenance 
of a particular kind of relation with nature that seems to involve meanings which demand 
precisely an element of monstrosity, demonization, and fear. 
 An artist who gives an excellent expression of this somehow troubling love of 
discomforting nature is filmmaker and documentarist Werner Herzog. Herzog, throughout 
his career, engaged extensively with the subject of human relation to wildness, both the one 
we find hidden deep within our psyche, and the one we encounter in the world surrounding 
us. His perhaps most famous movie on this subject has been Grizzly Man (2005) – a 
documentary on the life and untimely death of Timothy Treadwell, a man who spent several 
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summers living with bears in Alaska’s Katmai National Park. But in many of his fiction 
movies he also engaged with the subject of human life in contact with wild nature (Dren-
then 2009). One of the recurring locations for his movies have been tropical jungles, which 
play a more important role than a mere backdrop. In Burden of Dreams (Blank 1982), a 
documentary following the filming of his chilling Fitzcarraldo (1982), Herzog speaks 
about jungle in a way that at the same time moves us deeply, and leaves us puzzled: 
 
It’s just, nature here is vile and base. […] I see fornication and asphyxiation and choking 
and fighting for survival and growing and just rotting away. Of course there is a lot of mis-
ery, but it is the same misery that is all around us. The trees here are in misery and the birds 
are in misery; I don’t think they sing, they just screech in pain. […] It is a land which God, 
if he exists, has created in anger, the only place were creation is unfinished yet. Taking a 
close look at what surrounds us there is some sort of a harmony here. It is the harmony of 
overwhelming and collective murder. And we in comparison to this articulate vileness and 
baseness and obscenity of all this jungle, we in comparison to that enormous articulation, 
we only sound and look like badly pronounced and half-finished sentences out of a stupid 
suburban novel, a cheap novel. And we have to become humble in front of this overwhelm-
ing misery, overwhelming fornication, overwhelming growth and overwhelming lack of or-
der. Even the stars up here in the sky look like a mess. There is no harmony in the universe, 
we have to get acquainted to this idea that there is no real harmony as we have conceived it. 
But when I say this I say this all full of admiration for the jungle. It is not that I hate it, I 
love it, I love it very much. 
 
What are we to make of such statements? They reveal clearly that there is some kind of 
value in experiences, perceptions, and impacts that we would normally like to avoid. The 
most startling possibility is not only that we can accept animals despite the discomfort they 
cause, but that there is something about the very discomforts they cause that is of great and 
enduring importance. It is not only that different people can find the same things disturbing 
or desirable, but that some of those who see something as disturbing will embrace this 
discomfort and find value precisely in being disturbed, threatened, and made vulnerable. 
This opens up interesting possibilities with regard to the role wildness can play in our lives. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have shown the relevance of studying ecological discomforts for 
the environmentalist project of nature protection. In the first section, building on existing 
texts, I argued that ecological discomforts can be an important source of insights into our 
understanding of ourselves and the world, and can even provide a basis for justifying the 
protection of wild nature. In the second section, I concluded that the study of recolonization 
is particularly suited to rethinking our relations with discomforting nature as it raises with 
particular clarity the issues of power and human vulnerability. In the last section, by 
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criticizing the reduction of discomforts to risk, I identified meanings of discomforts as a 
particularly promising avenue for reflection. 
With respect to all three sections, we can provisionally conclude that a reductive 
approach to discomforts is counterproductive in various ways. First, it fails to recognize the 
meanings which experiences of threat may actually have for people and as such it fails to 
help us understand various reasons for opposing or welcoming recolonization. Second, it 
fails to do justice to the environmental concerns by obscuring the significance of animals’ 
agency, thereby limiting the richness of potential relationships with animals, and downplay-
ing some important meanings that discomforting nature might have. To better understand 
the various meanings that disruptive recolonization may have, as well as the various roles 
that discomforting nature may play in shaping people’s lives, we need to engage with 
interpretations that explicitly recognize the discomforting presence of animals as significant 
and try to locate its significance within a broader context, thus giving it meaning. Which 
interpretations of nature are at stake and how do they allow these discomforts to appear in 
our experience? 
One of the most prevalent interpretations of nature, and historically perhaps the 
most firmly entrenched in the Western world, is the instrumental attitude to nature. It 
presents nature as a domain of useful resources for humans. In the next chapter, I will 
explore further this interpretation, focusing particularly on the meanings acquired by 
discomforts. One of the common ways of conceptualizing nature based on this attitude is to 
speak of costs and benefits. In this approach, disruptions and damages caused by wild 
animals present themselves as costs of coexistence. That there are costs involved is not in 
itself already a reason to oppose recolonization. Progress in environmental sciences has 
revealed our dependence on ecosystems and other species, and these insights have rele-
vance also in the context of current recolonization. There are good reasons to accept 
wildlife despite the discomforts they bring, primarily because wild animals can in fact 
deliver important services and goods, the values of which may exceed the costs. This is 
possibly the most immediately intelligible way of engaging with discomforts: it presents 
them as negative aspects of coexistence, and whenever arguments for coexistence are 
involved they are predicated upon attempts to show that benefits eventually outweigh the 
costs. Thus, the argument goes, we should tolerate wildlife despite the discomforts it brings. 
Because this is a well-entrenched perspective that seems intuitively intelligible, and has 
historically played such an important role in the Western world (and indeed still does, even 
in many environmentalist discourses), I will engage with this interpretation first, before 
moving to the more controversial ones. 
 
 3. 
Interests, costs, benefits, and the    
social complexity of discomforts 
 
 
I would like to open this chapter with a quotation from an interview with George Monbiot 
that begins with the interpretation of discomforts as risks explored in the last chapter, but 
moves beyond it. In an interview for environmental magazine Orion Monbiot, pleads: 
 
In North America, for example, there are sixty thousand wolves, and the average number of 
people killed every year by wolves is zero. The average number of people killed by vending 
machines is ten. We need a way of weighing the risks that dangerous wild animals might 
pose against the delight and wonder they would bring to our lives.35  
 
The first part of this quotation should look familiar, as it compares different threats in terms 
of their probability. But Monbiot’s aim here is no longer that of avoiding the discussion of 
discomforts by foregrounding their low probability. Rather, speaking about risks becomes a 
way of criticizing a certain failing of ours. The problem he identifies is that we lack 
meaningful ways of comparing threats with potential benefits that creatures such as wolves 
may bring. While previously he only compared different risks to tone down the sense of 
threat posed by predators, here the assessment of the level of risk is placed in relation to 
possible benefits. The threats are not ridiculed, but weighed against the possible benefits 
wild animals bring. He does this in another essay36, where he weights the undeniable, 
though minimal, risk to human life posed by wolves against the distributed benefits in the 
form of aesthetic pleasure, psychological benefits, appreciation of nature’s diversity, and 
excitement from engaging with unruly, unpredictable creatures. In the end, the balance, 
according to Monbiot, clearly falls in favor of having wolves around: “I am prepared to 
exchange a small risk to my life for the thrill of encountering that which lies beyond it. This 
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 https://orionmagazine.org/article/the-great-rewilding/, accessed: 26.07.2016. 
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 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2004/dec/07/comment.columnists, accessed: 12.09.2016. 
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is a romantic proposition, I admit. But is it not also a rational one?” The argument might be 
romantic in that it identifies seeing wild creatures with experiences of beauty, wonder, and 
personal wellbeing. Yet, if one accepts that seeing wild animals such as wolves does 
produce such experiences, and many would agree with this, then the terms of discussion 
change dramatically. Once we accept that wolves bring such intangible, yet crucial, 
benefits, we can place these against some of the threats and damages. As a consequence, we 
speak about calculated self-interest and as such the claim appears to be unquestionably 
rational. 
 Monbiot himself calls this a ‘moral arithmetic’ – to those more familiar with 
ethical vocabulary and theories, his exercise is essentially a utilitarian calculation. Utilitari-
an thinking considers the goodness of actions in terms of maximizing welfare, well-being, 
or happiness of relevant individuals (O’Neill et al. 2008, 13-14), where welfare is common-
ly interpreted in terms of either fulfilling or frustrating the preferences of those same 
individuals (O’Neill et al. 2008, 5-6). In instances of conflicts and dilemmas, utilitarianism 
proposes to see all the relevant aspects in terms of interests or preferences of individuals 
that can then be weighed against one another in terms of their expected costs and benefits 
(O’Neill et al. 2008, 5-6). And this is precisely what Monbiot does, as he weighs the costs 
of reintroduction or return of unruly wildlife (like livestock depredations and attacks on 
humans), against the expected benefits (in the form of e.g. wonder, joy, psychological 
benefits). This focus on preferences and interests leads us to another important observation: 
such comparisons also commonly involve an instrumental interpretation of nature. What 
matters in such interpretations, are human states of mind or states of affairs which can 
benefit from using nature appropriately. Although utilitarianism does not have to instru-
mentalize nature as such (see below, section 3.1.4) in this chapter I will consider those 
interpretations which do seem to treat nature purely instrumentally. 
 Many of the assumptions and commitments of utilitarianism have been criticized 
and remain intensely controversial. But I do not want to enter into this general discussion, 
which has been extensively addressed in other places37. Here I want to focus on the specific 
issues that arise when we try to address the question of the place of ecological discomforts 
in human life via utilitarian calculations. In this chapter, I will examine three such issues in 
three separate sections, each having to do with a specific limitation that arises when 
utilitarianism is taken up as a way of engaging with discomforts. But to begin with, I want 
to present several examples of this kind of framing of ecological discomforts taken from 
various sources. This illustration will allow us to fully grasp the specific conceptual 
patterns involved, and identify the contexts in which this framing is most often employed. It 
will also reveal the way in which utilitarian calculations are tightly connected to wildlife 
management, and to social sciences. Exploring these connections will occupy the majority 
of this chapter. 
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 For an extensive discussion and critique in the context of environmental questions, see e.g. O’Neill et al. (2008). 
55 
 
 
3.1 THE USE OF COST BENEFIT ASSESMENTS IN DISCUSSIONS OVER 
ECOLOGICAL DISCOMFORTS 
 
3.1.1 Policy 
 
O'Neill et al. (2008) identify utilitarianism as one of the major strands in environmentalist 
thinking and environmental policy, and point to cost benefit analysis (CBA) as one of the 
most pervasive tools used to approach environmental issues, particularly environmental 
conflicts and dilemmas, within the context of environmental policy. In this context, CBA is 
a specific policy tool, associated with systematic economic, psychological, and sociological 
studies, where costs incurred through e.g. depredations, or the psychological costs of stress, 
are weighted against benefits from e.g. eco-tourism, or against so-called ‘ecosystem 
services’ which a particular species provides. What is most commonly assessed, are ‘use 
values’ of nature, that is: the various benefits that arise from directly using nature for 
satisfaction of human interests, needs, or desires. But recent calculations have also begun to 
take into consideration so called ‘existence values’. These express human preferences for 
some natural entities to continue existing, whether or not they are of use to humans. Thus 
we may have no use for polar bears, but we might still want polar bears to live. Such 
existence values are meant to capture human ethical commitments to the survival of certain 
species or the wellbeing of certain individual animals, and as such, it is claimed, they 
introduce the possibility of weighing material interests against ethical concerns (O’Neill et 
al. 2008, 22). This obviously raises the problem of comparison – how are we to compare 
the costs of depredations with ethical commitments to save the wolves? This problem is 
usually addressed by proposing to use a single measuring rod for different kinds of con-
cerns. This common denominator is often money and the respective costs and benefits are 
assessed by proximal assessment of how much would a given state of matters be worth 
financially (O’Neill et al. 2008, 21-22). This involves asking how much one would be 
willing to pay for survival of polar bears or rainforests. This strategy of comparing how 
much one would be willing to pay for a given state of affairs, or how much one would need 
to be compensated to accept a given state of affairs, is called Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM) (O’Neill et al. 2008, 22). 
 An example of an explicit use of the CBA for the analysis of spontaneous predator 
dispersal is a series of studies from Scandinavia (Boman 1995; Fredman and Boman 1996; 
Boman and Bostedt 1999; Bostedt 1999; Bostedt and Grahn 2008; Ericsson et al. 2008). 
Ericsson et al. (2008) use CVM to assess the costs of coexistence with wildlife in order to 
inform conservation policy. Low willingness to pay on part of rural inhabitants in areas 
with predator presence is explained as an attempt to voice the experienced costs of living 
with predators, including the threat to a given way of life, disruption of agricultural 
practices, and a sense of personal threat that limits outdoor opportunities. Consequently, 
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they identify a need to develop a distribution of costs and benefits such that those most 
burdened by the costs could also experience some of the benefits. Boman and Bostedt 
(1999) assume that the costs of wolf presence are well known, as they are adequately 
captured by the economic costs of wolf depredations, therefore they focus on the assess-
ment of benefits, including existence values, through CVM. Boman et al. (2003) give some 
indications for optimized management that would maximize benefits. 
 What we see in all these, and similar, studies, is a close attention to social dimen-
sion of discomforts. Cost-benefit analyses proceed by summing-up the individual desires, 
preferences, needs, and moral concerns. In the process, these disparate aspects need to be 
reduced to a single measure, and that is usually money. In case of recolonization, this also 
means taking into consideration individual losses – not just the economic losses (e.g. 
domestic animals lost through depredations), but also issues like threat to one’s community 
and heritage. Since these also have to be captured through measures like CVM, a question 
appears whether such measures can adequately represent the landscape of social, political, 
and ethical concerns that are usually at play in situations of recolonization. This is some-
thing I will explore in section 3.5. 
 
3.1.2 Ecosystem services 
 
An important area of cost-benefit analyses of recolonization is the concern with ecosystem 
services. It is often claimed that ecosystems provide human societies with important 
services that can vary from crop pollination by bees, through air quality improvement by 
forests, through rodent control by urban foxes. We often forget about these services or take 
them for granted. However, if we understand better the services provided by some wild 
animals, and include them into our calculations of costs and benefits, this might radically 
change our opinion of these animals. 
 For instance, Nielsen et al. (2007) assess the benefits of reintroducing wolves to 
Scotland in the context of deer management, where it can have numerous benefits to do 
with the control of deer population. Manning et al. (2009) speak about wolf reintroduction 
to Scotland in terms of ecosystem restoration and explicitly note that while there might be 
cultural, political, and practical barriers, one of the roles of ecological research is to assess 
the potential benefits of wolf reintroduction for e.g. deer management and ecosystem 
recovery. 
 These, and similar, assessments are meant to give us a better grasp of the scope of 
costs and benefits involved in recolonization, by illuminating how particular species can 
provide some important services from which humans can benefit. 
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3.1.3 Public outreach 
 
Assessing costs and benefits is not just an explicit policy tool associated with sociological 
and environmental studies. It exists in many forms as a pervasive argumentative strategy 
throughout the academic and more popular literature. It is present, among others, in the 
public outreach literature of conservation organizations, including rewilding organizations. 
In such instances it exists more as an underlying logic38, shaping the arguments for embrac-
ing the return of wildlife, rather than as a formal assessment tool. For instance, Lynx UK 
Trust, a rewilding organization that aims to reintroduce the lynx to Britain, summarizes the 
motives behind their work as follows: 
 
This solitary and secretive nature means that they [lynx] present no threat to humans and it 
is exceptionally rare for them to predate on agricultural animals. Their presence will return 
a vital natural function to our ecology helping control numbers of deer and a variety of agri-
cultural pest species whilst protecting forestry from deer damage caused by overpopulation. 
Reintroductions into other European countries have been a remarkable success, with the 
best managed programs constructing whole new eco-friendly industries such as wildlife 
tourism around their presence, breathing new economic life into remote rural communities. 
With no natural threats and bringing a great range of benefits to humans, the time is perfect 
to bring back the lynx to the British Isles.39 
 
In this passage, several benefits (ecosystem services, economic benefits) are placed against 
possible costs (threat to humans, predation on livestock). It is argued, in fact, that there are 
only benefits and virtually no costs involved in the species’ return. Where costs are 
acknowledged, an attempt is often made to blunt our possible worry by stressing the 
minimal level of negative impacts. This is a strategy similar to the one encountered in the 
previous chapter (2.3.), aiming at minimizing our worry through denying the likelihood of 
any problematic aspects of coexistence. 
 Another form of this strategy can be found in the public outreach of Rewilding 
Britain, also a rewilding organization working in the UK. On its website, the organization 
foregrounds the benefits of rewilding40, but rather than speaking about costs it notes the 
presence of ‘challenges’. This use of language (benefits against challenges) is revealing. It 
suggests the transitory nature of the problematic aspects, something that in principle can be 
overcome, with only the robust benefits remaining. However, this is not always an adequate 
characterization. Some of the challenges are just that – institutional obstacles standing in 
the way of rewilding. But some of the challenges are basically costs (e.g. livestock losses). 
This strategy is not uncommon. Navarro and Pereira (2012), in their discussion of the 
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 I will distinguish here between cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is an explicit policy tool, and a cost-benefit 
logic, which is a pervasive way of thinking that acquires strict and explicit formulation in e.g. CBA.   
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 http://www.lynxuk.org/index.html, accessed: 08.06.2016. 
40
 http://www.rewildingbritain.org.uk/rewilding/benefits, accessed: 20.03.2017. 
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feasibility of rewilding as a response to current land abandonment, also distinguish between 
benefits and challenges41. Strategically replacing costs with challenges might be a discur-
sive trick, aiming at diminishing the sense of threat from the side of recolonizing animals. 
As such, rather than truly assessing the issues involved in coexistence, the challenge-benefit 
analysis might be a rhetoric device used to win people over for organization’s pre-defined 
aims. 
 But whether one speaks about costs or challenges, in both cases the aim can only 
be to diminish or completely remove them – they are something to be worked on, to be 
transformed, something that can be gotten rid of, leaving only permanent benefits. Such 
overcoming of the possible obstacles (costs) requires practical engagement and this is 
usually achieved through management of both wildlife and people. I will discuss the 
connection between management and CBA in section 3.4. 
 
3.1.4 Moral questions 
 
Cost-benefit logic appears also in connection to more principled arguments. As in the ideas 
of Monbiot I presented in the beginning of this chapter, arguments based on illustrating 
personal benefits arising from recolonization are presented as self-evident and plainly 
reasonable, in contrast to more controversial, principle-based arguments. As a good 
example, we can take a passage from Zoopolis by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011). Their 
account is a principled approach marrying animal rights theory with political theory, with a 
view to building a strongly normative account of animal ethics. I will discuss their ideas 
more extensively in chapter 8, but what matters at this point is that after they make their 
case with reference to the principles of deontological animal ethics, they provide us with a 
very revealing afterthought: 
 
City life is simply too messy, complex, and permeable to ever effectively barricade it from 
liminal animals. Besides, who would want to? Some liminal animals become pests, but they 
also provide welcome diversity and interest to city life. It would be terrible (and futile) if, in 
the name of solving a few serious animal-human conflicts, we cut ourselves off from the 
natural world. (2011, 250-251) 
 
The difficulties caused by some wild animals that become pests, in their opinion, are 
largely overwhelmed by the benefits in the form of diversity and interest. Thus, whether we 
agree or not that animals have rights that should be respected, we could all agree that it is 
good for us to have wild animals around. Here the weighting of costs and benefits appears 
as a final coup employed after the extensive and explicitly ethical discussion. Like in 
Monbiot, they present a rational and self-evident truth to persuade even those who remain 
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 The two challenges they note, are humans-wildlife conflicts and (of lesser interest here) vulnerability of 
successional stages to perturbations. 
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unconvinced by explicitly moral arguments. This might obscure, however, that assessment 
of costs and benefits is also predicated upon moral commitments, and that an instrumental 
interpretation of nature is also a moral interpretation. This relates particularly to the 
discrimination involved in any instrumental interpretation as to who counts morally and 
what the moral concern is based on. 
 An important question in cost-benefit analyses is whose interests count. The 
aforementioned utilitarian analyses are largely focused on benefits and costs to humans, and 
they present nature as an instrument in furthering human ends. As such, only humans are 
seen as deserving moral consideration. But this is not a necessary commitment of utilitarian 
ethics. There are also instances where benefits and costs to other animals are included in the 
moral accounting: “We do not seek to protect ourselves from mosquitoes regardless of the 
costs. The benefit has to be worth the risk. Many of us would say the risks we should take 
into account include not only risks to humans but also risks to wildlife or even nature as a 
whole” (Willott 2004, 149). We might, for example, wonder whether indiscriminate use of 
pesticides is an appropriate thing to do, even though we do want to get rid of the mosquitos. 
Even if blood-sucking insects do not trigger our moral concern, we might still wonder 
whether the negative effects of pesticides on other creatures like birds or mammals over-
shadow the satisfaction of not being feasted upon. This kind of concern illustrates the 
extension of utilitarian thinking beyond human self-interest. The aggregated good might 
relate not just to humans, but also to a broader group of creatures, specifically all those that 
can intelligibly be said to have interests. Utilitarian animal ethics has long argued that this 
includes also many animals, particularly those who can experience pleasure and pain: 
 
The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a 
condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. 
[…] If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering 
into consideration. (Singer 1993, 57) 
 
Although grounding moral concern in individual preferences, interests, welfare or wellbe-
ing allows (perhaps even demands) inclusion of non-human creatures – a claim made 
already by the father of utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham42 – the arguments using cost-benefit 
logic in speaking about discomforts relate mostly to humans. They do not aim at making 
moral claims about who matters, but at pointing out that even in our most conservative 
moods of self-interest, it is still reasonable to accept the presence of sometimes disturbing 
animals. 
 However, if we took seriously the extension of utilitarian concern over wild 
animals and took their interests into account, then most probably the case for tolerating 
their presence and their actions could be made even stronger. This is because in our 
                                                          
42
 The famous quotation states: “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” 
(Bentham quoted in Singer 1993, 57). 
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calculations of costs and benefits, we also would have to take into account the interests of 
wild animals. For example, material damages caused by wild animals can be seen as costs 
to ourselves, but the destruction of a flowerbed could be seen as contributing to the 
satisfaction of interests of wild boar that found there plenty of succulent tubers. 
 It is good to keep in mind the possibility of extending the utilitarian concern over 
recolonizing animals, taking also their interests into consideration. However, at this point I 
want to focus on those uses of utilitarian thinking which are limited to human interest. 
Thus, while being aware of the strong commitment of utilitarian ethics to concern for non-
humans, I will focus, for now, on those instances where it is used in the context of satisfy-
ing human preferences and supporting human wellbeing. 
 
3.2 CBA GIVES A FRAME FOR SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OF DISCOMFORTS 
 
What interpretation of discomforts plays a role in the utilitarian arguments mentioned 
above? When we think of discomforts in terms of costs, what exactly does that mean for 
our understanding of those discomforts? Discomfort, in the light of a cost-benefit logic, is a 
negative consequence of living with another being. This being, however, might otherwise 
be very beneficial. In such logic, discomfort is a necessary evil. It does not have any 
position in itself, any meaning of its own. It is just something that needs to be put up with 
as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Discomforting, troubling, difficult events are 
simply a negative, but to an extent unavoidable, part of coexistence. 
 We recognize this way of thinking from everyday life. In situations in which we 
expect to face adversities, we weigh them against the expected benefits to see if the deal is 
worth taking, and assess the possibility of minimizing the downsides. We assess whether it 
is worth putting up with a given difficulty considering the disadvantages and advantages. 
 Danger and risk are seen here as a flaw in the design of living arrangements, a 
necessary evil, something to be minimized, a glitch in mutual relations that ideally should 
be as smooth as possible. Discomfort is really just a negative outcome and, in as far as the 
logic of cost-benefit weighing goes, it has nothing to contribute to our lives. 
 In this sense, the cost-benefit logic is not neutral, but does extend its own interpre-
tation of discomforts, providing a very specific way of integrating them into our lives and 
placing them in relation to the rest of meaningful reality. This interpretation might in a way 
be empty, in that the discomfort has no significance, but even such emptiness has conse-
quences for the way we argue for acceptance of discomforts, and determines a way of 
engaging with the discomforts. I now want to move to the consequences of taking up such 
perspective. This will involve, first of all, the consequences that a cost-benefit logic has for 
the categorization of the problematic aspects of nature that I have summarized in the 
Introduction. Secondly, I will discuss the consequences in terms of our practical engage-
ment with those costs through wildlife management. Thirdly, I will show the relation 
between cost-benefit logic, nature management and social sciences. The discussion of these 
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themes will help us illuminate some of the problematic aspects of approaching ecological 
discomforts from the perspective of costs and benefits, and the instrumental attitude. 
 
3.3 DISCOMFORTS AS BENEFITS 
 
In the Introduction, I have presented a long list of ways in which recolonizing animals 
become controversial or problematic. Most of these aspects can, in principle, be seen as 
costs. This includes not just material damages, but also the less tangible effects such as 
negative emotions or loss of a particular way of life. But in some instances, some of these 
costs can be re-appreciated as benefits. 
 
3.3.1 The ‘risk is fun’ culture of nature 
 
In the quotation I presented in the previous chapter Steve Carver states that we need nature 
that is a little dangerous so we can feel ‘a little unsafe’. It appears that, for Carver, such 
negative emotions as fear, and such situations as being under some degree of threat, appear 
to be precisely what constitutes one of the benefits of connecting with nature. The idea that 
benefits of wildness are linked to a limited amount of threat and fear holds an important 
place in the Western culture. Heike Puchan speaks about the “risk is fun” culture, identify-
ing it as “a sign of the times in which people are looking for new ways to define their lives 
and to escape from an increasingly regulated and sanitised way of living” (2005, 177). This 
is not altogether different from the way the appearance of nineteenth century tourism has 
been considered. Already in the nineteenth century, “visits to nature […] came to be 
regarded by urban reformers as a kind of treatment for a variety of real or imagined ills 
suffered by the working classes in the US and Europe” (Elliot, 2006: 4). Today, contact 
with wild and ‘a little dangerous’ nature often becomes a treatment for middle-classes, 
promising a temporary escape from their lives of stifling material comfort, social control, 
and stress. The wild becomes the place where one can escape the dreary routine of every-
day life, engage in a wide range of emotions, and test one’s self-reliance, without too much 
concern for the consequences. 
Such interpretations have a long history in Europe and as such can be seen as inte-
gral part of the Western tradition. Thomas Kirchhoff and Vera Vicenzotti (2014) provide a 
useful historical study of the development of ‘wilderness as a place of thrill’. Two im-
portant motives that we can still recognize in the current fascination with wild nature are: 
the interpretation of the sublime, as proposed by Edmund Burke (see: Burke 1757), and the 
ideas on the role of wild nature in shaping identity, as proposed by Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl 
(see: Riehl 1990)43. 
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One of the key ideas shaping Western attitudes to nature has been that of the ‘sub-
lime’. Edmund Burke, an eighteenth-century Irish statesman, author, and philosopher, 
proposed an interpretation of the sublime as an experience of nature involving suspension 
of rational capacities, and stimulation of our basic instincts. In apprehending vast and 
overwhelming nature, our rationality is paralyzed and our mind is overwhelmed with 
astonishment, which stimulates our basic drives to self-preservation (Kirchhoff and 
Vincenzotti 2014, 452-453). We experience a ‘delightful horror’ that stimulates our 
physical and psychological capacities, awakening them again after they have been stultified 
by the urban life of security and comfort. Today, desire for re-awakening is one of the main 
motives behind searching for contact with wild nature: 
 
The risk that something unforeseen or predictably dangerous will occur is [...] seen as re-
establishing contact to basic, universal human emotions and physical responses from which 
one is estranged in comfortable urban living. The experience of fear is interpreted as a mo-
ment in which a person is brought into close contact with their true self, bringing a reassur-
ing sense of their own aliveness. (Kirchhoff and Vincenzotti 2014, 456) 
 
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, a nineteenth-century German novelist, journalist and folklorist, 
explored in his writings the connections between landscape and group identity. For him, the 
value of wild nature was primarily associated with a search for authenticity. In contact with 
wild nature, “unhindered active physicality seems to have replaced contemplative intro-
spection as a way to access feelings of authenticity” (Kirchhoff and Vicenzotti 2014, 456). 
Thus, while in e.g. Romanticism authenticity could have been found in artistic expression, 
here it is physical activity in wild landscapes that provides opportunities for individuation 
and the search for one’s true self. While Riehl focused mostly on national or folk identity, 
today such quest is usually connected to individual authenticity and self-realization. In as 
much as modern urban life is experienced as alienating, homogenizing, and constraining, it 
is in the wild that one can truly develop as an individual (Kirchhoff and Vicenzotti 2014, 
456). 
 Ultimately, in both Burke and Riehl, the desire for unruly (“sublime”) wilderness 
can be seen as a symptom or by-product of the ‘domestication’ of humans, via technologi-
cal and bureaucratic control. Though Kirchhoff and Vicenzotti do not refer to Monbiot, 
many of their formulations remind us almost verbatim of Monbiot’s diagnosis of the 
predicament we find ourselves in, and of his ideas about the role contact with wild nature 
can play in helping us out of it. 
For Monbiot, the main importance of encounters with dangerous nature lies in the 
exercise of our cognitive and emotional capacities, which have developed through the ages, 
but which today remain suppressed or forgotten. His ideas are at least historically con-
                                                                                                                                                    
sublime proposed by Burke (which they also discuss), seems to me to much better capture the ideas we can find in 
contemporary culture. 
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firmed by many studies. Kruuk (2002) has popularized the idea that early humans and their 
hominid ancestors, besides being hunters, have also been a prey to many formidable 
predator species. Hart and Sussman (2005) take this idea further by arguing that it is the 
vulnerability of early hominid species to predators that shaped the features we think of as 
characteristically human, like brain size, cooperation, and sociality. Research generally 
confirms the thesis that predation formed a consistent aspect of hominid life (Brain 1981; 
Treves & Naughton-Treves 1999; Treves and Palmqvist 2007; Daujeard 2016). Thus, we 
can think of dangerous nature as a feature of the environment that literally shaped and gave 
rise to our present humanity. 
Monbiot claims that these psychological capacities that developed under predatory 
pressures are an essential part of our humanity: “We still possess the fear, the courage, the 
aggression which evolved to see us through our quests and crises, and we still feel the need 
to exercise them” (Monbiot 2013, 6). Erasing them from our everyday lives – as according 
to Monbiot we often do in our comfortable urban existence – leads to a sense of emptiness, 
or, as he terms it, “ecological boredom” (Monbiot 2013, 7). Our present lives, safe, 
regulated, and comfortable as they are, do not leave space for the exercise of these capaci-
ties. It is precisely engagement with wild nature that appears as a promising avenue to again 
employ these capacities and skills, thus allowing for a fuller engagement with our humani-
ty. 
The main themes here are searching for repressed psychological capacities, seek-
ing self-affirmation and authenticity, and breaking through the boredom of an all-too-
comfortable existence. All these effects can be regarded as benefits that should be taken 
into account within a cost-benefit analysis. We can see, then, that certain discomforts can 
be desirable, inasmuch as they contribute to self-affirmation, and therefore searched for. 
However, because this acceptance is grounded in desirability, discomforts can be accepted 
only inasmuch as they are not experienced as really problematic. Thus we recognize that 
certain ostensibly discomforting experiences of nature can be accepted because they agree 
with certain human desires and needs. Meanwhile, really disruptive activities of nature, 
those that frustrate our interests, would still be perceived as costs. There are several issues 
that can be raised with respect to such framing of the matter. 
 
3.3.2 Wildness as a useful negation of civilization 
 
First, where such concern with nature is present, it leads to a reductive appropriation of 
wildness. This might be problematic depending on what kind of experience of wildness we 
are referring to. In his extensive discussion of the modern meaning of wildness, Martin 
Drenthen (1999; 2005; 2007) presents the kind of moral experience of wildness, which sees 
it as a chaos that resists all appropriation. As such, wildness is something that escapes all 
attempts at interpretation. While we might conceive of and appreciate wildness as that 
which escapes any bounds of human civilization, even by stating this, we already appropri-
64 | Interests, costs, benefits, and the social complexity of discomforts 
 
ate wildness, giving it some concrete shape and meaning, and as such making it part of our 
world. Still, when we are trying to respect wildness as that which resists all human appro-
priations, there might be better and worse interpretations. The more appropriate ones will 
recognize their own partiality and failure, while others will try to fully appropriate the 
meaning of wildness, thus failing to stay true to the experience of resistance that exists at its 
core. 
In this context, it seems that the interpretation of nature involved in nature-related 
‘risk is fun’ narratives is an example of such a poor, or shallow, interpretation. Contact with 
wild nature as an antidote to civilization assigns to wildness a clearly circumscribed role 
within the overarching domain of civilization: 
 
[I]t would appear that the late twentieth century’s popular enthusiasm for what is perceived 
to be independent wild nature stands as an antidote for the scientifically controlled and cul-
turally civilized but stressful modern living experienced by most people. […] Arguably, 
post-modern society has appropriated the symbol of its antithesis, “wildness”, and re-
contextualized it devoid of its original meaning. In this way, the “otherness” of nature, the 
non-human, is once more domesticated and brought within the material and psychological 
control of the human domain. (O’Rourke 2000, 161) 
 
By ‘original meaning’ O’Rourke refers to the understanding of wildness as something 
independent from human control and concerns. This includes both the meaning of wildness 
proposed by authors such as Snyder, who see wild nature as an independent order of being, 
but also the interpretations of nature that they opposed, where nature is seen as the chaos 
that is always threatening and negating the work of humanity. These two interpretations 
both appear to acknowledge that wildness always escapes full appropriation, and as such 
would, following Drenthen’s analysis, be more appropriate. On the other hand, the post-
modern appropriation of wildness, which is also present in the ‘risk is fun’ culture, treats 
wildness as nothing more than a useful treatment for a clearly pre-defined human need. As 
such it becomes fully appropriated by the civilization. This kind of wildness merely 
responds to the needs of technocratic civilization obsessed with safety and control, provid-
ing individuals what they lack in their everyday lives, and as such becomes defined in 
relation to that civilization, becoming complementary to it (Deliège 2007). Would our 
civilization overcome its obsessive focus on control, safety, and material abundance, 
wildness would lose its meaning. While in ‘risk is fun’ narratives wildness remains a 
negation of civilization, it is so in a useful, rather than threatening sense. Thus, it becomes 
fully appropriated by civilization. 
It appears that this is at least partially made possible by not taking very seriously 
the threats posed by wild nature. As we saw above, we are always only ‘a little afraid’ and 
in the experience of the sublime the individual must always observe such nature from a safe 
vantage point. Consequently, it seems that one of the dangers in ignoring the importance of 
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discomforting nature is that of perpetuating the very conceptual schemes that form the basis 
of ethical perspectives we aim to transcend. Matthew Taylor suggests that the common 
ideas motivating attempts to connect to the natural world follow the same logic as the 
openly destructive attitudes of environmental ecophobia: 
 
[T]he Enlightenment self is formed through a constitutive exclusion of the “natural” world 
whereas the para-Enlightenment self is born of an ostensible inclusion of it, but the distinc-
tion is largely semantic: in both, the nonhuman world serves our all-too-human agendas, ei-
ther by being our slave or by becoming our selves. (Taylor 2012, 361) 
 
Thus, attempts to connect with nature that recognize only the positive impacts of nature risk 
perpetuating the exploitation of nature. Seeking self-affirmation without taking seriously 
the possibility of the loss of self merely repeats the patterns of exploitation of nature, 
ignoring nature as an independent order of being. We exploit nature for self-affirmation, 
without taking into consideration the possibility that instead of affirming our aims, nature 
might also question some of them. 
Given that many of those who promote contact with wild nature (including Craver 
and Monbiot) seem to oppose its ongoing appropriation by civilization, grounding their 
ideas on reconnection with nature in the ‘risk is fun’ culture becomes deeply problematic. 
What we must ask here, is whether conceptualizing discomforts as benefits is the only way 
in which we can value them. When Carver speaks about wanting to experience dangerous 
nature, does he really follow the instrumental conceptualization of nature and sees wildness 
as nothing more than a means to his self-affirmation? Or is there perhaps another interpreta-
tion of nature at work here? In chapter 4, I will propose a different reading of Carver’s 
demands and as such illustrate a different way of thinking about discomforts. For now, I 
want to discuss two more objections to treating discomforts as benefits. 
 
3.3.3 Discomfort as benefit does not require wildness 
 
A second issue to be addressed is that most of the benefits discussed above do not require 
nature to be truly wild, in the sense of being independent from human control. Here the 
issue is not interpretative and conceptual, but rather material, having to do with the ways 
nature physically acts on those who come in contact with it.  
In section 2.2, I quoted Gary Snyder who mentioned several characteristics of 
wildness. These involved, among others, such qualities as self-organization, independence, 
self-willedness. But it is not clear that human self-affirmation really requires such truly 
wild nature. Indeed, wouldn’t it be better if nature in such encounters was monitored and 
constrained to such an extent that we always remain only ‘a little afraid’ and no genuine 
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danger remains?44 After all, to be truly exposed to danger might also endanger our self-
affirmation, and instead of being ‘truly alive’ we might end up dead. Burke already argued 
that we can only appreciate sublime nature (mountains, oceans, etc.) insofar as we feel 
reasonably safe, due to the techno-scientific backdrop which may be mobilized should the 
encounter become too real. Though Monbiot himself does not speak explicitly about the 
need for safety, this concern does become clearly visible in some of his statements: 
 
In these [rewilded] places we can leave our linearity and confinement behind, surrender to 
the unplanned and emergent world of nature, be surprised once more by joy, as surprise en-
counters with great beasts (almost all of which, despite our fears, are harmless to us) be-
come possible again.45 (emphasis added) 
 
This focus on safety, in my opinion, suggests that in pursuit of self-affirmation one does not 
seriously want to come in contact with wildness that really escapes human control. Inde-
pendence of nature, its wildness, does not play a substantial role in the exercise of those 
redundant psychological capacities of which Monbiot spoke. If our contact with wildness 
could be fully explained by the ‘risk is fun’ attitude, then we would not even need nature as 
such, and we could find similar stimulating experiences in fully staged pursuits like bungee 
jumping or obstacle courses. 
 While this might be the case for the ‘risk is fun’ attitude, the question we might 
raise here, is whether there could be some deeper sense in which human contact with truly 
independent nature is important, and whether discomforts play some role in such contact. 
Since we would be talking about truly independent nature, we would have to take into 
consideration not just those discomforts that are easily reinterpreted as benefits, but also 
those truly dangerous encounters which pose real threat. In chapters 4 and 5, I will propose 
that there is a form of contact with nature in which we seek truly independent nature, and 
where real danger has actual significance. 
 
3.3.4 Is cost the only alternative to benefit? 
 
What if the great beasts do not prove harmless after all? Would that mean that such truly 
dangerous nature would collapse back into cost? Putting discomforts on the side of benefits 
only makes sense to a point – perhaps to the point where, as Carver noted, we are only ‘a 
                                                          
44
 Indeed, rewilding has been charged with applying double standards in their efforts to reintroduce wild animals 
by on the one hand arguing for the importance of their wildness, while at the same time limiting their freedom to 
act according to their own devises. This has been termed ‘goldilocks conservation’ (Von Essen and Allen 2015; 
Von Essen et al. 2015b), where wildness is reinstated but continues to be micro-managed, in order to make sure 
that in the end its activities fit with the pre-existing restoration aims. On this account, the restored wild should be 
not too wild and all actions of animals that move beyond human purposes or convenience are brought under 
control. 
45
 http://www.monbiot.com/2014/12/09/civilisation-is-boring/, accessed: 10.01.2017. 
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little bit’ afraid. When we are very afraid, seriously mortified, the benefit collapses again 
into cost. Or so it would seem… 
I think that in some responses to tragic encounters with nature we can discern an 
ambivalent sort of experience that does not lend itself to simple categorization in terms of 
costs and benefits. It is, however, a specific kind of ambivalence that I have in mind here, 
one that cannot be simply reduced to a mixture of good and bad, positive and negative. It is 
true that the above example of Burke’s ‘delightful horror’ carries a sense of ambivalence. 
But it is ambivalence of emotion and not of evaluation. Though the sublime is horrendous, 
it is still delightful – therefore we can still value these experiences as positive and desirable. 
In contrast, the true challenge of threatening encounters with wild nature is that they might 
lead to experiences that cannot be simply called desirable or undesirable, good or bad, 
beneficial or costly, in the interest of someone or not. To see this we must take a closer look 
at the way people speak about such encounters. As Mark Bekoff notes regarding his 
encounters with bears around his home, he would not want to meet with bears up close 
again, even though he does recognize the meaningfulness of those encounters and wants to 
allow the animals to live where they are and where they pose danger: “Do I feel lucky to 
have met these wonderful beings? Yes, indeed! Does that make me want to meet these 
amazing non-human beasts up front and personal again? Nope. Each time, I was lucky to 
get away unscathed, and I know it” (Bekoff 2014, 68). It is hard to see whether this 
comment would characterize the meeting as benefit or cost, as desirable or not. These 
events are not valuable in a way that would allow them to be placed in a cost-benefit 
calculation. We cannot say that such events satisfy individual preferences. And we certainly 
would not advocate such experiences for others. But neither are these strictly speaking 
costs. After all, the encounter with bears was for Bekoff a highly significant, even cherished 
moment. It was not something he would want to erase from his memory, even if he would 
not want to experience it again. 
If desire, interest and calculability have no place in such considerations, then how 
else are we to appreciate these encounters, so as to fully capture their significance? This is a 
question I will address in the next three chapters, where I will discuss how such events can 
be seen as meaningful, rather than simply good or bad, and how they give rise to a specific 
sense of ambivalence. For now, I will turn to two other important consequences of follow-
ing a cost-benefit logic and the instrumental interpretation of nature: the employment of 
management in minimizing costs, and the use of social sciences in illuminating public 
concerns over recolonization. 
 
3.4 COST-BENEFIT LOGIC AND MANAGEMENT 
 
I already noted that management is closely associated with the cost-benefit logic. If 
discomforts are nothing more than a necessary evil, a meaningless downside, then the 
reasonable way to engage with them is to try to minimize them. Such task is commonly 
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carried out by environmental management, or, in the specific case of animals, wildlife 
management. In many instances, wildlife management is employed to minimize negative 
impacts and provide benefits: 
 
Interventions in HWC [human-wildlife conflict] situations are any activity designed to re-
duce the severity or frequency of encounters between people and wild animals or any activi-
ty that increases tolerance of people for those conflicts […]. Examples of the former include 
barriers, guards, deterrents, wildlife removal, and changes in the locations or types of hu-
man activities. Examples of interventions to raise the tolerance of people for remaining en-
counters include compensation programs, incentive schemes, environmental education, and 
regulated public harvests. (Treves et al. 2006, 390) 
 
While reduction of impacts’ severity leads to minimization of costs, tolerance depends on 
the extent to which benefits outscore costs. Various experimental studies have been 
conducted to assess the efficiency of preventive measures, like, for instance, using guard 
dogs, fladry, deterrents, or gathering flocks into shelters for the night (Smith et al. 2000a; 
Smith et al. 2000b; Musiani et al. 2003; Espuno et al. 2004; Yilmaz et al. 2015), and to 
analyze the relative importance of factors underlying creation of damage (e.g. Treves et al. 
2004; Bautista et al. 2016). In the case of predator attacks, such studies analyze the circum-
stances of attack with the explicit aim of distilling the information that might be useful in 
preventing impacts in the future (e.g. Löe and Röskaft, 2004; Gurung et al. 2008; White and 
Gehrt, 2009; Bhattacharjee and Parthasarathy 2013; Behdarvand and Kaboli 2015). 
Building of tolerance can be achieved by provision of financial incentives and reimburse-
ment of impact costs. Another approach aims at conversion of problematic animals into 
assets through transformation of local subsistence strategies (e.g. Gordon 2009; Jackson 
2012). Such approach can involve transformation of local economy from one dependent on 
livestock herding, to one focused on wildlife tourism. In such case, predators, which 
previously created costs in the form of livestock depredations, become valuable assets as 
tourist magnets. 
 
3.4.1 Management and the instrumental attitude to nature 
 
Much of nature and wildlife management is predicated upon an instrumental interpretation 
of nature, which takes into consideration the interests of humans and treats nature as a 
resource: 
 
Most conservationists see natural ecosystems and other species as resources and are con-
cerned mainly with the wise use of them. Finding its philosophical roots in the ideas of 
Gifford Pinchot, first official forester of the United States, this group judges all questions 
according to the criterion of the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run. (Nor-
ton 1994, 6) 
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Pinchot explicitly embraced utilitarian commitment to the maximization of good and 
identified humans as the sole recipients of natural resources. Consequently, the aim of 
nature management carried out in the tradition of nature conservation is to maximize the 
productivity of nature, in order to gather the benefits for humans (see e.g. Hays 1959; 
Norton 1994). In this tradition, the benefits of nature have very often been conceived in 
monetary terms, as in the contingent valuation method: 
 
Conservationists, especially those who are trained in resource management and those who 
work in government resource agencies, have generally applied concepts and a value system 
that tend toward economic reductionism, which interprets values as individual preferences 
expressed in free markets. (Norton 1994, 7) 
 
Although this instrumental approach to nature management is very common, it is not the 
only kind of wildlife management. The second tradition, often traced back to the ideas of 
Scottish-American naturalist, writer and environmental philosopher John Muir, explicitly 
questions the acceptability of seeing nature in terms of its utility to humans. Below I will 
present the preservationist alternative to nature management and discuss the questions it 
raises with respect to our engagement with ecological discomforts. 
 
3.4.2 The preservationist alternative 
 
Many environmentalists are actively engaged in nature management in one way or another. 
But not all would agree that their motivation is that of maximizing nature’s utility to 
humans. Indeed, 
 
environmentalists often begin by implying that there is something morally wrong in the sys-
tematic exploitation of nature, something that cannot be fully expressed in the language of 
scientific resource management and maximum sustainable yields. (Norton 1994, 5-6) 
 
I already addressed the moral concern with nature in the Introduction, where I suggested 
that protection of wild nature is no longer linked merely to the satisfaction of our desires, in 
which case reappearance of truly wild nature would be highly problematic, but also to 
moral arguments demanding respect for nature. 
 This kind of concern with wildness has also made its way into nature management 
and its early formulations are associated with a contemporary of Gifford Pinchot, John 
Muir, famous for his contribution to the establishment of Yosemite National Park (1890). 
Muir was one of the founding fathers of the wilderness protection in the U.S. – an approach 
to nature management which focuses on the preservation of wilderness areas free from 
human use and infringement. He was strongly opposed to the reduction of nature to its 
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utility to humans and is one of the early environmentalists who very clearly developed the 
idea of concern with nature in its own right, without any necessary relation to human 
interests. 
 Today, preservationists focus on wildness independent from its usefulness to 
humans, and their views and concerns are reflected in the work of many environmental 
organizations, including rewilding organizations. While rewilders, strictly speaking, do not 
want to preserve nature, or even less so wilderness – especially those working in Europe 
readily acknowledge that untouched wilderness no longer exists – their basic moral concern 
for nature is very much aligned with the concerns of preservationists. In rewilding, this 
moral concern shows up mostly through attempts to revoke human control over nature and 
let nature define its own course. Thus, rather than preserve the remaining undisturbed 
nature – as preservationism strictly defined would do – rewilders try to reinstate the 
independence of nature. As such, the basic concerns with freedom of nature from human 
control and exploitation continue through rewilding, and also motivate those forms of 
nature management that are geared towards rewilding. 
 This retraction of human control is sometimes associated with the recognition that, 
in the process, human desires might be frustrated: 
 
The wild in wildlife means something – there is an element of risk, of potential loss, and, 
perhaps most importantly, a statement that we, the managers, are not in total control. In this 
there is a potential renewed reverence for nature and natural processes, and it is this that 
provides the greatest chance to ‘save the planet’. (Taylor 2009, 55) 
 
To take wildness seriously as something to be respected, means that perhaps we should not 
just revoke human control of nature, but also accept some of the losses and risks that this 
may bring. This already suggests that our attitude to ecological discomforts in the form of 
costs – losses, damages, frustrated interests – will be different if it is predicated upon 
respect for the wildness of nature, than if it was based only on our self-interest. In that case, 
human interests cease to be the only measure for determining the condition of landscapes 
and assessing animal behaviors. This does not necessarily mean that the interests of animals 
come into play here (as they did in section 3.1.4). Rewilders usually show more concern 
with species and ecosystems than with the interests of individual animals, and they are 
typically motivated by different moral concerns than the utilitarian ones. I will later return 
to a more detailed elaboration of these concerns. What matters now is that human interests 
will not play a decisive role in determining acceptability of animal behaviors in this second 
approach to wildlife management. As Taylor notes, in some places we strive to respect 
whatever nature does and find virtue in stepping back and accepting the losses. 
 But if this is the prevalent attitude of rewilding, we meet with a problem here. As 
we saw earlier in the chapter (section 3.1.3), rewilding organizations often use cost-benefit 
logic to speak about ecological discomforts, focusing on human interests. How is it possible 
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for rewilders to integrate such an instrumental interpretation of nature with ‘reverence for 
nature’? 
 
3.4.3 The rewilding conundrum 
 
Inasmuch as rewilders use arguments from an anthropocentric cost-benefit analysis, they 
seem to be working in continuity with the ideological basis of the dominant instrumental 
approach to nature. They present land and animals as sources of benefits, with negative 
impacts being nothing more than obstacles to be removed. Although they might broaden the 
concept of benefits to include ecosystem benefits, and even reinterpret some of the apparent 
costs as benefits (section 3.3), this does not change the basic moral structure of focus on 
human interests. This logic brings rewilding to its most conservative form – one which 
considers its task and practices in terms of maximizing benefits from the land for humans. 
It is a logic that draws rewilding closest to its usual opponents (farmers, hunters, conserva-
tionists). Significantly, we find George Monbiot utter his most anthropocentric vision of 
rewilding precisely after a meeting with a sheep farmer, Daffyd Morris-Jones: “If rewilding 
took place it would happen in order to meet human needs, not the needs of ecosystem. That, 
for me, is the point of it. Wolves would be introduced not for the sake of wolves but for the 
sake of people” (Monbiot 2013, 179). This strongly anthropocentric claim stands in stark 
contrast with many other claims he makes, which rather articulate concern for nature itself. 
For instance, in the same book, Monbiot quotes with approval Alan Watson Featherstone, 
the founder of Scottish charity Trees for Life: 
 
Seeing the stumps in the peat and the remnant trees, I asked myself: what’s the message in 
the land? What’s the story it’s telling us? My question was: “What’s Nature seeking to do 
here?” That is crucially different from the ethos of human domination. Rewilding is about 
humility, about stepping back. (Alan Watson Featherstone in Monbiot 2013, 105) 
 
How are we to think about the apparent clash of concerns that we see here? 
 In principle, there does not need to be a conflict between concern with nature in 
itself and benefits to humans. As Norton (1994) notes, while preservationists and conserva-
tionists might disagree with respect to fundamental values, they might still agree on shared 
objectives. In a similar way, what is good for nature might turn out to be good for humans 
as well. It is often argued in rewilding discourses, that retraction of control might be in 
itself a precondition for reaping benefits from nature. For example, it is claimed that when 
beavers are left to their own devices, they will transform the rivers so that the flow of water 
will slow down, which will lead to increased sequestration of debris, higher biodiversity, 
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improved water quality, flood protection etc.46 Often serving human interests and preserv-
ing wild nature can be done simultaneously. 
 Even when it comes to discomforts, the cost-benefit logic can be applied by 
preservationist groups without coming in conflict with other moral concerns. However, this 
is only possible when instrumental arguments and the cost-benefit logic are used only as 
discursive, argumentative, or rhetorical devices, not as an actual decision making tool. 
When such logic is used as an argumentative tool, it can illuminate additional factors that 
support protection of nature, and even function as a consolation strategy. As I already noted 
before, we can explain to ourselves that putting up with something is worth it when we 
clearly see that it carries important benefits apart from costs. In this case, it is worth to live 
with problematic animals, and even to suffer some of the negative impacts, because they 
bring many benefits in return. To know that discomforts are a minor downside to other 
overwhelmingly positive elements helps to accommodate the unease. 
 This raises an interesting question: if the instrumental logic can find its place 
within preservationist concerns, can the same be true the other way around? Are interpreta-
tions of nature arising from preservationist moral concerns with wildness in any way 
relevant for instrumental ways of engaging with nature? I will address this question at the 
end of chapter 4, when we have deepened our understanding of the preservationist vision of 
nature. 
 But even though there may be agreements, we need to recognize that the instru-
mental attitude can easily come into conflict with preservationist concerns. If we take 
seriously the moral claims of preservationism, we will be unwilling to accept the preva-
lence of costs over benefits as a reason to reject presence of problematic wildlife. If we are 
no longer the measure of things, nor the only morally relevant entity, then the existence of 
costs to humans becomes only one, and possibly a fairly minor, element in our considera-
tions regarding coexistence. When we distance ourselves from a narrow focus on human 
interests, the world appears in a different light, in which what is a cost for us might be 
another creature’s benefit. This suggests that, while the anthropocentric cost-benefit logic 
can be a part of preservationist discourses, it has to be used with caution. The calculation of 
costs and benefits to humans cannot be the taken-for-granted decision-making device as it 
often is in much of policy and anthropocentric utilitarian ethics. Ultimately, the ethos of 
rewilding seems definitely incompatible with an anthropocentric utilitarian ethics. 
 But there is another, a hermeneutical, concern here. The cost-benefit logic and its 
associated instrumental interpretation of nature quite obviously do not exhaust the interpre-
tative scope of the ideas behind rewilding. While there may be instances of the instrumental 
                                                          
46
 Rewilding Britain has been particularly vocal in underlining such benefit of beavers as part of their campaign to 
reintroduce these animals to the UK. Copious information on the benefits brought by beavers, together with links 
to scientific studies, can be found on their website:  
http://www.rewildingbritain.org.uk/rewilding/benefits, accessed: 21.02.2017; 
http://www.rewildingbritain.org.uk/magazine/beavers-and-flood-risk-management, accessed: 21.02.2017. 
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attitude at work in preservationist projects, the focus should be on the actual moral concerns 
to which rewilding practices aim to respond. If they indeed strive to give more freedom to 
nature and to limit human control, then we should strive to better understand what kind of 
experience of nature is motivating such aims. There appears to be something more that 
beckons to be understood, something that is not well answered by speaking about costs and 
benefits of wildness to us. How, then, does a preservationist moral perspective make sense 
of discomforts, what meaning do they have? Might there be even a specifically preserva-
tionist interpretation of such discomforts? Again, this is something I will turn to in chapter 
4, where I will discuss more in-depth the interpretations shaping the preservationist attitude 
to nature. These interpretations will open up a whole different way of thinking about 
discomforts. 
 
3.5 POLITICAL MEANINGS OF DISCOMFORTING NATURE 
 
Even though nature conservation management, as presented above, may itself be motivated 
by the resourcist interpretation of nature, it cannot disregard concerns such as those 
presented by strong preservationist perspectives. This is because conservation-style 
management is not a fully autonomous practice. Unlike preservationists, who predicate 
their work on explicit moral claims about nature, conservationists often define their work as 
an effort to satisfy in the best possible way the interests of various stakeholders, which 
(depending on the area and the situation) might be governmental organizations, the citizens, 
private owners, interest groups, future generations, etc. (Decker et al. 2012, 5-6). In as 
much as such management is directed towards “production of value as defined by society” 
(Decker et al. 2012, 4), it is subservient to the values of society. In some cases, as in the 
case of rewilding, management might at least partially be in conflict with important demand 
held by society – much of the current fascination with wildness requires removal of control 
over nature and, as such, a minimization of nature management itself. Another problem for 
nature and wildlife management might be the change in values and attitudes towards 
wildlife which have made the traditional management techniques unacceptable to large 
segments of the population (Messmer 2000). Finally, many of the interactions between 
animals and people are not shaped only by mutual material impacts, but also by human 
beliefs, views, traditions, and values (Dickman 2010). In all these instances, managers need 
to understand the various needs and demands of stakeholders and trustees. Because 
managers often lack the tools, knowledge, and skills to carry out necessary research into 
stakeholder demands, conservationists have been seeking cooperation with social scientists: 
 
Knowledge about stakeholders, how they value wildlife, and how to make decisions about 
wildlife to increase benefits and reduce costs (increase positive impacts and decrease nega-
tive impacts) all require systematic and rigorous science. Wildlife management has evolved 
in many ways and one of those ways is reliance on social science for reliable information on 
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the human dimensions of wildlife management. (Decker et al. 2012, 7; see also: Clark et al. 
1996; Fritts et al. 1997; Baruch-Mordo 2009; Bruskotter and Shelby 2010) 
 
Social scientists have become important in the work of nature and wildlife managers for 
other reasons as well. Due to the varying demands made by different groups in society, 
nature managers have been faced with social conflicts over conservation-related issues. 
Conflicts between people over environmental conservation or preservation began to 
increase significantly in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Adams et al., 2006: 194), and are often 
cited as one of the greatest challenges for 21st century nature protection (Peterson et al., 
2002; Dickman 2010). Conflicts between people over wildlife have already received a fair 
amount of attention, and the specific conflicts that I am interested in here can be seen as a 
special case of a broader category of conservation or biodiversity conflicts (see e.g. Youg et 
al., 2005; Young et al., 2010; Redpath et al. 2015). 
 
3.5.1 Social sciences and wildlife conflicts 
 
Social sciences, which have been instrumental in determining the interests of stakeholders, 
have thus become important in addressing social conflicts and analyzing their various 
dimensions. Social, political and cultural researchers, on their part, often recognize their 
work as ultimately tied to helping managers and policy makers make sense of the conflicts, 
and address their most relevant dimensions (Knight 2000b; Goedeke and Herda-Rapp 2005; 
Skogen et al. 2008). 
 As social sciences and humanities have explored the subject of wildlife conflicts, it 
became obvious that these conflicts are not caused simply by ignorance about animals or 
conservation practices, nor by conflicting economic interests alone (Kaltenborn et al., 1998; 
Stoll-Kleemann, 2001; Redpath et al. 2013; Skogen 2015). Rather, some of the most 
important factors in these conflicts have been those of clashing beliefs and values, where 
differences exists over normative interpretations, and political issues linked to power 
relations, justice and fairness: “wildlife conflicts can become conflicts not just over specific 
animals, but conflicts over larger sociopolitical concepts such as equity, tradition, private 
property rights, government control, power, and acceptable forms of knowledge” (Patterson 
et al. 2003). In such instances, problematic animals acquire a symbolic, rather than a 
material significance. They are seen as symbolic focal points around which the more 
distributed and immaterial conflicts of values, beliefs, and cultures can materialize (Nie 
2001; Nie 2002). By now, there is a broad and ever growing literature on the social, 
cultural, interpretative, and political dimensions of wildlife conflicts which, building on a 
plethora of methods, concepts, and disciplinary perspectives, reveals new and surprising 
insights, an exhaustive review of which would deserve its own book-length treatment (see 
e.g. Wilson 1997; Brox 2000; Knight 2000a; Nie 2001; Nie 2002; Skogen and Krange 
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2003; Brownlow 2004; Bisi et al. 2007; Sjölander-Lindqvist 2008; Krange and Skogen 
2011; Deliège and Drenthen 2014). 
 
3.5.2 Wildlife conflicts and management 
 
The extent to which those insights have been integrated into nature and wildlife manage-
ment varies. Within the management-oriented literature, these conflicts are still very often 
seen as conflicts between management strategies, or as conflicts of interest. Definitions of 
nature or wildlife conflicts often share these basic assumptions about the source of human 
concern with nature: 
 
[B]iodiversity conflicts are defined as situations in which the interests of two or more par-
ties towards the goods and services provided by a wildlife-related resource differ, and when 
at least one of the parties is perceived to assert its interests at the expense of another party’s 
interests. (Marshall et al. 2007, 3130) 
 
[S]ituations that occur when two or more parties with strongly held opinions clash over 
conservation objectives and when one party is perceived to assert its interests at the ex-
pense of another. (Redpath et al. 2013, 100) 
 
Where multiple parties with little in common are thrust into disputes over how to manage 
wildlife, language serves strategic goals. (Peterson et al. 2013, 97) 
 
Conflicts are essentially differences in people’s views on the source and scale of the 'prob-
lem' and possible management options. (Young et al. 2010, 3986) 
 
In other words, the bulk of conservation management discourse continues to perceive all 
the positions engaged in the conflict as instances of an instrumental attitude to nature 
framed in terms of costs, benefits, interests, and preferences, while nature conservation 
management allegedly strives to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs, according 
to the interests of the public. The question here is no longer whether all the relevant 
stakeholders are taken into consideration (e.g. whether animals should be seen as stake-
holders), but whether talking about interests and preferences adequately reflects the 
problems we are facing. The worry is that the richness of moral concerns involved is not 
adequately represented: 
 
[T]here is an interesting and emergent literature that attempts to explore the “human dimen-
sions” of wildlife management. This literature is in part an outgrowth of wildlife manage-
ment’s self-recognition that the natural sciences are never enough to understand either hu-
man-animal relations, or environmental policy as it impacts wildlife. Much of this literature 
invests itself in the trappings of natural science, however, with an emphasis on quantifica-
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tion, prediction, and control. Human beings become another “variable” to be managed, us-
ing the scientistic theories and methods of what is loosely called the social sciences, or 
more accurately the behavioral sciences. Values, including moral values, become individu-
alist preferences to be managed by technocratic elites for the highest material or political re-
turn. (Lynn 2010, 81) 
 
There might be a practical reason why many insights of the social sciences that take human 
dimensions more seriously are not taken up. Many of those insights are rather difficult to 
ingrate into the existing management practices and approaches. If the aim in conflict 
management is conflict resolution, than one might move away from values, which often are 
incompatible and non-negotiable, to interests, which are (Redpath et al., 2013). However, 
this implies sacrificing deeply engaged moral positions and their reduction to interests. This 
is not always possible, and indeed is not necessarily a desirable thing to do. Indeed, one of 
the most persistent criticisms of the application of the cost-benefit analyses and utilitarian 
logic to environmental conflicts is that they fail to recognize that some of the issues at stake 
cannot be represented in terms of preferences that could be compared on the basis of e.g. 
contingent valuation method. When issues like the dissolution of communities, ways of life, 
and personal well-established ties are involved, these cannot be reduced to simple matters 
of financial interests and material costs or benefits (O’Neill 2008, 77-79). 
What is needed according to many is a management reform which explicitly takes 
into consideration the ethical and political issues at play in conflicts (Patterson et al. 2003; 
Fox and Bekoff 2011). To facilitate discussion over such issues, an envisioned appropriate 
managerial approach usually includes the education of managers, the participation of staff 
skilled in facilitating discussions, and a series of additional measures aimed at supporting 
the deliberative process (Messmer 2000; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001; Peterson et al. 2002; Fox 
and Bekoff 2011). Although all these relate to the process of negotiation, it is not clear that 
they actually address the subject of the negotiation, namely the conflicting moral perspec-
tives or different ideas concerning what is at stake in the situation. 
 Environmental philosophers already provided some inputs with respect to biodi-
versity conflicts. This has been done primarily in the context of pragmatic approaches to 
conflict resolution, where the focus is on reaching practical results through deliberations 
aimed at finding possible solutions that all participants could agree on, rather than values, 
meanings and beliefs that usually divide them (see e.g. Norton 1994; Light and Katz 1996). 
Here, I would like to make another suggestion, following the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer47. By presenting below some of his ideas on conversation, and particularly about 
the appropriate aim of conversation, I hope to suggest a productive way of addressing 
wildlife conflicts. While I present the idea of true conversation specifically in relation to 
                                                          
47
 For another example of a hermeneutical approach to conflicts within environmental philosophy with a more 
extensive discussion of how environmental hermeneutics is particularly suited to addressing such conflicts, see: 
Deliège and Drenthen (2014). 
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wildlife conflicts, the significance of Gadamer’s ideas on dialogue extends beyond the 
confines of this chapter. As I noted already in the Introduction, conversation takes a central 
position in hermeneutics and in this thesis. The ideas presented below will be thus relevant 
for the entirety of this book. 
 
3.5.3 A dialogical approach to wildlife conflicts 
 
The idea of conversation is central to the hermeneutics of Gadamer, who sees it as aimed 
primarily at understanding. In terms used by Gadamer, the aim of a conversation is a 
‘fusion of horizons’. This does not mean that we have to reach a compromise or arrive at 
some kind of agreement; neither is it about arguing to win or to show-off one’s knowledge. 
It means that through dialogue, those involved are striving towards a deepening of their 
understanding of the subject matter that they have a common interest in. Given such a 
common subject, we will listen to each other because the other might have something 
crucial to say on a subject matter of importance to me. A true dialogue requires that we 
open ourselves up to the possibility that the other has something to say that relates to the 
heart of my concerns. In a true dialogue, we fuse horizons with the other, incorporating 
their views in a way that transfigures our own. We ourselves are changed by a true dialogue 
because the other enlarges our understanding of the topic of the dialogue. Gadamer puts it 
this way: “To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself 
forward and successfully asserting one’s point of view, but being transformed into a 
communion in which we do not remain what we were” (2013, 387). We engage in such a 
dialogue because we know that another person, with different experiences, views, and 
ideas, can illuminate an issue from a different perspective, revealing aspects of it that we 
might not have seen and maybe never would have thought of on our own. For the possibil-
ity of a dialogue to be realized, it is necessary that we open ourselves up to the critique and 
the appeal of the other. It is the presence of a challenge that is a litmus test for the broaden-
ing of horizons. By entering into a true conversation, we are risking that what we believe in 
might prove to be wrong or at least incomplete, and that, as a consequence of such conver-
sation, we ourselves will have to change. Gadamer uses a metaphor of the horizon to 
illustrate his point. When we speak about education and experience, we often speak about 
broadening of our horizons, meaning that we’ve opened-up to a better, usually broader, 
perspective. Our viewpoints are altered by these experiences, and we ourselves are trans-
formed – we are confronted with the possibility that we may be wrong, and might need to 
fundamentally rethink our beliefs and commitments, including what we find desirable or 
not. 
 Not every conversation reaches this status, but especially in situations of conflict 
or disagreement a true dialogue can reveal important ideas and inspire us to change our 
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thinking48. Such ‘fusion of horizons’ begins with transposing ourselves into the other’s 
horizon: 
 
Transposing ourselves consist neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in 
subordinating another person to our standards; rather, it always involves rising to a higher 
universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other. The 
concept of “horizon” suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that 
the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one 
learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from it but to see it 
better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. (Gadamer 2013, 316) 
 
This does not mean trying to get into someone else’s shoes. Though we have to be empa-
thetic in our conversations, if we only see a perspective from someone else’s point of view, 
we’ve failed to question our own understanding of the issue at hand. When we try to simply 
understand the other, and the position in which she finds herself, we objectify the conversa-
tional partner. Instead of trying to see the partner as somebody who has something to say on 
a subject we both share interest in, one is trying to understand what the other says as 
contingently dependent on the position from which the other is speaking. Ultimately, 
Gadamer writes, “[a]cknowledging the otherness of the other in this way, making him the 
object of objective knowledge, involves the fundamental suspension of his claim to truth” 
(2013, 314). This is a way of closing oneself to the possibility that the other has something 
to say that will challenge one’s own understanding. 
It is also not enough to agree to disagree and just remain where we are standing. 
This shows unwillingness to recognize that the other might actually have something to add 
that could be of relevance. At the same time, to agree to disagree seems hardly possible in a 
situation in which we deeply care about some subject. We can hardly imagine a situation in 
which a human rights believer would agree to disagree with a sectarian believer in human 
sacrifice – and this is not for fear for one’s own life. Because we think of the matter under 
discussion as of such importance, we cannot let important factors remain unexamined. We 
can disagree whether some perspective provides an important contribution to the given 
subject under discussion, but this is very far from agreeing to disagree. The conservationist 
analogue of such agreement is the managerial attempt to find the greatest satisfaction for 
the greatest number of diverging individual interests. Though this might be an adequate 
way to proceed if indeed we are speaking simply about personal preferences, it is inade-
quate if the conflict involves disagreement on fundamental values, meanings, or beliefs. 
                                                          
48
 As such, conflicts can be seen not as problems and obstacles, but rather as opportunities giving us a chance to 
broaden our understanding. Focusing on constructive engagement with conflicts and disagreement, instead of the 
common foregrounding of consensus, has been championed by Peterson et al. 2005. 
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Quite clearly, all this depends on the requirement that we indeed do have a shared 
subject of interest. Whether such subject can be found in all instances cannot be claimed 
before we actually engage in a conversation. But in some instances, where people appear to 
be speaking at cross-purposes, a shared subject matter can indeed be discerned (for exam-
ples see Deliège and Drenthen 2014; Deliège 2016). Recognition of such shared subject can 
be achieved by paying close attention to the experiences of nature that play a role in 
motivating the sides of the conflict to join the debate in the first place. In this study, we are 
concerned with the subject of coexistence with wildlife in terms of the significant moral 
meanings that appear in encounters with discomforting nature. In a dialogical approach to 
conflicts over recolonization presented here, we must therefore ask if there are any shared 
subjects that tie together the concerns of those who welcome and those who oppose the 
possibility of coexisting with disruptive wildlife. My way into finding such a shared subject 
will be to proceed via an articulation of the significance of discomforts in the preservation-
ist vision of nature which I will carry out in the next chapter. At the end of that chapter the 
common subject will become apparent and I will return to the idea of conversation, 
confronting the concern with wildness with utilitarian attitudes towards nature. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
An instrumental attitude to nature allows us to take discomforts seriously as an element 
shaping our lives. Of course, an instrumental attitude is still an interpretation and it does 
present nature as in some sense meaningful. In such cases, we take nature to be clearly 
defined and its meanings only limited to the reflection of our interests. Nature is meaning-
ful, perhaps in the way that timber is a meaningful part of forester’s life, but there is no 
space left for nature to address us in any other way. 
 
Those in modern Western society who claim to find nature meaningless are disingenuous. 
In fact they restrict the meanings nature has to those that matter to them, those supposedly 
‘discovered’ by science and technology. Nature only speaks to them insofar as it can ex-
press itself in a manner communicable in terms of quantity, number, and instrumentality. 
The modern form of life and its associated linguistic traditions regard nature as inert materi-
al at the service of humanity. (Smith 2001, 70) 
 
Within this interpretation, discomforts appear as costs and can be weighed against the 
benefits that are sometimes brought by the very same animals. But while this interpretation 
does acknowledge the reality and importance of discomforts in shaping our lives, it does 
limit their meaning to that of mere costs. Indeed, to approach recolonization from the 
perspective of this interpretation, all the consequences of animal presence need to be seen 
simply as costs or benefits. But, as we have seen, encounters with wildlife are rarely that, 
escaping the reduction by being connected to more complex experiences, moral concerns or 
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political struggle. This becomes particularly problematic when one attempts to apply the 
cost-benefit logic to conflicts over nature and animals in which different interpretations 
clash with each other. Though utilitarianism might reduce all these concerns to instances of 
individual interest, such an approach does not recognize that these concerns often present 
radically different interpretations of nature, interpretations that refuse to see nature solely in 
terms of human interests. 
 A successful nature conservation management strategy might satisfy the interests 
of several stakeholders and dissolve, at least for a time being, a conflict. More realistically, 
however, when political and ethical issues are at stake, an attempt to sidestep conversations 
on ethical issues by employment of technical strategies will not suffice. To satisfy every-
one’s interests – which is a managerial analogue of agreeing to disagree – is often impossi-
ble in actual landscapes where many groups lay claims to the same place. To enforce one’s 
position can only inflame existing conflicts and will not be accepted in a democratic 
society. A more adequate approach is to recognize fully the radical differences present in 
conflicting interpretations and to take them seriously as proposing different perspectives on 
the subject of conflict. Hermeneutical ideas on true conversation show how this can be 
done. The hermeneutical perspective on conflicts transforms them into substantial discus-
sions on subject matters that are of interest to all participants involved in such a conflict. 
Such transformation is not a sociological claim which says that this is what these conflicts 
are – rather it extends a possibility of what these conflicts can be and how they can be 
approached. 
 Such a conversation requires an articulation and clarification of alternative 
interpretations of the subject matter, extended from different horizons involved in the 
conflict, and an understanding of what these perspectives have to offer to one another. The 
instrumental attitude to nature, discussed in this chapter, is one perspective that often plays 
a role in these conflicts. Though it might raise pretentions to a privileged position, present-
ing itself as a kind of bird’s eye view, or a neutral platform from which all other interpreta-
tions (treated as individual or group interests) can be scrutinized and balanced, it is itself 
just one possible interpretation of nature. It is an interpretation that treats all nature as a 
resource that can be used by humans. As such, far from being an external position from 
which to carry out a discussion, it is only one perspective on the subject matter. In an open 
discussion, it needs to be confronted with other interpretations. In the context of this work, 
inasmuch as the subject matter is the significance of ecological discomforts in human life, 
the instrumental attitude frames such discomforts as costs. Managerial and policy ap-
proaches often attempt to subsume all discussions on ecological discomforts precisely 
under this interpretation, employing cost-benefit analyses as the ultimate reference point for 
understanding discomforting situations. From the perspective of environmental hermeneu-
tics this is an extreme reduction. The alternative proposed here is, consequently, to broaden 
the interpretative scope and include other meanings of nature and of discomforts. 
81 
 
 One such interpretation, that has already made its appearance in this chapter, is the 
preservationist concern with protection of nature in itself. Preservationist nature manage-
ment is one specific perspective within a broader environmentalist current, which concerns 
itself with articulating the moral significance of nature irrespective of human interests (even 
if for strategic reasons it can occasionally make use of instrumental logic). In the next three 
chapters, I will explore in greater depth the specific moral meanings that discomforting 
nature acquires in such non-anthropocentric perspectives. This will include three themes 
which I think have something crucial to add to our understanding of the meanings of 
discomforts, and so also can clarify the ambivalence experienced in face of the recoloniza-
tion. These themes will include the role of discomfort in experiences of wildness (chapter 
4), wilderness adventures as encounters with the unruly wild (chapter 5), and the moral 
significance of ecological wholes like ecosystems and biotic communities (chapter 6). 
These themes have been mostly discussed in the context of wilderness – undisturbed, 
pristine nature existing far away from humans, in spaces where people do not live or work – 
and it is in relation to such nature that the meaningfulness of discomforts has usually been 
spoken of. My discussion of these well-established themes in environmentalist thought will 
include their reinterpretation and application to the current situation, in an attempt to see 
what they have to tell us about our current predicament. This is a reinterpretation of some 
crucial themes in the environmental tradition, in order to keep the tradition alive and 
relevant, and to make ourselves at home in it. Thus, for each of these themes, I will show 
how they still have something to tell us about recolonization and coexistence. 
 In the next chapter, I will focus on the significance of the unruly agency of nature 
as it is present in preserving and coming in contact with wild, independent nature. This will 
stand in direct opposition to the denial of animal agency or meaningfulness of such agency 
present respectively in risk interpretations and instrumental interpretations of nature. By 
showing how, from a different interpretation, such agency can in fact be highly meaningful, 
I will attempt to stage a dialogue on this subject matter. The next chapter will end with a 
reflection on whether the unruly agency of nature can in fact have some significance for the 
instrumental engagement with nature. Doing so, will illustrate how a substantial conversa-
tion on contentious matters in wildlife conflicts can work. 
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 4. 
Wildness and the preconditions for 
meaningfulness of nature 
 
 
Chapter 3 illustrated how an instrumental attitude to nature engages with ecological 
discomforts. We also saw that even those approaches that express concern for nature 
protection irrespective of its usefulness to humans, such as rewilding, often refer to an 
instrumental interpretation of nature to justify the presence of discomforting animals. The 
question with which we are faced at this point is whether there is a way of understanding 
ecological discomforts that is typically preservationist, arising from a moral concern with 
nature independent of its usefulness to humans. An articulation of meanings of discomforts 
native to preservationism would not only add consistency to the arguments of preservation-
ist organizations, but would also be a potentially important contribution providing a 
different perspective on what is at stake in encounters with discomforting nature. 
 As a starting point for the articulation of such meanings, I want to take a claim 
made by rewilder Steve Carver, who, ostensibly opposing the resourcist attitude, highlights 
the importance of discomforts: 
 
Many argue that it is absolutely necessary for us to reconnect with nature but there is a 
more specific question as to what kind of nature and how and here answers differ. […] A 
nature that is unthreatening and conveniently constrained within the pastoral bliss of a well-
ordered countryside where natural capital is regarded as highly as profit? Sounds attractive 
doesn't it? And just that little bit… er... dull? We need more than this. We need some truly 
wild places, with truly wild and self-willed nature and, yes, with predators where we can 
feel a little unsafe and very alive! (Carver 2014, 12) (emphasis original) 
 
Although I used parts of this quotation previously to show an underlying instrumental 
attitude towards nature, I think there is another way of interpreting this passage, or rather, 
the passage captures in a confused manner different kinds of concerns. Let me elaborate 
this. 
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 The conservationist ideal of managed, constrained, productive and profitable (so 
essentially instrumental) nature is rejected here by Carver primarily as ‘dull’. As an 
alternative he proposes unconstrained, self-willed nature that to some extent can be 
threatening. It appears there is some connection between the independence of nature, the 
discomfort it causes, and its importance for us. Carver identifies ‘being very alive’ as the 
aim of contact with such nature. How are we to understand this aliveness? It could be 
understood in the psychological, physical and emotional sense that was discussed in chapter 
3. As such, it could be simply a benefit understood in terms of self-affirmation. Indeed, the 
fact that Carver qualifies the lack of safety as only very limited, and his characterization of 
constrained nature as ‘dull’, suggest a connection to the ‘risk is fun’ culture, where a 
limited amount of danger allows for self-affirmation in contact with an exciting world. 
However, as I noted in the previous chapter, such an approach would not require wildness 
in any deeper sense other than merely surprising, and slightly unruly. Instead, Carver 
underlies the definition of wild as self-willed. This is a positive characterization of wild-
ness, which was also endorsed by Snyder, and which is usually used when speaking about a 
moral concern with nature irrespective of its usefulness to humans. Carver’s mentioning of 
self-willed nature could of course be incidental, but I suggest to take his use of the term as 
possibly an expression of an actual connection between the independence of nature, its role 
in our lives, and the way this independence of nature is connected to how nature can be a 
threat to us. If it is indeed true that threatening and ‘truly wild and self-willed’ nature has an 
important meaning in human lives, then this could be an avenue which would facilitate a 
specifically preservationist understanding of the meaning of ecological discomforts. 
Articulation of such an understanding will be the aim of this chapter. I will begin by 
discussing the idea of wildness that is captured by the term ‘self-willed nature’. 
 
4.1 WILDNESS AS SELF-WILLED NATURE 
 
As was already noted in the Introduction and in chapter 2, the idea of wildness has played 
an important role in modern environmentalism. Here, I would like to further explore its 
meaning in modern environmentalism and its contribution to moral perspectives on nature. 
Particularly, I will focus on understanding the characterization of nature as self-willed. This 
is a term used not only by Carver, but rather one of the most common ways of speaking 
about wild nature in preservationist discourses. The roots of this use can be traced to the 
etymological studies of the terms ‘wild’ and ‘wilderness’ which attempted to uncover the 
original meaning of the terms. 
Roderick Nash, professor of history and environmental studies, in his classic anal-
ysis of the role of wilderness in American culture (Nash 1967) points to the origins of the 
term ‘wild’ as coming from ‘wildeor’, meaning self-willed animal, and ‘wildeorness’, 
meaning home of self-willed animals. An alternative interpretation of ‘wilderness’ is 
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provided by Jay Hansford Vest, who understands it as self-willed land (1985). Despite 
minor differences, in both interpretations wildness is understood as meaning ‘self-willed’. 
 This return to the original meaning of wildness has been picked up by many 
preservationists and as a consequence many speak today about self-willed nature as a focus 
of their concern and work. But what exactly does it mean for nature to be self-willed? Both 
terms of this composite – ‘self’ and ‘will’ – are usually used with reference to humans and 
appear to only uneasily be applied to nature. Are we to believe that nature has some sense 
of self, or a will of its own? Both of these terms acquire a specific meaning when applied to 
nature. This specific usage is well capture by Bill Willers: 
 
Unmanaged landscapes are the focus of the struggle to protect and restore wildness […] 
When a living system becomes fragmented or manipulated, its internal pattern of relation-
ships is destroyed. When managed for some human-centred purpose, its autonomy is lost. 
Restoring wilderness conditions on landscapes of all sizes can allow for self-regulation in a 
state of ancestral wholeness. (Willers 1999, 1) (emphasis added) 
 
We can understand the ‘self’ as meaning essentially self-organizing, or possessing a distinct 
pattern of organization. As such we need not make reference to any cognitive ideas of 
consciousness or identity. But to speak about ‘autonomy’ instead of ‘will’ might strike one 
as still problematic. Indeed, Kant reserved the characteristic of autonomy to those rational 
beings capable of setting themselves ends following rational laws, rather than being driven 
by blind laws of nature. Environmental scholars, while aware of this specific understanding 
of autonomy, often argue for using the term to describe nature, albeit they delimit the 
meaning of the term to signify either independence from human control and purposes, as 
seen in the quotation above, or self-organization: 
 
[R]ecognizing some being as autonomous means realizing both that this entity can maintain 
its organization (at least for a time) in the presence of diverse external forces and, conse-
quently, that it may exert a systematic force on its environment, at least passively, insofar as 
it seeks to maintain its integrity. (Heyd 2005, 5) 
 
In what follows, I will speak about wild (self-willed) nature as characterized by autonomy 
and self-organization. I will use the term ‘autonomy’ in the sense of independence from 
human purposes and control, without making claims about nature having the ability to 
reason or set itself rational goals. 
Though often spoken of in one breath, it seems that autonomy and self-
organization are separable at least in principle. This is visible particularly in those instances 
where human activity leads to loss of wildness. On the one hand human impacts can take 
the form of control, where the autonomy of nature is denied; on the other hand they can 
lead to chaos, where the original organization of ecosystems dissolves leaving behind 
86 | Wildness and the preconditions for meaningfulness of nature 
 
merely random collection of elements. Both of these, separately or together, lead to the loss 
of nature’s wildness. 
 Human control is clearly a factor in those cases where people redirect spontaneous 
development of places or evolution of species to serve human ends, as in industrial agricul-
ture or genetic engineering. The worry over the disappearance of the autonomy of nature 
can be very often found in preservationist discourses and is sometimes explicitly mentioned 
as the fundamental motivation behind preservationist work, as in the following passage by 
rewilder Dave Foreman: “conservationists work to keep Man’s will from taming all of the 
Earth; resourcists work to stamp Man’s will over as much Earth as they can […] Whose 
will? Is the bedrock question behind conservation battles” (Foreman 2013, 191)49. 
 A good example of the loss of self-organization is climate change. As American 
environmentalist and author Bill McKibben (2003) stressed, one of the most dramatic 
things about the global climate crisis is that nature becomes unpredictable and chaotic: 
 
Simply because it bears our mark doesn’t mean we can control it. This ‘new’ nature may 
not be predictably violent. It won’t be predictably anything, and therefore it will take us a 
very long time to work out relationship with it, if we ever do. The salient characteristic of 
this new nature is its unpredictability, just as the salient feature of the old nature was its ut-
ter dependability. (2003, 104-5) 
 
Even though we might not control the future climate, it will not be a definite organized 
system either. It will be an unpredictable chaos. This is also the case with e.g. landscapes 
where erosion, invasive species, pollution, etc. do escape our capacities to keep them in the 
shape we would like them to be. While escaping our control, they do not possess any 
internal organization or coherence that could identify them as definite systems and allow 
us, or any other creature, to develop a more or less stable relation to them. 
 The appreciation of nature as self-willed in the sense explained above can be a 
reason to respect such nature. Such self-willed nature not only has an independent exist-
ence, but due to its unique and definite organization it can develop on its own and achieve a 
form of self-realization. As such self-willed nature exists as an independent entity with a 
‘good of its own’ which might be harmed or respected. This view of nature opens up a 
possibility of valuing nature for itself rather than in a merely instrumental fashion. We can 
find a representative expression of this normative way of thinking in the following quota-
tion by environmental philosopher Thomas Heyd: 
 
[W]hen we do hold something as valuable for itself, and consequently as a candidate for 
moral consideration, we are doing it, among other things, in virtue of our recognition of its 
                                                          
49
 Clarification note: Foreman uses a different nomenclature then the one I have been using so far. By ‘conserva-
tionists’ he refers to the group that I have been calling ‘preservationists’. His ‘resourcists’ refers to my ‘conserva-
tionists’. Foreman’s nomenclature is quite commonly applied. 
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autonomy. In other words, what I propose is that, when we say that we value some being for 
itself, we are saying that we minimally recognize it as counting in a manner similar to our-
selves, namely for its self, thereby implying that there may be legitimate, morally relevant 
limits to our own acting. (2005, 5-6) 
 
For many environmentalists this kind of respect extends not just to other people, and other 
animals, but also to ecosystems, or species. 
 These ideas are highly contentious even within environmentalist community and 
have been a subject of many polemics (for a critical discussion see e.g.: O’Neill et al. 2008, 
125-148). Here I do not want to go too deeply into those discussions, which would take us 
too far from our focus of interest. I merely want to point out, that if we take these intuitions 
as intelligible, this has important consequences for how we engage with discomforting 
nature. This can be illustrated with the example of the attitude that preservationists take to 
keystone species, and especially predators. 
 
4.2 SELF-ORGANIZATION AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
One of the concepts that play a fundamental role in rewilding is that of ‘keystone species’. 
Keystone species are those animals that through their activity exert an influence on the 
landscape that is disproportional to their numbers (Mills et al. 1993). Sometimes called 
ecosystem engineers, some of these keystone animals actively shape the landscape by 
creating their own living spaces, and in doing so influence many other species. Beavers, for 
instance, build dams and thus create wetlands and significantly change the shape of rivers, 
adding to biodiversity (Nummi and Holopainen 2014); large grazers stop forests from 
encroaching on grassland, creating mosaic landscapes known for high biomass and support-
ing high biodiversity (Vera 2009). Predators are of particular importance: as keystone 
species (Foreman 2004) and initiators of trophic cascades (Terborgh and Estes 2010), they 
take up a crucial role in the capacity of landscapes to self-organize: 
 
Our principal premise is that rewilding is a critical step in restoring self-regulating 
land communities […] Once large predators are restored, many if not most of the 
other keystone and “habitat creating” species (e.g., beavers, prairie dogs) […] and 
natural regimes of disturbance and other processes will recover on their own. 
(Soulé and Noss 1998, 6-7) 
 
Although this overwhelming focus on grazers and predators might be questioned on 
scientific grounds50, here I want to merely focus on the fact that their connection to self-
                                                          
50
 The focus on the role of large herbivores and carnivores in reconstructing natural processes has been criticized 
by Boitani and Linnell (2015). The problems, particularly in European context, are mainly that we are largely 
ignorant of how such natural processes would look like, that human impacts all across the continent are too large 
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organization of ecosystems in rewilding is of paramount importance. My claim is that the 
focus on predators and grazers can be understood as arising from the moral concern with re-
establishing ecosystems as instantiations of self-willed nature. The self-organization of 
ecosystems that is supported and initiated by the activities of keystone species is often 
understood in material terms, as the presence of crucial processes like speciation, evolu-
tionary pressure, regimes of change, competition etc. These are the processes through 
which the landscape transforms itself, and through which it self-organizes and reaches 
dynamic equilibriums, thus gaining specific characteristics that distinguish it from other 
places. This self-organization is morally significant because it gives these landscapes a 
distinct being of their own, a distinct sort of organization that can then develop autono-
mously. Thus, keystone species help establish the self-organization of nature, and as such 
open the possibility of viewing landscapes in moral terms, as objects of moral concern. 
 What is the place of discomforts here? Quite clearly many of the wild animals that 
are keystone species can be problematic for humans. This is obvious in the case of preda-
tors, but is also true for animals like beavers that, financially speaking, cause much more 
damage than wolves. In the case of beavers, for instance, the animals are in fact problemat-
ic precisely because they are ecosystem engineers – because the self-organization of 
landscapes brought about by their actions leads to a transformation of the landscape that is 
not always in line with the desires of humans. In other words, nature that follows its own 
will, will not always be in agreement with our will. But following the commitment to 
respect self-willed nature, in many instances this going against our will is not taken as a 
reason to oppose such developments. 
 Preservationists claim that at least in some places allowing nature to develop along 
its own designs is the right thing to do. A commitment to respect its autonomous self-
organization means that to accept unsettling outcomes when nature reasserts its own will 
against ours can be a praiseworthy attitude. Of course respect does not require absolute 
acceptance in every case, and our own will can play a role in shaping the land as well, but it 
must be recognized that our will is not the ultimate determining factor. 
 What is more, if we are truly willing to suspend looking at the world from the 
perspective of our own preferences only, then the work of these animals, and the independ-
ent development of nature, can be appreciated in their own right. In such cases, some 
changes only appear problematic as long as we assess nature merely in terms of our 
preferences and desires. When we begin appreciating ecosystems and landscapes on their 
own terms, in terms of the unfolding of their own sort of order and organization that leads 
to a variety of interesting forms, we can perhaps transcend such a limited instrumental 
view. 
                                                                                                                                                    
to allow for independent natural processes without significant impacts on all trophic levels, and, finally, that 
striving towards establishment of such natural processes will likely lead to inflammation of already significant 
social conflicts. 
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 The way we relate to discomforts here is determined by our moral commitments. 
If one holds self-willed nature as deserving respect, one will generally also try to tolerate 
instances in which such nature happens to do something that is not in line with our desires. 
Note that in these cases, our acceptance of discomforts comes from outside of the experi-
ence of discomfort itself – it comes from a moral commitment to respect the autonomy of 
nature. But I think there is yet another way of relating to discomforts present in the non-
instrumental attitude towards nature, one in which discomforts play a constitutive role. By 
constitutive role I mean to say that our appreciation of nature can arise precisely from the 
very experience of discomfort. 
 As I will explicate in the section below, this constitutive role of discomforts will 
arise from attempts to find meaning in nature or to have a meaningful engagement with 
nature. In the remainder of the chapter, I want to propose that ecological discomforts might 
play a crucial role in finding nature meaningful, especially in situations where such 
meaningfulness of nature is put in doubt. In order to explain and substantiate this claim I 
have to first present some conceptual insights relating to human experience of meaning. I 
will begin with presenting some ideas on the preconditions for finding meaning in general. 
 
4.3 WILDNESS, MEANING AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
According to environmental philosopher Glenn Deliège (2016), who bases his work on the 
theory of meaning developed by philosophers Arnold Burms and Herman De Dijn (2005), a 
fundamental precondition for meaning is the mediation of external reality. In order to 
understand what this means we can relate to our intuitions about human relationships. An 
example discussed by Deliège is the search for recognition: 
 
[G]etting recognition (from whomever) is a deep desire for most, if not all, people. The 
point is that we can never recognise ourselves: patting ourselves on the back might bring 
some brief comfort, but it is just not the same as getting recognition from someone else. In 
order to feel recognised, we thus need the mediation of an ‘outside’ to ourselves, the exter-
nal reality that is the other. (Deliège 2016, 413) 
 
I think we can all recognize common situations that can make this insight concrete. 
Suppose I need to ask someone for an honest opinion about a paper I have been working on 
recently. I do think the piece is quite good, but that feels insufficient – I need someone else 
to recognize the quality of such a work. But even if I ask somebody for an assessment, this 
will not necessarily ensure satisfying results. I might decide to ask a friend, but let us 
assume that only a few days ago this same friend asked me to lend him some money. And 
now that I ask for his opinion I cannot be certain whether my friend’s opinion will be 
genuine, or whether it will be motivated by his desire to acquire future benefits. He might 
praise my work, but only because he is worried that his criticism might make me less 
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willing to lend him money. Although his approval comes from the outside, because he is 
another person, it will not be truly external, because my friend will try to align himself as 
much as possible with my will and my desires. 
 External reality means here not simply anything that is not us, because in some 
instances the outside which is mediating the search for meaning is not really external. Just 
as in our example, anxieties with respect to the natural world might arise precisely from the 
worry that the outside world is not independent in such a way that it can become a source of 
meaningful experiences and relationships. 
 To draw a connection between the ideas presented here and the previously 
presented analysis of the idea of wildness, I think that ‘external reality’ is precisely what 
environmentalists speak about when they talk about self-willed nature. The loss of wildness 
can be interpreted as precisely loss of external reality to which we can orientate ourselves 
and in which we can find meaning. Domesticated and controlled nature that forms the lion’s 
share of our environments can be understood in a way that is similar to a position of 
subservient friend. The control that we extend over nature destroys its externality, making 
impossible what Anthony Weston (1991) termed a “genuine encounter”: “a reaching out, 
opening the possibility of being touched rather than touching, whatever — we can hardly 
yet say — might eventuate” (Weston 1991, no page; see also: Cheney 1989). We must ask, 
therefore, what kind of nature can be deemed as truly external, and on what grounds. 
 
4.3.1 Searching for (and failing to find) external nature 
 
The basis of the externality of nature has been considered in environmental thinking in 
different ways but perhaps the most common has been that of finding it in the purity of 
unspoiled wilderness. In as much as wilderness has been considered as an order of inde-
pendent origin untouched by human impacts it could have been seen as such an outside 
reality. Philosophers such as Robert Elliot (2000) and Eric Katz (2000), who criticize nature 
restoration as ‘nature fakery’, argue that nature has a transcendence that rests on the 
ontological status of wilderness as originating outside the domain of human artefacts. 
Although this line of reasoning is popular, it seems to be largely irrelevant for us today, 
given how much of nature has been transformed by humans. Especially in Europe, there is 
quite possibly not a square inch of ground that has not been touched and transformed by 
humans in one way or another. 
 But externality of nature need not be based on the ontological separateness from 
humans. Deliège points out that nature can sometimes appear as an external reality while 
apparently still being in spontaneous agreement with our desires. As an illustration, Deliège 
discusses John Muir’s account of Yosemite (Deliège 2016). According to Muir, the nature 
he encountered in Yosemite appeared as if it was made to welcome humans – an Earthly 
paradise. It seems that without our influence, humanity and nature achieved in that land-
scape a spontaneous confluence. However, today we are always left with a suspicion that 
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when nature agrees with our needs and desires, it has probably been already shaped by 
previous generations or an invisible manager so as to harmonize with us. Indeed, the reason 
that Yosemite appeared so welcoming to Muir was because it had been actively managed 
by indigenous populations for centuries prior to his arrival (Olwig 1996). Muir made 
contact with a cultivated landscape, and so, one might say, made no contact at all – at least 
not with self-willed nature. The danger that we would make the same mistake as Muir did, 
poses a serious threat for any possibility of finding transcendence in situations where nature 
appears to spontaneously agree with our preferences. 
 Perhaps finding external reality is still possible where chaos is involved. Ecosys-
tems or the climate can reach a state of unpredictable and uncontrollable disorder, a state in 
which autonomy still seems to be present, but self-organization is gone. No servility is 
present in such instances, and so one could argue that we are confronted with an external 
reality when encountering chaos. However, I doubt that this is the kind of external reality 
that can be meaningful. To use an example that is intuitively familiar: we cannot establish a 
meaningful relationship with someone who decides whether to accept us or not by flipping 
a coin. Earlier, Bill McKibben argued that the unpredictability of new nature might make it 
impossible to establish a meaningful relation to it. This suggests strongly that both self-
organization and autonomy are essential ingredients of the kind of external reality that may 
appear meaningful. After all, when we come in contact with something, we need it to be 
something – not something completely immaterial and amorphous. Drenthen (2005) argues 
that even in situations where we try to conceive of nature as chaos, we cannot spell-out the 
importance of such interpretation and its significance for us, without assigning some 
content to it: “Nature as chaos faces us with the task of acknowledging the fact that we 
inevitably appropriate nature as soon as we try to express its moral meaning to ourselves” 
(Drenthen 2005, 328). I take this to mean that we cannot find anything meaningful in chaos 
unless even such chaos is given some definite shape. As such, the actual chaos of the world 
presents no opportunities for meaning unless we can discern some organization in it. If we 
do, we must be weary whether such organization is just our imputation of order onto an 
external reality, which would again question the externality of such organization. If the 
organization can be, however, intelligibly discerned as somehow pre-existing and inde-
pendent of our appropriation, we are left again asking what really grounds its externality. 
 
4.3.2 Externality of nature and resistance 
 
The above discussion might leave us depressed about the possibility of finding external 
nature in today’s world. Thus we must ask whether there is any other way in which 
externality of the natural world that surrounds us today can intelligibly and believably 
appear. Indeed, there is – externality of the world can be understood also as the capacity of 
the world to resist our appropriations: 
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[T]he reality towards which we are oriented in our quest for meaning and with which we 
hope to establish contact is only really external to our desires if it can negate those desires 
and resist full appropriation. It is only when our quest for meaning can be denied by the re-
ality towards which we are oriented, that we know we are oriented towards a reality that is 
truly external to us. The presence of meaning is thus premised on the possibility of its coun-
terpart: the denial of meaning. (Deliège 2016, 414) 
 
Thus presence of the possibility of resistance, negation, or denial is necessary for us to be 
able to find meaning. It must be underlined here that it is a possibility of denial or re-
sistance that is the precondition. This means that the negation does not have to turn up 
every time, but merely be a possibility. 
 Is this way of conceiving the externality of the world any more helpful? It seems 
that as far as our current relations with nature go resistance of nature is just as rare as the 
previous experiences of externality. When we domesticate nature we remove from it the 
possibility to deny our advances and we do it both by controlling it, and by re-shaping it 
according to our desires. We breed into animals the features that will make them more 
responsive to our demands – we shape them based on our needs and desires. We restrain 
and reshape landscapes in such a way that they will be productive in ways that we desire 
them to be, and as such there is no place for their self-organization. 
 Despite this danger, I think that the externality of nature, in as far as it is under-
stood in terms of resistance, can still be found, and more importantly reinstated51, in our 
largely domesticated world. Moreover, I think that this idea of resistance and denial of 
meaning can be helpful in illuminating some of the reasons for current fascination with 
rewilding, predators, and threatening nature. I think that grounding the externality of nature 
in negation, resistance, and denial can explain why people like Carver, Monbiot, Snyder, or 
even Herzog, find encounters with discomforting nature so strangely appealing. I want to 
suggest that fascination with nature’s threats arises precisely from the interpretation of 
these threats and harms as instances of the resistance of nature to human appropriation. The 
paradigmatic examples I will discuss below are: evasion of all assignment of meaning, 
transgressions, and presentation of alternative identity predicated upon physical danger. 
 
4.3.3 Experiencing discomforts and finding meaning in nature 
 
I want to begin this section with a paper by David Troupes, in which he discusses the 
subject of “negation of the human sphere by ‘wilderness’” (2015)52. Troupes describes an 
experience that arises precisely from coming in contact with nature that negates our 
                                                          
51
 Such return is not possible in the case of wilderness. Once we influence nature, its purity that grounds its 
externality is forever gone. 
52
 This paper was delivered at a conference on “Landscape, Wilderness and the Wild” (Newcastle, March 2015). 
93 
 
appropriations, in which we are being ‘thrown back upon ourselves,’ and all our attempts at 
making sense are being frustrated: 
 
Thus does wilderness negate every idea, every meaning, every code we might write. Thus 
are we, in its presence, thrown back on ourselves – in every sense. [...] We must read this 
negativity mindful of its context, of course. But that final note of being reminded – fright-
ened, even – of our own humanity, our own life, when confronting wilderness, all meanings 
negated, stripped away: this is the note to isolate, to listen for. This is why we head out. [...] 
in confronting it, standing before it, not turning away, we find ourselves ‘more truly and 
more strange’ [...]. Which is to say, more alive. (Troupes 2015, 125) 
 
Troupes speaks here about feeling ‘more alive’, which should remind us of Carver’s ‘very 
alive’. However, I want to propose that Carver’s version is a very different kind of alive-
ness that we meet here. It is not the aliveness of psychological excitement, it is the alive-
ness of encountering something that refuses easy appropriation and as such allows us to 
access the world more fully, from new perspectives. This is not a physical resistance that 
demands the exertion of muscles and hormonal glands, but rather a hermeneutic resistance. 
As such it requires an interpretative effort in encountering something that stands beyond 
and questions any assignment of meaning. We are more alive because we understand life 
better, we see more of its richness and complexity – we discern more meanings. 
This is one way in which we can understand the idea of resistance or denial in na-
ture. Troupes speaks about frustration of our interpretations that we try to impose on nature. 
In the examples he gives, such rejections seem to take the form of obstinacy: an escaping 
deer or an elusive lynx; things slipping from our grasp, denying easy appropriation. But 
there is a possibility of a more radical denial as in the case of the symbolic threats, like 
when animals cross symbolic borders between wild and domestic spaces, and thus deny the 
validity and universality of the distinctions we have drawn. 
The negation that is embodied in transgressions makes the discussion above direct-
ly relevant to the cases of recolonization. Inasmuch as recolonization involves animals 
crossing boundaries between wild and civilized, even as far as crossing the thresholds of 
our houses, they show a capacity to challenge even the most deeply entrenched of our 
meaningful distinctions. Here animals do not merely slip out of any specification, categori-
zation, or assignment of meaning – they actively challenge the meanings and distinctions 
that are already there and that seem to us stable and universal. Although here we speak not 
just about the possibility of negation of meaning, but about actual negation of imposed 
meanings, the role with respect to meaningfulness is similar. Suddenly, the animals are not 
just constrained or incarcerated53 objects of our manipulations, but free and independent 
beings, truly external, and as such able to answer to our search for meaning. 
                                                          
53
 By this term, I refer back to the charge of Thomas Birch who claimed that wilderness areas ‘incarcerate’ wild 
nature (1990), limiting it to a clearly predefined by humans area. 
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Such an instance of resistance of nature exists in perhaps the most troubling way 
when animals force upon us an alternative interpretation of human identity by posing a 
physical threat to us. This capacity of predators to challenge our identities is discussed by 
Drenthen in the context of the return of wolves to the Netherlands: “Wolves force us to 
recognize that in our desire for control, we lose sight of the unruly nature, the unruly that 
confronts us with our limitations and finitude, that puts at stake the image we have of 
ourselves” (Drenthen 2014, 172). By being physically dangerous, predators such as bear or 
wolf embody not just a possibility to refuse something, but actually force upon us an 
alternative interpretation of what it means to be human. To understand this better we can 
imagine a common enough situation of going to visit a nature area, hoping to connect to 
nature by appreciating its beauty, serenity, complexity, and, perhaps, through simply 
enjoying ourselves. A visitor to a place where predators roam might, however, encounter an 
unexpected surprise. While strolling down the trail and listening to the bird song, he or she 
might suddenly hear some heavy rustling of branches and a growl, catch a glimpse of 
brown fur, smell a distinct odor of rotten flesh. Irrespective of what follows we can expect 
that at this very moment that visitor will immediately stop thinking about the beauty and 
enjoyment of nature and will suddenly see himself or herself as a collection of succulent 
morsels poorly prepared for direct combat. It appears that the attempt to connect to nature 
through appreciation of its beauty is lost in such a moment. But does it mean that all 
meaning is lost? Not really – while the initial interpretation of nature is denied, another one 
presents itself. In the instances when we become an object of interest for a predator, and 
potentially food, even though we are not accepted on our terms, we are accepted as a part 
of nature, of a landscape, or an ecosystem. Rather than being accepted as eco-tourists, or as 
owners, managers, and exploiters of a nature area, we are accepted as food. That is: we are 
accepted as part of the trophic chain of life. The possibility of denial of imposed meanings 
can be understood here precisely as the capacity to present us with such different self-
understanding. Once we look at ourselves through the eye of the predator, we understand 
ourselves differently. If we are looking for a confirmation of our identity as somehow 
special, different from all the other animals, we do not find it – that particular interpretation 
is negated. But that is not all. Instead, we are presented with an alternative substantial 
interpretation of who we are – flesh that turns into flesh, belonging to no one and everyone, 
but certainly not to ourselves. Predators present us with a different horizon of meaning, not 
because they live in a different tradition with which we are confronted and that must be 
appreciated and interpreted by us, but rather because such horizon is embodied in a 
predators’ physiology and in the bodily relationships in which we stand to one another. 
Bears eat flesh. We are made of flesh. We can be food for bears. We are food. As such, 
predators are dangerous not merely in terms of being capable of hurting us, but also by 
enforcing an alternative interpretation of what it means to be human (Hatley 2004; Thorp 
2014; Plumwood 2000; Plumwood 2012). They make us appear to ourselves as edible 
flesh. 
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The three above examples show how resistance to appropriations can appear 
through elusiveness, transgressions, or reinterpretations. This kind of resistance of nature 
establishes nature as truly external reality, and as such a candidate for experiences of 
meaning. Inasmuch as such natural resistance can take forms that we find discomforting, 
these discomforting experiences themselves can become reinterpreted as instances in which 
an externality is established that opens the possibility of finding meaning in nature. As 
such, then, our appreciation of nature as meaningful is predicated upon the existence, or at 
the very least the possibility of the existence, of discomforting experiences of nature. 
So far in this chapter I have presented the resistance present in ecological discom-
forts as the very precondition for finding meaning in nature. In the next two chapters I will 
discuss specific meanings that can appear as we come in contact with such external nature. 
But before that, I want to return to the question raised in the previous chapter, where I 
reflected on the place of an instrumental interpretation of nature in preservationist discours-
es and vice-versa. Having identified the significance of discomforts as intricately tied to 
externality of nature, I want to ask whether the idea of external nature has any significance 
in such nominally instrumental practices as farming. 
 
4.4 EXTERNALITY OF NATURE AND INSTRUMENTAL PRACTICES 
 
We saw in section 3.4.3 that preservationists often fall back on the instrumental interpreta-
tion of nature in arguing for the acceptance of discomforting wildlife – we should accept 
disruptive wildlife because the benefits they bring to us overwhelm the costs. I observed 
there that such an instrumental interpretation can work as a supportive argumentative 
strategy in preservationism. This chapter illuminated the way in which discomforts become 
significant for preservationism in their own right, broadening the scope of situations in 
which discomforts will be acceptable and even desirable. The question remaining from the 
previous chapter is whether the preservationist ideas have any relevance for the instrumen-
tal attitude to nature. To answer this question I will reflect on whether the appreciation of 
discomforts as linked to the resistance and externality of nature plays any role in such 
practices as farming. Showing such connection would establish a shared interest that could 
be a beginning of a conversation on coexistence with discomforting wildlife between 
preservationists promoting such coexistence and farmers (or hunters) who often oppose it. I 
think such connection exists, and that discomforting and autonomous wild nature does 
indeed have a meaningful role to play in such ostensibly instrumental practices as farming. 
But first, we need to clear up some controversies linked to the perception of recol-
onizing wild animals. Recolonizing animals are often seen by farmers not as truly wild, but 
rather as tools in the hands of nature protection groups who use the animals to fight 
political battles over control of the land. If we see animals as mere human tools, they once 
again lose their sense of being a truly external self-willed nature. In such cases, discomforts 
can no longer give us access to meaningful experiences of nature and it becomes impossible 
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to discuss the role of external nature in farming. Therefore I will first try to argue that even 
where political conflicts over recolonization and rewilding are present, we can still see wild 
animals as truly external nature. 
 
4.4.1 From the self-willed to the politicized nature (and back again) 
 
Above, I have argued that encounters with dangerous nature open up the experience of wild 
nature as a truly external reality. However, already in the Introduction, I also pointed out 
that current recolonizations are an effect of human political actions and social transfor-
mations. If current recolonizations are very much dependent on human political activity, 
then there is a case to be made that even in encountering dangerous wild we are in fact 
engaging with (the effects of) human agency, rather than animal agency. Let me explain 
this further. 
Today, animal recolonization can only take place due to intentional and extensive 
human involvement, which includes active protection of these animals and the broad 
changes in economy and culture that I mentioned previously. Consequently, even those 
recolonizations that we would wish to designate as spontaneous are very much intertwined 
with human political and managerial choices. In his study of rewilding of the Apostle 
Islands, James Feldman argues that apparently spontaneous rewilding often does not 
involve cessation of human management but rather a change in management (Feldman 
2010, 2011). Recolonization is often supported by particular political constituencies, either 
passively (limits on hunting) or actively (establishment of reserves and reintroductions). 
Social scientific studies have shown that recolonization is very often seen by its opponents 
(especially farmers and hunters) as an orchestrated and controlled political process advanc-
ing the interests of a very specific political constituency (Wilson 1997; Nie 2001; Skogen et 
al. 2008). In this context, encounters with wild animals are often first and foremost tied to 
political issues of power, land control, discrimination, repression, and injustice, rather than 
to ethical and ontological considerations having to do with our relationship to nature. 
Consequently, dangers and pressures are seen to be primarily an effect of human actions, 
even if they involve natural entities (see also: Gerber et al. 2011). This generates much 
different ethical questions than in the case of encounters with pure wilderness: 
 
The decision of a wild (as opposed to domesticated) animal to eat us, or at least attempt to 
do so, occurs in a context in which morality, or at least humane morality, is simply not rele-
vant. [...] Wilderness, at least insofar as it offers the prospect of being eaten by other ani-
mals, is not inhumane in the manner that murderers and torturers are. To be eaten by a bear 
does not carry the same sense of inhumanity as to be eaten by a fellow human. (Hatley 
2004, 16-17) 
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Wilderness is a place where questions of responsibility do not have a place, as in wilder-
nesses human actions, and so human moral agency, are to be absent per definition. In the 
wilderness, being eaten, attacked, or suffering damage is nobody’s fault. Indeed, it cannot 
be conceived in terms of fault simply because our moral vocabulary does not make sense in 
this context in the way it does in human contexts. However, even if this might be the case 
in excursions to some wilderness areas in the U.S., this might not be exactly so in Europe. 
The mentioned political layer of recolonization complicates matters. Although the animals 
are supposedly wild, the way their return is perceived – essentially as an orchestrated 
intentional reintroduction – means that animal attacks cannot be perceived as a-moral 
events, but rather as events involving human agents. This means they will not be experienc-
es of wild external reality. If the appearance of animals is the result of a political action by 
an opposing political constituency, then there are good reasons to see those animals not as 
wild inhabitants of a-moral world, but rather as partial, if unwilling, participants in the 
human moral world. Hatley observes that: 
 
insofar as domesticated animals are regularly trained to respect human life (or to become a 
threat to it!), they function at least as quasi moral agents in a manner that wild animals may 
not. Different standards would be adopted to judge a grizzly bear attack and the attack of a 
trained dog. (Hatley 2004, 28 footnote 8) 
 
We end up in a strange situation in which a bear or a wolf can be treated much as a trained 
dog would be. Not because it has been trained, but simply because its appearance in a 
specific place is an effect of political action. 
But does that mean that contact with an external, non-human reality is impossible 
also in encounters with recolonizing wildlife? This would mean that we could only encoun-
ter non-political external reality of the wild in pure wilderness, and since there is no pure 
wilderness such contact would be impossible. 
But this is not a necessary conclusion – indeed, it overlooks the very aim of re-
wilding. Just because the act of reintroduction is political does not mean that there is no 
externality that appears as an effect of such political action. The whole idea of rewilding is 
to give room to nature’s autonomy. And although the decision to rewild implies a political 
act and can – even should – be discussed in a democratic arena, the fact remains that the 
consequence of it might be the creation of a new, autonomous agency. Freeing slaves was 
clearly a political act, but it led to the formation of an independent autonomous political 
constituency which did not previously exist. It seems that with rewilding something similar 
is happening. Although decisions leading up to recolonization may be a political matter, 
and as such require political and ethical deliberation, once the animals are actually given 
freedom to roam, encounters with them can be intelligibly seen as encounters with inde-
pendent wild nature. 
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The possibility of seeing recolonizing wild animals as truly autonomous and rec-
ognizing that their presence cannot be reduced to human political activities, allows us to see 
the discomforts they cause as a matter concerning our relation to nature, and not just as a 
case of political (in)justice. Does such reappraisal change in any significant way the 
discussion on coexistence? 
If we take as an example farmers who oppose recolonization, at first blush such 
reappraisal would be irrelevant. Farming is a practice that largely treats nature instrumental-
ly, and aims for an efficient and unobstructed use of nature. There appears to be no mean-
ingful place for discomforting nature and no means to engage with it other than through 
subjugation. Whether the unruly animals are seen as wild others or as political pawns is of 
secondary importance as they will be opposed either way, and reappraisal of discomforts in 
terms of nature’s autonomy seems to bring little to the discussion. However, I want to 
oppose such a perspective. In the next section, I want to show how autonomous and 
discomforting nature may actually play a role even in those practices, such as farming, that 
are predicated upon the use of nature. 
 
4.4.2 Farming and the autonomy of nature 
 
The question is here whether external nature in its discomforting moods can be a meaning-
ful part of practices and traditions, such as farming, that take an instrumental approach to 
nature. Does unruly, external nature have a place within a greater whole constituted by 
farming as a way of life? Can it be discerned within stories, values, meanings, and practices 
that are already present in farming? If it can be shown that such nature already plays a role 
in farming, than perhaps we can find a common way in which to speak about discomforting 
nature – and perhaps create an initial opening for a conversation between environmentalists 
and those opposing recolonizations. 
Before exploring such a possibility an important qualification is necessary. My 
propositions in this chapter are not meant to relate to how farming in general is practiced 
today – rather they are an exploration of interpretations that are present in farming, but have 
been rare, perhaps at risk of a complete disappearance. As such, I speak here about what 
farming can be, given certain possibilities native to this practice, albeit rarely entertained 
today. In exploring such a possibility I refer mostly to work done on marginal kinds of 
farming depending on traditional methods and involving a direct contact between farmers 
and nature, whether wild or domestic. Thus, I am not speaking about industrialized and 
digitalized farming, in which a farmer begins to resemble a cross between an IT specialist 
and an engineer. This is in fact quite appropriate, given that the resurgence of predators 
poses a threat precisely to extensive, traditional forms of farming. Wolves are not a threat to 
cows fattened in intensive feed-lots; they are a threat to sheep freely ranging on mountain 
pastures under sparse supervision. 
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I want to begin by asking what place wildness has in agricultural landscapes. 
There are at least two ways of conceiving of this. In many environmental discourses, rural 
space is seen as a sort of hybrid between wild and domestic, somewhere in between the 
extremes of pure wilderness on the one hand and cities on the other. Holmes Rolston is one 
of the philosophers who embraces and explores this idea: “The rural environment is, or 
ought to be, a place of symbiosis between humankind and nature” (1979, 21). Rural 
landscapes, being hybrids between wild and civil can lean in one direction or the other. For 
Rolston, a well-balanced hybrid is an ideal worth striving for. Some elements of nature, 
presumably wildness as such, may inevitably be lost within rural landscapes, but our aim 
should be to maintain as many as possible: “Within our agricultural goals our preference is 
for those alterations that can be construed as “natural”, those most congenial to the natural 
environment; and we prohibit those that disfigure it” (Rolston 1979, 20). When wildness is 
lost entirely, agriculture becomes an industrial exploitation of the landscape in which 
nothing natural remains. According to this interpretation, one should actively work to keep 
the wild on board, as its disappearance would be a failure to respect the meaning of such 
places. On this view, keeping elements of wildness in rural areas involves constant work 
and is an ongoing balancing act. 
However, there exists a different interpretation of rural space that places it firmly 
on the side of the civilized and domesticated, an interpretation that in all probability is 
closer to the way farmers themselves see it. This interpretation is explored by James Hatley: 
 
While authors such as Holmes Rolston tend to see the rural as between the urban and the 
wild landscape, a “hybrid” of the natural and the cultural, the claim that is being made here 
is that the rural is fully on the side of the urban in regards to edibility. In fact, the very work 
of the rural – even more than the urban – is to render nature edible for humans in a thor-
oughgoing manner. […] even if in the rural we find ourselves working creatively in con-
junction with nature’s pliability and diversity, profiting from its powers and properties, we 
should also recognize that the nature that would eat us is kept resolutely at bay in this pro-
cess. (Hatley 2002, 36) 
 
On this account, wildness is explicitly recognized as a part of rural space. And because the 
rural area is not seen as a hybrid place, it does not make sense to think we should be 
combining domesticated and wild elements. But even tough farmers do not intentionally 
and explicitly make space for wild elements, these elements are always already present in 
rural areas and the practice of farming is marked by a constant engagement with those 
natural forces that are external, often overwhelming, and clearly independent. We do not 
need to make space for wildness, and we do not need to hold presence of wildness as an 
ideal, because this wildness is always already there as a force we cannot get rid of. This is 
confirmed by studies of how farmers see nature in their work: 
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For many farmers nature had different guises. Sometimes they saw themselves as working 
with nature; at other times they suggested that they were engaged in a constant power 
struggle, as nature and wilderness await any opportunity to win back cultivated land. This 
idea is evoked in the vocabulary of farming, where land is 'reclaimed' from nature, or 'bro-
ken in', or 'improved'. These words relate to the concept of controlling land, and managing 
it as the farmer wants, with farmers taking great pride in their improvements. Although 
those concerned with preserving nature may view it as a vulnerable unstable entity, farmers 
tend to view it as robust […] expecting that once they cease to tend it wilderness will return. 
(McHenry 1998, 1044) 
 
Nature was thus conceptualised as a force ultimately uncontrollable and outside of the 
sphere of human activity. As weather, climatic conditions, sheep reproduction or illness, na-
ture acted as a limit on their husbandry skills and farmwork, providing a dimension beyond 
technology or finance. Nature seen like this permeated farmwork and, though they could 
not change or control it, they tried to circumvent it or prevent its worst excesses. 
(McEachern 1992, 163) 
 
If wild, autonomous nature is always already present in the practice of farming, then we 
could expect that this practice somehow has a way to relate to it; farming somehow has to 
define itself in relation to this always felt and always powerful presence. Indeed, in the 
above quotations we can hear the echo of the perception of nature captured by Bernard 
Williams in the phrase ‘Promethean fear’ (1995), which I discussed earlier (in Chapter 2). 
Williams suggested that such fear can be the basis of respect, because its object is the 
existence of a powerful and independent force. Such respect, in turn, can become an 
attitude that shapes many aspects of farming practice. I think such respect for nature, 
grounded in a fear of nature, is already integrated into the farming practice. In this sense 
nature is experienced as an accepted external limit on human activities. 
 
4.4.3 Nature as a limit on our will 
 
Incidentally, the ideas of Bernard Williams, are taken up and expanded by David Wiggins 
with reference precisely to farming practices. One of the different attitudes to nature that he 
mentions, is 
 
the attitude of one who struggles against Nature in a tempest or a sandstorm or in the con-
triving of a great feat of engineering or athletics. One might say that he emerges from the 
experience (if he emerges at all) with a healthy or enhanced respect for Nature as a redoubt-
able opponent or a force to be reckoned with, etc. [..]. This is a highly idiomatic and natural 
(that is unforced) use of the word ‘respect’. But the state it denominates is just one special 
form of respect, where the genus is the more general notion of respect for Nature which col-
lects up this variety together with most or all of the other attitudes so far as enumerated. All 
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these varieties sustain the thought that we should see Nature as some sort of limitation upon 
our will. (Wiggins 2000, 26) 
 
The specific context in which Wiggins speaks about this idea of a limit on the human will is 
that of BSE crisis (commonly known as Mad Cow Disease). As a starting point for his 
analysis, he takes a fragment of a text by British journalist and farmer Robin Page, on the 
sources of BSE crisis. Wiggins suggests that underlying the enumerations of the causes of 
the crisis, though conspicuously missing from Page’s explicit account, is an underlying 
experience of a pre-existing order in nature that should have been respected. Wiggins 
recognizes that today we are generally suspicious of ideas referring to respect for the ‘order 
of nature’. However, Wiggins argues, instead of trying to articulate in a more contemporary 
and intelligible manner this sort of experience of order, we reduce all our considerations 
concerning the moral acceptability of our actions to cost-benefit calculations and safety 
audits: 
 
But the thing we need to dare to say is that this act that was done [feeding offal to cows] 
should never even have been contemplated. There was something in it that was not only 
mindlessly rapacious [...] but nefarious and sacrilegious. [...] Meanwhile, we no longer even 
speak of the thing the Romans called nefas or the related thing Homer and Herodotus call 
atasthalie. Having dispensed not only with theism but with feelings specifically for Nature 
as such, our new inclination is to superannuate entirely the misgivings or scruples or intima-
tions of holy dread that we still have experience of. Distrusting these ordinary misgivings, 
we now delegate the questions that disturb us to specialists charged with making a complete 
human safety audit, a complete environmental audit, a complete inventory of things that 
might be irretrievably lost and things that might be gained. In the light of the best infor-
mation, the relevant probabilities will be estimated, we hope, and a sound policy proposed 
for each class of risk. In this way our society can maximize expected utility. (Wiggins 2000, 
27) 
 
As an alternative to risk assessment and cost-benefit analyses, and a still intelligible 
analogue to the historical concept of sacrilege, Wiggins proposes to pay closer attention to 
the experience of respect to nature as “a redoubtable opponent or a force to be reckoned 
with” (Wiggins 2000, 26). It is such respect for nature as an external and independent force 
that can resist our actions, or respond in catastrophic ways to our activities, that we can 
recognize and promote as an important experience shaping the use of nature. In summary, 
the externality of nature capable to resist human appropriations, though currently under-
articulated, continues to be present in farming in vestigial forms, and it could, if properly 
illuminated, become an important and explicit element shaping its practices. 
 
 
 
102 | Wildness and the preconditions for meaningfulness of nature 
 
4.4.4 Discomforts and identity 
 
The second aspect of farming practice where contact with wildness plays a role is the 
formation of an identity. Taking nature seriously, and living in constant struggle with it, are 
not treated simply as facts that need to be grudgingly accepted. If so, they could have been 
treated simply as costs of being a farmer. Instead, living with powerful nature acquires a 
crucial role in shaping of farmers’ identities. It gives rise to a sense of pride in being able to 
live with an external threatening world and navigate it in daily practices, to know how far it 
can be pushed and at which point humans need to bow down. Most importantly, there is 
pride in being able to live under the constant pressure of this externality as an integral and 
invariable background of life: 
 
Engaging with living nature is part of being rural. Rural people have to put up with both the 
positives and negatives of living with nature. However, these negatives need not be purified 
or hidden away. Rather, it is the process of living alongside them that allows a rural identity 
to evolve. (Enticott 2003, 418) 
 
Thus, “putting up with nature and all that it can throw at you is part and parcel of being 
rural” (Enticott 2003, 418), and this ability is consistently contrasted with the urban, the 
‘townie’, way of engaging with nature, which is seen as focused only on pleasure and ‘easy 
nature’. Farmers do not shy away from confrontations with nature. All of their work is 
replete with that and they take pride in their capacity to face the risks and dangers of nature. 
But in such a worldview where risks are real part of life, taking those risks lightly and 
intentionally introducing new ones must seem absurd, or at the very least suspicious. 
 Consequently, even though the struggle with and capacity to face recalcitrant 
nature is an important element of a farmer’s identity, it does result in very different 
experience of wildness, one which is linked to a very specific sense of vulnerability (in 
contrast with the experience of wildness of most environmentalists). As Berger notes: “the 
peasant is unprotected. Each day a peasant experiences more change and more closely than 
any other class” (Berger 1992, xxi). Even Monbiot recognizes that the life of farmers is 
“sparsest and hardest of livings” (Monbiot 2013, 172). The farmer's position is, then, one of 
perpetual susceptibility and exposure. Though the wild is constantly present in rural areas, 
it is present not as something that we intentionally need to make space for simply because it 
is always already there, constantly exerting its influence, something that is ceaselessly 
making space for itself. Farmers work with nature and to a large extent they work against 
nature – against the weeds, pests, and diseases; they are constantly vulnerable to weather 
and other freak incidents. They are thus naturally more sensitive and their whole comport-
ment towards nature is one of being on guard: 
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Scarcely anything changes in a peasant’s entourage, from the clouds to the tail feathers of a 
cock, without his noticing and interpreting it in terms of the future. […] his economic situa-
tion […] is usually such that even a slight change for the worse […] can have disastrous or 
near-disastrous consequences. His observation does not allow the slightest sign of change to 
pass unnoticed, and his debt magnifies the real and imagined threat of a great part of what 
he observes. (Berger 1992, xxi) 
 
While it is the work of a farmer to struggle with this wildness, the necessity for such a 
struggle, whether real or imagined, suggests that farmers do already recognize the constant 
presence of wildness as an independent force in their land. Moreover, this presence is not 
just opposed, but is also taken up in their practice and becomes fundamental for defining 
the extent of acceptable actions and for construction of identity. 
This analysis shows us that the interpretation of nature as independent and recalci-
trant does indeed play a role in practices and identities of farmers. Farming does not 
identify fully with the instrumental attitude to nature, and there are experiences in farming 
itself that relate directly to the idea of nature’s independence and externality. Here, perhaps, 
we find a point of connection between proponents and opponents of rewilding and recolo-
nization – a subject matter that is of concern to both sides and from which a conversation 
about what is important about living with nature can start: the role that an external, and so 
potentially threatening, nature plays in shaping the practices of farming, hunting, and nature 
protection. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In the interpretations of nature we explored in chapter 3, nature was revealed as of instru-
mental value, and as such could become part of a cost-benefit analysis. The ambivalence of 
recolonization in this context appeared as a ‘mixed blessing’, where the benefits brought 
about by wildlife, some of them material and others less material, are placed against the 
costs produced by their unruly behavior. While these interpretations are associated with 
striving to use and control nature, the interpretations explored in this chapter reveal an 
appreciation of nature as a domain independent from human control, an autonomous order 
of existence that follows its own purposes, and has an importance in human life that 
transcends mere usefulness. The latter perspective opens up the possibility of finding rich 
and varied meanings in nature. 
 There is, however, a clear ambivalence in the experience of such meaningfulness 
of nature: the possibility of meaning is dependent precisely on the possibility that we will 
not find meaning, that the meanings we seek in nature will not be confirmed. This latter 
ambivalence is not just a side effect we grudgingly accept. Rather, such ambivalence is 
intricately tied to how we come to experience meaning. As such, ecological discomforts 
acquire a constitutive importance. 
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 For an instrumental interpretation, on the other hand, the ambivalence of unruly 
nature is of no significance in itself. It presents nature in terms of its costs and benefits, and 
there is little more to say on the subject. We could explore further what counts as costs or 
benefits, and how much value each of these should be assigned to, but I doubt any signifi-
cant insights contributing to our understanding of the ethics of recolonization could be 
found along that road. On the other hand, opening up nature as a sphere of meaningful 
experiences is only the beginning, and an invitation to further interpretation and explora-
tion. 
 In the next two chapters I will engage with two specific contexts in which ecologi-
cal discomforts can become meaningful to us. In the following chapter I will interpret 
dangerous encounters with animals as moral experiences that challenge our established 
moral ideas and as such open a way to further ethical reflection on some of our most 
fundamental ethical prejudices. I will do this using the example of wilderness adventure 
narratives, since it is in this context that encounters with dangerous wildness have been 
most commonly described. In chapter 6, I will present a second meaning arising originally 
in the context of wilderness protection. There, I will discuss the ideas of Aldo Leopold and 
Holmes Rolston III on the significance of ecosystemic wholes and biotic communities. This 
will open up a possibility of making sense of painful individual experiences by referring to 
the significance such events can have for the development and functioning of greater 
wholes like ecosystems and biotic communities. 
 
 5. 
Discomforting encounters with nature 
as moral experiences 
 
 
One of the most common themes in environmentalist writings has been that of leaving 
civilization to submerge oneself in wilderness. A recent and well known story of this kind 
involves Christopher McCandless, a ‘promising’ young man who, disappointed with 
modern middle-class existence, decided to abandon plans for a future career, sever all 
connections with family and friends, and travel across the US. The highlight of his adven-
ture was a lonely trip into the Alaskan wilderness – a trip from which he never returned. 
This true story was popularized by Jon Krakauer’s book Into the Wild (1996), and was 
eventually made into a highly successful movie directed by Sean Penn (2007). McCandless 
was just one in a long line of people who chose to retire into the wilderness in order to 
escape the trappings of modern civilization and search for freedom, inspiration, truth, 
authenticity, or deep insights. We can trace this practice perhaps all the way to shamanic 
retreats, rites of passage, and Christian hermits. The spiritual undertones of such practices 
are not entirely lost even today. American author and environmental activist Edward Abbey 
explains his need to occasionally escape civilization thus: 
 
I am here not only to evade for a while the clamor and filth and confusion of the cultural 
apparatus but also to confront, immediately and directly if it’s possible, the bare bones of 
existence, the elemental and the fundamental, the bedrock which sustains us. […] To meet 
God or Medusa face to face, even if it means risking everything human in myself. I dream 
of a hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self merges with a non-human world and 
yet somehow survives intact, individual, separate. (Abbey 1971, 7) 
 
The difficulties and dangers involved in such travels have been openly recognized, and 
even embraced as integral elements of the adventure: 
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One departs the home to embark on a quest into an archetypal wilderness that is dangerous, 
threatening, and full of beasts and hostile aliens. This sort of encounter with the other—
both the inner and the outer—requires giving up comfort and safety, accepting cold and 
hunger, and being willing to eat anything. You may never see home again. Loneliness is 
your bread. Your bones may turn up someday in some riverbank mud. It grants freedom, 
expansion, and release. Untied. Unstuck. Crazy for a while. It breaks taboo, it verges on 
transgression, it teaches humility. Going out—fasting—singing alone—talking across the 
species boundaries—praying— giving thanks—coming back. On the mythical plane this is 
the source of the worldwide hero narratives. (Snyder 1990, 179-180) 
 
As such, these narratives seem to have much to teach us about encounters with discomfort-
ing wild nature, and about the roles these can play in human life. But there are certain 
invariable features of these stories that demand that we stop and reflect on their applicabil-
ity to the context of coexistence in more domesticated landscapes. Of particular importance 
is the way these stories link such quests to wilderness, thus presupposing a separation from 
everyday life. This in turn might raise doubts about the relevance of these narratives to our 
current situation: 
 
Like women nature writers everywhere, I labored  under the tremendous weight of  the  
Thoreauvian model—men leaving society and going alone to the wilderness, men involved 
in feats of bravery in the natural world. Though I love much of this writing, Thoreau’s writ-
ing and that of many men after him often centered on nature encountered in a world sepa-
rate from our daily one, separate from society. […] There should be no walls or gates be-
tween the domestic and the natural worlds: the house flows into the garden, the garden into 
the wilderness, and all are connected. (Puckett 2013, 85) 
 
In this quotation, Catherine Puckett, nature writer and public affairs chief of US Geological 
Survey, captures well both the general discontent with the wilderness adventure model, and 
at the same time points out the concern which is also at the heart of this study. She criticizes 
the ‘Thoreauvian tradition’ for creating a clear separation between the places where we live 
and the places where we encounter wildness of the world. She claims that we should strive 
to dissolve some of the walls we have erected between ourselves and the non-human world. 
What I have been pointing out consistently is that because of the process of recolonization 
these walls are already falling, whether we like it or not. Therefore, in this work, the 
demolishing of the borders between the domesticated and the wild is not treated as a 
normative ideal, but rather as a reality to which we have to respond. With this in mind, I 
want to examine here what this so-called Thoreauvian model has to offer to questions of 
cohabitation with discomforting nature, while at the same time remaining aware of the 
possible difficulties in its application to the situation under examination. 
In the first part of this chapter, I would like to propose that the key element of all 
wilderness adventures is that of a personal transformation. I will present a model that can 
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allow us to free the idea of personal transformation in encounters with troubling nature 
from the specific context of wilderness adventure. I will do this by carrying out an in-depth 
analysis of one such wilderness experience: the near-death encounter between Australian 
environmental philosopher Val Plumwood and a crocodile54. This analysis will allow us to 
understand better the core feature of the wilderness experience – that it is a challenge to our 
established beliefs, values, and self-understanding, which I will characterize as a moral 
experience. A more in-depth understanding of this main motive behind wilderness adven-
ture will reveal that it is not necessarily linked to wilderness, and as such can also be a 
model for understanding our troubling encounters with wild animals closer home. The 
second part of this chapter will consequently focus on spelling out the insights this model 
can carry for coexistence. This will involve, first of all, a reflection on how the Thoreauvian 
model already influences coexistence in a problematic way; and secondly, how both the 
structure of moral experience, and the content of some of the particular moral experiences 
of wilderness, can actually have something constructive to say on the subject of coexistence 
with discomforting wildlife. 
 
5.1 VAL PLUMWOOD AND THE CROCODILE 
 
On the morning of 19th February 1985, Val Plumwood set out on a canoe trip across the 
backwaters of Australia’s Kakadu National Park, with the aim of exploring Aboriginal rock 
paintings. She decided on the excursion despite the aura being much less inviting than on 
the previous days: “Yesterday, the water lilies and the wonderful bird life had enticed me 
into a joyous afternoon’s idyll (…) Today, I was tempted to repeat that wonderful experi-
ence despite the light drizzle beginning to fall” (2000, 128). Though she left the camp 
intending to pass the day pleasantly on exploration, her narrative masterfully suggests a 
constant presence of some looming force that tried to pierce through the sense of calm and 
leisure. As the drizzle turned to rain “the magic was lost” (2000, 128), and with that 
alteration of the mood Plumwood’s appreciation of the environment begun changing 
dramatically: 
 
[T]he birds were invisible, the water lilies were sparser, and the lagoon seemed even a little 
menacing. I noticed now how low the fourteen-foot Canadian canoe sat in the water, just a 
few inches of fiberglass between me and the great saurian. (2000, 129) 
 
Her apprehensiveness rises as she stops for a quick lunch and experiences a sensation of 
being watched. Despite these intuitions she decides to carry on: “Having never been one for 
timidity, in philosophy or in life, I decided, rather than return defeated to my sticky 
                                                          
54
 This particular example, though this was not the main reason for its choice, will also help us see that there is 
nothing particularly masculine about the Thoreauvian model. Even if it has been historically associated with men, 
the example of Plumwood clearly shows that this does not have to be so. 
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caravan, to explore” (2000, 129). She was unwilling to finish the trip before some meaning-
ful element gave the trip a content that could be easily appropriated and would retrospec-
tively give a reason for all this miserable paddling around in rain. She found such reason in 
the view of a balanced rock which seemed to provide a clear message, an insight that could 
make the trip worthwhile after all: 
 
One especially striking rock formation – a single large rock balanced precariously on a 
much smaller one – held my gaze. As I looked, my whispering unease turned into a shout of 
danger. The strange formation put me sharply in mind of two things: the indigenous Ga-
gadgu owners of Kakadu, whose advice about coming here I had not sought, and of the pre-
cariousness of my own life, of human lives. (…) I turned decisively to go back the way I 
had come, with a feeling of relief. I had not found the rock paintings, I rationalized, but it 
was too late to look for them now. The strange rock formation presented itself instead as a 
telos of the day. I had come here, I had seen something interesting, now I could go, home to 
caravan comfort. (2000, 130) 
 
In the image of the rock, and its accompanying message, she found an idea, something to 
chew on, something that would provide cognitive and narrative satisfaction, and finally an 
excuse to turn back to the campsite. Even the sighting of a crocodile, already on her way 
back, was initially seen as possibly adding to the day as an attraction: “I was close to it now 
but was not especially afraid; an encounter would add interest to the day” (2000, 130). 
After all, it appeared that the story of the day was over – she passed through an adventure 
and acquired some insights. Now all that was left was to return home. But the story was far 
from being over and as the crocodile struck the canoe it became clear there were others who 
would play their role in writing the narrative of the day. 
Two death rolls55 and a difficult crawl through the jungle later, she found herself 
in the vicinity of the camp where she was discovered by a ranger alarmed by her absence. I 
will not describe the moment of the attack and I will let readers turn to Plumwood’s own 
vivid descriptions of the event (2000, 2012). Instead, I want to turn to the way she tried to 
make sense of the attack and to what she herself found most important about it. What stands 
out conspicuously in Plumwood’s accounts of the event, is the extent to which she strug-
gled to make sense of what happened: 
 
 My experience then left me with a huge sense of puzzlement, as if I had somehow stumbled 
into a sinister unfamiliar world that was not my own, but perhaps the stage-set for a movie 
like Jurassic Park. Now after years of reflecting on those events, and of teaching and writ-
ing about the philosophical issues raised by predation, I believe I am at last ready to return 
                                                          
55
 A death roll is a strategy that crocodiles use to kill their prey. When a crocodile catches a large prey, it drags the 
victim into the water, and then uses its own body weight to roll around its own axis until the prey drowns; or in 
more personal fashion: “It is, essentially, an experience of total terror, total helplessness, total certainty, experi-
enced with undivided mind and body, of a terrible death in the swirling depths” (Plumwood 2000, 132). 
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and recognise that strange terrifying world as my own. This journey, I hope, will help me to 
understand the meaning of what happened there not only for my own life, but for life itself, 
from the perspective of both the eater and the eaten. (Plumwood 2012, 25) (emphasis add-
ed) 
 
This quotation reveals an interpretative dimension of Plumwood’s experience and a deeply 
felt need to understand. The encounter posed an interpretative challenge – she had to 
understand what it meant for her, and for others. At this point, we should underline that the 
challenge was not to overcome confusion about what was the right thing to do – that was 
quite obvious to her. On the way to a hospital, while the rangers discussed going back to the 
area of attack to find and kill the culprit crocodile, Plumwood, although seriously wounded, 
vehemently opposed their plan: “I wanted to defend the crocodile’s right to eat humans who 
strayed into their territory” (Plumwood 2012, 17). This shows Plumwood’s concern with 
the wellbeing of the animal and acceptance of its actions, even while she was the victim. 
The concern for the crocodile follows the familiar route in ethics, where relations 
between humans and non-humans are organized through considerations of the rights and 
interests of an individual animal. The attack happened in the wilderness, and since the 
crocodile did simply what crocodiles do, it had all the right to attack Plumwood. Crocodiles 
lack the capacity for moral reflection, and so are not capable of recognizing rights of other 
creatures. It is therefore our human responsibility not to place ourselves in precarious 
situations. Plumwood acknowledged that it was indeed her fault to so carelessly expose 
herself to danger. She acknowledged responsibility for the whole event, absolving the 
crocodile. In other words, the strictly ethical issue, understood as looking for action-
guidance with respect to morally considerable entities, was not what confused her and 
demanded clarification and understanding. 
Instead, she focused on the way that the event was a moment of breaking down of 
her established way of making sense of the world. What was most important for Plumwood, 
was that her taken for granted ideas proved meaningless and new avenues for reflection 
opened up. Given that most of her writings on the attack focus precisely on this breaking 
down, and on her attempt to make sense of the world anew in the wake of the event, I take 
precisely this dynamic of disintegration and reconstruction as the key aspect of her wilder-
ness experience. How are we to understand this kind of experience? I propose to look at this 
event as a moral experience. 
I will now present the idea of a hermeneutical interpretation of moral experience 
and will suggest it might be a productive theoretical framework for understanding what 
happens in at least some of the challenging encounters with discomforting nature. As a 
starting point, I take the idea of a hermeneutics of moral experience from philosopher Paul 
van Tongeren, who builds on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer; I will explain this idea by 
drawing heavily on both philosophers. In the latter part of this chapter, I will return to 
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Plumwood’s experience and analyze it in greater depth using the theoretical framework 
presented. 
 
5.2 MORAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Building on Gadamer, Paul van Tongeren argues that we can identify three aspects of moral 
experiences: an openness to being addressed, a negativity of being questioned, and finally 
an active interpretative appropriation of an experience. 
 
5.2.1 Being addressed 
 
The idea of ‘address’ arises from the recognition that humans possess sensitivity to 
meaning: 
 
Speaking of a hermeneutics of experience means beginning from the premise that people 
are beings who can be addressed, or, in other words, who can be brought to action by means 
other than stimuli that force responses: beings that can be stimulated by meanings; beings 
who can be impressed by meaning, that is, understand and thus are interested in the world; 
beings for whom differences exist, and thus are not indifferent. Experience is first of all an 
openness to this address. In this sense it is the precondition that makes possible what we 
usually call experience. (Van Tongeren 1994, 202-203) 
 
What characterizes a specifically moral experience (in contrast to experience in general) is 
the obligatory receptiveness with which we encounter that which addresses us. We find 
ourselves addressed by the world, an event, a human, or a creature, in such a way that we 
cannot ignore them: 
 
Thus, moral experience is being addressed by something or someone in such a way that, by 
inherent authority, we are summoned or obliged to commit ourselves to, or continue in, a 
certain way of acting or relating, or praxis, which is at the same time understood as being 
part of real or good human life. (Van Tongeren 1994, 204) 
 
While it is us who undergo such experiences, and us who have to make sense of them and 
understand them, we do not have control over such experiences. Therefore, we cannot 
simply create or manipulate moral meanings: 
 
I cannot change moral rules, not even in agreement with all the others who might be in-
volved. That does not mean that they are immutable, but that for those who experience them 
as moral their alteration cannot originate in some form of manipulation. This is because 
moral rules are experienced as being normative, or as calling us to moral response, in and of 
themselves, and thus are not dependent on intervention by or the objectives of any individu-
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al or group. […] I myself cannot choose to take part in morality, for I am always already 
taking part in it. (Van Tongeren 1994, 206) 
 
5.2.2 Being questioned 
 
Once we are open to this address, to being captivated, touched, and demanded from, we 
become aware of the second aspect of experience – being questioned. A moral experience is 
also always about being questioned, it always involves the revelation of the fundamental 
finitude of our understanding of the world. A real experience is always negative, in that it 
questions what we have up to now taken for granted (Gadamer 2013, 361-362). 
 
[E]xperience in this sense inevitably involves many disappointments of one’s expectations 
and only thus is experience acquired. That experience refers chiefly to painful and disagree-
able experiences does not mean that we are being especially pessimistic, but can be seen di-
rectly from its nature. Only through negative instances do we acquire new experiences […]. 
Every experience worthy of the name thwarts an expectation. Thus the historical nature of 
man essentially implies a fundamental negativity that emerges in the relation between expe-
rience and insight. (Gadamer 2013, 364) 
 
The painfulness of the experience of which Gadamer is speaking here does not refer to 
actual harm. There is no essential connection between the hermeneutic idea of negative 
experience and, say, being mauled by a bear. The painfulness is one of disappointment, 
disillusionment, or being shown to be wrong. It is not that we learn through painful 
experiences, though that much is often true as well, but rather that the very experience of 
understanding is always painful inasmuch as it entails a moment of disappointment and a 
revelation of our ignorance. And the more fundamental the disappointment and the more 
fundamental prejudices it touches, the more painful the experience will be, but also the 
more significant it will be, because it will potentially lead to a revision of the most funda-
mental aspects of our understanding of the world and ourselves. 
Each such lesson refers to a specific aspect of our understanding of the world, but 
the ultimate lesson of such experiences is that of the limitations of human understanding: 
“The truly experienced person is one who has taken this to heart, who knows that he is 
master neither of time nor the future. The experienced man knows that all foresight is 
limited and all plans uncertain” (Gadamer 2013, 365). As we are finite beings, our under-
standing is always circumscribed within a specific horizon of tradition. A tradition to which 
we belong, and which carries with it certain prejudices, allows only certain things to light 
up as significant, while obscuring others. This is why we need the openness in the first 
place – precisely because we are limited, we need to be open to the possibility of learning 
which assumptions of ours are particularly unwieldy, which prejudices misguided, which 
important insights unavailable within the specific horizon in which we stand. Still, the 
openness cannot originate anywhere else but within a specific set of assumptions. For this 
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reason, our experiences are always in one way or another encounters with a tradition – they 
address the limitations of this tradition and transform them through the experiences. 
Therefore, “’being experienced’ does not consist in the fact that someone already knows 
everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather the experienced person proves to be, 
on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic” (Gadamer 2013, 364). In other 
words, to be experienced means to know that one cannot but encounter the world from the 
perspective of a specific tradition, but at the same time to be aware that this tradition, being 
limited and particular, must always be open to revisions. 
 
5.2.3 Interpretation 
 
These revisions, however, do not come to us on a silver platter. Because experience is a 
breaking down of familiarity and a questioning of what we have taken for granted, it is not 
self-evident or immediately comprehensible. As Paul van Tongeren puts it: 
 
[E]xperience is a breaking-through of intimacy, and thus, a novelty. […] Events, or our re-
actions to them, because they break through our expectations can also present themselves as 
laden with meaning which, since it both addresses us and at the same time draws away from 
us, we cannot re-cognize. In this manner, our experience and what we experience pose a 
question to us, demand an answer. In order to give that answer, in order to determine our re-
sponse to it, we must ask what it has to say to us. (Van Tongeren 1994, 203) 
 
The way to understand this ‘what’ of the address is through interpretation, without which 
we cannot integrate this novelty nor understand the significance events can have for us in 
terms of understanding the world and ourselves: 
 
[T]exts and happenings in fact appear to be full of meaning, but without that meaning being 
fully clear. We sense their pretension to meaning, but go on to ask what, precisely, the ex-
perience or perception contains. Through interpretation, we try to understand more fully 
what is already, but insufficiently, understood in experience, be it the experience of reading 
or the experience of living. (Van Tongeren 1994, 199) 
 
It is also important to remember, that even a successful interpretation, one which seems to 
be truthful to the experience, is not final. The three stages of experience cannot be seen as 
sequential – rather they are always present. Despite having understood something, we need 
to be aware that this understanding is provisional and always open to new revisions. New 
experiences might put our presuppositions and interpretations in a different light and 
demand a revision. What is more, because of this incompleteness of our interpretations, the 
openness to the world is also an ongoing feature of our engagement with the world – we 
remain open to new meanings, new experiences, and an understanding of our limitation 
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leads to willingness to understand more, to be vigilant for new experiences that might 
change our prejudices. 
Because meaning is never clearly given, every interpretation also struggles with 
the difficulty of staying true to the experience. It is therefore necessary to give some clues 
as to how we can be truthful to our experiences in their interpretation. It is in this sense that 
we have to consider hermeneutical appropriateness – how do we make sense of these 
encounters in a truthful and accurate manner? 
We can take some guiding ideas from French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, who pro-
poses a twofold route of interpretation, which can be applied to texts, but also to meaning-
ful human actions. The route consists of explanation and interpretation: 
 
[T]o explain is to bring out the structure, that is, the internal relations of depend-
ence that constitute the statics of the text; to interpret is to follow the path of 
thought opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the orient of the 
text. (Ricoeur 1991, 121-122) 
 
The explanation, as Ricoeur presents it, consists of a structural analysis that treats a given 
text, action, or event as an entity closed in on itself, allowing it to be analyzed with respect 
to its internal relations. By looking at the internal relations between the elements, we make 
sure we do not omit or misrepresent what is there in the event. Environmental philosopher 
Martin Drenthen uses these concepts with regard to interpretations of landscapes. He calls 
the structural analysis ‘semiotic’ and notes that “[t]he semiotic approach brings into play 
the ‘objectivity’ of a place by conveying certain place features with a specific ‘gravity’” 
(Drenthen 2011, 136). Thus, analogously, certain features/structures of an event might 
stand out as particularly important, as elements that we have to take into consideration. A 
structural analysis allows us to recognize certain elements of interest which can be found in 
a text or event, which have to be taken into account if we want to stay true to the interpreted 
matter, rather than merely being concerned with our projections. This is however only one 
part of interpretation: 
 
[T]he interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thence-
forth understands himself better, understand himself differently, or simply begins to under-
stand himself. […] On the one hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of under-
standing the cultural signs in which self documents and forms itself. On the other hand, un-
derstanding the text is not an end in itself; it mediates the relation to himself of a subject 
who, in the short circuit of immediate reflection, does not find the meaning of his own life. 
(Ricoeur 1991, 118-119) 
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Thus, for every reader, the encounter with a description of experience like that of Plum-
wood is also an interpretative challenge linked with willingness to be open to what the text 
might have to say to us: 
 
[G]ood reading requires willingness on the part of the reader to participate in the world that 
is opened up by the text and abstract from the context of one’s particular life (‘distancia-
tion’). However, understanding a text also mean to be involved, to be ‘present’ in the act of 
reading. […] Good reading therefore does not only require ‘distanciation’, but also ’appro-
priation’: the reader must use the context of his life to ‘bring to life’ the world that is being 
brought forward by the text. (Drenthen 2011, 133-134) 
 
I will now move to apply these theoretical insights to the case of wilderness adventure. To 
understand better how wilderness adventures can be appreciated as moral experiences, and 
how a hermeneutics of such experiences would look, I will now show how all three aspects 
appear in Plumwood’s encounter with the crocodile. 
 
5.3 WILDERNESS EXPERIENCE AS MORAL EXPERIENCE 
 
5.3.1 Being addressed 
 
Plumwood could have responded to her encounter with the crocodile in a purely physical 
manner. And to some extent she did – she fought back and struggled for survival, and in 
that she was successful. Perhaps that is also how most other animals would respond to 
being attacked –fight or flee. Once successful, Plumwood could have gone to a hospital, 
recover, and never again thought about the whole event, short of perhaps being a bit more 
careful when paddling around in the crocodile territory. But this is not all that happened. As 
we recall from the quotation presented before, Plumwood admitted she was left with a 
“huge sense of puzzlement” and wanted to “understand the meaning of what happened”. 
Already during the event, according to her own account, she was trying to understand the 
significance of what was happening and in this we can see that she was open to the meaning 
of the situation and not merely physically involved in the attack. What is important here is 
that she was addressed by the event not as a brute physical occurrence, but as a meaningful 
event that demands reflection. 
 Perhaps we can find this openness already in her sensitivity to the surroundings in 
the beginning of her excursion. The whole trip was pervaded by a sense of being spoken to. 
We can see this very clearly in her apprehension of the balanced rock. Here, it appeared, the 
environment had something meaningful to say – she did not see a mere bunch of boulders 
stuck one upon another. Upon seeing the rock formation she was gripped by fear and 
certain ideas and anxieties imposed themselves on her. Such address was something she 
had already been waiting for – she had been waiting for something to happen that would 
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give meaning to the day – but she did not know what would be the time, content, or form 
this meaning would present itself in to her. 
 While the message of the rock was both imposing and clear from the beginning56, 
the interpretative content of her encounter with the crocodile was rather obscure, even 
while imposing itself on her. She could not simply ignore the event and what it had to say 
to her. Despite not fully understanding the message, she kept on ruminating on it for years 
after and felt the need to understand it: 
 
Some events can completely change your life and your work, although sometimes the extent 
of this change is not evident until much later. They can lead you to see the world in a com-
pletely different way, and you can never again see it as you did before. You have been to 
the limit, and seen the stars change their course. (2012, 11) 
 
It is not without reason that Plumwood places herself in this quotation as a passive subject 
of the experience. The event changed her, she was led to see the world differently, she saw 
the stars change their course. She was placed before the events that had a grip on her to 
such an extent that she could only respond – that she had to respond. 
 
5.3.2 Being questioned 
 
The event of being attacked was so radically different from the usual way the world is, that 
at first, in the heat of the moment, she rejected what she was undergoing as an illusion, 
impossibility, or a mistake: 
 
This was a strong sense, at the moment of being grabbed by those powerful jaws, that there 
was something profoundly and incredibly wrong in what was happening, some sort of mis-
taken identity. My disbelief was not just existential but ethical—this wasn’t happening, 
couldn’t be happening. The world was not like that! The creature was breaking the rules, 
was totally mistaken, utterly wrong to think I could be reduced to food. As a human being, I 
was so much more than food. It was a denial of, an insult to all I was to reduce me to food. 
Were all the other facets of my being to be sacrificed to this utterly undiscriminating use, 
was my complex organisation to be destroyed so I could be reassembled as part of this other 
being? With indignation as well as disbelief, I rejected this event. It was an illusion! It was 
not only unjust but unreal! It couldn’t be happening. (2012, 11-12) 
 
It was only after reflection that she recognized that the mistake and illusion was in her and 
in the cultural assumptions with which she was brought up, and not in the world outside. 
                                                          
56
 Though it was clear for her form the beginning what the rock ‘said’, its message was certainly given depth and 
reality by her subsequent experience with the crocodile. Still the idea of fragility and precariousness did not seem 
to pose particular interpretative challenges to her, which we can all perhaps understand, given how commonly we 
hear about the precariousness and fragility of human life. 
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Despite that eventual integration of the novel insights, her accounts are full of admissions 
of personal failing, ignorance, and painful realizations: 
 
In the vivid intensity of those last moments, when great, toothed jaws descend upon you, it 
can HIT YOU LIKE A THUNDERCLAP that you were completely wrong about it all—not 
only about what your own personal life meant, but about what life and death themselves ac-
tually mean. (2012, 11) 
 
As she reflected, it became clear to her that the event revealed to her the extent, depth and 
wrongness of the prejudices that she held on to. Perhaps the most important and most 
striking one, for an environmental philosopher, was the revelation that deep inside, despite 
being a well-known environmental philosopher who had criticized the nature-humanity 
dualism for many years, she still held on to a belief in a strict separation of humans and 
wild nature. Plumwood makes it clear that the event revealed to her how she, in fact, 
continued to hold on to such traditional conceptual separations: 
 
These events provided me with rich material for reflection long after my recovery and left 
me with many intellectual puzzles around food and death and a strong sense of incomplete-
ness. Why could I not see myself as food—why did it seem so wrong? In what sense was it 
wrong? Why was being food such a shock? What kind of shock was it? Why did I do such 
dangerous things and not perceive my danger? Why did I not see myself as subject to these 
kinds of dangers in this place? Why was I, as a critic of anthropocentrism over many years, 
able to harbor so many illusions about human apartness? Does this reveal my personal con-
fusion or how deep the sense of human superiority and apartness runs in the dominant cul-
ture? Or both? (2012, 14) (emphasis added) 
 
The event thus revealed to her the shallowness of some of her convictions and the way in 
which certain ideas traditionally held in the western world, particularly those having to do 
with human separateness from the natural world, continued to work through her. The 
experience of encountering a predator was, in this way, very much an encounter with the 
tradition which provided a specific horizon of meaning that still, and unbeknownst to her, 
orientated her in her life and actions. 
 This admittance reveals also anguish and even shame, of having been so deeply 
mistaken about her own commitment and depth of understanding of the issues with which 
she had been engaged for years. Thus, the event questioned not just the taken for granted 
cultural assumptions she still apparently held on to, but also her taken for granted personal 
integration of environmentalist ideas. By understanding that her departure from traditional 
conceptions of nature was weaker and more shallow than she thought, she realized she was 
not who she thought she was. The crocodile encounter was, therefore, in the full sense also 
a journey of self-understanding. Through the encounter with the crocodile she understood 
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certain specific limitations on human capacities to change – there was a gulf between an 
intellectual understanding and a more visceral one: 
 
Of course, in some very remote and abstract way, I knew it happened, knew that humans 
were animals and were sometimes—very rarely—eaten like other animals. I knew I was 
food for crocodiles, that my body, like theirs, was made of meat. But then again in some 
very important way, I did not know it, absolutely rejected it. Somehow, the fact of being 
food for others had not seemed real, not in the way it did now, as I stood in my canoe in the 
beating rain staring down into the beautiful, gold-flecked eyes of the crocodile. Until that 
moment, I knew that I was food in the same remote, abstract way that I knew I was animal, 
was mortal. In the moment of truth, abstract knowledge becomes concrete. (2012, 10) 
 
This is an important insight into the limits of human understanding and transformation, 
suggesting we cannot simply choose to change certain of our beliefs and prejudices. Rather, 
we have to undergo a transformation through real experiences. This insight adds depth to 
the sociological studies showing that those who are most willing to act for nature have a 
history of direct engagement with wild nature (see section 1.2). This also confirms the 
critique sometimes levelled at the common environmentalist claim that we should change 
our values and beliefs, as if that change was something we can do by fiat: 
 
We cannot, contrary to what some environmental ethicists argue, simply 'choose' one par-
ticular moral image of nature, commit ourselves to the practices that stem from it (as if one 
could 'choose' to conceive of nature in an ecocentric way and henceforth be an ecocentrist) 
and decide to confront those who hold a different view (for instance, those who tend to look 
at nature as merely a resource for economic purposes). (Drenthen 2007, 392) 
 
The experience of Plumwood attests to the difficulties and limitations involved in such 
changes and the burden present in cases where one truly undergoes a transformation. It also 
raises a suggestion that moral experiences in nature, experiences that carry with them 
possibly physical and certainly emotional danger, might be necessary to truly transform our 
beliefs, identities, and commitments. 
 
5.3.3 Truthful interpretation 
 
In any interpretational task, the major worry is that of misinterpretation – of proposing 
interpretations that fail to be truthful to the experience. Indeed, this was one of the worries 
of Plumwood, as her story had been taken up by media and narrated in ways she thought 
misrepresented the event and failed to do justice to her experience: “I had survived the 
crocodile attack but still had to survive the contest with the cultural drive to present such 
experiences in terms of the masculinist monster myth: the master narrative” (2000, 139). 
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This was essentially a hermeneutical concern. People were not interpreting the events well, 
imposing alien meanings, drawing false conclusions: 
 
As a story that evoked the monster myth, mine was especially subject to masculinist appro-
priation. (…) The events seemed to provide irresistible material for the pornographic imagi-
nation, which encouraged male identification with the crocodile and interpretation of the at-
tack as sadistic rape. (2000, 140) 
 
But rather than being a story about a weak and ignorant woman who entered wild territory 
only to suffer inevitable consequences, and to be finally rescued by a male hero, she 
claimed the event had ethical and ontological significance pertaining to our relationship 
with nature, and contained a revelation about our ecological identity long lost in the western 
world. Some of these misconceptions could have been easily avoided if only some attention 
has been paid to the ‘structure’ of the event: “Although I have survived in part because of 
my active struggle and bush experience, one of the major meanings evoked by the narrative 
was that the bush was no place for a woman” (2000, 140). 
Such interpretative failures and intentional misrepresentations have a huge impact 
on how those who participated in the event relate to it. As it becomes apparent from 
Plumwood’s account, the very inability or ability to pass on the story can be a source of 
anguish or fulfillment. It is precisely the impossibility to tell the story in a truthful way that 
was the cause of perhaps even greater suffering than the physical wounds she sustained: 
 
We all want to pass on our story, of course, and I was no exception. Often, for the dying, it 
is not the death itself that is the main concern, but the loss of their story, the waste of the 
narrative that is their life’s experience […] To the extent that the story is crucial, by the 
same token the narrative self is threatened with invasion and loss of integrity when the story 
of the self is taken over by others and given an alien meaning. (2000, 139) 
 
This suggests that perhaps a fundamental precondition for accommodating discomforts 
caused by nature can be the ability to tell one’s story, to have it heard respectfully, and to 
be able to pass it on. In such context, ridiculing, dismissing, or misunderstanding the stories 
that those troubled by wildlife tell might in many ways be worse than the difficult encoun-
ters these stories try to narrate. 
 
5.3.4 Extending the scope of relevance of the Thoreauvian model 
 
The above three sections have applied the key characteristics of moral experience to 
Plumwood’s encounter with a crocodile. This analysis confirms the applicability of the idea 
of moral experience to at least some of the discomforting encounters with wildlife. The 
question we are faced with now is that of application. That is, while the above illustrates 
convincingly that wilderness adventures can be seen as moral experiences, the question 
119 
 
remains whether or not: a) discomforting encounters with wildlife in the context of recolo-
nization and coexistence can also be seen as moral experiences; b) the insights acquired 
through interpretations of wilderness encounters like that of Plumwood can tell us anything 
important about recolonization and coexistence. 
 I think that the answer to both of these questions is affirmative. With respect to the 
first question, it seems quite obvious to me that a moral experience does not require any 
special location, but rather the hermeneutic openness to being addressed. As such, an 
experience of being addressed can take place anywhere. We might be less willing to have 
these experiences in familiar and more intimate spaces, given our general desire to remain 
in our comfortable and familiar world. In this context wilderness might be the kind of space 
where we are more willing to open ourselves to being addressed by the wild. But these are 
factors contingent on our personal attitudes and our hermeneutic openness or reticence. 
Meanwhile, there seems to be no principled reason why we should not to be able to 
apprehend the discomforting encounters close to home as moral experiences. In chapter 8, I 
will give an example of moral experience in encounter with animals in domestic space. 
 The affirmative answer to the second question – whether interpretations of 
wilderness adventures can tell us anything important about recolonization and coexistence – 
I will substantiate below. In the final section of this chapter, I will turn towards the insights 
of Plumwood regarding her wilderness encounter with the crocodile, with specific focus on 
what they might tell us regarding the subject of coexistence with wildlife close to our 
homes. 
 
5.4 DISTANCIATION AND APPROPRIATION: ACCEPTANCE OF DISCOMFORTS 
 
A hermeneutics of moral experience gives us a frame that opens up a new way of interpret-
ing disturbing encounters with wild nature, and seeing them as highly meaningful. These 
encounters are experiences that beckon to be understood. But particular moral experiences, 
like that of Plumwood, might also carry specific insights that in themselves might be 
relevant to the question of coexistence. Here, we are no longer asking about the relevance 
of the general framing of encounters with wildlife as moral experiences, but about what 
specific moral experiences in wilderness, of which we have many stories, can tell us about 
our current situation. 
Below, I will interpret the experience of Plumwood with respect to what it has to 
say to us today in the context of recolonization. In this I will follow the ideas about 
interpretation presented above. This is appropriate since interpretation applies not just to 
events, but also to texts that we experience as having something to say to us: “Through 
interpretation, we try to understand more fully what is already, but insufficiently, under-
stood in experience, be it the experience of reading or the experience of living” (Van 
Tongeren 1994a, 199). When reading wilderness stories like those of Plumwood, we might 
be addressed by some of the insights and ideas presented there, as having something to say 
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to us in our particular situation. In applying them to our own situation we “follow the path 
of thought opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the orient of the text” 
(Ricoeur 1991, 122). 
What insights regarding the meaning of discomforts can we find in Plumwood’s 
experience that could be relevant for those of us who are confronted with recolonization 
and face questions raised by coexistence? Since we are concerned here particularly with the 
role that ecological discomforts can play in coexistence, I want to begin with structural 
observations on the salient factors that played a role in Plumwood’s reactions to nature’s 
threat. 
 
5.4.1 Structural observations 
 
As we saw above, what stands out rather starkly is how Plumwood in strong terms under-
lined her acceptance of crocodile’s attack. Since we are concerned here with understanding 
the meaning of discomforts, this appears as a promising place to start an exploration of 
what her insights into the subject can tell us about recolonization. 
What motivates this acceptance? The virtually universal feature which Plum-
wood’s account shares with most other wilderness stories is the recognition that humans 
freely enter into a foreign territory and therefore need to accept discomforting nature. Dave 
Foreman notes how “[t]he sign at the National Forest trailhead a quarter mile from my front 
door welcomes hikers, but also warns that we are coming into the home of many kinds of 
wildlife and that we are ‘guests in their home’ (italics on the sign)” (Foreman 2013, 184). 
Wilderness is, thus, a home of animals, and as such demands that we act respectfully 
towards those animal inhabitants and allow them to lead their lives the way they see fit. 
What does this mean in the context of danger or nuisance? We can turn to the essays of Val 
Plumwood for a clear illustration: 
 
I wanted to defend the crocodile's right to eat humans who strayed into their territory. 
(Plumwood 2012, 17) (emphasis added) 
 
[M]y rescuers discussed going upriver the next day to shoot the crocodile. I spoke strongly 
against this plan: I was the intruder, and no good purpose could be served by random re-
venge. (Plumwood 2000, 135) (emphasis added) 
 
I struggled on, through driving rain, shouting for mercy from the sky, apologizing to the an-
gry crocodile, calling out my repentance to this place for the fault of my intrusion. (Plum-
wood 2000, 134) (emphasis added) 
 
One accepts what animals do, no matter how unruly and dangerous that is, because one is 
an intruder in their territory. When a human transgresses into animal space, she renounces 
the claim not only to dominance or superiority, but even to humane treatment. This means 
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that wilderness becomes an appropriate place for potentially tragic encounters with wild 
nature. As Gary Snyder notes, wilderness is “[a] place of danger and difficulty: where you 
take your own chances, depend on your own skills, and do not count on rescue” (1990, 11). 
The danger here appears as a consequence of entering a place that is not made and shaped 
specifically with us in mind. 
 Beyond that, it is also important to note that it is individuals, or at most small 
groups, that venture into wilderness, freely and with an awareness of what they might 
encounter there. 
 
A venturesome minority will always be eager to set off on their own, and no obstacles 
should be placed in their path; let them take risks, for godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt, 
stranded, drowned, eaten by bears, buried alive under avalanches – that is the right and priv-
ilege of any free American. (Abbey 1968, 69) 
 
The possibility of going into the wilderness is presented as an individual right, and such 
perspective makes sense in this context, since a wilderness adventure virtually always 
involves activities taken up willingly by individuals who take full responsibility for what 
they do. Since it is just about an individual’s free choice, no obstacles should be placed on 
their way. It is a libertarian ideal, supported by the fact that such individual adventures do 
not directly impact anyone else – they are carried out by individuals outside of the confines 
of everyday lives, and away from other people57. Virtually all the wilderness narratives 
share this basic structure of an individual, willingly and fully aware of possible hardships, 
deciding to enter a ‘foreign’ territory. 
 So far this does not sound promising. Indeed, the situation of recolonization might 
appear as a mirror image of wilderness encounters. Cities and farms are decidedly the kind 
of places where we are most at home, where we most belong, where we do not expect to be 
exposed to danger. Wild animals seem to be intruders here. Moreover, there is no individual 
human choice involved in coming into contact with dangerous wildness at home. All this 
suggests that we need to be very careful about the application of ideas from the Thoreauvi-
an model to cases of coexistence. Unless we take seriously into consideration these 
differences, we might fail to stay true to the concerns raised by the recolonization. To 
illustrate how misinterpretation and misapplication can happen, I would like to discuss two 
examples of the way in which the Thoreauvian model still implicitly orientates some of the 
attempts to engage with wildlife close to home, extending the characteristics of individual 
free human choice to cases of coexistence. 
 
                                                          
57
 An implication of relatives who suffer the loss, or of the rescue services that will eventually have to save the 
wilderness adventurer, might complicate such an ideal. Still, the ideal would be that, as Snyder notes, one does not 
expect rescue, and perhaps it is also expected that family and friends identify with the goals and ideals of a 
wilderness adventurer. 
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5.4.2 Problematic application of the Thoreauvian model: From human decision to human 
passivity 
 
As could have already been glimpsed in the above, it is not only that in classical wilderness 
adventure tales humans enter wild territory, but also that they do so voluntarily and 
intentionally. In other words, one chooses to go on a trip, trek, travel, or adventure. I would 
like to look a bit closer now at the consequences that such a voluntary engagement with 
wildness has for our thinking about our encounters with wildness closer home. 
Let me start with a quotation from Bill Sherwonit, a late-in-life nature writer living 
in Alaska, who ends his collection of essays about encounters with the wild world with 
these words: “The good news is that wildness reaches everywhere, from the far wilderness 
to the innermost pockets of our biggest cities. We can each choose where, in what form, 
and in what way we get to know the wild” (Sherwonit 2008, 214) (emphasis added). This 
passage is so interesting because it reveals an unsubstantiated claim to control – if wildness 
is everywhere, then how come we can choose when and how to encounter it? Wouldn’t it be 
a fair assumption that if wildness permeates our lives, sometimes, without expecting it, we 
can be called to attention and forced to face it, precisely where we don’t want to and when 
we least expect it. To paraphrase St. Paul: wildness comes like a thief in the night. In many 
cases, animals do express agency in moving to places without asking for our permission 
and without taking into account our readiness to encounter wildness. This might be most 
startling in the case of insects and birds, which cannot be stopped by earth-bound bounda-
ries. But many mammals are also adept at breaching obstacles put in their way. The 
discomforts experienced over wildlife penetrating symbolic boundaries are a case in point 
here. One of the reasons why a fox entering a house in an urban metropolis like London, or 
a wolf walking along a street of a Dutch town, are so startling, is because we had little to 
say regarding whether we were willing or not to encounter them. 
Whence, then, comes such a strong sense of human capacity to choose? It makes 
sense to interpret it as a residue of the wilderness adventure model. When encountering 
wildness in wilderness areas we do indeed choose ourselves if, when, and where we 
encounter such wildness, if only because travelling to wilderness areas usually involves 
extensive planning. In such cases, one indeed has to choose to embark on such a trip and 
the decision to encounter wildness is in human hands – indeed one not so much encounters 
wildness, as rather searches for it. But wildness is not limited to wilderness. In chapter 2 I 
have noted the recent reinterpretations of the place of wildness in the world. Many nature 
writers, environmentalists, and philosophers have begun thinking about wildness as a 
quality that permeates the whole world. Sherwonit is himself part of this trend. But if 
wildness is everywhere, we are not in the position any more to freely choose the terms of an 
encounter. This is precisely what is so clearly visible in the current cases of recolonization. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, not being fully in control of the situation might 
be precisely what is needed to experience nature as an autonomous other, and therefore also 
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to experience nature as meaningful (see 4.3.). At the same time it is precisely this lack of 
control that might become truly discomforting. It is one thing to lose control in strictly 
defined space (a wilderness area), as a result of one’s choosing, but it is quite another to be 
always open to surprise confrontations. This suggests there is a good reason not to lay 
ourselves fully open to the vagaries of wildness in our homes, cities, and villages – there is 
nothing strange about wanting to have places where we can feel reasonably safe, where we 
can lay claim to some control. Moreover, even if we do strive for meaningful encounters, it 
might also be unnecessary to fully lower our guard against wildness. Also in our engage-
ments with other people, we extend a certain amount of control and erect boundaries and 
rules that keep us protected. A space of home is one such place where we can feel protect-
ed. So although saying we can determine how, where, and when we meet wildness is an 
overstatement, laying oneself fully open to wildness is not the only alternative. The 
question that emerges here is one of balance, of finding the right extent of control, interac-
tion, and mutual influence in encounters with wild others in humanized spaces. But when a 
truly disruptive encounter does happen every now and then, the hermeneutic analysis of the 
moral experience involved in such encounters might offer us a constructive way of looking 
at such events. What is more, such experiences might be helpful in our reflections on what 
would constitute an appropriate balance of control and letting go. 
 
5.4.3 Problematic application of the Thoreauvian model: from individual choice to 
normative questions 
 
In the common wilderness narratives it is always an individual or at most a small group of 
people who choose to enter the wilderness as visitors. On the other hand, in cases of animal 
recolonization we see the opposite: individual animals, or whole groups of animals entering 
human communities. However, in many instances, this appearance of wild animals within 
human communities is still framed in terms of personal choice, and even preference: 
 
When I lived in the mountains outside Boulder, Colorado, I would sometimes feel this fear 
when walking or riding along the roads and trails around my house. Some animals can be 
dangerous; I might unexpectedly startle them, or they might not appreciate my presence in 
their home. I had to be on the alert. This isn’t a bad thing, and it always reminded me how 
incredibly fortunate I was to be sharing my home with other magnificent animals. I chose to 
live where I did, and if I didn’t like the particular terms of coexistence, I could move else-
where. (Bekoff 2014, 14) (emphasis added) 
 
I think that speaking about living in a place in terms of choice and preference is unhelpful, 
as it misrepresents how we make ourselves at home in places, and also because it might be 
counterproductive in terms of developing coexistence with wild newcomers. Let me 
explain. 
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 We see in the quotation above a human individual who is not so much choosing to 
go into the wild, but rather choosing to live where she does, a place where apparently 
animals choose to live too. But this way of looking at inhabiting place, although perhaps 
steeped in an American tradition of thinking about place, can be questioned. One does not 
necessarily choose to live in a place – one is born into a place and perhaps into the whole 
culture that goes with it; or perhaps one is chosen by a place and has to respond by making 
a living there. The value of emplacement and belonging is often recognized as crucial check 
on the ideology of free-spiritedness and superficiality: 
 
[W]e no longer have a home except in a brute commercial sense: home is where the bills 
come. To seriously help homeless humans and animals will require a sense of home that is 
not commercial. The Eskimo, the Aranda, the Sioux – all belonged to a place. Where is our 
habitat? Where do we belong? (Turner 1996, 34) 
 
Such an account of place proposes an alternative to the view that holds that we chose 
ourselves where we want to live. A sense of belonging has been identified as of potential 
importance in addressing environmental issues. Belonging has, for instance, been of central 
importance to the thinking of Aldo Leopold: “We abuse land because we regard it as a 
commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we belong, we 
may begin to use it with love and respect” (1970, xviii-xix). The importance of place 
attachment and belonging is recognized not only by environmental philosophers. Social 
sciences have also identified place attachment as an important factor in motivating pro-
environmental behavior and development of concern for nature (Vorkinn and Riese 2001; 
Brehm et al. 2006). 
 But speaking about place-belonging might raise some eyebrows – after all, 
belonging has often been used in connection to chauvinistic beliefs to justify exclusion and 
oppression of those who purportedly ‘do not belong’. Strong claims on who belongs and 
who does not belong to a place or a country have been too often used to justify racial and 
social exclusion, pogroms, and enforced relocations. But speaking about belonging in 
normative terms does not have to lead to such consequences. On the contrary, it is precisely 
a framing of belonging in terms of preference that can be problematic. Indeed, Bekoff’s 
statement entails the risk of chauvinism: by suggesting that the choice to live in a place 
requires one to agree with the pre-existing arrangement of a place, he assumes that the 
terms of coexistence are non-negotiable. If someone coming from outside does not like 
them, then that newcomer should stay out. If somebody already living in a given place does 
not like the terms of coexistence – they should leave as well. Given that terms of coexist-
ence in most urban and rural areas for the last decades and often centuries excluded wild 
animals, this way of speaking closes-off any possibility for arguing that animals should 
perhaps be accepted into these places. 
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 Considering that a crucial issue in recolonization is the dynamically changing 
spatial co-occurrence, we need to be open to the possibility of renegotiating the terms of 
coexistence – indeed, to the possibility of introducing coexistence as a viable option. The 
question should not be couched in terms of individual choice and preference, but rather 
become an ethical question of whether to accept given creatures or given behaviors in a 
given place. This is an ethical question that does not so much rest on personal preferences 
but that demands public discussion, and that should involving both those that uphold and 
those that question the appropriateness of accepting recolonizing animals. 
 Articulating and discussing the meaning of moral experiences can play an im-
portant role in such renegotiation. Inasmuch as they reveal to us the limitations of our 
established ways of making sense of the world, and challenge us to rethink those, they 
might be crucial in helping us move beyond the normative status quo. An encounter with an 
animal in one’s living area might open one up to rethinking the place in terms of home for 
other creatures as well.  This does not have to include dramatic events like  that  of  
Plumwood. Even finding a fox den under one’s porch (a common enough event these days), 
confronts one in a direct and visceral fashion with the fact that our homes might also be 
homes to countless other creatures, and that perhaps – just perhaps – they should become 
such shared homes. I am not raising here a strong normative point. I am merely suggesting 
that such encounters, rather than an annoying nuisance, can become opportunities for 
individuals to rethink the terms of cohabitation in places we live in. 
 
 The two above examples showed how misapplication can lead us astray when our 
thoughts are focused on features of wilderness experience that do not apply to a given 
situation. I would now like to move to those parts of Plumwood’s moral experience that 
actually do have something to say to us that will be relevant for cases of coexistence. 
 
5.4.4 Between individual justice and radical generosity 
 
Plumwood recalls the first thoughts that overwhelmed her the moment the crocodile struck 
as follows: “As the crocodile pulled me out of my normal universe and down into that 
watery parallel universe I thought that the world revealed there was one of terrible injustice, 
indifference and grim necessity” (Plumwood 2012, 36). In her subsequent analyses, she 
identifies the conceptual framework from which these thoughts arose, locating them within 
the common ideas of justice and inviolable integrity of individuals: 
 
[I]n the individual justice universe the individual subject’s universe is like the person-as-
the-walled-moated-castle-town. It is under constant siege and desperately, obsessively seek-
ing to keep the body—this body made out of food—away from others and retain it for our-
selves alone. Of course we know the walled-moated castle will fall in the end but we try to 
hold off the siege as long as possible while seeking always more and better siege-resisting 
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technology that will enable us to remain self-enclosed. In the individual/justice universe 
you own the energy volume of your body absolutely and spend much of that energy defend-
ing it frantically against all comers. Any attempt by others at sharing is regarded as an out-
rage, an injustice, that must be resisted to the hilt (consider our reaction to the overfamiliar 
gate-crashers at our high-class feast—mosquitoes, leeches, ticks. These outrage our proprie-
tary sensibilities). (2012, 35) 
 
As a consequence of looking from such a self-centered horizon, the actions of the crocodile 
could have only appeared as a wrongful violation of personal integrity. The acceptance of 
an attack, within such perspective, could have only come from a recognition that a human 
transgressed into an animal’s territory, or from the recognition that the animal was just 
doing what it normally does. But as she reflected on that moment, Plumwood changed her 
opinion about the world she encountered in the jaws of the crocodile: “I now think differ-
ently. Now I have thought about it more. I think the food chain world is a world of radical 
and startling equality—it is not unfair, it treats all the same way” (Plumwood 2012, 36). 
Plumwood’s conclusion was that in that moment, rather than being subject to injustice and 
violation, she actually became a participant in a whole different set of relations, a world 
with its own sort of appropriateness, which far from being meaningless, can in fact be of 
great relevance to understanding of our place in the world: 
 
This is the universe represented in the food chain whose logic confounds our sense of jus-
tice because it presents a completely different sense of generosity. It is pervaded and organ-
ised by a generosity that takes a Heraclitean perspective, one in which our bodies flow with 
the food chain. They do not belong to us; rather they belong to all. A different kind of jus-
tice rules the food chain, one of sharing what has been provided by energy and matter and 
passing it on. (2012, 35) 
 
What we encounter here is, first, a completely different concept of justice that opens up a 
radically different way of assessing relations between individuals; and secondly, a com-
pletely different idea of self. The latter, in stark contrast to the idea of an inviolable 
subjectivity, is a transient kind of individuality, which is always shared between individuals 
on the basis of, what Plumwood calls, ‘generosity’. And it is this generosity, a constant 
giving and sharing, that is the basis of justice. Staring from a different side, we can first 
state that there is a sort of justice as a sense of complete and indiscriminate equality, 
perhaps akin to the promise captured by the medieval imagery of danse macabre: we are all 
equal in death, poor and rich, kings and beggars, humans and animals. But such equality in 
death is not linked to an ultimate end, or the Day of Judgement, but rather to an idea of 
generosity: in the moment of death everyone will be shared between the others in an act of 
unconditional giving. It is curious that Plumwood decides to speak about generosity here. It 
suggests not just sharing, but a willing sharing, even giving, as part of a view on the good 
life and an expression of virtue. 
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 I think Plumwood is getting on dangerous grounds by taking these concepts to the 
edge of intelligibility. But perhaps her aim is to support the radical shift of perception that 
is involved in acquiring this other perspective, and the radical difference of attitude that 
arises once we take it. 
Once Plumwood truly recognizes her ecological identity and the intelligibility of 
this radical ecological justice, she no longer objects to the crocodile’s attack: “So who was I 
to deny the crocodile the food of my body? In the logic of the Heraclitean universe the food 
of my body, representing the body as energy–matter, never belonged to me. It always 
belonged to the ecosystem” (2012, 36). It is true that Plumwood never really objected to 
crocodile’s right to eat her. But this acceptance of the animal threat is no longer anchored in 
the meaning of a place, or in the recognition of a punishable transgression. It is therefore 
different than the reasons usually given for the acceptance of animal threats that were 
presented earlier. 
The insights into human identity as also an animal suspended in the relations of 
radical generosity, do not relate to a specific location or transgression, and this is the point 
at which her experience becomes relevant to our considerations of coexistence. Plum-
wood’s claim is not that we become flesh as soon as we enter wilderness areas. Rather, she 
claims that we are always already flesh, wherever we are, even if we first become confront-
ed with this reality as we stare in the eye of a predator. This is not a unique insight of 
Plumwood, and we can find similar reflections in many of those who venture into wilder-
ness (see e.g.: Turner 1996; Hatley 2004). 
The ethical task here is not to acknowledge the appropriateness of wilderness as a 
place of discomfort, but to always see ourselves as also flesh for others: “It is also false to 
see the boundary between these [Heraclitean and individual justice] universes as coinciding 
with the wild/domestic boundary. Living within an urban and domestic/cultivated sphere 
does not preclude being in an ecosystem framework” (Plumwood 2012, 38). 
It would appear, then, that to truly accept the message of the flesh, to truly under-
stand and internalize our ecological identity, has consequences for how we govern the 
places that nominally we consider as exclusively human. Val Plumwood claims that: “the 
existence of free communities of animals that can prey on humans indicates our prepared-
ness to share and to coexist with the otherness of the earth […] The persistence of predator 
populations tests our integration of ethical and ecological identities” (2000, 145). Although 
this self-interpretation does not in any logically necessary way lead to an acceptance of 
dangerous animals close to homes, it does present a horizon in which such acceptance 
appears as intelligible and reasonable. What could have been a meaningless accident 
appears as a meaningful participation in the universal generosity in which we are also 
participants. 
If we are always flesh, then it would appear that to always be open to the possibil-
ity of becoming food is quite appropriate. This acceptance comes from the recognition of 
our continuing identity as fleshly beings who can at all times be legitimately seen as food 
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for other creatures. Indeed, it should lead to the recognition that we always already are food 
for countless beings – bacteria, mites, mosquitoes, ticks. Since such wildness is no longer 
tied to wilderness, it can also be found at home. 
Given that many argue it is important that we begin to see ourselves as integral 
members of the community of life, it is of great importance to realize that we do not need to 
venture into wilderness areas to acquire such self-understanding. Every mosquito bite 
becomes a reminder of our membership in the community of life, and of our participation in 
processes that predate our coming into this world, or rather: processes which brought us 
into this world in the first place. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have proposed a specific way of engaging with discomforting, even 
terrifying or tragic, encounters with wildlife. The core of wilderness adventures is to 
undergo moral experiences that question us. This, first of all, gave us a better understanding 
of what constitutes a moral experience and how a hermeneutical analysis of such an 
experience can give us a better grasp of the nature of ethical normativity. But it also gave us 
an alternative way of understanding encounters with disruptive nature. 
Looking at encounters with troubling wildlife as moral experiences opens up a 
way of conceiving the ambivalence of those events, revealing them as troubling not just in 
terms of their material impact, but primarily in terms of the way they challenge our most 
fundamental beliefs. This also enables a possibility of productive engagement with these 
events. They are not merely physical harms and material damages. Inasmuch as they can 
address us as meaningful events, they can become an occasion for reflection and deeper 
understanding. Such challenging experiences are not just destructive threats to the existing 
order of things, for they also provide an opportunity for rethinking whether the existing 
ways of making sense of the world are appropriate. The experience of Val Plumwood is a 
perfect example: it challenged some of the most fundamental assumptions about human 
identity and its relation to the world of nature. Plumwood was able to engage in a produc-
tive fashion with what could have been merely a traumatic and destructive event provoking 
retaliation. Though such an engagement requires radical hermeneutic openness and 
significant psychological strength, it provides a model on the basis of which we can think 
of a broader set of events in which nature challenges the established ways of acting, 
thinking, and living in a constructive way. 
Wildlife is discomforting and destructive, yes, but by engaging reflectively with 
such destruction, we can gain insights and acquire a better understanding of ourselves and 
our culture, and on the basis of this hopefully develop more adequate ways of living with 
non-human nature. This framework, therefore, allows us to recognize the potentially 
destructive agency of animals, but also gives reasons for accepting such agency as poten-
tially productive. As such, rather than showing these events as beneficial, it presents them 
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as ambivalent but important. And, as in the previous chapter, they are important precisely in 
their ambivalence, not despite of it. The ambivalence embodies the possibility of a painful 
destruction of the established meanings, but one which is recognized as important, since it 
can lead to a deeper, better understanding. 
 Following the reflective path opened by one such moral experience of wildness we 
gained also some specific insights regarding the subject of coexistence, specifically with 
respect to our identity and our conceptualization of the relationships which tie us with other 
creatures. Plumwood proposed that we see ourselves as suspended in ecological relations of 
ecological generosity, governed by radical justice. But while we can meaningfully see 
ourselves as participants in a Heraclitean world, this does not mean we should abandon the 
world of individual justice. Rather, her claim is that we exist in both these two radically 
different worlds at the same time: 
 
The boundary and radical difference between what I am calling the person/justice and the 
food/ecological framework is real. I have been there, I have journeyed to this other world in 
which we are all food, and I have come back […]. There is an incommensurability which 
shuts these two worlds off from each other. They exist as parallel universes, in different di-
mensions. Yet, we exist in both simultaneously. They do not invalidate one another, except 
when people mistakenly try to reduce one to the other or make other mistakes resulting 
from human arrogance. These lead us to divide the world between the one in which you are 
a person-subject from an individual justice perspective, and that other, older shocking, sub-
versive and denied world in which you are food. (Plumwood 2012, 37) 
 
The question remains what to do with this radical difference. It is not easy to come to terms 
with existing in two so radically different realities. Plumwood seems to suggest that we 
should respect their differences, recognize their incommensurability, acknowledge the 
tensions that exist between them, but also let them qualify each other (Plumwood 2012, 38). 
What would that mean in practice? And what kind of dangers do we encounter when we try 
to somehow make sense of this dual existence? 
In chapter 6, I will reflect on the relationship that exists between individual crea-
tures and the ecosystems or biotic communities in which they live. I will present a systemic 
value theory of Holmes Rolston III, which can be seen as an attempt to build a bridge 
between the concern with individual wellbeing arising from the individual justice world, 
and the recognition of ecological values arising from the radical justice of generosity. 
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 6. 
Individual sacrifices  
and the flourishing of ecosystems 
 
 
The last two chapters addressed the direct impacts of animals on humans, even such 
extreme ones as being attacked by predators and becoming their food. While the very 
thought of becoming food might be deeply disturbing, we do not need to become victims 
ourselves to find predation discomforting. Recolonization reacquaints us with the reality of 
life on Earth consisting of eating and being eaten. Of course we are all aware that death and 
suffering are present all through the natural world. But most of the time we do not give this 
much thought. Once confronted with the fact that death and suffering are an integral part of 
the natural world, which we otherwise find so beautiful and fascinating, many people find 
themselves deeply disturbed and find it difficult to figure out how to relate to this reality 
and what to make of it. 
 A good example illustrating such unease is the controversy surrounding the 
management of a Dutch nature reserve, the Oostvaardersplassen. The reserve is located in 
an artificially created polder which was abandoned soon after construction. After some 
years of oblivion, the place was discovered as a hotspot for wetland birds. Subsequent 
reintroductions of Heck Cattle and Konik Horses resulted in the area becoming a famous 
rewilding site and a test-bed for theories concerning bottom-up influences of large grazers 
on ecosystem development. 
 The management of the area from the very beginning took a hands-off approach, 
with rewilding as its conceptual basis. This meant primarily allowing the horses and the 
cattle, which became one of the main attractions of the reserve, to lead their lives as 
naturally as possible. After the initial period of acclimatization, the animals were allowed to 
roam the area freely, developing their own social structure, looking for food, and caring for 
their young. After years of free development, today we can admire the Oostvaardersplassen 
as a truly spectacular landscape. 
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 But there is a side to this preservation approach, which many find deeply problem-
atic. The hands-off approach means that the animals are not treated for diseases or injuries, 
there is no supplementary feeding, and no shelters are provided during the winter. It is this 
that quickly became contentious, as sick or starving animals began to die58. Many hunters, 
farmers, and animal advocacy groups took issue with what they considered to be a gross 
negligence from the side of park’s management. While managers argued that the amount of 
animals dying in the reserve is within the bounds of natural population dynamics, and that 
deaths of starvation and sickness are all too common in nature, many find these arguments 
unsatisfactory and demand a management of the area that would at the very least minimize 
the suffering of the animals, and hopefully somehow help them to survive during hard 
times. 
 The demands of the public seem fairly intelligible. In our daily lives we try to 
support the needy, protect the vulnerable, and are deeply troubled by suffering and harm. 
Suffering and death, and often a gruesome death, seem to be an inevitable part of nature, 
and we are troubled by their pervasive presence once we are really confronted with them. 
These moral intuitions are recognized even by those who openly express their love and 
admiration for wild nature. 
 We can find the experience of such unease explicitly articulated by Holmes 
Rolston III, one of the key figures in the development of modern environmental ethics. In a 
passage that brings us back to Bernard William’s identification of horror as a fundamental 
human experience of nature, Rolston acknowledges that “[a] formidable emotion before 
nature is a kind of horror at the anarchy and relentless struggle in a world which opposes 
either by its indifference, or by its hostility” (Rolston 1983, 192). Although Rolston is 
deeply sensitive to the beauty of nature, he is also aware of the ways in which nature 
apparently tortures its creations: “Each seeming advance—from plants to animals, from 
instinct to learning, from sentience to self‑awareness, from nature to culture—steps up the 
pain. Earthen natural history might almost be called the evolution of suffering” (Rolston 
2015, 48). Sensitivity to the beauty of nature and the wellbeing of wild creatures might in 
fact deepen our anguish. In the Western ethical tradition, suffering has largely been 
depreciated as a basic wrong, a claim that is taken to its ultimate formulation in the 
utilitarian consequentialism of Jeremy Bentham and John-Stuart Mill, and is reinterpreted 
in the context of animal ethics by, for instance, Peter Singer (1975). Within the animal 
rights movement, individual harms can only appear as breaches of inviolable rights. In this 
context, safety, satisfaction of desires, happiness, pleasure, and individual inviolability are 
all seen as good. Sensitivity to the wellbeing of individual animals, opened up to us 
particularly by animal ethics, exposed with renewed urgency the extent of suffering in the 
world. As we begin to see beauty, value, and subjectivity in nature, we are also troubled by 
                                                          
58
 For an in-depth discussion of the controversy and interesting philosophical ideas on the issue see Klaver et al. 
(2002). 
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how often these are destroyed: “Wolves put out the fire in the eyes of deer. All of us need 
time to accept a world built on predation. We come to empathize, to sympathize with both 
hunter and hunted” (Rolston 2015, 48). Once we come to appreciate nature, it is possible to 
notice that much of what we appreciate is being destroyed routinely and on a massive scale, 
and this is precisely something that appears troubling to us and stands in need of explana-
tion: 
 
I had no fears of being eaten, but then again I had to realize that all the animals in those 
woods did live in constant fear of being eaten. Hunters are on the alert; their prey equally 
so. I was safe enough from any physical threat, but I had found myself alerted by intellectu-
al threat—what to make of predators and prey, of eating and being eaten. (Rolston 2015, 
49) 
 
Overall, Rolston identifies no less than eleven sources of intellectual threat: predation, 
parasitism, selfishness, randomness, blindness, disaster, indifference, waste, struggle, 
suffering, and death (Rolston 1992a). All of these threats seem to call for explanations. And 
this is not just a matter of soothing our unease, for it seems that without good reasons to 
accept the extent of suffering in the world, our commitment to nature protection might be 
weakened. Thus, the destructive dimension of nature becomes an issue for the environmen-
tal movement which attempts to articulate the value of nature as a reason to protect nature 
from human intrusions. If our concern for nature is predicated upon illustrations of nature’s 
value, as it is very often assumed in environmental ethics, then unless we can somehow 
account for apparent disvalues, the motivation for respecting nature is untenable or at least 
weakened. Environmental philosopher Wayne Ouderkirk pithily summarizes those con-
cerns: 
 
To talk of nature being intrinsically valuable is to invite the charge of romanticizing it, of 
being sentimentalist tree huggers, nature lovers who idealize nature, when we all know that 
there are nasty, horrible aspects of nature such as destructive forces, pain and disease. Thus 
such philosophers have a problem […] of explaining the role in nature of what seem to be 
nonmoral evils. (Ouderkirk 1999, 135-136) 
 
Evils are non-moral since we cannot expect nature to be making moral choices. But these 
processes in nature, which are often designated rather unfortunately as ‘evil’, appear no less 
troubling because of that. Today we no longer attach moral agency to the non-human 
world. Still, we do often search for value in it – a value that will give reasons for our 
protection of nature, and will provide firm ground for criticism of wanton use and destruc-
tion of the non-human world. 
 Such is the approach taken by Rolston, who, in many of his writings, attempts to 
articulate the different values of nature for broader audiences. Consequently, he is also 
forced to account somehow for the horrific aspects of nature which would seem to diminish 
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our commitment to nature protection. My aim in this chapter will be to examine the 
proposition extended by Rolston in the form of an ethical theory of nature’s value, by 
means of which he attempts to address our unease with the horrors of nature. To help us 
come to terms with the disturbing processes in nature, he proposes to see these in terms of 
their contribution to the achievement of systemic value: what appears as a disvalue from an 
individual perspective, ultimately contributes to the development of species, ecosystems, 
and of life on Earth as such. Thus, it becomes a value from the perspective of ecological 
systems. 
 To understand properly the theory that Rolston provides and the role that systems, 
wholes, or communities play in it, we must first of all familiarize ourselves with the moral 
experiences in modern environmentalism that gave rise to moral concern with ecological 
systems (as opposed to individuals), and secondly, with the religious roots of the theory 
Rolston proposes. Subsequently, I will proceed to present and analyze Rolston’s ethical 
theory, ultimately proposing to reinterpret it in terms of meanings (rather than values, as 
Rolston himself does). In the final part of the chapter, I will reflect on the applicability of 
these ideas to the situation of recolonization and coexistence in terms of a direct human 
participation in the discomforting processes of nature. 
 
6.1 ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE BIG GOOD WOLF 
 
There are few stories that have such an importance for the environmental movement as that 
of Aldo Leopold’s encounter with a dying she-wolf. Leopold confesses openly that in his 
young days, when still engaged with Forest Service, he “had never heard of passing up a 
chance to kill a wolf” (Leopold 1970, 138). One day during a lunch-break, he and his 
companions saw a wolf with pups crossing a river and immediately opened fire. 
 
We reached the old wolf in time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes. I realized 
then, and have known ever since, that there was something new to me in those eyes some-
thing known only to her and to the mountain. I was young then, and full of trigger-itch; I 
thought that because fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters' 
paradise. But after seeing the green fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain 
agreed with such a view. (Leopold 1970, 138-139) 
 
This experience was recognized by Leopold as of capital importance: “Leopold attached 
almost mystical importance to one glimpse of wildness he had caught years before in the 
Southwest” (Lewis 1986, 28). What was perhaps so mystical was precisely the nature of 
this encounter as a moral experience (as explained in chapter 5) in the full sense of the 
term. An experience that opened up a possibility of understanding more and understanding 
differently, one that exposed the flaws of his taken for granted ideas, and ultimately 
addressed him with a normative force. In that moment something addressed Leopold and he 
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could not help but see the world differently: “Following the killing of the Wolf and seeing 
the dying flame in her eyes, Leopold was born again, no longer the same person as before” 
(Callicott et al. 2011, 126). 
In many ways this event encapsulates the character of moral experiences constitu-
tive of environmentalism. It captures the moment when the Western ethical tradition is 
challenged and forced to admit its deficiencies when it comes to understanding the place of 
humans in the wider world. It is this kind of experiences that have unleashed the environ-
mental movement, revealing how humans have up to now mistreated nature and failed to 
appreciate it adequately. This is a characteristic moral experience of environmentalism as it 
shows the vulnerability of nature to our actions (see section 2.1) and alerts us to the 
damages our existing understanding of nature leads to. In the aftermath of the experience, 
Leopold criticized both ranching and the attempts to eradicate predators, projects which he 
previously supported. 
But I think it was not this realization of human failure that was the crucial aspect 
of his experience. Rather, in the moment of staring into the wolf’s eyes, Leopold felt that he 
caught a glimpse of some truth about the world itself. The eyes of the wolf, in a move 
reminiscent of Plumwood’s focus on crocodile’s gold-flecked eye, become a gate through 
which Leopold passed to a new horizon from which the world appeared in a different way. 
And it was not even the horizon of the wolf that he attained, but rather he became privy to 
the ‘secret opinions of the mountains.’ In that moment Leopold saw the world through the 
slow eyes of the mountain, with the herds of deer coming and going, wolves making their 
kills, trees growing and dying, becoming a source of life for countless other beings. In this 
perspective, death turns to life and together they contribute to the flourishing of a mountain 
as an interconnected community of life. The wolf was not forgotten in that vision. In the 
words of Leopold: “Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the 
howl of a wolf” (1970, 137). Leopold looked again at the wolf, but he no longer saw her as 
a varmint stealing deer from hunters and threatening ranchers’ profits. He saw the wolf as 
part of the mountain, playing a crucial and irreplaceable part in ensuring that it continues as 
a place where life can thrive. But for that to happen, wolf’s “deep chesty bawl” (1970, 137) 
must strike fear in those who live upon the mountain. Wolves – they might only be follow-
ing their instincts; deer – they might just fear wolves and love the leaves of trees; but the 
mountain looks upon them all and sees that without deer, wolves won’t survive, that 
without wolves, deer will destroy their own environment, and the mountain as a great 
community that supports all the individual creatures will be nothing without deer and 
wolves. The title of the small section of Sand County Almanac where Leopold describes 
this event is Thinking Like a Mountain, and this is exactly what Leopold realized we need 
to learn. 
Many have taken this demand to heart. The heritage of Leopold today is the holis-
tic environmental ethics which foregrounds the concern for wholes like ecosystems, 
populations, or biotic communities. Consequently, ethicists have been proposing articula-
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tions of the moral significance not only of individual wild creatures, but also of such 
wholes, and have attempted to capture the specific ways in which these matter. Today, for 
most of us, even among the general public, it makes perfect sense to speak about the beauty 
and the survival of ecosystems, stability of nature, or the flourishing of species. Beyond our 
concern with individual animals we also want to save polar bears (as a species) and the 
endangered rainforests (not just individual creatures living there). 
But salvation of such wholes and their appreciation, and the affirmation of their 
value, requires acceptance of the death of individual creatures that constitute these ecosys-
tems. Saving an ecosystem might involve killing invasive species. Survival of species as a 
whole might involve death of many of its members that, perhaps, are not fully fit. This is 
the case not just in ecosystems that have been impacted by humans – this is how nature 
works, and it means that the wellbeing of the whole is not always equal to the wellbeing of 
its individual members. In Leopold’s land ethic the ‘beauty, stability and integrity’ of the 
biotic community takes priority over the wellbeing of individual members of that communi-
ty, and the individual losses and suffering are acceptable as long as they contribute to the 
flourishing of that community (Callicott 1980). 
As Callicott et al. (2011, 134) point out, the question of killing individual animals, 
whether by humans (Leopold remained an avid hunter even after his wolf experience), or as 
part of the economy of nature, has never appeared to Leopold as an ethical dilemma. As the 
mountain sees it, deer come and go, and the death of a few of them is better than their 
unrestrained proliferation, which would almost certainly lead to the undermining of the 
whole community: 
 
I now suspect that just as a deer herd lives in mortal fear of its wolves, so does a mountain 
live in mortal fear of its deer. And perhaps with better cause, for while a buck pulled down 
by wolves can be replaced in two or three years, a range pulled down by too many deer may 
fail of replacement in as many decades. (1970, 140) 
 
It is not that Leopold holds a mechanistic view of animals and does not realize they can feel 
pain. Indeed, his speaking about ‘fierce green fire’ with all probability signals a recognition 
of much more than a capacity to suffer – there is a recognition of will, intentionality, desire 
for life, intelligence, perhaps anger. Still he worries little for the death of individual deer 
and seems fully satisfied with the fact that a dying animal will be replaced by another, as 
long as the range on which they live continues to flourish. 
 But while Leopold himself never saw these countless individual losses as a moral 
problem, this has not been so for many others and Holmes Rolston is among those seeing 
need for further explanation. Rolston articulates the unease we feel when we are confronted 
with the fact that the beauty of nature we appreciate so much is predicated upon death and 
suffering of countless creatures. What, then, are we to make of such beauty predicated upon 
suffering and death? How can we make sense of the individual sacrifices? Can we even still 
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appreciate the mountain knowing how many creatures need to die and suffer on its slopes? 
Perhaps there is even something wicked in a mountain’s secret thoughts? Rolston’s 
exposition of this ambivalence culminates in a proposition of an ethical theory which 
attempts to show how we can make sense of individual deaths in terms of their contribution 
to the flourishing of the ecological whole to which they belong. This theory provides a 
more extensive articulation of the kind of horizon from which one can come to terms with 
those tragic aspects of nature that seem necessary for the development of the kind of natural 
world we cherish. But to understand Rolston’s theory fully, it might be good to move few 
centuries back. 
Ambivalence like the one articulated by Rolston, between the admiration for na-
ture at large and the horror at some of the processes through which nature creates its 
marvels, is not a uniquely contemporary phenomenon. Indeed, it has already been experi-
enced by the naturalists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who, becoming ac-
quainted through their studies with the less palatable aspects of nature, began asking how so 
much evil is possible in an otherwise good world. That the world was good was not a 
question to them, steeped as they still were in the Christian beliefs about a benevolent God 
creating a good world. In the mismatch between their belief in the goodness of the world 
and their empirical observations which revealed to them omnipresence of horrors, they 
were confronted with what is known as the ‘problem of evil’. The ‘problem of evil’ is a 
question arising in theology, where the presence of evil seems incompatible with the 
existence of an omnipotent and benevolent God. Attempts to explain the coexistence of 
God and evil have been referred to as theodicy. Though the term was coined in the eight-
eenth century by Gottfried Leibniz, attempts to address the problem of evil go all the way 
back to the ancient times. To understand better how the theodicy concept may apply to our 
concern with nature, I will explain how these concerns first came together in the modern 
period in the works of the early naturalists. Subsequently, I will discuss Rolston’s proposi-
tion, which has been characterized as an ecological theodicy. 
 
6.2 INTELLECTUAL THREATS AND THE EARLY NATURALISTS 
 
Although Christianity has had a rather ambivalent relationship to the natural world, and 
even though in environmentalism there is a tendency to stress the negative influence of 
Christianity on environmental attitudes (e.g. White 1967), the theme of the natural world as 
God’s work, and therefore essentially good, has been part of the Christian worldview from 
the very outset. Positive ideas about wilderness have been particularly strong since the 
seventeenth century, when scholars began to see God as embodied in the uncultivated 
natural world. Wilderness became a place where one could discern the divine harmonies, 
which transcend the finite human condition (Kirchhoff and Vicenzotti 2014). With the 
dawn of the Enlightenment and the rise of scientific rationality, the idea of nature as a 
creation of a benevolent God became linked with the mechanistic image of the world as an 
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efficient, predictable, rationally designed machine – a fusion perhaps best captured in the 
systematic ordering of God’s creatures by Linnaeus (Worster 1977, 35-36, 44). 
 But precisely at this moment, when new scientific and technological developments 
granted early moderns a degree of control over the world and a sense of safety which 
allowed for its distanced admiration, discomforts of nature returned in a new guise. Donald 
Worster (1977) provides a brilliant analysis of the tension that pervaded the early develop-
ment of ecology, namely between the rational scientific image of the natural world as a 
well-oiled machine designed by a benevolent God, and the unavoidable realization of the 
presence in nature of conflict, death, violence, suffering, excess, and waste. Confrontation 
with tropical colonial ecosystems, so much different from the domesticated and well-
organized nature of Europe, created a strong impetus forcing many of the early naturalists 
to rethink their idealized image of nature and forced them to make sense of the apparently 
omnipresent mayhem (Worster 1977, 46-49). They were confronted with moral experiences 
that demanded a serious reflection on their taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. 
 Their impressions might have been very much like those of Werner Herzog I 
recounted earlier on, though, unlike Herzog, they found it difficult to embrace this ‘harmo-
ny of collective murder.’ What was truly discomforting for them, were not the direct 
impacts of nature on humans, but rather the processes through which nature operated and 
the way these seemed to contradict their fundamental metaphysical assumptions about the 
world. The amount of bloodshed and chaos apparently present in nature shocked these 
naturalists and confronted them with the problem of explaining how such natural evils can 
be a part of God’s perfect machine. These experiences gave rise to ecological theodicies – 
attempts to rehabilitate the goodness of the natural world in face of so much evil. 
 Although predation has often been seen as the primary example of this threat, a 
particularly troubling case, exemplifying the whole experience, was the horror that the 
procreation of ichneumon wasps struck in hearts of those naturalists: 
 
Their greatest challenge to the concept of a benevolent deity was not simple predation – for 
one can admire quick and efficient butcheries, especially since we strive to construct them 
ourselves – but slow death by parasitic ingestion. The classic case, treated at length by all 
the great naturalists, involved the so-called ichneumon fly. (Gould 1982, 19) 
 
These wasps are best known for depositing their eggs inside a living victim, which is, as the 
wasp larvae grow, devoured while kept alive. This practice provoked in the naturalists both 
a deep unease and an admiration for the ingenuity of the parasites (hardly surprising, in the 
age when ingenuity was valued so highly). The apparent threat to the goodness of God’s 
creation presented by the developmental stages of wasps demanded an explanation or at the 
very least some form of accommodation. Some diverted the attention from these disturbing 
aspects and rather focused on the virtues of the parasite, like taking good care for its 
offspring. Others pointed to the benefits human agriculture reaped from the destruction of 
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so many caterpillars, though this left unaddressed the specific form in which this salvation 
was achieved (Gould 1982, 22). Most commonly, however, the discomfort was accommo-
dated by emphasizing the necessity of evil for the over-all functioning of nature: 
 
A theodicy tries to answer the question of how God’s goodness is reconcilable with the evil 
in the world. In physico-theology the evil that results from the ‘struggle for life’ is por-
trayed as an essential element of natural harmony. This struggle between species, notably 
between predators and prey, guarantees that a balance will be maintained among the various 
species. (Keulartz 2004, 90) 
 
Though many were satisfied with the rehabilitation of God's creation by stressing the 
necessity of various forms of struggle, some remained troubled, and Charles Darwin was 
among them: 
 
I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of de-
sign and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I 
cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly creat-
ed the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of 
Caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice. (Charles Darwin quoted in Gould 1982, 24) 
 
What is interesting is that for these early naturalists, the presence of ‘evil’ in the natural 
world became a problem precisely because they thought this world to be supremely good. 
This was not the ‘evil’ of a fallen world, a valley of tears where humans scrape a living 
with broken fingernails. Rather, ‘evil’ appeared as an experience which challenged the 
taken-for-granted image of the world as good. As a challenge to this deeply held belief 
about the goodness of the world, the apparent evils of death, suffering and brutal competi-
tion demanded explanation. In some way, then, the particular form of the discomforts these 
naturalists experienced, and the particular form in which they were addressed, was a direct 
result of their metaphysical beliefs about the world and nature. 
 These observations are of more than merely historical interest. The subject of 
natural evil has resurged in modern environmentalism, together with the theories of 
intrinsic value of nature, in a surprisingly similar form. Although modern environmentalism 
can safely be described as a secular endeavor59, the ideas of the essential goodness of nature 
promoted by it inevitably clash with apparent ‘evil’ discernable in nature. The ecological 
                                                          
59
 But see e.g. Keulartz (2003) and Holland (2011) who both point out the strong Christian motives underneath 
Rolston’s ideas. This should not be surprising, given that Rolston is an ordained minister of the Presbyterian 
Church. Still, many of his ideas, even those relating to theodicy, can be intelligible in a secular worldview and no 
strong commitment to Christian beliefs seems necessary to embrace his philosophy. 
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theodicy of Holmes Rolston III60 is one of the most prominent efforts to address this 
tension. 
 
6.3 ROLSTON’S ECOLOGICAL THEODICY 
 
The main thrust of Rolston’s theodicy is an attempt to show that natural ‘disvalues’61, once 
appreciated in an appropriate way, can be seen as necessary elements of a larger, overall 
valuable system, and so as necessary for the production of value. And this attempt builds on 
the themes that can already be found in Leopold. Arguing against common sensibility, 
Leopold already redefined goodness from a more ecological perspective: 
 
We all strive for safety, prosperity, comfort, long life, and dullness. The deer strives with 
his supple legs, the cowman with trap and poison, the statesman with pen, the most of us 
with machines, votes, and dollars, but it all comes to the same thing: peace in our time. A 
measure of success in this is all well enough, and perhaps is a requisite to objective think-
ing, but too much safety seems to yield only danger in the long run. Perhaps this is behind 
Thoreau's dictum: In wildness is the salvation of the world. Perhaps this is the hidden mean-
ing in the howl of the wolf, long known among mountains, but seldom perceived among 
men. (Leopold 1970, 141) 
 
What matters most is that Leopold opens up the possibility that disruption, openness to 
disturbance, and vulnerability are actually necessary for what we find so valuable in nature 
– its various forms, its richness, its beauty. How exactly is that possible? We can find a 
clarification of this point in a passage in Rolston that seems to directly extend Leopold’s 
ideas: 
 
Perhaps the context of creativity logically and empirically requires this context of conflict 
and resolution. An environment entirely hostile would slay us; life could never have ap-
peared within it. An environment entirely irenic would stagnate us; advanced life, including 
human life, could never have appeared there either. Oppositional nature is the first half of 
the truth; the second is that none of life's heroic quality is possible without this dialectical 
stress. Take away the friction, and would the structures stand? Would they move? Muscles, 
teeth, eyes, ears, noses, fins, legs, wings, scales, hair, hands, brains—all these and almost 
everything else comes out of the need to make a way through a world that mixes environ-
mental resistance with environmental conductance. Half the beauty of life comes out of en-
durance through struggle. (Rolston 1992a, 270) 
 
                                                          
60
 For an extensive study of this subject that includes not just a summary of all the existing attempts to address the 
problem of evil in environmentalism, but also an insightful discussion of the relationship between theological and 
ecological theodicies see Kowalsky (2006). 
61
 Kowalsky (2006) notes that Rolston hardly ever speaks about ‘evil’ in nature, and instead uses the term 
‘disvalues’, at least in the works that are directed towards the environmental community. 
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Discomforting aspects of existence are seen here as a friction necessary for development 
and change. Once we look closely at how the life that we admire develops, we realize that 
the varied forms appear only as a response to the constant resistance of the environment and 
of other creatures. This, however, seems to refer only to friction. But Rolston is certainly no 
Lamarckian – giraffes as a species do not acquire long necks by trying to stretch them so as 
to reach higher. The resistance of which Rolston speaks here is not the easy kind of friction 
that can be considered as pure benefit since it always leads to self-affirmation and self-
realization of individuals. In the natural world progress towards ever more admirable forms 
proceeds through innumerable deaths and painful failures. While Rolston recognizes this, 
he pushes on to affirm this fact: 
 
Earth slays her children, a seeming evil, but bears an annual crop in their stead. This prolife, 
generative impulse is the most startling and valuable miracle of all. The “birthing” is na-
ture’s orderly self‑assembling of new creatures amidst this perpetual perishing. In a hurt-
less, painless world, there could never have come to pass anything like these dramas in bo-
tanical and zoological nature that have happened, events that in their central thrusts we 
greatly treasure. There are sorts of creation that cannot occur without death, without one life 
seeded into another, and these include the highest created goods. Death can be meaningfully 
integrated into the biological processes as a necessary counterpart to the advancing of life. 
(Rolston 2015, 49) 
 
Thus death and suffering become necessary elements in the development of life. But is it 
reasonable to value such a life? Perhaps death is necessary to the progress of life, but if life 
progresses through suffering it may ultimately not be worth our admiration. Can the 
creation of ever new life balance out the disvalues involved in the ongoing destruction of 
life? Rolston believes so, and he illustrates this by showing how value predominates in 
nature, even if we may discern some disvalue here and there. There are several stages to 
such appreciation. 
 We can begin from a common enough situation of predation: a pack of wolves 
takes down a deer. Such an incident is an instance of evil from the perspective of the deer, 
inasmuch as the deer prefers to live. But it is also objectively disvaluable in that the 
individual deer, as a unique form of existence, is destroyed (unless we see the individual 
animal as replaceable by other deer). Here we need to make a short theoretical detour into 
value theory. 
 Meta-ethically speaking, Rolston is a realist, maintaining that objective values 
exist in the world. And just as for Leopold ecological insights into the workings of ecosys-
tems had an important role in shaping his ethical attitudes to nature, so does scientific 
description form the window into the proper appreciation of values: 
 
What is ethically puzzling and exciting is that an ought is not so much derived from an is as 
discovered simultaneously with it. As we progress from descriptions of fauna and flora, of 
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cycles and pyramids, of autotrophs coordinated with heterotrophs, of stability and dyna-
mism, on to intricacy, planetary opulence and interdependence, unity and harmony with op-
positions in counterpoint and synthesis, organisms evolved within and satisfactorily fitting 
their communities, and we arrive at length at beauty and goodness, we find that it is difficult 
to say where the natural facts leave off and where the natural values appear. For some peo-
ple at least, the sharp is-ought dichotomy is gone; the values seem to be there as soon as the 
facts are fully in, and both facts and values seem to be alike properties of the system. (Rol-
ston 1991, 95-96) 
 
Rolston acknowledges that there are values and disvalues and that both of these exist as real 
objective givens, independent of actual appreciation, though we may come to appreciate 
them once we recognize them. Thus, individual existence, nutrition/energy, characteristics 
like speed, agility or intelligence, and complex interactions between individuals can all be 
appreciated as values existing in the world. In this context, the death of a deer is a disvalue 
both subjectively (for the deer), and objectively (as a loss of certain form of life with 
intrinsic objective value). 
 But such a death can also be appreciated as valuable: “The violent death of the 
hunted means life to the hunter. There is not value loss so much as value capture; nutrient 
materials and energy flow from one life stream to another, with selective pressures to be 
efficient about the transfer” (Rolston 1992a, 253). On one level this means that the death of 
a deer is of value to wolves. In such a case, value arises out of valuation, and wolves are as 
capable of their own sort of valuation as people are. But beyond this, Rolston also believes 
that in the moment of death, and subsequently during ingestion, some objectively existing 
values are ‘captured’ rather than assigned. Rolston speaks about ‘energy flow’ and ‘transfer 
of values,’ which means that the value that was objectively there in the deer, in the form of, 
say, nutrition (or perhaps something like beauty and agility), is captured by a wolf, contrib-
uting to its being. The nutrition and energy that had assumed a particular form when they 
were embodied in a deer, and valued accordingly, now becomes embodied in the specific 
form of a wolf. As such they are not lost, but transferred. Thus, while death might be 
properly seen as disvalue in the context of an individual animal and its intrinsic value, it 
becomes a ‘value capture’ if considered in the context of the interaction between two 
species, and in this sense no value loss is involved. 
 Such exchange can be appreciated as valuable if we scale-up the context further to 
the level of species. This is because selective pressures involved in predation ultimately 
contribute to the development of both deer and wolf species, so that besides value transfer 
the interaction may contribute to the flourishing of the species or even to the development 
of new forms with higher values. Death of individual animals might be disvaluable, but in 
the context of the development of a species it can be appreciated as valuable. Deer will 
become faster and more agile and, in response to these developments, the wolves’ intelli-
gence and cooperative capacities will develop too. As a consequence, both the new 
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members of the species, but also the species as such, will represent a higher value in the 
form of greater speed and/or intelligence. 
 Scaling up even higher, predation will also limit the pressure of deer on the 
ecosystem, allowing plants to regenerate, which in turn will make room for more life, and 
so more value (in the form of biodiversity and individual values). In this way, all the evils 
can be re-appreciated as elements in the production of ever greater values at higher system-
ic scales: 
 
Overall the myriad individual passages through life and death upgrade the system. Value 
has to be something more, something opposed to what any individual actor likes or selects, 
since even struggle and death which are never approved, are ingredients used instrumentally 
to produce still higher intrinsic values. […] This can seem in morally wild disregard for 
their individuality, treating each as a means to an end. But the whole system in turn gener-
ates more and higher individuality. Problem solving is a function of the system too as it re-
cycles, pulls conflicts into harmony, and redeems life from an ever-pressing death. (Rolston 
1983, 196-197) 
 
Thus, Rolston’s ideas open up for us a way of accommodating ecological discomforts by 
reference to the good of a greater whole, characterized here as the systemic level of the 
natural world. On this systemic level eco-theodicy transcends the interests and preferences 
of individuals: “Value has to be something more, something opposed to what any individu-
al actor likes or selects” (Rolston 1983, 196). Rolston speaks here about values, but it is the 
same intuition, I think, which Leopold tried to capture by proposing that “A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” 
(Leopold 1970, 262). These are two examples of trying to give voice to the experience of 
there being a sort of goodness above and beyond the good of all the individual creatures 
that constitute some system or community. The specific reason why we looked to Rolston, 
was because he explicitly recognized that there was a problematic relationship between 
such a holistic good and individual wellbeing. Now the question is whether his response to 
our unease is satisfactory. 
 Discomforts are accommodated in Rolston’s argument in a twofold manner, 
namely by showing both the necessity of certain disvalues for the production of ever greater 
value, and by the reappraisal of certain apparent disvalues as values when seen from a 
broader systemic perspective (Kowalsky 2006, 58). The strategy relates thus to a holistic 
perspective we already saw in Leopold, which establishes the supra-individual whole – in 
this case a system, rather than a community as in Leopold’s case – as an appropriate and 
more important level of moral concern. It is at the systemic level (of ecosystems, land-
scapes, biotic communities, evolution, perhaps the whole biosphere) that we can appreciate 
the hidden goodness of processes like predation. Indeed, it even seems that at this systemic 
level virtually all local disvalues (like the death of a deer) can be re-appreciated as instru-
mentally valuable for the creation of some higher value. The death of a deer becomes 
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instrumentally valuable for the maintenance of the intrinsic value of the wolf, the develop-
ment of the intrinsic value of the deer species (their agility, speed, intelligence, etc.), and 
the intrinsic value of the ecosystem in terms of its richness, complexity, variety etc. Thus an 
individual death is of local disvalue, inasmuch as it involves the loss of intrinsic value of an 
individual, but is of systemic value inasmuch as it constitutes a part of a process in which 
the species, ecosystem, and life-system achieve higher overall value. This allows us to 
appreciate much of the horrors of nature as in fact valuable, and gives us a perspective from 
which we can come to terms with much of the evil in nature. Horrors, which, we might 
assert from such a perspective, are only apparently horrific, since from the systemic 
perspective they appear as value creating events and processes. 
 There might still be disvalues that cannot be so transvaluated: for instance, the 
random death of bird chicks killed in a ground nest by a deer running away from wolves. 
But the overall prevalence of value over these instances of disvalue will be overwhelming. 
And since our concern for nature is theorized as grounded in the appreciation of value in 
nature, our concern for nature, and our motivation to protect nature, are not threatened any 
more. Some events might be disvaluable, but overall nature is valuable. 
 I do not want to take issue with the idea of holistic good as such. I think for most 
of us, the idea that there is some worth or good of nature that relates to something more 
than just individual creatures is fully intelligible. We marvel at landscapes, the complexity 
of ecosystems, their variety, richness etc. Most of us would also agree that death is a 
necessary part of nature, that life as we know it needs death. 
 There are however, a couple of things which I find dissatisfying about the way 
Rolston approaches the tension between individual wellbeing and the holistic good. First, I 
am not convinced by the conclusions that Rolston draws from the tight coupling between 
holistic goods and individual harms, particularly his unambiguous affirmation of value of 
nature at the systemic level. Second, I would argue, and I am not alone in this, that his way 
of addressing the unease we feel over the individual losses (re-appreciating them from a 
systemic perspective) is problematic – my sense is that if we actually follow his way of 
thinking, we do not so much come to terms with suffering and death in the world, as stop 
caring about them altogether. Both of these worries need a more extensive elaboration to 
become fully intelligible, and to this I will devote the rest of this chapter. 
 
6.4 APPRECIATION OF NATURE AND AMBIVALENCE 
 
First of all I would like to address the unambiguous affirmation of nature as an outcome of 
Rolston’s systemic value theory. As we have seen, Rolston does not deny the reality of 
disvalues. He does acknowledge that there is something deeply troubling about the loss of 
individual life and about individual suffering. However, virtually all disvalues are eventual-
ly transmuted into values by showing that they are necessary for the production of value. 
All the destructive (‘evil’) elements are reaffirmed as necessary for the production of more 
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valuable life. He uses a light-and-shadow metaphor to illustrate the necessary dialectic that 
plays a role here: “Nature is random, contingent, blind, disastrous, wasteful, indifferent, 
selfish, cruel, clumsy, ugly, struggling, full of suffering, and, ultimately, death? This sees 
only the shadows, and there has to be light to cast shadows” (Rolston 1992a, 275). And 
later: “The view here is not panglossian; it is a sometimes tragic view of life, but one in 
which tragedy is the shadow of prolific creativity” (Rolston 1992a, 275). I find this 
metaphor inappropriate. Although it does show the necessary connection between disvalues 
and values – light and shadow – it suggests that disvalues (shadows) are merely a side-
effect of light. Shadows appear when light is cast. This is inaccurate even on Rolston’s 
account: without disvalues the variety of life that is deemed valuable would not be possible. 
Disvalues are thus not after-effect of values, but a necessary precondition of values. Indeed 
they have to be seen as such, since their affirmation is only possible if such necessity can be 
showed. This, according to Rolston, allows for transmuting disvalues into values. 
 But we might ask at this point why the transmutation does not work in the opposite 
direction? If creation of value requires disvalue, does that not make values disvaluable? To 
know that value is predicated upon disvalue, happiness on misery, good on evil, as far as 
my intuitions can reach, makes value, happiness, or good deeply problematic. A world built 
on suffering would be very difficult to accept, and would certainly not be claimed as 
unambiguously valuable. If disvalues are indeed necessary for the proliferation of life, than 
life becomes a deeply disturbing matter. It is not just that death is a shadow of prolific 
creativity – indeed, life’s creativity happens only through countless deaths, and this indeed 
affirms that the image presented here is not panglossian. But it is perhaps even less so than 
Rolston himself is willing to admit. What ecological theodicy achieves is not an illustration 
of the overwhelming value of nature, and the rehabilitation of the aspects of it we experi-
ence as ‘evil,’ but rather the deepening of the ambivalence of nature, showing the mutual 
dependence of life and death – a disturbing thought if there ever was one. 
 But Rolston might disagree with my interpretation of the impact of disvalues on 
value. This is possible because of the specific understanding of disvalue he works with and 
because of the requirements that need to be in place (according to Rolston) for something to 
be seen as intelligibly disturbing. 
 
6.4.1 Disvalues and moral responsibility 
 
One of Rolston’s strategies for sustaining his argument is by considering disvalues in terms 
of moral responsibility. When discussing the charge that nature is selfish, Rolston dismisses 
such claims: “Selfishness is rightfully lamented in humans but immoral selfishness can be a 
disvalue in nature only if there is moral agency present” (Rolston 1992a, 256). But there is 
no moral agency in nature, therefore nature cannot be blamed for selfishness and so we 
cannot intelligibly speak about selfishness of e.g. selfish genes as a disvalue. In a similar 
vein it makes no sense to speak about evolution being evil on account of its blindness: 
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“evolution has no ‘sight’ and cannot be faulted for being short-sighted” (Rolston 1992a, 
257). But what is troubling us when we are troubled by the blindness of nature or the 
selfishness of genes? Is there a sense in which selfishness and blindness can be justifiably 
troubling even if they are not linked to moral agency? 
 It is true that what we commonly find troubling about selfishness or blindness is 
the fact that they are attributed to moral agents who can and therefore should act different-
ly. When humans act selfishly, or overlook things they should be paying attention to, we 
can blame them for their lack of concern or care. But something can be troubling even if it 
is in no way linked to moral agency. Death, for instance, does not need to be caused by 
immoral human action (e.g. a murder) to be a troubling experience we somehow have to 
come to terms with. Similarly, the idea of blind fate ruling our lives has been a troublesome 
idea for humans for many centuries. One might be struck with misery as an outcome of 
unfortunate coincidences, with no moral agency involved, but such instances may still be an 
occasion for deep anguish and may require some explanation and accommodation. Indeed, 
throughout history, humans tried to assign instances of bad luck to moral agency (either of 
other humans or supernatural beings), rather than to admit the presence of sheer bad luck. 
By extension, selfishness, blindness, suffering, and death in nature, though outside of the 
provenance of moral agency, still necessitate explanation and can be seen as legitimately 
troubling aspects of existence. 
 
6.4.2 Disvalues and necessity 
 
The second way in which Rolston tries to maintain his arguments is by affirming the 
necessity of disvalues. Yes, they exist at the systemic level, but they are necessary for the 
creation of value: “Since the world we have, in its general character, is the only world 
logically and empirically possible under the natural givens on Earth – so far as we can see 
at these native ranges that we inhabit – such a world ought also to be” (Rolston 1992a, 
275). For Rolston, the necessity somehow rehabilitates the disvalue. If something is 
necessary, it means there is no reason for us to depreciate it, even if it is something we find 
troubling: 
 
Should we value the capacity to catch or discard, while cursing the world of contingency? 
But that is to value the retention side as though the supply side were not logically and em-
pirically necessary. It does not seem possible for the world to be otherwise if there is to be 
autonomy, freedom, adventure, success, achievement, emergents, openness, surprise, and 
idiographic particularity. (Rolston 1992a, 259) 
 
If, therefore, contingency and other discomforting aspects are necessary requirements for 
things we value, then there is no real reason to find them disturbing. Discomforts can only 
to be taken seriously if they are not necessary. If something is necessary we simply must 
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accept it and talking about disvalue or discomfort makes no sense. It appears, then, that for 
something to be disvaluable or troubling, it must be optional. But is that so? 
 American ecologist William Jordan discusses the issue of necessity in relation to 
human uses of the natural world: “Killing to eat is okay, the conservationist says, because it 
is ‘necessary’ or ‘natural,’ disregarding the fact that that is precisely what makes it an 
existential crisis” (Jordan 2003, 42). What Jordan says here about human necessity applies 
similarly to the destructive aspects of nature. Because predation is necessary to the devel-
opment of life, it becomes valuable. But is it precisely not more troubling that, for there to 
be value, there must be disvalue? The fact that disvalue is necessary for the creation of 
value perhaps shows disvalue in a different light, but at the same time it problematizes this 
value. If predation is truly disvaluable, then placing it at the heart of life’s productivity must 
have some impact on how we think about life. So far we are only told that death's being 
necessary to life makes death acceptable. But the other side of the coin is that life's neces-
sary dependence on death makes life a much more troubling phenomenon than it may 
initially seem. We cannot think the one without the other. Death’s necessity does not make 
it less troubling, but, in the words of Jordan, it turns the situation into an existential crisis. 
 
6.4.3 Nature’s ambivalence and value 
 
To my mind, then, ecological theodicy as developed by Rolston does not remove the 
intellectual threat posed by the evils in nature, but rather accentuates it by showing mutual 
dependence of what we value on what we find troubling. This ambivalence exists at two 
levels. First, we recognize that there are both beautiful and horrific things in nature. As 
such we see different discrete events and processes and can evaluate them as valuable or 
disvaluable. But now we also realize that the beautiful and the horrific are tightly connect-
ed, that there is no glory without horror and vice versa. On this deeper level the horror of 
nature can never be avoided – we cannot simply surround ourselves with beauty. In every 
instance of beauty we know there hide millennia of suffering and death. Nature might be 
beautiful, magnificent and awe-inspiring, but it is also tragic, and this tragedy is at the very 
core of existence, affecting those aspects of nature we seem to appreciate the most. 
 If we interpret Rolston’s theory in this way, it can be seen not so much as an 
attempt to accommodate and explain disvalues, but rather as an exploration of our experi-
ence of nature’s ambivalence with which we started this chapter. Thus, the theory does not 
really accommodate the discomfort we feel, but rather explains better why we feel such 
discomfort and what constitutes our ambivalence. What would be the consequences of 
looking at his theory in this way? I think the main issue that arises has to do with our 
commitment to nature protection, which was brought up in the beginning of this chapter, as 
one of the reasons for developing an ecological theodicy. 
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 To understand whether this deepening of ambivalence really poses a problem to 
our commitment to nature protection we must first of all ask what kind of ambivalence we 
experience when we look at tragic nature. What is our attitude to this ambivalence?  
 In a utilitarian analysis (chapter 3), problematic aspects are perceived as pure 
negatives, something to be diminished. In the context of meaningful encounters with nature 
(chapters 4 and 5), however, the ambivalence itself became an important part of the 
experience. In his theodicy, Rolston assumes that our commitment to nature is grounded in 
an appreciation of nature as valuable. The problem nature poses is, then, that there are both 
values and disvalues in the world. While values are clearly what we strive for and embrace, 
disvalues seem to be clearly the things we want to avoid. Thus, what needs to be shown is 
that values eclipse the disvalues. Consequently, the whole project of Rolston seems to show 
that either disvalues are not really there, or can be in fact re-appreciated as values. Disval-
ues, in as far as they are disvaluable, are only an obstacle for the appreciation of nature. It is 
true that predation is necessary. But if the same effects (e.g. beauty, complexity, variety of 
nature’s forms) could have been achieved by processes that do not produce disvalues (e.g. 
do not involve killing) this could only be better. Both in the case of utilitarianism and in 
Rolston’s theodicy there is a necessity of showing prevalence of values (or benefits) over 
disvalues (or costs). While this was possible and believable in the case of anthropocentric 
utilitarianism, it seems highly improbable that any such calculation could produce a plus 
sum for values in nature (see: Holland 2011, 382-383). If my argument about the deepening 
of ambivalence is true, and if we continue to see our commitment to nature in terms of 
value, then the problem of sustaining motivation does indeed appear. 
 One direction to question this conclusion would be to reflect on whether our 
commitment to nature is indeed grounded in the appreciation of values, and whether our 
appreciation is indeed as intolerant of ambivalences as it seems. To begin with, we may ask 
if there is a view which can affirm the appreciation of something that is axiologically 
ambivalent. As noted above, we have already encountered this kind of appreciation in our 
discussion of meaning in the two previous chapters. There, I showed that the experience of 
meaning, while extremely important in human life, is predicated upon certain instances of 
ambivalence (meaning is predicated upon the possibility of negation of meaning), and that 
meaningful experiences in themselves might be highly ambivalent (involving, for instance 
both painful realization of ignorance and better understanding). Moreover, it became clear 
that the ambivalence itself is an integral part of the experience of meaning, and not a mere 
side-effect. Following these insights, we could re-appreciate some of Rolston’s ideas in 
terms of meaning, so that the layered ambivalence of nature entailed in his ecological 
theodicy would no longer be a problem for our concern with nature. 
 The controversial move that this requires is to leave behind objective values, and 
move to rich articulations of human experiences of nature in terms of meaning. This, 
however, is not necessarily in opposition to Rolston’s broader ideas. There is one early 
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formulation of the ‘ecological problem of evil’ in which he explicitly mentions frames other 
than value that play a role in the appreciation of nature: 
 
I do not find nature meaningful everywhere, or beautiful, or valuable, or educational; and I 
am moved to horror by malaria, intestinal parasites, and genetic deformities. My concept of 
the good is not coextensive with the natural, but it does greatly overlap it; and I find my es-
timates steadily enlarging that overlap. I even find myself stimulated positively in wrestling 
with nature's deceits. They stir me with a creative discontent. (Rolston 1979, 28) (emphasis 
added) 
 
Value is then only one way of appreciating nature. Perhaps the intellectual threats posed by 
discomforting nature can be appreciated better if we look at them in terms of meaning, 
aesthetics, and understanding. Thus, far from being inimical to Rolston’s ideas, the reinter-
pretation proposed here can be seen to foreground the avenues he developed to a lesser 
extent. What I want to do now, is to bring up some propositions by environmental philoso-
phers suggesting that two forms of ambivalence – namely that there are both horrific and 
wonderful aspects of nature, and that the wonderful aspects may be irreducibly based on the 
horrific ones – can be appreciated in such a way that we find commitment to nature 
precisely through recognition of these ambivalences. This will relate specifically to our 
appreciation of nature and to seeking grounds for our commitment to respect for nature. 
 
6.4.4 Ambivalence and aesthetics 
 
Theories of value strive to reduce ambiguity: something needs to be shown to be valuable 
and therefore worthy of protection or respect. But this is not a universal feature of human 
appreciation. There are forms of appreciation that are not only tolerant of, but indeed that 
thrive on, ambiguity. One example is the aesthetic appreciation: 
 
In contrast to easy beauty, difficult aesthetic experiences involve a more diverse range of 
feelings and emotions, from anxiety and awe to fascination and aversion, as we are drawn 
out of more comfortable forms of appreciation. Feelings of unease, of discomfort, of some-
thing being unresolved or somehow less fitted to our capacities, characterize these respons-
es. The challenges they present contrast with experiences demanding less effort and those 
distinguished by their pleasure or delight. (Brady 2013, 166) 
 
In aesthetic appreciation, easy (unambiguous) beauty is usually thought less of, than the 
more difficult and challenging aesthetic experiences: 
 
That there is more to be valued in aesthetic experience than pleasure is a reasonable claim, 
and it is the nature of both painful art and sublime experience to present complex occasions 
to which our emotions can rise. Pleasure alone cannot account for the range of emotions and 
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feelings felt in response to serious events, events which call for integrity and depth of feel-
ing such as sympathy and humility. This sort of approach also highlights the unhelpful 
downplaying of negative emotions in favour of pleasure in a range of debates in aesthetics. 
(Brady 2013, 162) 
 
Ned Hettinger (2010) (and after him Emily Brady) identifies precisely predation as an 
example of terrible beauty. To a large extent, Hettinger follows Rolston in articulating what 
there is to appreciate in predation. But rather than suggesting that the systemic level is the 
appropriate one from which to assess activities like predation, he keeps both individual and 
systemic level in sight, suggesting an appropriateness of aesthetic responses that are much 
more complex than simply embracing the value of predation: 
 
The disvalue of the prey’s suffering and death remain poignant and it must be integrated in-
to the overall aesthetic response to and evaluation of predation. A sympathetic emotional 
reaction to the prey’s suffering and loss of life should color the appreciate [sic] event. But 
this emotional involvement should not wash out the positive aesthetic appreciation in-
volved, and it may even deepen it. There is beauty in predation, but it is a sad beauty, per-
haps even a “terrible beauty.” Instead of an easy beauty such as pretty scenery, the aesthet-
ics of predation is more complex and difficult. Just as the aesthetic experience of the sub-
lime is more profound than the experience of the pretty, in part because it is sterner, less 
lovely, and involves more difficult and even negative emotions (such as fear), so the aes-
thetic experience of predation is more difficult and profound because it too involves taxing 
emotions such as sympathy and pity. Although not particularly pleasurable, it sustains atten-
tion, supports meaning, and has far greater significance than does more easily accessible an-
imal beauty, such as the delight at seeing a cardinal at the feeder or the graceful running of 
a gazelle. (Hettinger 2010, 133) 
 
There is, thus, a possibility of appreciating value both on the systemic, ecological level and 
on the level of individual concerns, where the loss of individual life and suffering are 
acutely felt. This broader scope of concern does not question our appreciation of the 
environment, but rather deepens it, despite of, or precisely because of the fact that the more 
problematic aspects of the experience are taken into consideration. Emily Brady, taking up 
the example of predation as an instance of terrible beauty, makes a strong argument that the 
shift to the systemic-ecological level makes us lose something of importance: 
 
Where ugliness is concerned, the claim is that an ecological understanding of the thing in 
question, for example, a rotting animal carcass, can be transformed or ultimately valued as 
something beautiful once we fully comprehend the ecological narrative involved. That is, 
we can find beauty there if we understand the ecological processes of life and death at 
work. […] although this approach is appealing for its ecological awareness, it fails to rec-
ognize the range of aesthetic values we do, in fact, find in nature – both positive and nega-
tive. As I see it, ugliness is not something that can be explained away through an ecological 
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story. Instead, we ought to embrace the significance that more difficult forms of aesthetic 
experience have for human-environment relations. (Brady 2013, 181) 
 
In the above quotation, Brady points out that it is precisely the discomfort, and the ensuing 
ambivalence, that are found productive. Precisely this is missing in the Rolstonian version 
of theodicy and the ethical theory based on unambiguous valuation. Discomforts do not 
really count as valuable for Rolston. In his theory of value, they can only be seen as 
disvalue: a negativity that problematizes a positive appreciation of nature. Discomforts are 
obstacles. If predation was actually not discomforting, it would not be an issue for Rolston 
– indeed through his theodicy he aims precisely to remove our discomfort with nature. In 
the example of terrible beauty, however, aesthetic appreciation moves beyond that, finding 
value precisely in what is discomforting. It is precisely through being troubling that 
ugliness and the tragic bring in an extra dimension to our aesthetic experience, giving it a 
deeper meaning. To attempt to remove ambivalence (the troubling aspects of nature) from 
our conceptualizations of nature might seem like an equivalent of removing predation from 
ecosystems – we impoverish it and limit the capacities for more complex engagements with 
nature. 
 What is the basis for the ability of aesthetic appreciation to accommodate the 
tragic? And how does it link to ethical issues? 
 
6.4.5 Ambivalence and meaning 
 
It seems that the underlying reason why aesthetic experience may integrate discomforts is 
linked to finding meaning in these experiences. Indeed, Brady herself points towards 
meaning as the basis for aesthetic appreciation of the terrible and ugly: 
 
[I]nsofar as ugliness enables us to experience a diverse range of emotions, it can deepen and 
add meaning to our experiences of other humans and other creatures, and of things unlike 
ourselves. Setting aside (in theory) or avoiding (in practice) more challenging forms of aes-
thetic engagement, even at their extremes, such as disgust, would create a gap in the range 
of meaningful interactions with nature – and the arts – which lie beyond the realm of easy 
appreciation. (Brady 2013, 180) 
 
But why is it that a broader range of interactions, including the more discomforting ones, 
can contribute to the meaningfulness of our lives? We can find some clues to this by 
following Alan Holland, another philosopher who draws an explicit link between the 
appreciation of disturbing facts of nature and meaning. Discussing an example of finding a 
nest with dead chicks whose parents had died, Holland claims that: 
 
[M]eaning survives the gaze into lifeless nest where […] value does not. Hence it is capable 
of carrying our commitment to the natural world far further, and deeper, than the concept of 
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value ever can. For even the bitterest meaning is a potential source of understanding, our 
quest for which explains our interest in meaning. (Holland 2011, 387) 
 
Our relation to the world presented here is not primarily one of valuing it, but rather 
understanding it and our place in it. What motivates our actions and care is not a desire to 
increase value, but to deepen our understanding. While death, suffering, tragedy, or loss can 
hardly be defined as values, we can certainly see them as meaningful. They do so in two 
ways. First of all, because they further our understanding of the relationships and wholes in 
which we already participate. Secondly, because they reveal to us new contexts to which 
we can relate our lives, as such broadening the scope of appropriateness. As meaningful, 
they help us understand the world and our position in it. I have already identified some of 
these understandings and contexts in the previous chapters, identifying meanings pertaining 
to our identity, our relations with non-human others, and our insights into alternative 
conceptions of goodness and justice, all of which further our understanding of ourselves 
and of the world. 
 But the example given by Holland might not fit very well with the ideas explored 
so far. Is it not rather the case that such horrors of nature as the purely accidental death of 
little fledglings endanger all meaning? Such deaths seem to have no purpose, no context, no 
appropriateness, and as such only attest to the meaninglessness of the universe. I think this 
is the worry that Michael Scoville raises (2013) in his discussion of Holland’s paper, when 
he doubtfully asks: “what exactly is the understanding we gain when we gaze into a lifeless 
nest?” (2013: 22). He notes that Holland does not give an answer and therefore proposes 
some options himself: 
 
Perhaps the relevant understanding is insight into the extreme contingency and fragility of 
the lives and goods of living beings. Or maybe it is the idea that awe or wonder (or some-
thing along these lines) is an appropriate response to those beings and species that do sur-
vive, and even thrive, given the order of things natural and the rule of chance, accident, and 
disaster. (2013, 22-23) 
 
But I think that Scoville misunderstands Holland’s intention. Scoville proposes here 
specific understandings that result from looking into such a nest. But this is not necessarily 
what Holland has in mind, and not what perhaps we should have in mind when we think 
about safeguarding the meaningfulness of the world. First of all, I think Holland would 
acknowledge that as we gaze into such a nest, no specific understanding appears, apart from 
a profound sense of the meaninglessness of the world and the anxiety experienced over 
such meaninglessness, emptiness, contingency, randomness, and blindness. There is a sort 
of understanding here, but as we begin to understand the world as a place of contingency, 
disaster and emptiness, it is precisely the meaningfulness that seems to be at risk. How can 
we find meaning in such a cold, blind, and uncaring world? Meaning here seems to 
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encounter a danger comparable to the one encountered by value, and perhaps even a greater 
one, because while the disvalue of this one particular death can be eclipsed by value 
emerging in other places, the threat of meaninglessness is total. 
 But precisely here is the point where the account of meaning departs from the 
account of value most starkly. Theories of value seem to entail a balance sheet of values 
and disvalues. As already noted, due to the prevalence of disvalues and the overwhelming 
importance of contingency, death, suffering, and loss, it is quite uncertain what the outcome 
of this balancing act will be. But for a life lived in pursuit of meaning and understanding, 
our anxiety in the face of such world is only the beginning. Meaninglessness, contingency, 
and suffering might be givens, but it is our task to make something of our lives in the face 
of them. In other words, the discomforts of the world are given, but our responses to them 
are not. And it is precisely in those responses, in how we relate to the world as we encoun-
ter it, that we may find meaning in our lives. Moreover, Alan Holland, echoing Paul Tillich 
(1952), argues that it is precisely in the experiences of anxiety that arise from apprehension 
of contingency and meaninglessness of the world around us, that the deepest meanings can 
be found: “life at its best – the most meaningful and worthwhile of lives – involves self-
affirmation in the face of these anxieties [of meaninglessness and emptiness]” (Holland 
2012, 514). Indeed, as Holland argues, far from being a reason for despair, “living of a life 
with no assurance that it will be worthwhile gives that life a zest and calls for the most 
meaningful form of self-affirmation” (Holland 2012, 516). Consequently, rather than trying 
to find frameworks that will show the world as secure and full of value, it is better to “relish 
that rich range of responses awakened in us by a natural world that [...] we can find in turn 
exhilarating, intriguing, fragile, bleak, fascinating, sombre, awe-inspiring, poignant, 
mysterious, threatening and – it may be – unutterably sad” (Holland 2009, 516). 
 Is there not an affinity between this idea of life and some of the ideas put forward 
by Leopold and Rolston? Rolston affirmed that resistance and loss are necessary for the 
emergence of the kind of world we treasure. Could we not argue that uncertainty, re-
sistance, vulnerability and loss may give us rich ecologies of meaning, leading to an ever 
more sophisticated understanding, and ever deeper meaning? The idea of a worthwhile life 
led in pursuit of meaning and understanding may provide a starting point from which we 
can appreciate the world with all its bright and dark sides. Our commitment to such world 
can still be affirmed and the ambivalence, far from being a threat, becomes an opportunity 
for leading a full human life. This, I think, could address the worry that tragic, sad and even 
horrific aspects of nature might weaken our commitment to nature protection. This worry is 
overcome when we can show that nature, notwithstanding its ambivalences and disturbing 
processes, can be a meaningful context for worthwhile human lives. 
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6.5 COMING TO TERMS WITH INDIVIDUAL HARMS 
 
The second issue I raised with respect to Rolston’s theodicy is the specific way in which he 
addresses our unease with individual suffering. While the initial aim was to somehow come 
to terms with such individual losses, the proposition he extends, it seems to me, does that 
by altogether removing our concern with individual creatures. Once we can re-appreciate 
virtually every instance of suffering as in some way valuable, there seems to be little reason 
to care for such losses. So rather than helping us come to terms with such harms, it seems to 
me Rolston actually explains why some people do not care about them – they take the 
systemic perspective. To make this critique more tangible, and to illustrate dangers I think 
are involved in taking solely a systemic stance, I want to bring up an example taken from 
Edward Abbey’s environmentalist classic Desert Solitaire (1968). 
 One quiet evening, as Abbey sits alone during nightfall, he hears a horned owl 
hoot and a rabbit stir, and the sounds become an occasion for a meditation on the relation-
ships between the two creatures: 
 
One can imagine easily the fondness, the sympathy, the genuine affection with which the 
owl regards the rabbit before rendering it into edible portions. Is the affection reciprocated? 
[…] After a lifetime of dread it is more than likely that the rabbit yields to the owl during 
the last moment with a sense of gratitude, as pleased to be eaten – finally! – as the owl is to 
eat. For the one consummation, for the other fulfillment. How can we speak about natural 
enemies in such a well-organized system of operations and procedures? All the time, eve-
rywhere, something or someone is dying to please. (Abbey 1968, 123) 
 
Is it not surprising that Abbey chooses to term the interaction between owl and rabbit a 
“system of operations and procedures”? It seems necessary to evoke such abstract vocabu-
lary to substantiate his intuitions about warm feelings of a rabbit towards an owl. Some-
how, the intuition only becomes convincing when taken to a detached, systemic level. Only 
then we can buy into the idea of an ecological system as a well-oiled machine in which the 
energy moves around and there is no waste; there is only an efficient production of ever 
more life – and therefore value. The moral trappings of this become apparent when he 
draws an analogy to humans: “We know that the condemned man, at the end, does not 
resist but submits passively, almost gratefully, to the instruments of his executioner. We 
have seen millions march without a whimper of protest into an inferno. Is it love? Or only 
teamwork again – good sportsmanship?” (Abbey 1968, 123). Unless this is a case of 
morbid irony, it exemplifies what happens when we remain at such a systemic level. To 
speak of love, teamwork or sportsmanship seems to justify Tom Regan’s condemnation of a 
holistic ethics as an example of ‘environmental fascism’. Here, any concern with the 
individual is lost and replaced by maximization of the systemic value. Even if in the last 
155 
 
moment one submits to the executioner, it is not this that should be our concern, but the 
‘lifetime of dread’ which led to the state in which one is happy to die. 
 What appears problematic here is how the significance of individual suffering is 
depreciated and ignored. Jill Le Blanc, in her discussion of Rolston’s theodicy, worries that 
Rolston excuses ‘evil’ and that the introduction of the systemic perspective is more an 
evasion than an explanation of the problem posed by suffering (Le Blanc 2001). Similarly, 
Holland argues that the way the issue of individual suffering is conceptualized is inappro-
priate: 
 
[I]t seems wholly inappropriate to treat suffering as a ‘disvalue’, merely. The issue raised 
by suffering is not whether it is of such a degree and kind as to threaten the overall balance 
of value in the world. Rather, the issue raised by suffering – both our own and that of count-
less other creatures – is how much we can bear and how we can bear it. (Holland 2009, 511) 
 
Both Le Blanc and Holland do not want to argue that there is something wrong with 
predation, or that predation does not contribute to development and flourishing of ecosys-
tems. Rather, their issue is with how taking a systemic perspective makes us bear the 
suffering. To understand what the problem with systemic perspective is, I want to return to 
Plumwood’s account of her experience of the two worlds: 
 
We have to learn to see from both worlds, for we live in both. We will be seriously astray if 
we fail to realise that both are our home. Unreserved affirmation of predation requires, as it 
were, blotting out one of these worlds. To argue that being eaten is bad for the prey animal 
but valuable for the predator, that the violent death of the hunted gives life to the hunter and 
should be regarded not as value lost but rather as ‘value capture’, fails to open up the 
boundary between the two worlds. Taken to its extreme, unreserved affirmation of preda-
tion requires what is an even more problematic illusory assumption, the standard one that 
humans exist in the world of culture and animals are in the other ‘food’ world of nature. 
(Plumwood 2012, 37) 
 
Although Plumwood does not mention Rolston by name, the reference to “value capture” 
makes the object of her criticism more than obvious. She identifies the problem involved in 
the systemic value theory as a failure to properly engage with the reality of both worlds. In 
her view, and I think also in the view of Holland and Le Blanc, Rolston’s attempt moves 
dangerously far towards the affirmation of a Heraclitean world, at the expense of recogni-
tion of the individual justice world, and the ethical concerns present there. None of them 
argues for removing predation or suffering from the world, rather, they raise an issue of 
moral sensibility. The threat is that we may turn into a “monster of indifference”, to use 
Plumwood’s phrase (2012, 38). Such indifference, in turn, might lead to callousness on our 
part when actual issues of action turn up. But even more importantly, it does not help us in 
trying to make sense of our own position in the world. 
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 This raises two problems. The first problem has to do with the holistic good as a 
concept that exists in many of our intuitions about the concern with the natural world. 
While I suggested that such a good is in itself intelligible, it may entail a callous moral 
attitude. As such it becomes problematic and needs to be reconsidered. How can the idea of 
system, community, or any other form of association exist in such a way that it still 
involves respect for individual creatures? How can we maintain our respect for ecological 
wholes without becoming indifferent to individual suffering, and what role can concern for 
such wholes play in our ethical sensibilities? 
 The second problem has to do with our own possible implication in the discom-
forting processes of nature. As I mentioned before, as animals come closer to human 
habitats, we ourselves are becoming implicated in discomforting processes of nature. This 
does not have to involve being eaten, but parasites, blood-feeding insects, zoonotic diseas-
es, territorial skirmishes, stone martens damaging our cars, etc., all raise the question of 
how we can become part of nature and participate in systems or communities that include 
both humans and wild animals. For Rolston this issue does not arise, as he focuses on 
ecological systems only and recognizes that painful and violent processes of nature do not 
play any role in the development of the human species (1992b). This makes it doubtful 
whether we can directly use Rolston’s theory to meaningfully think about human coexist-
ence with other natural entities. 
 Both issues eventually raise the same question: how can we properly conceive of 
the relationship between an individual and the greater whole to which such individual 
belongs, in such a way that a respect for their wellbeing is maintained? A better framework 
is needed not only to have a more ethically inclusive perspective on the world of nature, but 
also to help us figure out how we could become part of that nature. One option would be to 
examine those forms of association which prioritize the wellbeing of individuals. Such 
proposals, drawing their inspiration from liberal models of society and the tradition of 
human rights, have in fact been proposed within animal ethics62. In the next chapter I will 
examine both the ideas of individual rights, and the kinds of communities that involve both 
humans and wildlife in respectful forms of coexistence. In these ideas we may perhaps find 
more clarity on how to create forms of association with wildlife that will take into consider-
ation both the individual and the systemic level of concern. 
 
                                                          
62
 Another interesting direction to pursue would be to seek inspiration in communitarian political theory. In 
communitarian writings of Alasdair MacIntyre (e.g. 1981), Michael Sandel (1982), Charles Taylor (e.g. 1989), 
Amitai Etzioni (2014a; 2014b; 2014c), and others, we can find not just a focus on the importance of community, 
the common good, and the role that community plays in individual development, but also close attention to the 
appropriate kinds of relations existing between individuals and the community to which they belong. I will return 
to this point briefly in the next chapter. In this thesis I will not give a thorough analysis, since this would require 
first a general reflection on the applicability of these ideas to environmental issues raised by concern with animals 
and environments. Such preliminary work would take us too far from the topic at hand, though it remains an 
interesting and potentially promising direction to pursue. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I discussed a specific way of engaging with discomforts we experience when 
confronted with suffering in the natural world. Ecological theodicy proposed by Rolston 
was designed as a means of accommodating this discomfort by showing how troubling 
aspects of nature contribute to the beauty, variety and complexity of nature. Against 
Rolston, I argued that the theodicy he develops only deepens the ambivalence. But his 
discussion of the necessary intertwining of life and death did provide us with a better grasp 
of the particular content of the ambivalence we experience when we confront wild nature. 
Eventually, framing the insights of Rolston in terms of meaning, rather than value, allowed 
us to recognize that such ambivalence does contribute to finding meaning in nature and as 
such can foster our commitment to the natural world. 
 I also questioned the specific way in which Rolston addresses our unease with 
individual suffering. This critique eventually resulted in considering forms of association 
which can play a role in situations of recolonization and coexistence. We can perhaps see 
ourselves as a part of biotic communities. But it seems that this is not all, especially in cases 
of recolonization, where animals enter landscapes significantly transformed by humans, so 
that it is difficult to speak about ecosystems. As we come to exist closer together, new 
possibilities for creating associations with wild animals emerge. We already exist in various 
associations with domestic animals, and the question now is whether this can be extended 
also to wild animals, with which we are already beginning to share spaces. Such possible 
associations will be discussed in the next chapter, where I will engage with ethical themes 
that have already been applied to coexistence with animals in human dominated landscapes 
– that is: animal ethics championed by the animal advocacy movement. Even though 
animal ethics has from its inception been applied to organizing our immediate coexistence 
with animals, this usually involved only domesticated animals. Thus, this strand of ethics 
needs reinterpretation, so that it can be applicable to situations of recolonization. Some 
ethicists have already began the work of reinterpreting this tradition and illuminating 
ethical issues present in coexistence with wildlife. As will become clear, many of their 
reinterpretations have to do with imagining various forms of association with wild animals, 
including community, neighborhood, citizenship, and denizenship. These forms of associa-
tion, as they are imagined within animal ethics, will prove to be primarily concerned with 
individual wellbeing. My aim will be to confront them with the reality of discomforts, 
which tend to be treated in a cursory manner, and to reflect on the extent to which they 
engage with the problems arising from attempts to maintain and form communities. 
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 7. 
Towards a wilder community 
 
 
When we encounter a wild animal whose presence is in some way disturbing, very often we 
hear reactions like ‘yes, yes, but it also has the right to be here,’ for instance: 
 
I live in the forest I have no sympathy with those who want to cull the boar, we live in a 
Forest and the boar have more right to be here than we.63 
 
A word of caution! Boar can be dangerous under certain circumstances, so please don’t un-
derestimate the fact. […] People on the continent have learned to live with this, because in 
general, they have accepted the countryside does not belong to us humans but to the animals 
– let’s be honest, most of us wouldn’t want them in our living rooms so we should show re-
spect when we are in theirs.64 
 
These examples come from the Forest of Dean, a relatively densely populated forest in the 
UK, with a long history of human habitation, but also a natural area of great beauty and 
ecological importance. They capture a certain sentiment, a specific way of responding to 
discomforts that is loosely linked to thinking about animal rights. We hear that animals 
‘have a right’ to live in a given place, to choose where they want to go, to satisfy their 
needs, not to be disturbed, etc. In this chapter I want to focus on the ethical theories which 
have attempted to capture and articulate the kind of moral intuitions underlying these 
responses, that is: the theories proposed by the animal advocacy movement. These include 
mainly animal rights theories, and to a lesser extent utilitarian animal welfare theories, 
which, though not committed to animal rights in any strict sense of the word, have also 
used the vocabulary of rights. 
 These intuitions, and their elaborations by the animal advocacy movement, 
certainly deserve attention, given their important role in transforming the position of 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/legacy/natureuk/2011/10/the-big-debate-wild-boars-in-t.shtml, accessed: 
29.07.2016. 
64
 http://www.britishwildboar.org.uk/index.htm?letters.html, accessed: 29.07.2016. 
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animals in western societies. I will begin, then, by briefly summarizing the most important 
claims made by the animal advocacy movement as to why animals matter morally. This 
will include also foregrounding those concepts which are most helpful in understanding our 
relations with their discomforting activities. 
 Previously, I argued that the themes developed in relation to wilderness areas need 
to be reinterpreted for the present situation of recolonization. In a similar way, ethicists 
reflecting on coexistence have criticized the established animal ethics approaches for being 
too general, thus failing to take into account the specificity of coexistence in human-
dominated landscapes. I will briefly summarize these criticisms and subsequently move on 
to the positive claims extended by these ethicists. 
 Individualistic animal ethics which aim to include the specific urban context of 
coexistence have focused mostly on the way in which the construction of communities with 
urban wild animals can mediate care and respect for these creatures. Coexistence is taken 
not just as a brute spatial fact, but as the first step to the development of morally important 
forms of association. Though different forms of association have been proposed, in each 
case the wellbeing of individual creatures is at the center of concern, thus distinguishing 
these proposals from those discussed in the previous chapter. Where in the previous chapter 
we discovered that concern with the individual was missing, here it will show that such 
concern is overwhelming. I will finish this chapter with a reflection foregrounding a tension 
between these two approaches. 
 
7.1 WHY DO WE CARE FOR INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS? 
 
Concern with the wellbeing of individual animals has been one of the significant develop-
ments in ethics within the last several decades. The two theories that have been dominant 
here are extensions of utilitarian and deontological ethics onto the question of animals. The 
idea of animal rights has become perhaps one of the most commonly used ways of framing 
our concern with animals, being employed beyond the confines of the deontological 
approaches in the context of which it was first proposed. Peter Singer, though himself a 
utilitarian, does acknowledge the term ‘right’ as a short-hand for utilitarian considerations 
(Singer 1993, 90). Thus, while his focus is on the satisfaction of interests and preferences, 
on suffering and pleasure, he does acknowledge that we can speak about rights (e.g. the 
right to better treatment), though what is really meant here is the maximization of prefer-
ences and minimization of pain. The vocabulary of rights has also gained a firm position in 
public discourses, where it is used in a way that follows the utilitarian logic: 
 
In everyday parlance, anyone who argues for greater limits on the use of animals is said to 
be a defender of animal rights (AR). Thus, someone who advocates that pigs being raised 
for slaughter should have larger stalls, so as to improve the quality of their short lives, is de-
scribed as a believer in animal right. And indeed we can say that such a person believes that 
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animals have a 'right to humane treatment'. Someone defending a more robust rights view 
might argue that humans should not eat animals since we have lots of nutritious alterna-
tives, but that medical experiments on animals are permissible if this is the only way to ad-
vance crucial medical knowledge, or that culling wild animals is permissible if this is the 
only way to save key habitats. We can say that such a person believes animals have a 'right 
not to be sacrificed by humans unless an important human or ecological interest is at stake'. 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 19) 
 
This is, however, a way of thinking about rights which differs from the one developed 
within the context of the animal rights movement. There, the demand that animals be given 
rights means that their lives should be respected unconditionally, and that they should never 
be treated purely as a means to human ends, no matter how high the benefits to humans, or 
how well the animals are treated. This demand is anchored in a specific way of understand-
ing subjectivity and vulnerability as grounds of moral concern. 
 While the idea of rights as applied to humans has usually been anchored in higher 
cognitive capacities such as the ability to reason, to speak, or to deliberate rationally, for 
obvious reasons this cannot be done for animals. Indeed, there is an ongoing argument 
between animal rights proponents and those ethicists who want to limit rights to humans 
regarding the proper morally-relevant characteristics which give rise to rights and duties. 
Animal ethicists commonly argue that higher cognitive capacities cannot be the basis of 
moral concern, as this would exclude a significant number of human beings, such as infants 
and mentally handicapped or senile persons (the so-called ‘marginal cases’),while very 
often these are the very individuals who receive the strongest protection. Anchoring rights 
in account of personhood that includes language, abstract reasoning, long-term planning, or 
self-reflective moral reasoning would “render human rights insecure for everyone. And this 
would defeat the purpose of human rights, which is precisely to provide security for 
vulnerable selves, including (and indeed especially) in those conditions or periods of life 
when capacities are limited” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 27). 
 As an alternative ground for moral considerability, which is claimed to more 
adequately mirror our actual moral intuitions, animal ethicists commonly propose sen-
tience: “Sentience/consciousness has a distinct moral significance because it enables a 
subjective experience of the world” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 24). It is not the sole 
satisfaction of interests that matters morally, but rather the subjective experience of their 
satisfaction or frustration: 
 
Once we know there is someone home, we know we are dealing with a vulnerable self, a 
being with subjective experience whose life can go better or worse as experienced from the 
inside. And so we know we should respect their inviolable rights, even before we know 
their variable capacities such as intelligence or moral agency. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 30) 
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The fact that there is a self that experiences the world gives vulnerability a specific meaning 
and makes it morally relevant. As overwhelming scientific evidence suggests, we are fully 
justified to speak of some forms of subjectivity in animals (e.g. Bekoff 2013). This subjec-
tivity, then, is taken as the basic ground for moral concern irrespective of whether we are 
speaking about humans or animals. This subjectivity, in turn, must be protected through 
rights – those whose lives and wellbeing matter to themselves cannot be treated simply as 
means. 
 I will now move to the specific consequences that this perspective has for concep-
tualizing and addressing ecological discomforts. 
 
7.2 MORAL CONSIDERABILITY OF ANIMALS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
Concern with individual rights has something to say not just about the treatment of animals 
in general, but also about specific situations in which animals become disruptive or 
threatening. Three concepts are particularly important in shaping the approach of animal 
ethics to threatening or discomforting nature: the distinction between moral agents and 
patients, the concept of circumstances of justice, and the idea of a fair distribution of 
burdens and benefits. 
 
7.2.1 Moral agents and patients 
 
There is a significant difference in the treatment of animals and humans when it comes to 
harmful actions. When humans exploit or harm others, we can speak about wrongdoing and 
hold the wrongdoer responsible. This is not possible in the case of animals: 
 
Many ethicists accept the distinction between moral agents and moral patients. The class of 
moral patients is that class of beings to whom we consider that we owe ethical obligations, 
when those obligations can be ascertained, and are deserving of […] moral considerability. 
Moral agents are defined as that class of moral patients to whom we owe obligations and 
who, in turn, are held to be morally responsible for their actions. (Light and Rolston 2003, 
6) 
 
Animals as moral patients cannot be blamed or held responsible for their actions. In as far 
as these actions constitute a regular behavioral repertoire of an animal, the creature cannot 
be blamed. In fact, it becomes our responsibility to make sure that nobody is harmed, 
because we can predict and take action to minimize the possibility of harm, and therefore 
we should work towards minimizing possible occasions for conflict (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 42). 
 An illustration of this logic can be found in charges filed against national parks in 
the U.S. in cases of grizzly bear attacks. As journalist Scott McMillion observes in his book 
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on grizzly attacks (1998), most of the victims (or relatives of those who did not survive) did 
not blame the bears and did not seek revenge on the animals. In cases where retributive 
actions have been taken, these have been directed against the National Parks as institutions 
and their staff, the assumption being that not enough has been done to minimize the 
possibility of an attack. 
 
7.2.2 Circumstances of justice 
 
What about situations where our life is endangered? Or where we have to choose between 
our and the animals’ wellbeing? From the perspective of animal rights, in such situations 
we are fully justified to take protective action, even if this means killing an animal. The 
phrase ‘circumstances of justice’ refers to certain basic preconditions that must be in place 
before we can consider the situation in terms of ethics. We need to be in a situation where 
justice can be applied: 
 
Ought implies can: humans only owe justice to each other when they are in fact able to re-
spect each other's rights without jeopardizing their own existence. Rawls calls this the re-
quirement of 'moderate scarcity': justice is necessary because there isn't an unlimited pool of 
resources such that everyone can have everything that they want; but for justice to be possi-
ble, the competition for resources must be moderate rather than severe, in the sense that I 
can afford to recognize your legitimate claims without undermining my own existence. 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 41) 
 
The situations in which we are forced to make tragic choices are treated as extreme cases, 
so-called ‘lifeboat situations’, which can tell us little or nothing about the mutual rights and 
obligations in normal cases where circumstances of justice apply (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 41). The assumption here is that, through most of our lives, and in most of the 
situations where we encounter animals, circumstances of justice do apply. Moreover, while 
we are justified in protecting ourselves in such ‘lifeboat situations’, it is claimed that we 
also have an obligation “to try to sustain the circumstances of justice where they exist, and 
to move towards the circumstances of justice where they do not yet exist” (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 42). 
 
7.2.3 Fair distribution of risks 
 
One of the main aims of animal advocacy has been to provide an equality of consideration 
for humans and animals. This means first of all that the vulnerability of humans and 
animals should in principle be considered with equal seriousness. In practice, such equality 
of consideration often translates to issues of justice and fairness. Justice is a rather broad 
ethical concept and one of its most important aspects is that of fair distribution of responsi-
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bilities, benefits, and burdens (Rawls 1958). In the context of vulnerability, this demand for 
a fair distribution of burdens appears as a fair sharing of negative impacts and provisions of 
equal protection. It is not enough to respect the rights of individuals. Where harms are 
unavoidable, justice demands that we share them fairly. It would be unjust to overburden 
one specific group. 
 However, as history shows, we have been predominately concerned with our own 
(human) vulnerability. Usually, the distribution of harms has been carried out under the 
‘anthropocentric’, or ‘speciesist’65 bias: 
 
At the moment, we are hypersensitive to any risk that liminal animals66 might pose to us-
getting sucked into airplane engines, causing car accidents, chewing insulated electrical 
wires. Or we wildly exaggerate threats, especially in the case of disease. Meanwhile, we ig-
nore the countless risks we impose on liminals - cars, electrical transformers, tall structures 
and wires, window glass, backyard pools, pesticides, and many others. […] it is unfair to 
have a zero-tolerance policy as regards animal risks to humans, while completely disregard-
ing the risks we impose on them. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 244) 
 
Such asymmetry in concern continues. In the U.S., Wildlife Services killed 3.2 million 
animals in 2015 alone67, although there is scant evidence that lethal control is efficacious, 
indeed, it might in fact be counter-productive (Treves et al. 2016). A recent case is a 
shooting of 9 bears within a space of three days in a Canadian town, simply because of 
improper garbage storage by citizens. Bears attracted by the smell of food visited the town 
and wandered around in the proximity of inhabitants. Even though proper storage of trash is 
a responsibility of the residents, and does not require much effort, it was the bears that were 
punished for doing what bears do – which is search for food68. 
From the perspective of cross-species justice, such practices are considered unac-
ceptable. When we encounter animal impacts, it is claimed, justice demands that we do not 
focus solely on our own vulnerability, but also reflect on how our response relates to just 
distribution of benefits, burdens, and responsibilities. Thus, within the horizon of this 
                                                          
65
 ‘Speciesism’ is a concept commonly used in the animal advocacy movement, which is analogous to concepts 
such as racism or sexism. It captures the tendency to give preference to one’s own species in situations where such 
prioritizing has nothing to do with the actual context of the situation. 
66
 ‘Liminal animals’ is the technical term that Donaldson and Kymlicka use for urban wildlife. I will explain the 
use of this term later in this chapter. At this point its specific meaning is not relevant. What is more, even though 
the authors refer in this example specifically to urban wildlife, I do not think the principle of equal consideration 
of harms is in any way tied to urban wildlife. Rather, it is tied to a notion of cross species justice, which is rooted 
in the claim that the basis of moral concern should be a universal principle applicable in all situations. 
67
 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/opinion/sunday/americas-wildlife-body-count.html?_r=0, accessed: 
11.10.2016. 
68
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/23/nine-bears-killed-in-canadian-city-of-revelstoke-after-raiding-
the-garbage, accessed: 25.08.2016. 
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ethical perspective, we should accept our share of animal discomfort because this is what 
inter-species justice demands. 
 
7.3 CRITIQUES OF THE ESTABLISHED ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORIES 
 
The ethical concepts discussed above are anchored in the recognition of vulnerable subjec-
tivity, and as such not specific to the situations of coexistence, but certainly relevant for it. 
However, their universality may also be regarded as a possible weakness. Criticisms of 
animal rights theory generally point out that it fails to address the specific challenges that 
coexistence poses. 
Clare Palmer, for instance, notes that animal ethicists “tend to the view that ethical 
prescriptions are invariant among urban, rural, oceanic, and wilderness environments. In 
this sense, animal ethics in urban environments would be no different from animal ethics 
anywhere else” (Palmer 2003, 64). However, “the complex nature of urban areas and the 
diversity of human-animal relationships within these areas raise very different questions for 
animal ethics than (say) those raised within wilderness areas” (Palmer 2003, 64). Conse-
quently, she argues for a more contextual approach that takes into consideration the 
specificity of the developed relationships and their characteristics. 
Diane Michelfelder (2003) mounts a similar objection, arguing that although ani-
mal rights theory can support recognition of inviolable rights of animals, it can say little 
regarding how to integrate human existence with that of other creatures inhabiting the same 
area. In her attempt to address this lacuna, she focuses on illuminating the grounds for our 
concern with wildlife in urban environments. 
In their widely discussed Zoopolis (2011), Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka 
agree with the general claims of animal rights theory, but argue that in its traditional shape 
it is insufficient to address cases of cohabitation: “[Animal Rights Theory] presents a 
remarkably flat moral landscape, devoid of particularized relationships or obligations” 
(2011, 6). This is because 
 
the traditional ART view ignores the dense patterns of interaction that inevitably link hu-
mans and animals. It rests implicitly on a picture in which humans live in urban or other 
human-altered environments, assumed to be largely devoid of animals (except for unjustly 
domesticated and captured ones), while animals live out in the wild, in spaces that humans 
can and should vacate or leave alone. This picture ignores the realities of human-animal co-
existence. (2011, 8) 
 
Donaldson and Kymlicka propose to supplement the negative rights account with an 
account of positive obligations towards animals, based on specific developed relationships 
and framed in a context of unfolding political relations. 
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 I will now discuss three proposals to address these limitations, put forward by 
Diane Michelfelder (2003), Ralph Acampora (2004), and Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka (2011). 
 
7.4 BUILDING COMMUNITY WITH WILD ANIMALS 
 
7.4.1 Animals as members of a community 
 
Philosopher Diane Michelfelder asks in virtue of what does urban wildlife matter (in 
contrast to domesticated animals and wild animals in wilderness areas). Environmental and 
animal ethics has so far focused either on domesticated animals (living with humans) and 
wild animals (living in separation from humans). What motivates our respect for urban 
wildlife? She argues that community value is an adequate description of why urban wildlife 
matters: 
 
No matter what the reasons may be for why a particular wildlife population has settled into 
an urban neighborhood, those in that neighborhood are related to it by virtue of this popula-
tion consisting of social beings who live in the same place with them, interact with them, 
and, together with them, contribute to form a community. When we recognize that the city 
is their home too, it helps to make more vivid to us a sense of place. Community value, […] 
would on this account be the primary value for wanting to preserve the urban wildlife popu-
lations in our midst. (Michelfelder 2003, 86) 
 
This quotation moves beyond the recognition of animal vulnerability and the necessity to 
protect it via rights. According to Michelfelder, animals begin to matter not only because of 
general characteristics such as subjective experience, but also because they become part of 
a given community, contributing to it in significant ways. There is a positive reason why we 
should welcome wildlife in cities: “Through being accommodated and welcomed within the 
city, wildlife in turn would contribute to shaping the identity of a place and thereby enrich 
and enhance a sense of belonging to the urban environment” (Michelfelder 2003, 88). We 
should welcome wildlife, not just because they are vulnerable creatures that should not be 
harmed, but also because they actually contribute something to our lives. 
Michelfelder speaks about ‘community value’ and this can be understood in two 
ways. First, community may refer to a sense of place, identity of a place, sense of belong-
ing. There is a difference between belonging in terms of entitlement – who belongs where – 
and belonging as a personal attachment, a sense of rootedness in a place. I already referred 
briefly to ethical questions of belonging previously (section 5.4.3). Here, however, belong-
ing refers to this latter meaning. It captures a sense of feeling at home, a specific meaning 
that a given place has for us, with its associations, including the narratives we can tell of 
our relation to it, or the role it has in our life stories. Place identity (or sense of place) in 
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turn captures the specific character of a place, again as it appears through the stories we can 
tell about it, differentiating it from other places, or as it is captured in the specific features, 
objects or the history of a place. The sense of belonging and the identity of a place might be 
tightly connected, inasmuch as a place, with its specific identity, in many cases might 
ground the individual identity of people and provide the meaningful framework in the 
context of which individual lives can unfold (Drenthen 2009; Drenthen 2011). All these are 
characterizations of human experiences of habitation. We have a sense of belonging to a 
place; we cherish the particular identity of a place, we can develop our life projects within 
the context of a place-based community. The ‘values’ that Michelfelder brings up can be, 
then, appropriately characterized as meanings that humans appreciate in terms of their 
inhabitation of a very specific place. 
But there is a second sense of community that might be playing a role here, which 
is more similar to Rolston’s idea of a system: something existing over and above the 
individuals and their appreciations. On this account, community would be something to 
which we belong, and which has some sort of value of its own, a meaningful context for our 
lives, a meaningful whole which we cherish on its own terms. So it seems that we can 
distinguish between the existence of a community and our appreciation of it. The question 
now is how the ecological discomforts relate respectively to the existence of a community 
and our sense of community. 
 As we saw in the Introduction, the arrival of animals very often upsets the 
established meanings of place and community, potentially leading to their dissolution. The 
appearance of predators might endanger the already existing farming practices that often 
constitute the identity of the place and in the context of which people have developed their 
lives. It might also threaten the already established close relationships with pets. The 
presence of ungulates often leads to damages to the local flora which also contributes to the 
sense of place. While rooting behavior of wild boars might not pose a direct threat to 
anyone, it can lead to significant damages to gardens, which might in turn constitute a 
serious damage to the established identity of a place. 
 Thus, while wildlife might contribute to a sense of place, it might also endanger 
the established sense of place and belonging. Therefore, we need to ask how these threats 
are to be addressed. Given our discussion in this chapter, we shall pay particular attention to 
whether the threats can be addressed in such a way that they also respect the individuals 
who pose such threats. 
 
7.4.2 Maintaining communities 
 
Maintaining communities entails problems which transcend issues of personal safety, such 
as stability of relations, trust, commitment, authority, cohesion, and the sense of belonging 
or not belonging. What are we to make of situations in which these aspects of community 
are endangered by the arrival of wild animals? 
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 Philosopher Ralph Acampora recognizes that life with animal neighbors will not 
always run smoothly and that “It harbors no pretense of utopian perfection or ease” 
(Acampora 2004, 230). Despite that, he has little to say when it comes to specifying what 
levels of threat are acceptable or how we should think about these threats in ethical terms: 
“Of course self-defense prerogatives are duly applicable, but where cohabitation does not 
pose a serious risk to life or health other organisms living in our vicinity ought to be viewed 
as neighbors even when they present nuisances” (Acampora 2004, 229). These disclaimers 
can be understood fully by reference to universal ethical principles. The first observation 
relates to presence or absence of circumstances of justice: where there is a direct threat to 
life we are justified to protect ourselves. The second observation can be fully understood in 
terms of fairness and individual rights. Little nuisances do not justify drastic measures and 
an animal’s right to life and living space should always be taken into account. This certain-
ly responds to our previous worries about a lack of concern with individual wellbeing – 
indeed, the wellbeing is at the center of concern here. But the discussion relates only to risk 
to individuals and in no way raises the problems of place identity, sense of belonging, or 
cohesiveness. Thus we notice a lack of attention to the community as an object of moral 
concern. 
 We encounter similar issues in the work of Michelfelder, who notes that, with 
regard to our responsibilities to accept wildlife, “An exception [to general tolerance] could 
be made within this context for wildlife who, if we allow them to continue to be present in a 
certain area, could because of their predatory instincts raise threats to human life” 
(Michelfelder 2003, 87). This is again a concern with individual wellbeing fully contained 
within the ideas of universal rights of individual animals, relating specifically to lack of the 
circumstances of justice. However, Michelfelder does suggest that there are some principles 
relating to the cohesiveness of a community that come into action when that cohesiveness is 
threatened by unruly behavior of animals: 
 
Thinking of wildlife as one component of a larger urban community, a component that in an 
important way contributes to our having a sense of place, can also help us to think about 
how to deal with human-wildlife conflicts when they arise. As a basic principle, it could be 
said that actions that serve to make such a community more cohesive are morally preferable 
to those actions that would divide it69. If we wish to sustain and enhance community, 
though, it does not necessarily mean that we need to tolerate anything that anyone in the 
community does. (Michelfelder 2003, 86) 
 
The last sentence of this quotation raises some questions. If we are to enhance community 
in terms of its cohesiveness, than we certainly cannot tolerate everything that everyone 
does. Indeed, if we would tolerate everything, the coherence of a community would very 
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 This bears some similarity to Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, though as we will see the communitarian concerns of 
Leopold are largely absent in Michelfelder. 
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quickly come under threat. Michelfelder’s formulation is symptomatic of the ethical 
framework she implicitly follows. She thinks primarily in terms of individual rights, rather 
than in terms of the flourishing of community, and for that reason she is first of all con-
cerned with the wellbeing of individuals. This is confirmed by her subsequent exploration 
of acceptable ways of responding to actions that threaten the cohesiveness of communities. 
In her examples she suggests that the first step in any conflict situation should be 
“to accept their presence where they are, and learn to play around them” (Michelfelder 
2003, 87). But why should we accept their disruptive presence? The only reason would be 
the rights of animals to living space. While this ensures respect for individuals, it tells us 
little about how far we are to tolerate such behavior (especially when it threatens the 
cohesiveness of community, and not just our individual wellbeing) and what to do if it 
becomes too much. Another proposed strategy would be to explore whether our cities and 
infrastructures could be redesigned in such a way that the conflicts would lessen or disap-
pear. The last option would be to use other animals to resolve the problem. 
In all these cases, it is not quite clear how these strategies address the cohesiveness 
of community. Rather, they relate primarily to various ways of respecting individual 
animals. Consequently, they help assure that all animals that end up in an urban environ-
ment continue their life undisturbed by humans. This might be morally praiseworthy with 
respect to the individual wellbeing and freedom of animals, but says little about the 
formation and maintenance of community, identity, or sense of place. Indeed, inasmuch as 
such a community can freely change and transform, and indeed needs to be altered in order 
to accommodate arriving individual animals, it is doubtful whether it would allow for the 
creation of any sense of identity. What is missing, therefore, is the recognition that some 
form of discrimination might be needed in some cases: 
 
A community, it would seem, involves a measure of exclusiveness that defines it and gives 
it much of its meaning. There are psychological, social, and biological barriers around 
community, and crossing them is neither easy nor “natural,” but is difficult and involves 
hard emotional work. People do not, for the most part, carry out this work on their own, but 
in the context of cultural institutions, which provide the tools, techniques, and, to some ex-
tent even the incentive people need to confront the difficulties involved and deal with them 
in productive way. Community may be a great, even an irreducible value, but like other 
values and virtues – beauty, say, or charity or chastity – it is not the solution of a problem 
but is rather the problem itself: of course community is a good thing; the problem is how is 
it achieved and maintained? (Jordan 2003, 36) 
 
So while it is certainly important to be respectful to individuals when trying to construct a 
community, it must also be recognized and explicitly theorized how such respect can be 
combined with certain levels of exclusivity that would ensure that there is a community to 
speak of. Unfortunately, so far we have seen that while animal presence in cities is expected 
to contribute to the sense of place and belonging of its inhabitants, the discussion of the 
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problematic aspects of animals’ presence is carried out exclusively in terms of universal 
ethical principles relating to individual wellbeing of incoming animals. This is problematic 
because the construction of a community entails issues that cannot be fully addressed by 
individualistic ethics. 
As will be demonstrated below, one of the reasons why no morally binding com-
munity-related principles or intuitions are proposed, is because both Acampora and 
Michelfelder are working with a very limited idea of community: community is reduced to 
spatial proximity. I will begin the discussion of this commitment with a more elaborate 
presentation of Acampora’s ideas. 
 
7.4.3 Moral significance of spatial proximity 
 
Acampora reflects on the possibility of developing non-exploitative relationships between 
humans and animals. Taking cohabitation as a given, Acampora is searching for ways of 
building a shared life that would not be oppressive to its participants: “Might it be possible 
and desirable […] to cultivate an inter-species oikos that is not already (nor becomes) an 
oppressive domus?” (Acampora 2004, 220). He analyses a spectrum of places (from 
wilderness to city and home) and associated relationships in order to find a ‘respectful yet 
compassionate’ relationship. 
 Relationships of discovery and contact (located in the wilderness end of the 
spectrum) risk reification of natural entities. On the other side, relationships of affection, 
kinship, stewardship and domestication (located on the urban/domestic end of spectrum) 
are actually or at least potentially condescending, patronizing and dominating. Finally, the 
relationships of (mutual) influence and intervention are presented as potential models for 
‘constructive co-habitation’ in forms “of togetherness by which associates can be ethically 
bonded” (Acampora 2004, 225). Of primary importance are partnership (with working 
animals), neighborhood, and fellowship. Acampora discusses in greater depth precisely the 
idea of multi-species neighborhood: 
 
I would like to suggest that the category of neighbor, properly understood, is one of the 
more helpful ethical concepts for our purposes, because it avoids the paternalism to which 
the kin-metaphor is subject (at least in interspecific contexts) and yet retains a crucial ele-
ment of moral responsibility that drops out when we reduce animals to the status of pests. 
The discourse of neighborhood is also better than that of citizenship, another model often 
invoked or implied in environmental and animal ethics, because it maintains a sense of in-
timacy lacking from the abstract terminology of res publica.70 (Acampora 2004, 227) 
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 Although he raises this challenge specifically against Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, it is just as relevant with regard 
to Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) who discuss coexistence in terms of citizenship and denizenship, framing it 
within the context of liberal politics. The question here is what difference replacement of general relations of 
citizenship with those of neighborhood brings. As I will argue, the ideas of neighborhood and community used 
respectively by Acampora and Michelfelder are too thin to do actual ethical work. 
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What is necessary to become such neighbors? According to both Michelfelder and 
Acampora, spatial proximity is not only necessary but also sufficient for becoming neigh-
bors. This equation is affirmed by both Michelfelder and Acampora: “Wildlife that inhabit 
and have found a home in urban settings are our nonhuman neighbors. As a result we have 
a moral obligation to respond to them accordingly and treat them as the neighbors that they 
are” (Michelfelder 2003, 86). Acampora (2004) recognizes in his comments on Michelfeld-
er that there is a danger of equivocation involved in switching between moral and spatial 
senses of neighborhood. He acknowledges that there is ‘moral mileage’ in moving between 
those two, but claims this is not an unsurmountable problem: 
 
We cannot simply read off duties from brute nearness. Nonetheless, for social beings such 
as humans, those who live near us regularly awaken compassion and are accorded at least a 
modicum of respect in virtue of their proximity. If we are prepared to recognize this, then it 
will prove difficult to non-arbitrarily delimit neighborly norms at the boundary of the spe-
cies Homo sapiens. We must acknowledge that it is not human sapience but rather proximal 
residence that qualifies somebody as a neighbor, and that this qualification can be met at 
least by other animals (if not plants, though this latter case is an extension I will not consid-
er here). […] On pain of speciesism, then, we should not negate the neighborly status of any 
organism capable of residing and who does in fact dwell in our midst. (Acampora 2004, 
228) 
 
The key issue here is how we are to understand the relation of being neighbors. Specifical-
ly, from where do the moral obligations linked to being neighbors arise – is it really purely 
from spatial proximity or is there something more? An analogous problem is found in 
Michelfelder, where the relationship of being neighbors is replaced by a sense of communi-
ty – is such a community based purely on spatial proximity, or is there something else? The 
question here is not whether we should respect problematic animals as such – the commit-
ments of general animal rights might still be at play. Rather, the question is whether we 
respect these creatures as vulnerable selves, or as members of a community, as neighbors. 
To answer this question, we must ask what it means to be a neighbor (or a member 
of a community). Being neighbors is a specific kind of relationship which is closely tied to 
spatial relations. Neighbors are first and foremost those who live close to each other, whose 
spaces of life intersect or touch. Neighborhood might, then, be understood in a purely 
spatial sense – people simply living next door but never really interacting. But while 
spatiality is a necessary precondition for becoming neighbors, the idea of neighborhood 
may carry richer meanings. Neighbors might interact, help each other, perhaps develop 
joint routines, rituals, agree on many values or at least be open to discussing things in good 
faith and with a view to understanding. It is the development of such close associations that 
further creates a sense of obligation, and possibly sympathy, which can ground moral 
concern. 
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Acampora seems to be using the idea of neighbor in the purely spatial sense. But, I 
would argue, such use is insufficient if we want to use the idea of neighbors in any ethical 
discussion. Spatial proximity in and of itself might well be a reason for developing antago-
nistic relations. We consider potentially disruptive entities as unwanted and problematic 
precisely when they appear in our proximity, while having no problems with them if they 
are somewhere far away. Proximity might be a precondition, opening up the possibility of 
becoming neighbors, but proximity can also create enemies and may become a good reason 
to protect oneself by removing the other. It is also precisely proximity that can endanger the 
already established meanings. 
It might be true that I have more responsibilities to someone living next door than 
to someone living on the other side of town, but in the same way I have a responsibility to 
help a stranger who has an accident in my vicinity, or somebody I see drowning. This is 
based on general moral responsibilities, and not on such specific relations as that of being 
neighbors. To carry specific moral weight, the neighbor relationship must be developed 
before it brings in particular moral obligations. Reduction of the relationship of neighbor-
hood to spatial proximity is most unfortunate, given that Acampora does discuss different 
forms of interaction, mutual influence, and respectful negotiation across species. However, 
he discusses these examples only to show that respectful interaction is possible, not to point 
them out as preconditions for building meaningful relationships. I will revisit this point in 
the next chapter. 
In a very similar sense, we can think of differences between community in a rich 
and poor sense. It might be even easier for us to understand this difference because it is 
such an important part of our political discussions. Here we can distinguish between a 
community in a rich sense, involving the association of individuals who share a common 
good, identity, practices, history etc., and a society which assembles disparate, autonomous 
individuals with the aim of protecting the rights of those individuals and creating spaces in 
which they will be able to pursue their own freely chosen goals. The former understanding 
of community has been usually associated with the communitarian tradition, the latter with 
liberalism. 
 Western societies are based predominately on the liberal idea of society as a free 
association of individuals. In such a context, the role of society is primarily to ensure 
respect for individual rights, a just distribution of costs and benefits, and an unencumbered 
pursuit of one’s freely chosen good. However, the dominance of liberal ideas in shaping our 
social and political reality has met with significant backlash from the side of such important 
philosophical figures as Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), Michael Sandel (1982), or Charles 
Taylor (1989). The two issues that are most often raised are, first, that such liberal societies 
do not create a proper environment for people to live fulfilling lives; secondly, that liberal-
ism builds on a misguided idea of self which misrepresents how people grow into fully 
developed individuals. 
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 According to communitarians71, we cannot think about individuals in abstraction 
from the communities into which they are born. We develop in the context of specific 
groups, traditions, values, customs and meanings. Such communities often have a long 
history, and sometimes, though not necessarily, have lived in a given place, in the context 
of which they have developed themselves. These do not have to be invariable and rigid, but 
it is only against the background of such communities that we can fully develop as humans. 
Thus, communities are seen as the nurturing environment which allows for self-realization, 
development of moral character, maintenance of multiple relationships, and the pursuit of 
individual and joint plans. In turn, individuals, in becoming members of a community, 
come to embrace its goals and values, and contribute to a common good. Such commit-
ments may be seen as normative demands that should be realized by individuals. In other 
words, individual members of community need to integrate the shared values and contribute 
to the common good, even if they can expect no immediate benefits from such commit-
ment. The extent to which one is subject to this common good can vary greatly, and this is 
the place at which most communitarians would demand caution, because communities can 
in some circumstances become authoritarian and oppressive, subjecting its members to 
undue control, invigilation and exploitation, demanding extreme conformism, and exhibit-
ing xenophobia. These, however, are dangers, rather than intrinsic aspects of community 
life. 
Ideas of Leopold and Rolston have sometimes been characterized as communitari-
an (e.g. Callicott 1998). Certainly they do foreground the importance of community, and 
the mutual dependence of individuals and community. But I am not sure how far this 
analogy between their work and the political tradition of communitarianism can be drawn. 
The relationship between individual and community might be skewed too far towards the 
concern with community, as was noted in the previous chapter. On the other hand, while 
Michelfelder and Acampora speak about community and neighborhood, thus suggesting a 
concern with rich ideas of community characteristic of communitarianism, their treatment 
(or lack thereof) of the threats to community, and the purely spatial sense of community 
they use, indicate that they in fact work within the framework of liberal society. Therefore, 
their propositions can already give us an idea of how liberal forms of association could 
work and what is at stake in them – the right of individuals to pursue freely and without 
constraints their goals, as long as it does not endanger the goals of others. 
I now would like to discuss a theory which explicitly associates itself with the lib-
eral project. This is the political theory of animal rights proposed by Sue Donaldson and 
Will Kymlicka (2011). While their theory extends over various types of relationships 
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 A useful summary of basic communitarian claims can be found in the entries in The Encyclopedia of Political 
Thought written by Israeli-American sociologist Amitai Etzioni (2014a; 2014b; 2014c), who has been one of the 
central figures of American communitarianism since the 1990’s. 
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between humans and animals, the discussion which will be of greatest relevance here, and 
with which I will engage most fully, is their treatment of urban wildlife. 
 
7.5 POLITICS OF COEXISTENCE 
 
The two previous accounts argue for tightening the relations with wildlife. By becoming 
part of a community or as neighbors, wild animals enter in close relations with humans and 
become an integral part of city life. In this context, the ideas of Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka, presented in their widely read Zoopolis (2011), raise an important counterpoint. 
Rather than focusing on how to integrate wild animals into coexistence, they foreground the 
need to respect the independence of animals from humans and the existing communities. As 
such they develop ideas that locate animals in urban environments, and integrate them 
within urban life, while at the same time recognizing their separateness from the communi-
ties of humans and domesticated animals. In the remaining part of this chapter, I would like 
to focus on their propositions and particularly on their account of the ambiguous status of 
urban wildlife. 
 
7.5.1 Animal denizenship as a political category 
 
Although Donaldson and Kymlicka point out the limitations of animal rights approach, they 
do accept the fundamental commitment to the inherent worth of individuals as the source of 
moral considerability of animals. But unlike the traditional animal rights approaches, they 
believe that morally praiseworthy relationships with animals are possible. The real issue for 
them is the delineation of the specific rights and obligations of urban wildlife that would 
recognize their situation as being undomesticated but nevertheless living in close quarters 
with humans. This means that Donaldson and Kymlicka are interested in providing a 
general framework for understanding the consequences of inherent value of individuals in 
the specific context of urban cohabitation. 
 Since the discussion of Donaldson and Kymlicka is framed within their greater 
project of reappraising animal rights theory from the perspective of political theory, what 
they are looking for is a political category that would capture the political-moral specificity 
of urban wildlife and outline the extent of moral rights and obligations that this category 
entails. They show how domesticated animals can be seen as co-citizens and how wild 
animals can be appraised as members of sovereign nations. Subsequently, they define our 
rights and responsibilities to these respective groups by analogy to our moral commitments 
to human citizens and sovereign (human) foreigners. Urban wildlife cannot be subsumed 
under any of these categories. Although it would be possible to domesticate these animals, 
this would require “confinement, separation of families, controlled breeding, radical 
changes to diet and other habitual behaviours, and other violations of basic liberties like 
those that were imposed on domesticated animals as part of the historic domestication 
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process” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 214). These actions would go against the rights 
to non-interference and involve levels of control and violence that we would find hard to 
justify today. On the other hand, the usual strategy of ‘letting them be’ also seems impossi-
ble: 
 
In the wilderness case, 'let them be' is a shorthand for saying that we should respect the sov-
ereignty of wild animals over their habitat, and resist encroaching upon or colonizing their 
territory. But in the case of liminal animals, their habitat is our cities, and indeed our back-
yards and homes-in short, the same physical space in which sovereign human communities 
inevitably and legitimately exercise their self-government. The governance of human socie-
ties will unavoidably create all sorts of interference in the activities of the liminal animals 
who take up residence amongst us, and the task of ART is to figure out how to take those 
impacts into account. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 213) 
 
As neither citizenship nor sovereignty works for urban wildlife, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
characterize these animals as ‘liminal’ to capture the in-between status of urban wildlife 
existing close to humans (like domesticated animals), yet maintaining a high degree of 
independence (like wild animals in wild areas). This in-between status is captured by the 
political category of denizens: 
 
Liminal animals are co-residents of human communities but not co-citizens. They belong 
here amongst us, but are not one of us. Denizenship captures this distinctive status, which is 
fundamentally different from either co-citizenship or external sovereignty. Like citizenship, 
denizenship is a relationship that should be governed by norms of justice, but it is a looser 
sort of relationship, less intimate or cooperative, and therefore characterized by a reduced 
set of rights and responsibilities. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 214) 
 
Denizenship includes, first of all, the right to residency (2011, 241). Secondly, it involves a 
set of rights and obligations shaping our mutual relations, albeit one that is much reduced 
compared to human or animal citizens (2011, 241-242). However, such distributions of 
rights should still be fair and the reductions should be reciprocal. In practical terms this 
might mean taking their interests into account when designing infrastructure (2011, 244). 
We do not, however, have an obligation to protect them from predators as in the case of 
domestic animals, because this would mean a too large infringement on their autonomy 
(and on the autonomy of the predators) (2011, 242). 
 On the other hand, we have all the right to discourage the arrival of new animals, 
for instance by erecting barriers, and by making life in the city less attractive to them, at 
least as long as this is done in humane ways that do not harm them, and as long as these 
animals have other areas where they can continue to live (2011, 227). But once they are 
actually in the city, and begin acclimatizing themselves and developing relations with the 
place, their rights should be recognized (2011, 228). At that stage we can organize city 
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space in such a way as to minimize their unwanted impacts and limit their numbers, so that 
they do not endanger themselves and the rest of individuals inhabiting the place (2011, 
245). These limitations and constrains should be carried out in such a way as to respect 
animals, though it is acknowledged that this will not always be possible (2011, 246). 
 
7.5.2 Problematic aspects of animal liminality 
 
In general, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s discussion of the practicalities of coexistence in 
terms of limited rights and obligations is very lucid, balanced, and supported by many real-
life examples. When it comes to actual questions of action they go quite a long way in 
illuminating what coexistence could look like and how conflictual situations can be 
addressed in a respectful manner. But while the idea of denizenship does provide some 
concrete clues as to the extent of rights and responsibilities, Donaldson and Kymlicka admit 
that the concept of denizenship remains at heart ambiguous and precarious: 
 
The resulting status is a complex one, and not without its moral ambiguities. It does not of-
fer the seeming clarity of either citizenship for domesticated animals or sovereignty for an-
imals in the wild. Denizenship is, by comparison, a hybrid status, with fewer clear fixed 
points of reference. And, as a result, it is indeed more vulnerable to being misused as a cov-
er for subordination or neglect. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 251) 
 
The main danger for Donaldson and Kymlicka is that of potential ‘subordination or neglect’ 
of liminal animals, made more probable by their unclear moral status. This is a problem of 
inattention, not fundamentally linked to the specific political category (even if this category 
might give more opportunities for both). But I think there is another issue that stems 
precisely from the hybridity of denizenship. This hybridity, I will argue, resides in the 
coexistence of two radically different orders of goodness at the same time. 
 Donaldson and Kymlicka propose that liminal animals are suspended between two 
different political categories: that of citizens and of sovereign foreigners. They belong in 
cities, and this gives rise to certain rights and obligations. But at the same time these 
animals are still members of a sovereign animal nation and as such they demand first of all 
the negative right to non-interference. In the theory of Donaldson and Kymlicka, these two 
political categories are not different in any radical sense. Their ethical framework remains 
consistently a theory of individual animal rights and although they accept that wild animals 
can only flourish within ecosystems that involve individual suffering and death, they do 
find this “a regrettable feature of nature” (2011, 182). They explicitly dismiss the idea of a 
specific goodness of the ecological order (as in the case of Val Plumwood or James 
Hatley), or of biotic communities being the ultimate normative reference point (as was for 
Aldo Leopold and Holmes Rolston III). Meanwhile, violent relations between animals are 
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accepted by Plumwood and Hatley, not just because such animals lack capacity for moral 
deliberation, but because they express a distinct sort of goodness. 
 While Donaldson and Kymlicka reject this sort of goodness, committed as they are 
to the liberal ideals of ethics and self (‘person-as-the-walled-moated-castle-town,’ to use 
Plumwood’s phrase), others (myself included) sense that the intuitions explored by Plum-
wood, Hatley, Leopold, and Rolston capture something very important about our experi-
ence of the world. If we are willing to accept that such intuitions are indeed significant, and 
if we interpret the category of animal sovereignty in light of ideas on ecological goodness 
and radical justice, then I think the concept of liminal animals can capture a very important 
ambivalence we experience when we encounter these animals. 
 The category of liminal animals captures our experience of these animals as 
suspended between two radically different orders of goodness: the moral goodness of 
respect for the individual as a subject-of-a-life and the goodness of radical generosity 
pervading ecological relations. 
 My aim in proposing this interpretation of the idea of liminality is not to criticize 
Donaldson and Kymlicka, but rather to interpret their concept in a way which perhaps they 
would not fully agree with, but which, I think, does illuminate something important about 
our experience of urban animals, and as such can contribute to our understanding of the 
possibilities of coexistence. Since such understanding is also their focus, I think of this 
extension as a contribution to a conversation on the subject of coexistence. I would like to 
further explore this proposition by suggesting some of the consequences that follow from 
this understanding of the liminality of urban wildlife. 
 
7.5.3 Radical denizenship 
 
To be suspended between citizenship and sovereignty means for animals something else 
than it does for humans. Human denizens, whether immigrants or refugees, rely on the 
same basic ethical ideas regarding individual inviolability. Of course foreigners might 
differ and this might include customs, traditions, beliefs etc. The extent to which some 
beliefs or practices are deemed troublesome might differ. An extreme nationalist might see 
the peculiar dress code of refugees as a threat, while those with more liberal attitudes will 
not. But when a certain level of moral difference is reached even strongly liberal citizens 
will refuse to accept foreign customs. Genital mutilation of women, honor killings, or 
disregard for basic human rights are well-known examples. We accept refugees and 
immigrants with their foreign culture as long as their customs do not clash radically with 
certain fundamental ethical beliefs. 
 Liminal animals, in as much as they are wild animals, do bring with them certain 
‘customs’ that may clash with some fundamental moral beliefs. Indeed, they bring with 
them a form of life that may be at odds with the utilitarian and deontological ethics that we 
recently have been extending over animals. But unlike in the case of human denizens, we 
178 | Towards a wilder community 
 
seem strongly predisposed to accept this fundamental difference, even respect it, as quite 
appropriate. 
 At least for some of us, when we respect ecological relations between animals it is 
not just for prudential reasons72, but also because we recognize that being a member of an 
‘animal nation’ is connected with a completely different kind of goodness. This was already 
discussed in chapter 5. The sovereignty and moral otherness of wild animals is of a more 
radical kind than that of human denizens. Indeed, in many ways it is antithetical to the kind 
of justice that protects vulnerable individual selves from infringement: “the issue is that the 
eating of one species by another functions to let both species flourish. […] In wild space we 
encounter another sort of goodness, a goodness caught up in the circle of edibility articulat-
ed in the food chain” (Hatley 2002, 40). 
 These two orders of goodness have been separated, both spatially and conceptual-
ly, by the conceptual separation of wild and domesticated animals and by the assignment of 
different moral rules to these different spatial communities (e.g. in Callicott 1988; Wenz 
1988). Traditionally, ethics separated animal ethics from environmental ethics: the former 
following the ideas of individual justice, while the latter gravitated towards forms of radical 
justice. But here, as wild animals, humans, and domestic animals come together, we are 
drawn to recognize the irreducible presence of both dimensions of justice. Here we not only 
see these two moral orders coming together in one spatial location, but they are also 
localized in the same group of animals. Liminal animals are thus suspended between two 
different orders of goodness that make radically different demands. 
Thus, we cannot afford to ignore any longer this fundamental tension, perhaps 
even conflict and incommensurability, between the individual justice and the ecological 
goodness of edibility. Denizenship can be seen as a very preliminary articulation of this 
moral tension that makes urban wildlife so hard for us to capture ethically. We could 
continue trying to keep these two worlds separate or to reduce one to another (as is done in 
most animal ethics approaches). But is that an adequate course? 
 
The boundary and radical difference between what I am calling the person/justice and the 
food/ecological framework is real. I have been there, I have journeyed to this other world in 
which we are all food, and I have come back […]. There is an incommensurability which 
shuts these two worlds off from each other. They exist as parallel universes, in different di-
mensions. Yet, we exist in both simultaneously. They do not invalidate one another, except 
when people mistakenly try to reduce one to the other or make other mistakes resulting 
from human arrogance. These lead us to divide the world between the one in which you are 
a person-subject from an individual justice perspective, and that other, older shocking, sub-
versive and denied world in which you are food. (Plumwood 2012, 37) 
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 As when we worry that our interventions would cause more wrong then good. 
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Though Plumwood seems to be speaking here about humans, I think it is justifiable to 
extend this worry to non-humans too. This is especially relevant in the context of animals 
living close to humans who are often appreciated ethically in terms of individual justice 
(animal advocacy), while the ecological perspective is largely rejected. This is a reduction 
of the complex status which is most clearly visible in liminal animals. Plumwood proposes 
we should rather try to bridge these two worlds or use them to mutually qualify each other: 
 
These two worlds qualify each other and an unqualified affirmation of predation requires 
looking at it from only one side. Affirmation requires we confront the reality of both. Alt-
hough they are parallel, they are not completely independent. Completeness requires a 
recognition of both along with an understanding of why and how they differ. (Plumwood 
2012, 38) 
 
This seems to me a more promising direction. Reinterpretation of denizenship as a complex 
category – both politically and ethically – is one additional step on the way to recognize the 
simultaneous existence of these two radically different worlds. As we have seen, the animal 
ethics approaches that strive towards locating animals within spaces shared with humans, 
usually discuss concerns arising from the individual justice world only. This is particularly 
the case with respect to the problematic aspects of coexistence where all arising problems 
are conceptualized in terms of rights of individual animals. We cannot accept denizenship 
as an illuminating category unless we speak openly about the contribution of radical justice 
in shaping our coexistence with liminal animals. This can involve considering how radical 
generosity can contribute to developing and maintaining different forms of association. To 
fully flesh out the consequences of such a perspective would demand much more work, but 
here, at least, we have some starting points that help us understand the situation. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have examined the ideas of animal ethics on the subject of coexistence with 
discomforting wildlife. I have paid particular attention to those propositions which try to 
extend the idea of individual rights by conceptualizing them in terms of different forms of 
association by which they are enabled or endangered. Such propositions have mostly 
focused on showing how different forms of association can in themselves be morally 
meaningful, thus supplementing the account of negative animal rights. Unfortunately, these 
extensions do not take very seriously the problematic aspects of developing such associa-
tions as neighborhood, community, or society. When it comes to problematic aspects of the 
development and maintenance of such entities, most ethicists remain wholly within the 
confines of thinking along general rights-based principles, neglecting the specific demands, 
like those of having to protect and maintain existing communities. They also do not take 
into consideration the alternative ideas of goodness that arise from ecological relations in 
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which animals are implicated. I have provided some conceptual clarification on what would 
be involved in openly approaching such discomforting aspects of developing forms of 
association. 
 But we still need some clues about what this would mean in practice. Therefore, I 
would like to add one more quotation from Plumwood which, I think, summarizes quite 
well what has been discussed so far, while pointing out what still needs to be done: 
 
My proposal is that the food/death imaginary we have lost touch with is a key to re-
imagining ourselves ecologically, as members a larger earth community of radical equality, 
mutual nurturance and support. Our loss of this perspective has meant the loss of humbling 
but important forms of knowledge, of ourselves and of our world. We can learn to look for 
comfort and continuity, meaning and hope in the context of the earth community, and work 
in this key place to displace the hierarchical and exceptionalist cultural framework that so 
often defeats our efforts to adapt to the planet. This involves re-imagining ourselves through 
concrete practices of restraint and humility, not just in vague airy–fairy concepts of unity. 
(2012, 19) 
 
Much of Plumwood’s work, some of which I have discussed in previous chapters, aims to 
explore the food and death imagery. A large part of this thesis has been an extension of 
such articulation, which, moving beyond the specific questions of food and death, attempt-
ed to show how meaning, continuity and comfort can be found in many experiences of 
nature that we often avoid, repress, or simply lose touch with. We can see how many of 
these experiences can in fact contribute to a meaningful, worthwhile life with non-humans. 
But Plumwood also foregrounds a need to locate these meanings in concrete practices. It is 
not enough to articulate how such concepts as community, neighborhood, citizenship, and 
justice apply to our relations to animals. It is also important to show how these can be 
actually embodied in practices that can realistically organize our life. This requires showing 
how a community can be maintained, how we can develop neighborhood relations, and how 
different concepts of justice can organize mutual relations between humans and nonhu-
mans. In the next chapter, I want to illustrate at least some of these issues with practical, 
real-life examples. I will present two case studies, which I will analyze through the lens of 
the concepts, interpretations, and meanings that have been articulated so far. 
 8. 
Practicing coexistence 
 
 
In this closing chapter, I will show the relevance of the reflections from the previous 
chapters to the practical task of living with wild animals. To do this, I will bring up two 
examples of actual practices developed in response to arrivals of animals into human 
spaces. I will then proceed to show how the concepts and interpretations presented so far 
can illuminate what is happening in these practices, both in terms of what they strive for, 
and how they fall short of fulfilling their aims. Finally, it will be shown how a better 
understanding predicated upon previous analyses can contribute to improving these 
practices. 
I will begin with recounting a personal narrative of Erica Fudge, professor in ani-
mal studies, in which she presents her own attempt to develop some form of domestic 
coexistence with mice. It might seem strange to bring up house mice as an example for 
reflecting on recolonization and coexistence with wild nature. Indeed, so far I have been 
focusing on large, ‘charismatic’ fauna and have often referred to ideas related to wilderness. 
But there are good reasons to turn to such a humble example. First, by engaging with a 
contrasting case, we are given a chance to test the scope and relevance of the ideas present-
ed so far. Secondly, while mice have lived for millennia side by side with humans, are 
sometimes domesticated and kept as pets, and are one of the most commonly used experi-
mental animals, they inhabit our homes essentially as wild animals and are usually treated 
as pests. As such, for all practical purposes, they can be treated as wild creatures. Thirdly, 
the example of mice focusses our attention on the most intimate areas of our life – our 
homes – and reminds us of the power hidden even in tiny creatures. Finally, by representing 
a familiar presence they form an example that most of us can easily relate to. Given all 
these points, the example of mice will allow us to bring home, so to speak, many of the 
reflections that so far may have seemed rather distant and abstract. By using attempts to 
coexist with mice as an example, I will show how many of the themes brought up through-
out this thesis work out in an everyday life context. While the specific form of coexistence 
proposed by Erica Fudge will prove in the end unsatisfying, its analysis will be a first step 
to a constructive critique, which in the second part of this chapter, in confrontation with a 
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second example, will help us get closer to a model for meaningful and respectful coexist-
ence. 
 
8.1 SYMBOLIC DOMESTICATION 
 
The story of Erica Fudge begins when one day she discovers a mouse in her kitchen. Her 
confrontation with this wild creature was neither planned nor expected. Fudge did not invite 
the mouse – the mouse (or rather mice), invited themselves and so confronted a human 
being with the need to respond. Fudge does acknowledge that she already lives with many 
other wild creatures (e.g. spiders), but these are rather unobtrusive and unproblematic. It is 
only with the appearance of mice that Fudge is confronted with the problematic presence of 
wildness in her home. 
The initial response of Fudge is a mixture of self-interest and ethical concern. 
While aware of the difficulties that living with a mouse can bring, following her commit-
ment to the general ethical principles of animal ethics, she refuses to simply kill the mouse: 
“This was, after all, a house mouse, and I am, after all, a vegetarian. To put the mouse 
outside might be to kill it” (Fudge 2011, 54). This clearly reveals the moral concern with 
individual wellbeing and vulnerability based on general ethical commitments. 
But soon living with the mouse does prove to be a troubling experience and Fudge 
begins to feel a need for some form of accommodation. First of all, there is the looming 
threat of disease, the constant need to clean up after visits by the mouse, and the need to 
protect food from it. Beyond these material difficulties, there are also symbolic issues, such 
as maintaining her home as an ordered and controlled space of familiarity. As Mary 
Douglas notes:  
 
Perhaps the most subversive attack on the home is to be present physically without 
joining in its multiple coordinations. To leave erratically, without saying where or 
for how long, to come back and go upstairs without greeting, these lapses are rec-
ognized as spoliation of the commons. (Douglas 1991, 301) 
 
As far as wild animals can be seen to subvert all those rules, how can we conceive of them 
as part of a home, of the community of home, or, by extrapolation, of a neighborhood? If 
home is at heart an attempt to organize and order the world, than “an invading mouse is 
utterly antithetical to the stability of home. Such a creature steals, infects, destroys. […] A 
mouse is a law unto itself. To be a vegetarian and to have a house mouse, then, might make 
it impossible to live an orderly and ethically consistent home existence” (Fudge 2011, 66). 
Given the annoyance that the animal provokes, and the danger it poses, Fudge 
considers various options for managing the mouse, or at least its impacts. In this we can 
clearly see a reference to the personal costs involved in the presence of animals, and the 
managerial attempts to diminish these costs – attitudes I have discussed in chapter 3. One 
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possibility is the use of humane traps that do not harm an animal, but allow the user to 
transport it to another location where it will not be such a nuisance. Another advice she 
follows is to close all possible entry points and passages that the animal can use to get into 
and around the house. 
Her choice of management tools is clearly moderated by the ethical concerns re-
volving around the concern with animal wellbeing. Still, none of them seem to work and 
Fudge just continues putting up with the impacts until at some point she realizes that 
something has changed in her attitude to the animal – she finds herself treating the mouse 
like a pet. While this does not change in any way the material impacts of the mouse, she 
does feel that it eases the situation, and she begins to think about this attitude change as a 
form of management: “This is my version of pest control. The way I co-habit with mice is 
by turning the pests into pets” (Fudge 2011, 58/60). An important aspect of this transfor-
mation of the animal’s status is naming: “This is a mouse that has been named, and so has 
been tamed. I am in control of my environment and my ethics remain intact. I live with 
vermin by translating vermin into pet, pest into guest” (Fudge 2011, 68). This is a rather 
startling solution that seems to propose symbolic means for addressing material issues. To 
fully understand what is involved here, I will take some time to explain what I think is at 
work here. 
 
8.1.1 Symbolic power of naming 
 
It must be noted from the start that Fudge does not domesticate the mouse as such. Rather, 
she begins treating it as if it were a domesticated animal. The domestication, then, is not 
actual but rather symbolic – it consists in naming the mouse and treating it as if it was 
domesticated – hence I will call this practice ‘symbolic domestication’. How is it possible 
to domesticate an animal symbolically and why would it work? Naming the mouse plays a 
crucial role here. 
Naming is a speech act – it is doing by speaking – doing things with words (see 
e.g.: Austin 1962; Searle 1969). We are familiar with speech acts from our daily experi-
ence: ‘I order you to do this!’, ‘I name you my sole inheritor,’ ‘I pronounce you man and 
wife.’ In each of these cases an individual does something, changes the situation or the 
status of individuals, by uttering words. Naming of a mouse can be understood along these 
lines, in that by simply speaking about a mouse differently, Fudge completely changes the 
identity of the mouse, its status within the home, and the kind of relationship that binds the 
two of them. Two changes that follow from domestication through naming seem particular-
ly crucial, in that they can help accommodate the anxieties provoked by mouse’s presence. 
First, naming changes the relation between a human and a mouse in such a way that the 
human becomes a ‘master’, or ‘owner’; secondly, it includes mice into the community of 
home. Why would these transformations help in accommodating an animal and the 
difficulties it causes? 
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8.1.2 Accommodation and consolation 
 
First, establishing a pet relationship with a mouse creates a patronizing interaction with the 
human being as the one in charge. This is because humans invite pets, choose pets, decide 
to have pets – in each case there is a human decision involved in initiating the confronta-
tion; also because we think of ourselves as pet ‘owners’ or ‘masters’. This eases the 
psychological difficulties inasmuch as it creates a relationship with a clear hierarchical 
structure, thus giving humans a sense of power. While a relationship with a pet can be made 
fairly equal and respectful, it also leaves a lot of space for establishing human superiority 
and control. Such symbolic action responds directly to the loss of control over the domestic 
environment that Fudge experiences. 
Secondly, a pet relationship moves the animal into a category that belongs to do-
mestic existence. Unlike a wild animal, a pet belongs home – therefore no transgression is 
taking place. This means that impacts lose a sense of a challenge and become merely a 
tedious task – annoying perhaps, but not challenging the fundaments of orderly domestic 
existence. Shit and piss of a pet is not the same as shit and piss of a wild animal. Perhaps 
piss of a dog on a carpet is annoying but it is not upsetting the metaphysical order of things. 
Domesticated animals notoriously damage things at home, make it dirty and messy. But 
such mess is all within the bounds of domestic existence. This is because a community is 
never a fully harmonious entity and has to deal with tensions and transgressions of rules. 
Negative impacts are not in themselves a reason for excommunication. A community might 
tolerate certain problematic actions, or will develop forms of atonement. Thus, damage by a 
domestic animal is ‘only’ an internal problem of a domestic community. 
On the other hand, damage caused by a wild animal is a sign of transgression and a 
challenge to the established order – it is a challenge coming from the outside. There is a 
difference in how we treat threats coming from the outside and those internal to the 
community. Typically, impacts produced by someone who is seen as a member of an in-
group are perceived differently than impacts caused by an outsider. A lie by someone who 
we hardly know is usually of much less consequence than a lie told by somebody we are 
close with, know very well, and whom we trust. On the other hand, we are usually more 
lenient towards our friends and close ones in many little offences than we are to strangers. 
So a relevant distinguishing mark for an impact is not just its severity, but also the identity 
of the actor who committed it. Consequently, what was a serious offense by a wild animal 
can be of little importance when it is done by a pet. 
This way accommodation of the anxieties is achieved by including mice into the 
structures of order and familiarity. Such symbolic action can even change our attitude to 
material threats that mice bring, for instance in the form of possible diseases. Although 
disease is still physically a threat, it is no longer experienced as all that threatening. After 
all, pets can also harbor dangerous diseases. And yet, the threat we feel does not seem to be 
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of the same kind as that coming from wild creatures. This is because whether we perceive 
something as threatening or not, is based not only on ‘objective’ qualifiers, like probability 
and severity of a threat, but also on psychological, symbolic, and cultural considerations. 
This brings us back to the question of what determines our appreciation of threats. Here 
again, as in chapter 2, we see how the probability and severity are not the only determining 
factors, and the meanings of the threat, in this case specifically the status of the threat’s 
source, can also have an impact on how we respond. The source of a threat (a domesticated 
or a wild animal) can thus change its meaning, and as such also change our attitude towards 
it. 
 
8.1.3 Becoming a member of a community 
 
But how did it come about that Fudge began treating the mouse as a pet? Why did she name 
it in the first place? Did she simply decide to do this? This is how the idea presented itself 
to her: 
 
This solution was not originally a thought out response to the situation. I did not at any 
point sit down and think to myself: ‘Well, I can’t kill it, because that would be a violation of 
my ethical position. So I have to find a way of managing to live with it that is least unpleas-
ant for me. I will have to treat it as I would an animal that I had invited into my home. I will 
treat it as if it was a pet and then control over the environment seems to return to me.’ Life, 
of course, is not so rationally ordered for most of us. Rather, I think my motivation was 
more complex and less easy to represent rationally. I named the mouse because it was be-
coming a familiar feature of my domestic life. (Fudge 2011, 69/70) 
 
So her naming of a mouse – or rather now the mouse – was not a reasoned response to the 
problematic situation, but rather a response to the way the mouse has already been taken up 
by her in her daily life. Naming the mouse becomes a response to a specific way in which 
the mouse is already experienced by her: an attempt to capture how she already experiences 
the mouse as a familiar part of the domestic existence. Naming can thus be considered as an 
attempt to give a concrete form to a vague feeling she already has. 
This should be familiar from our earlier discussion of moral experience in chapter 
5. Her apprehension of the mouse’s presence at her home is an experience that addresses 
her and demands a response – a moral experience, perhaps not as extreme and troubling as 
that of Plumwood, but nevertheless one that does demand a transformation on the part of 
Fudge: she has to adapt her idea of who belongs at home and how. As such, it questions her 
already taken for granted beliefs about home and who belongs there. It also moves her 
beyond her initial response: tolerating the mouse’s presence in view of her commitment to 
vegetarianism. Here she feels herself addressed, or confronted with an experience, where 
the proximity of an independent being, and the ongoing interactions with it, lay some kind 
of claim on her to which she has to respond. She does it by naming the animal and by 
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beginning to treat it as a pet – acts which can be seen as attempts to interpret the experience 
and give a more concrete form to what she insufficiently clearly senses in the experience. 
This brings us back to the discussion of spatial proximity as a precondition for be-
ing neighbors. We could say that spatial proximity does indeed play a defining role in 
motivating Fudge’s experience. On this account, it would be precisely the proximity itself 
that, despite all the problems caused by the mouse, motivated Fudge to recognize the mouse 
as belonging to domestic existence as a pet (or perhaps a neighbor). We could see the act of 
naming as a formalization or institutionalization of an intuitively felt relationship already 
established by spatial proximity. But I think the matter is more complicated than that. To 
understand why we cannot predicate morally rich relationship purely on spatiality, I will 
move to a discussion of Fudge’s growing dissatisfaction with her response to the presence 
of the mouse. 
 
8.1.4 Dissatisfaction 
 
Symbolic domestication does appear to be doing a lot of work here. First, it respects the 
integrity of an animal, and even its freedom, since the domestication is only symbolic. 
Secondly, it reestablishes a sense of control and order, which helps in dealing with anxie-
ties, allowing both the human and the animal to live peacefully side by side. Thirdly, 
including the mouse as a community member may add richness to the sense of place. Still, 
Fudge remains ultimately quite dissatisfied with the way she responds to her own experi-
ence: 
 
This inclusion of the mice in my domestic space is in reality utterly reactionary. I have not 
challenged the structures by which we live with the natural world in naming the mice. I 
have simply used one relationship of order (the human/pet relation) that puts humans in 
control as a model for my co-existence with a being that is not a pet. […] A truly radical 
move might be to welcome the mice as a plurality, and to celebrate and encourage the mul-
ti-specific nature of my domestic existence. I have to admit I can’t go that far. (Fudge 2011, 
70) 
 
The dissatisfaction of Fudge can be traced back to the specific way in which she responds 
to the presence of mice. Ultimately, she finds the relationship of the pet-owner through 
which she integrates the mouse into her domestic existence unsatisfactory. I propose that 
the core of this dissatisfaction is interpretative: she recognizes that she did not respond 
truthfully to the moral experience entailed in the presence of a mouse. To substantiate this, I 
will unpack the admission of failure expressed in the quotation above. 
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8.1.5 Disrespect for the wildness of mice 
 
What does Fudge mean by ‘plurality’? Is it not simply about recognizing that there are 
many mice rather than one? As anyone who ever had experience with mice in their house 
knows, there is never just one mouse. To pretend that there is just one mouse is to deny the 
reality of what mice are – they are always many, a swarm, a quickly procreating, largely 
anonymous mass of furry creatures. But mice are a plurality not just because they are many, 
but also because they are independent from humans and from our desires, leading their own 
sort of life – for all practical purposes they are wild, autonomous creatures, even if they 
lack the charisma of wolves or bears. Thus, plurality here means ‘difference’ – a radical 
difference of a way of life clearly distinct from a human way of life. As such they are 
distinctly different also from pets – which are animals so transformed as to harmonize in 
one way or another with the human way of life. The problem that Fudge is facing here is 
precisely that through symbolic domestication she fails to recognize this kind of independ-
ence, otherness or difference. 
This in turn is a symptom of a deeper problem: the only way she can live with an 
animal is when she establishes a kind of relationship with it that occludes or even elimi-
nates all that makes the animal different, and as such makes the cohabitation challenging. 
Perhaps the relationship of pet and owner is not too bad in many ways, it is merely a mild 
instance of patronizing and involves no physical harm. But what is really troubling is the 
significance of establishing such a relationship – it shows a fundamental failure of being 
able to live with wild nature even in such a humble form as a mouse! This means she has 
not really learned to live with a wild animal. She lives with a wild animal only insofar as 
that animal appears to be a pet, a domesticated animal. She learned to accommodate or 
tolerate animals by pretending they are her pet. But she did not learn to live with wild 
animals. 
But why is that a problem? After all, her initial ethical motive was to respect the 
life of an animal. So why would it matter whether an animal is seen as wild or not? Appar-
ently it does. It appears that concern with the right to life is not the only ethical concern that 
plays a role here. There is also a concern with the independence and otherness of the 
animals. There is apparently some intuition that we should be able to live with wild 
animals, respecting their autonomy and their difference. This means we should be able to 
face the actual threats that wild animals bring. And not by pretending that these are not 
really serious threats, but by facing the threats to our established structures of order and 
organization. To be able to live with wild animals that do challenge and threaten us has a 
specific significance. To understand this significance, I suggest to return to the ideas 
presented in chapter 4, where I explored the significance of animal threats in establishing 
the independence of animals, thereby making it possible for animals to contribute to the 
meaningfulness of nature. It is only the independent animals – the ‘plurality’ to use the term 
of Fudge – that really contribute to the formation of an inter-species household. It is only 
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when animals remain threatening wild others, whose disruptive acts are seen precisely as 
destroying the established meanings and distinctions (termed in chapter 4 ‘denial of 
meaning’), that they can contribute to the shaping of the coexistence in terms of bringing 
their own contributions to the sense of place. 
If this analysis is accurate, then the problem is not so much the inclusion of wild 
animals into domestic existence, but rather the specific shape this inclusion takes. Fudge 
reinterprets mice as a pet in order to ease the sense of challenge to the established mean-
ings, categories, and distinctions. She develops the relationship of pet-master precisely 
because such a relationship opens up a possibility for complete integration of the animal 
into the already established existence. Though a pet-master relationship allows us to respect 
the integrity of the animal and diminishes the psychological difficulties arising from 
cohabitation, it also precludes the acknowledgement of mice as independent agents capable 
of contributing on their own to the development of new meanings – in this case new 
meanings of the place captured in the phrase ‘sense of place’, or ‘place identity’. 
This sense of dissatisfaction with the way she conceptualized the presence of mice 
is, I think, a sign of interpretative failure. In the above, we can see that the moral experience 
of Fudge was much more complex than initially may have seemed. It was not just a matter 
of including the animal in domestic existence, and was not just about the protection of its 
inviolable rights to life and home (both of which could be adequately addressed by treating 
mice as a pet). Rather, the experience involved also a sort of demand for recognizing the 
autonomy of these creatures. As such, interpreting the familiarity and proximity in terms of 
pet-owner relationship was, in my opinion, primarily an interpretative failure to truthfully 
capture the moral experience. Fudge ultimately did recognize this misinterpretation, and it 
is at this point that she shows her interpretative skill and sincerity. She openly recognizes 
her interpretative failure, and the incapacity to truthfully respond to the experience. This is 
an admission of an individual shortcoming, analogous to Plumwood’s admission discussed 
in chapter 5. The actual demand laid on her – to fully embrace the autonomy of animals and 
the plurality of meanings they bring in this specific context of close coexistence – is simply 
too much to bear. 
In the end, while recognizing her shortcomings, Fudge seems to resign herself to 
continue living with mice by treating them as a pet. Though this means she decides to hang 
onto the falseness of the interpretation (even while being aware of this falsity), perhaps 
there is still something positive about such a relationship? Certainly the animals survive 
intact, thus the respect for their integrity remains. Secondly, even though animals are 
subservient to the already established meanings of home, perhaps they can still contribute 
to these by enriching the established sense of place. Even though a pet does not necessarily 
radically challenge an established sense of home, it still brings some richness into domestic 
existence that can be highly valued. Thus, if we could show that the pet-owner relationship 
that she establishes does work, perhaps there could still be some meaningfulness in her 
practice. 
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To find out whether this is the case, we must reflect on whether symbolic domesti-
cation actually does contribute to building a satisfying human-pet relationship. Closer 
examination will reveal that even this relationship is ultimately not satisfying. It will also 
expose why spatial proximity on its own (or even accompanied by symbolic transfor-
mations) is not sufficient for establishing a meaningful relationships like that of neighbors 
or pet-owner. 
 
8.1.6 Failure to build a community 
 
Can symbolic domestication actually be the basis for developing a relationship that enriches 
our life? Two issues regarding the way Fudge establishes the pet-owner relationship raise 
doubts about this possibility: first, she is trying to include mice into the community of home 
unilaterally, through symbolic actions that have no relation to actual changes in interac-
tions; secondly, she is using community instrumentally, as a way to ease her own difficul-
ties in coping with having a wild animal around, rather than as a morally significant entity 
with moral demands of its own. These two characteristics are highly problematic. 
 A relationship is something towards which we work together with those we are 
bound to. In other words, a one-sided relationship is not a relationship. Building a true pet-
owner relationship would require to actually work with real animals, and to have these 
animals change and respond. For example, being a pet is not just a symbolic matter - it is 
also about rules, rituals, and activities undertaken together with a human. Pets have a way 
of life that is tightly connected with human life through various activities like feeding, 
going for walks, playing, or just being lazy on a couch in front of a TV. It requires learning 
and transformation from a pet just as much as from a human. Humans alter their daily 
routines, develop emotional attachments, perhaps sacrifice certain freedoms (like long-term 
holidays) in order to accommodate pets in their lives. On the other hand, pets have to learn 
certain commands, to respect some rules, and to live with certain constraints on their 
freedom. 
 Fudge, however, is not working together with mice. Rather, she uses the fact that, 
luckily, mice behavior is in some respects very much analogous to pet behavior. When 
Fudge says ‘go to your hole,’ a mouse does so – it may seem like she is communicating and 
the mouse listens, but actually it does not obey – it is just scared. It runs not because it 
developed certain rituals/behaviors together with a human, but because it is trying to avoid 
danger by responding to an immediate stimulus. In this case, the mouse, given its nature, is 
a perfect subject for such a trick, as mice run away timidly when they see us, even when 
they will eventually become more familiar with us, and as such seem to confirm the 
appearance of communication and obedience. This means that the success of this whole 
strategy for cohabitation hinges on a very fragile basis which will not hold in the case of 
many other animals. Not all animals will be passive participants in such psychological 
tricks we pull on ourselves. Wolves, bears, and foxes all slowly become accustomed to 
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humans, probing the extent of our tolerance. This makes the trick rather unreliable, even if 
our concern was only maintenance of the illusion of communication and control. To truly 
build a relationship, whether that of pet-owner or of neighbors, what seems to be required is 
actual working with animals, such that we are both transformed, and such that actual 
routines and responses develop – responses, which are grounded in mutual recognition and 
responsiveness to each other, and not to general stimuli. 
 The second problem is that Fudge does not build a community with a mouse but 
merely uses the symbolic connotations of community to ease her difficulties. As I noted 
earlier, membership in a community does have impact on how we perceive certain threats 
and harms, and it seems Fudge makes use of this fact in helping herself to come to terms 
with some of the difficult aspects of living with mice. But it does not seem to me that she 
actually builds any sort of real community with mice, or that there is any operative sense of 
common good, integrity of the household, or its stability that play a role in her actions. Her 
ethical motives remain tied to the level of individual wellbeing of mice and she is not 
taking any particular steps towards community maintenance. She feels like there is a 
community, and this feeling helps her deal with the difficulties, but she does not actively 
work in any way to build, maintain, protect, or transform the community. Again, this might 
be useful if we are merely trying to accommodate our unease, but it will not contribute to 
any of the meanings that can be developed as we build relationships together. 
 There is a good reason why one would not want to actually build a real relation-
ship, or a community. As was noted earlier, such work often requires a certain extent of 
control, transformation, even violence, and so the reason for refraining from building a real 
relationship might be the respect for freedom of the animal. Developing actual relationships 
would definitely require some extent of control and enforced transition of behavior, e.g. 
when mice are kept as pets they are usually kept in cages. If our concern is strictly with the 
wellbeing of animals or their rights, then we might be unwilling to proceed with such 
measures. However, if we do abstain from such methods, it means that most likely no true 
relationship or community will ever come to be. Nor will we truthfully respond to the moral 
experiences that lay a claim on us. 
 What, then, would be needed to actually work towards building relationships and 
communities with wild animals? What is needed is a sort of relationship in which the 
transformation of community is anchored in actual changes and actually developed 
relationships, and at the same time one which recognizes and makes space for the otherness 
of wild animals. In the next section I will propose some initial ideas on how such relation-
ship can be developed. Rather than speak of pet-master relationship, I will focus on the 
possibility of becoming neighbors with wild creatures. This is because, first, following 
Acampora, it seems to me that the relationship of neighbors is better suited to respect 
otherness and autonomy of animals; and secondly, because it suits better the examples on 
the basis of which I will develop my propositions. 
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8.2 MUTUAL LEARNING 
 
I first want to present a few examples of responses to presence of discomforting, or even 
threatening, animals close to humans. Some of these will be of formalized and institutional-
ized practices, but I will also present some direct individual reactions to a sense of personal 
threat. What initially captured my attention, was certain similarity in the structure of the 
response that all these reactions share, no matter whether they are individual or institution-
al. I take this similarity as a sign of an underlying complex concern, perhaps even a moral 
experience, to which all (most) of these practices try to respond. 
 
8.2.1 Examples 
 
There is a common wildlife management practice known colloquially as ‘two strikes 
policy’ (sometimes ‘three strikes policy’). The name might remind us of the infamous 
‘three strikes law’, used in some US states, which imposes harsher penalties on multiple 
offenders. The practice, as it is applied to animals, shares at least a formal similarity, and 
hence the use of the phrase. 
 
The 2-strike management directive, introduced in May 1994, is a state-wide policy aimed at 
guaranteeing human safety. This directive is put into effect when a black bear is considered 
to be a ‘problem bear’ by an in-the-field wildlife manager, for instance because (s)he broke 
into a home searching for food and/or threatened people. The bear in question will then be 
trapped, tagged, and relocated to ‘prime’ bear habitat (first strike). A labeled problem bear 
trapped for a second time (second strike) will be killed. The intention of this directive is to 
keep black bears out of cultivated areas and give them a second chance by providing them 
with their own – safe and natural – surroundings. In other words, this policy aims at separat-
ing human and black bear dwellings to prevent problematic situations and assumes that 
black bears are intelligent animals that learn from previous experience. (Boonman-Berson 
2016, 244) 
 
This policy is used in bear management by many of the wildlife agencies in the U.S. 
(Spencer et al. 2007). While the above description applies specifically to black bears, it is 
also sometimes applied to other problem-causing animals, like wolves. A slightly different 
version was employed in management of reintroduced Mexican wolves in the American 
south-west. There, it was required that if a wolf killed, or is suspected of killing, three 
livestock animals, it should be removed from the wild or killed. The management rule has 
since been revoked after a successful lawsuit by Western Environmental Law Centre filed 
on behalf of several nature protection organizations73. 
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 While the two above examples relate to specific policies, the following three are 
more anecdotal accounts of personal engagements with discomforting animals. However, I 
think they all share certain underlying similarities. 
Psychologist Peter Kahn recalls a story about the Dalai Lama: 
 
The Dali Lama said that if a mosquito lands on him he brushes it off. If it comes back, he 
brushes it off again. If it comes back a third time ... Slap! And His Holiness slapped his arm 
in demonstration and then let out a hearty laughter. (Kahn 2009, 40) 
 
Kahn is reminded of this story during his own encounter with a dangerous animal. One day, 
when picking up logs from a woodpile for a fireplace, Kahn discovers some scorpions that 
wedged themselves into cracks between wood: 
 
I hadn’t seen a scorpion for several years and hadn’t been thinking about them. When I 
went back for the next round, it caught my eye. I saw it wedging its way into a thin crack of 
the log that was next for me to carry. [...] I used a small twig to fling the scorpion out of the 
crack. Later that evening, I uncovered another under a partly rotten log in my woodpile, and 
I smashed it. (Kahn 2009, 42) 
 
The last example I want to bring up comes from Edward Abbey’s Desert Solitaire. One 
day, Abbey finds a rattlesnake near his trailer. This is one of the famous passages of the 
book, in which he pronounces that he would rather kill a human than a snake. For some, 
this pronouncement is a proof of Abbey’s misanthropy. But this anecdote has a rarely 
recalled post-script. After Abbey moves the snake away from the trailer where the animal 
won’t be a danger to him, he warns the snake: 
 
You better stay there, cousin, I warn him; if I catch you around the trailer again I'll chop 
your head off. A week later he comes back. If not him, his twin brother. [...] I have to keep 
my promise. (Abbey 1971, 21) 
 
8.2.2 Invariant structure 
 
There is a clear invariant structure that all these examples share. The animal is let-off scot-
free, even though it is from the start found dangerous, problematic, or annoying. However, 
the number of times that the animal is ‘pardoned’ is limited, and people do not continue 
their tactic of scaring the creatures away indefinitely. 
What this dynamic embodies, in ethical terms, seems to be a concern with individ-
ual well-being of humans and of animals: “In fact, in practice most in-the-field-wildlife 
managers experience safeguarding human safety and black bear safety as a balancing act” 
(Boonman-Berson 2016, 244). The practice quite clearly attempts to protect humans from 
animals by transporting the animal to another location, scaring it away, or trying to change 
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its behavior. But at the same time, these responses do also show a concern with the life of 
animals. At least in the beginning, non-lethal techniques are deployed: the animal is 
transported or scared away rather than killed. 
What interests me here, is not so much the practice of balancing human and animal 
needs itself, but rather the question why this balancing is done in this specific way. In every 
case, the problematic animal behavior is being tolerated, but at the same time this tolerance 
is limited to just a few occasions. How should we understand this dynamic? What kind of 
motives does it embody? Below, I will provide an interpretation of this structure as a 
practice aiming towards construction of a shared coexistence with wildlife, which, unlike 
the example of symbolic domestication discussed earlier, does attempt to explicitly 
recognize and make space for unruly otherness of wild animals. 
 
8.2.3 Giving a chance 
 
Let us first try to understand why exactly animals are let go. Although the policy speaks 
about giving ‘strikes’, this is a rather problematic and highly charged term that might in fact 
bring more confusion than clarification. As Parks and Wildlife officer Kristin Cannon 
observes: 
 
Nowhere in Colorado Parks and Wildlife’s (CPW) directive on black bear incidents does 
the phrase “two-strikes” exist. […] I’m not sure when we started referring to it as the “two-
strike policy” but that phrase has outlived any usefulness it may have provided in helping 
explain the concept. Managing bears isn’t a baseball game and we do not relocate and de-
stroy bears as some form of penalty.74 
 
Since ‘strike’ is seen as an inappropriate and charged term, which might suggest a criminal-
ization of animal behavior, I would prefer to speak about ‘giving a chance’ (a term already 
introduced in a quotation in sub-section 8.2.1). The animal is not penalized for transgres-
sion – but rather given a chance. But a chance to do what? What does it mean to give a 
chance in this context? There are at least two ways in which we can use this phrase and 
both can help us understand what might be happening in this practice. 
On the one hand, giving a chance might be a way of letting someone prove wheth-
er they are fit for something. This attitude assumes that one should already be able and 
ready to do certain work, perform certain tasks, or to be a true member of certain group. If 
one fails, one loses the chance one had. Sometimes, we may already be negatively predis-
posed to the given individual; in that case giving them a chance is merely waiting for a 
proof that the individual is indeed unfit – any sign of weakness will be seen as a confirma-
tion of our prejudice: ‘I don't think you're fit for this but I give you a chance. One slip and 
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you're out’. This is certainly the way that many ranchers understand the ‘two strikes’ 
policy, as is perhaps most prominent in the 3-strikes policy that was previously employed in 
the management of Mexican wolf. 
On the other hand, there is an understanding of giving a chance where there is a 
basic assumption that individual is potentially fit for something but needs to be given 
opportunities to try and figure things out. Here, the failure is not a reason for removing 
someone, but rather reveals that someone needs help to figure out how to do things. 
Failures are calls for learning: ‘Everyone fails the first time, let me show you how it is 
done’, ‘Let’s give you another chance and see how it works this time’. This, I think, is the 
way most environmentalists understand the ‘two chance’ policy, and it is also the way how 
giving a chance appears in the three anecdotal stories. Even though neither Kahn, nor the 
Dalai Lama, nor Edward Abbey speak explicitly about ‘strikes’ or ‘giving chances,’ their 
behavior is motivated precisely by a sense of wanting to give the animal a chance – in an 
attempt to show the animal that it is not welcome where it is but also to give it a chance to 
learn, or at least to move away. The animal is nudged to get a clue about what is appropri-
ate behavior, or what its appropriate place is. In these attempts we can glimpse an intention 
to somehow try and figure out a more respectful way of living with animals, even if they 
cause us problems. But it must be admitted that there is still something deeply unsatisfying 
about these attempts – how can we expect a mosquito to get a clue, or a snake to learn to 
respect the safe space of a human? We need to think more seriously about how we can 
properly give a chance in this second sense. 
 
8.2.4 Mutual learning 
 
The important thing about the attempts presented in the above examples is that, unlike in 
‘symbolic domestication,’ an animal is actually involved in these attempts. It is not just 
humans tricking themselves, but actually involving an animal in an attempt to organize 
some living arrangements. However, here there is also a danger of failure if the response of 
animals will not be such that it can actually lead to a satisfactory form of cohabitation. 
This means that we must ask first of all how the animal can be properly involved. 
It might be strange to expect snakes or mosquitos to learn from our nudges. Realistically, 
they most probably will not. In such cases, the act of giving them a chance is more of a 
gesture of good faith (so again a symbolic gesture), rather than a sincere attempt at mutual 
learning. But once we understand what motivates our behavior, rather than making empty 
gestures, we might take actions from our side that could actually be appropriate to the 
cognitive capacities of an animal. Perhaps the Dalai Lama would do better to use insect 
repellent. This might sound obvious, but the above examples show that we still let our good 
intentions dissolve into empty gestures. The key, then, is to draw out the intention under the 
gesture, and build around it a practice that will actually achieve what we implicitly strive 
for. This might mean that there is some violence towards an animal involved – perhaps it 
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has to be scared seriously, for instance by means of a rubber bullet when being released 
back into the wild. But such violence is not gratuitous – it is an attempt at communication 
and development of living arrangements. 
Secondly, we must remember that what is involved in developing relationships is a 
mutual adjustment. One of the reasons why Fudge failed in her attempt was the one-
sidedness of community building on her part. On the other hand, in all the examples of 
giving a chance mentioned above, there remains a risk of another kind of one-sidedness 
where the animals are expected to do all the work. Indeed, managers often complain that 
animals get into trouble because of human ignorance or carelessness. They are unwilling 
and unhappy about giving ‘strikes’ to animals because it would mean that all the responsi-
bility for learning is placed on an animal which is often not even given any help to actually 
learn. This lack of reciprocity – we expect animals to do all the work of learning while we 
fail to take action – is very much linked to the first sense of giving a chance, where we just 
wait and expect animals to behave appropriately from the start, and to figure out everything 
on their own. What needs to be added in order for this practice to be fully reciprocal is 
something that most wildlife managers already point to, namely that humans also need to 
do their part in this learning process. There needs to be mutual learning and taking action. 
This relates to the discussion of justice in the previous chapter. Fairness refers not just to 
the distribution of benefits and costs, but also to the extent to which both sides should 
participate in learning. The requirements for adjustment are placed equally on both sides. 
 
8.2.5 Limits to tolerance 
 
But then what really is the role of limiting the number of attempts? Why not just carry on 
trying forever? We could link this simply to impatience or laziness on our part, but I think 
there is a more important motive at play, namely the recognition that the already existing 
community needs to be respected. 
Unless we believe that animals can learn what behaviors are acceptable the whole 
practice makes no sense75. It is assumed they are intelligent agents that can learn and 
transform their routines, that they have the capacity to ultimately get the clue and learn 
what is appropriate. But if we take seriously the animal’s capacity to learn, we also have to 
take seriously the possible failure to learn, when consecutive attempts at developing living 
arrangements fail and no agreement appears to be possible. Those who cannot learn the 
rules of mutual engagement, even in some minimal sense, simply cannot be a part of a 
community. One cannot accept continuing offences against a community and its members. 
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 An alternative for animals that are not capable of sophisticated learning, would be the introduction of some 
technologies that would control, constrain, or manipulate the animals in question. Here , too, the assumption is that 
such techniques must be able to actually work – if not in all instances than at least in general. 
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To carry on tolerating misbehavior is not a sign of patience, rather, it is unfair towards 
others who have learned to coexist more or less peacefully. 
The ‘two chances policy’ acknowledges that not every individual will be able to be 
a part of a community, that there are certain limits to tolerance, and that living with wild 
animals sometimes demands taking radical action. It is, thus, recognized that wild animals 
can be seriously disruptive and that some of those disruptions cannot be tolerated. Rather 
than play games, we should acknowledge that we are not living with tame and obedient 
creatures, but with independent agents whose way of life sometimes can and sometimes 
cannot be brought in working agreement with ours. As a consequence, we need to take 
seriously the threats when they emerge. 
We can wonder what it would mean to decide that some animals do not belong in 
a certain place. Killing them may not be the only option. In many cases we can translocate 
the animal or spur it to move away. We might also impose greater restrictions on certain 
individuals, for instance by tagging and tracking them. All these approaches are already 
within the toolbox of wildlife managers and these professionals are well-skilled in using 
them. My task here is not to say when and how such techniques should be used, especially 
because such use may be extremely case sensitive. But what I can do, and what might make 
a big difference for the use of these practices, is to point out the overarching framework that 
allows us to think about all these specific instances of managerial intervention and point out 
how they can become meaningful, even morally meaningful practices. Let me elaborate on 
this. 
 
8.2.6 Community building 
 
Wildlife management can be an ungrateful job. One works long and hard to save animals, 
and then sometimes it happens that one needs to kill those animals after all. One attempts to 
navigate the demands of different stakeholders, only to find out that everyone is dissatis-
fied. One carries on intervening day after day in situations that resemble one another, but 
nobody seems to really learn from experience. 
 I want to suggest the hypothesis that dissatisfaction with everyday wildlife 
management can be at least in part the result of a too narrow way of looking at managerial 
interventions, either as an impact management tool (humans versus animals), or as a 
conflict management tool (e.g. farmers versus environmentalists). As such, the instances of 
managerial interventions can be seen as individual interventions into specific events. We try 
to address specific instances of impact or conflict between two groups. There might be 
similarities between the events, but there is no overarching conception, other than following 
a protocol, no overarching scheme into which these individual interventions fit. In such 
context dissatisfaction might be not just and not so much a consequence of moral failure – 
when the animal has to be put down – or disappointment – when people fail to learn and 
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cooperate – but might also arise from an overall sense of meaninglessness of the interven-
tions, notably when the animals involved are eventually killed. 
In chapter 2 I defined meaningfulness, following David Cooper (2003), as the abil-
ity to show the appropriateness of something with regard to a broader context, for instance 
a practice, a narrative, or an overarching aim. The managerial practice of intervening in 
instances of conflict or impact by merely following protocol might appear in this light as 
meaningless. It is true that there might be some ulterior motive, some ultimate point of 
reference that could still give sense to it. Many managers do what they do to save nature, 
wilderness, or endangered species, because in the end they want to develop a better 
relationship between humans and nature. But such ulterior aim, which we can perhaps 
identify with Cooper’s ultimate point of reference characterized as ‘Life,’ can seem so 
distant and so far removed that it might fail to provide a meaningful context for reconsider-
ing one’s everyday work. I am not bringing this up to criticize management. Rather, I 
suggest this possibility in order to point out that it does not necessarily have to be this way, 
and that there is something that could significantly improve the managerial practice at hand 
by making it meaningful again. This can be achieved if we begin to see the individual 
interventions as constitutive parts of an overarching meaningful project, which, following 
the discussions in the previous two chapters, can be characterized as development of multi 
species communities of place. 
 If we see the practice of wildlife management as aiming towards a construction of 
an inclusive community, this could give the practice a context in which individual instances 
of intervention could be seen as meaningful. Thus, individual interventions in instances of 
wildlife conflict and wildlife impact must adhere to the ‘mutual learning’ model, and 
should be thought of as a community-building and maintenance practice – an ongoing way 
of developing a shared coexistence. The individual interventions would then cease to be 
merely ad-hoc means of dealing with individual conflicts and impacts and would acquire a 
meaning within a broader context of trying to build a life together with other creatures, with 
their own, sometimes problematic, forms of agency. It is a practice of trying to fit our 
disparate needs and desires together while at the same time recognizing each other’s agency 
and fairly significant differences. Thus, rather than looking at the practice in negative 
terms, as an attempt to safeguard the rights of individuals and balance their interests, it 
rather provides a positive meaningful aim towards which we can work. 
 This would require changing the framework in which we conceive of our actions. 
It is thus a conceptual, symbolic, and interpretative task. As such we could worry over the 
possibility that such symbolic transformation will fail, as in the case study of symbolic 
domestication discussed above. But there the practice failed because it was not anchored in 
actual actions and relationships. It was purely symbolic – it was a simulacrum – a symbol 
without any relation to the real world. Here, however, we speak about very real practices. 
This is why actual management is so important. It is true that when we actually try to work 
with animals this might include an extent of control, violence, and manipulation. If we were 
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concerned purely about the individual integrity of animals in terms of their rights we might 
better remain at the symbolic level. But if we are ready to acknowledge that the extent of 
our moral engagement with the world, and its human and non-human inhabitants, is not 
exhausted by the idea of rights, engagement with real practices, even if they fail to fully 
respect all the rights, can lead to other things we find important. 
 Here, many of the concepts already discussed in this thesis can be of relevance. 
Animals contribute to a sense of place, together we build a community, we establish 
neighborly relations, and we recognize them as autonomous creatures that can make their 
own ‘propositions’ regarding the significance of objects and entities. They can also 
participate in the development of our moral sensibilities in that we expose ourselves to 
moral experiences involving these creatures. While respect for the individuality of these 
creatures remains important, these other concerns remain important aspects of our reality as 
well. They might involve suffering some discomforts on our part, and might force us to 
confront and engage in activities we find problematic due to their impact on other individu-
al creatures. But being aware of the various moral issues at stake we can develop practices 
in such a way that they are both meaningful and respectful. 
 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I have brought up two examples of actual real-life practices of trying to 
coexist with wild animals. Through discussion of these cases several things became clear. 
First, many of the moral intuitions explored throughout the thesis play a role in the ways we 
already experience wild animals’ presence and in the practices through which we already 
are trying to organize this presence. We saw how Fudge’s concern with the mice was 
related not just to the individual rights of the creatures, something most of us would 
perhaps readily acknowledge, but also to the concern with identity, autonomy, community 
formation, relationships, and the contribution of animals to place meaning. 
 This in turn means that many of the ideas that arose originally out of a concern 
with wild and charismatic nature, for instance in the context of wilderness protection, are 
applicable to more domestic contexts as well. Particularly the idea of autonomy is a very 
illustrative example. While we usually speak about the autonomy of nature in terms of 
wilderness or charismatic animals, the concern with autonomy was very important in 
understanding Fudge’s experience with mice. 
 Furthermore, the frameworks brought up and elaborated throughout this thesis 
proved to be useful for understanding the already existing practices and cases of encounters 
with animals. The idea of moral experience, for instance, and the hermeneutic approach to 
such experience, allowed us to better understand the experiences of Erica Fudge. Here 
again we see how concepts that were initially applied in the context of wilderness experi-
ences can be illuminating in the context of coexistence as well. 
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 Finally, we may notice how a hermeneutical sensitivity to meanings that are 
already present, but not fully articulated, can help us improve the practices through which 
we engage with animals. Both in the case of symbolic domestication, and the case of the 
‘two chances’ attitude, we were confronted with a practice that aimed at coming to terms 
with some kind of moral intuition. It is precisely this interpretative attitude that allows us to 
delve deeper and unpack these intuitions. Following on such deeper understanding we can 
reshape practices in such a way that they more truthfully respond to what is not yet clearly 
enough sensed in experience. 
 In summary, this chapter allowed us to more fully grasp the applicability of the 
theoretical insights gathered in the earlier parts of the thesis. The two cases are examples 
that illustrate the way theoretical insights can be applied in practice. As such this work is 
obviously not exhaustive, if only because there is a richness of moral intuitions in our 
tradition and in people’s experiences of nature, which has only been touched upon here. 
Thus, much more work can be carried out in terms of articulating moral experiences, 
intuitions, and interpretations, and, no less important, putting them in dialogue with one 
another. Moreover, there is a great variety of practices through which we already engage 
with animals, and which can in the future mediate our engagement with the natural world. 
The work of reflecting on these practices along the lines I followed here must be an 
ongoing task, through which we not only understand these practices better, but also reshape 
them so that they are more truthful to the moral intuitions and experiences to which they try 
to respond. 
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 9. 
Summary and general conclusions 
 
 
I have begun this study by pointing to an experience of ambivalence that accompanies the 
current recolonization of Europe by wild fauna. It is true that the revival of wildlife brings a 
hope for the future of human engagement with nature, that it may become an opportunity to 
atone for the way we have treated animals in the past, and that it opens new opportunities to 
connect to nature. As such it can be beneficial for humans, both materially and immaterial-
ly. But this return of the wild may also be seen as problematic, as wild animals tend to 
represent a disruptive presence. I have distinguished several domains in which recoloniza-
tion and living with wildlife can become problematic: material, psychological, symbolic, 
cultural, and socio-political. 
 Because these discomforts have significant impacts on people, animals, local 
traditions, heritage, and ecosystems, our primary aim has been to understand the relations 
between these discomforts and the ethical concerns that might arise in their context. I 
proposed to approach these concerns via hermeneutics, focusing on our interpretations of 
discomforting nature. And indeed, approaching discomforts as interpretations allowed us to 
remain open towards the various ways in which discomforts may become morally relevant. 
 Hermeneutics claims that our engagement with the world is always mediated 
through interpretations. As such, disturbing animal behaviors we are confronted with are 
never self-evident or obvious – they do not have any necessary meaning. In each case, 
encounters and impacts need to be interpreted – indeed they always already are interpreted. 
The specific significance they acquire in our lives, and the specific way they become 
discomforting to us, are always dependent on the way these events are interpreted. Some of 
these interpretations are so well-established we do not even recognize them as such – this is 
simply how the world appears to us and we often take this appearance for granted. But even 
in such apparently obvious cases we always interpret the event which can always be 
apprehended in different ways, from different horizons. One of the tasks of environmental 
hermeneutics, in this context, might be to open up to us the limited and partial nature of 
particular interpretations, especially of those which seem most obvious and self-evident to 
us. Further, hermeneutics can illuminate the prejudices on which such interpretations are 
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based, explore the limits of such interpretations, and finally confront the most entrenched 
ones with those less well known. These are precisely the tasks which I have carried out in 
this thesis. We are now in a position to better understand the different ways in which 
different interpretations shape the meanings of discomforts, particularly in the way that they 
relate to the ethical concerns. 
 
9.1 THE MANY MEANINGS OF DISCOMFORTS 
 
Perhaps the most entrenched and seemingly self-evident interpretation of nature present in 
the Western world is the instrumental one. The instrumental interpretation sees nature as 
raw material, as a resource, as something to be used for our ends, whether these aims 
include construction of new bridges, or our self-affirmation. In this interpretation, discom-
forts appear in terms of costs. While such impacts, as costs, call for minimization, there is 
much more involved in this attitude. First of all, we can become tolerant of such costs if we 
are aware that the presence of animals is also associated with benefits. This is because we 
usually consider costs not on their own, but locate them within a cost-benefit analysis, 
where we weigh the pros and cons against each other. Costs might thus be only a necessary 
downside of living with otherwise beneficial creatures. Secondly, some apparent costs, like 
stress, fear, anxiety, and a moderate level of threat, can be re-appreciated as leading to the 
kind of self-affirmation in which we come in touch with those aspects of ourselves which 
rarely come into play in our everyday lives. As such, they can become benefits we seek. 
 However, we are not limited to considering costs and benefits only in relation to 
ourselves. As animals come to live close to us, we become just another element in their 
environment, an element that animals have to deal with, but that they may also make use of 
for their own benefit. It is already here that we encounter an explicitly moral concern with 
animals. In this case, ethical concern with animals takes the shape of a commitment to 
maximize satisfaction of interests (usually in terms of maximization of pleasure and 
minimization of suffering), both ours and that of the animals involved. As such, this ethical 
concern follows the utilitarian ethic so well-established in the Western tradition. As animal 
interests come to count ethically, we begin looking at some of the discomforts as attempts 
by animals to satisfy their own interests: perhaps our garden furniture can offer good 
material for nest building, perhaps our garbage bins can be a source of nutritious food, 
perhaps attics can be perfect locations for nesting, perhaps our well-fed but defenseless pets 
can become delicious meals. Once we begin to think of animal interests in ethical terms, 
discomforts cease to be events demanding merely a technical solution. They demand ethical 
deliberation and understanding. 
 But animal interests are not the only morally relevant aspect of discomforts that we 
have identified. Indeed, interests of animals are perhaps the subject I have said the least 
about. The moral meanings in the context of which we have considered discomforts most 
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extensively are those relating to wildness, self-understanding and identity, community, 
conceptions of justice, and individual inviolability. 
 As I elaborated in chapter 4, resistance of nature to our appropriations, present e.g. 
in material damages and symbolic transgressions, might be experienced as an indication of 
the externality of nature, as such giving rise to a sense of nature’s autonomy, and becoming 
a precondition for finding meaning in nature. As a domain of meaning, nature comes to 
play an important role in our lives, bringing understanding, wonder, fascination, humility, 
relationships, joy etc. But for this to be the case we need to be open to the possibility of 
resistance, denial, negation, even harm, from the side of natural entities. 
 In chapter 5, I presented an interpretation of encounters with nature as moral 
experiences – events that confront us with ourselves and our tradition in such a way that 
they reveal our prejudices, question them, and open up possibilities for new understandings. 
As such, contact with nature can lead both to deeper self-understanding and at the same 
time can enrich our moral tradition. We saw examples of these in the experiences of Val 
Plumwood, Aldo Leopold, and Erica Fudge. 
 In chapters 6 and 7, I presented some ideas pertaining directly to questions of 
building a shared existence with wild nature, in terms of some forms of association, 
togetherness, perhaps even community. In chapter 6 we explored ideas from the border of 
ethics and ecology, foregrounding the ethical concern with the flourishing of ecosystems 
which followed radically communitarian interpretations of the moral significance of 
community. These, in chapter 7, were confronted with liberal ideas which take the inviola-
ble rights of individuals as of primary importance and focus much more on enabling 
individual flourishing within the context of loose associations with others. The latter ideas, 
while recognizing the importance of concepts such as sense of place, belonging, and 
cohesiveness, failed to adequately engage with those properly communitarian concerns. 
 Moral meanings of community in the context of coexistence with wildlife consti-
tute a subject that deserves a much more exhaustive exploration than the one I have 
provided here. One promising avenue would be to follow the communitarian tradition in 
political philosophy, which recognizes the ethical importance of common good, social 
cohesiveness, and the influence of community on individual formation, while at the same 
time also recognizing the need for respect for individuals (something the ecological models 
do not address adequately). Taking the rich communitarian tradition as an inspiration could 
potentially move our understanding of the questions and possibilities involved in coexist-
ence somewhat further. 
 Many of these moral interpretations also hold possibilities for consolation as we 
are faced with difficult experiences of nature. We find consolation for our own losses as we 
look beyond our own wellbeing or interest. This is particularly significant in the context of 
inter-species justice, which currently is profoundly out of balance, although we might be 
slowly moving towards a fairer distribution. As we suffer the consequences of coexistence, 
we might console ourselves that our losses become meaningful in the context of striving 
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towards greater equality of consideration. We can also find consolation in hope. We can 
speak of hope in fairly straightforward terms, as a hope that the future of our coexistence 
with nature on this planet might become better. Though such hope is uncertain, it is 
something many of us already feel. But there is another sort of hope, a more personal one, 
which we can draw from some of the ideas presented here. This hope, relating directly to 
our individual sense of vulnerability to nature, depends on recognition of continuity 
between ourselves and the rest of nature, predicated upon seeing ourselves as members in 
the ecological exchanges of nature. This is something linked directly to our ecological 
identity, arising from the possibility of seeing ourselves as members of an ecological 
community, and involved in the radical generosity of ecological exchanges. This is perhaps 
the most difficult of meanings to come to terms with, as it requires a radical reconsideration 
of our identity, and a very difficult task of locating this ecological identity with respect to 
the already established ideas of self, particularly those arising from the liberal tradition 
focused on protection of individual rights and interests. This is one of the domains where 
much more interpretative work would need to be done to find satisfying meanings, espe-
cially in the context of our western tradition. It is this application of radical interpretations 
to our own life that stands as perhaps the most difficult task. 
 Despite these lacunas, and the difficulties involved in applying some of the 
insights in practice, in chapter 8 I have attempted to show how many of the meanings 
explored theoretically in chapters 2 through 7, do already play a role in our attempts to 
organize coexistence with wildlife. There, I discussed two such attempts, illustrating, first, 
that many meanings discussed can already be found in these practices; second, that several 
meanings often exist simultaneously and in tension, and as such are in need of some form 
of accommodation (though not necessarily dissolution of the tension); third, I showed how 
a better understanding of the interpretations and meanings at play can help us improve on 
the practices in terms of letting them better embody the moral experiences they try to 
respond to. 
 The mention of tension and the existence of several different moral intuitions 
brings us to the second important area of concern for this thesis, which is illuminating the 
different kinds of ambivalence that we experience as we come to coexist with wildness of 
the nature. 
 
9.2 THE MANY AMBIVALENCES OF (OUR EXPERIENCE OF) NATURE 
 
Better understanding of the meanings that discomforting nature acquires has important 
consequences for our understanding of the ambivalence we experience in face of the 
recolonization, and for the place this experience might hold in shaping our current and 
future relations with the natural world. As I pointed out throughout this book, there is a 
possibility that the ambivalent experience of nature to which ecological discomforts 
contribute might be not just grudgingly accepted, but is something that people are ready to 
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embrace, maybe even promote. However, given that the discomforts that contributed to this 
ambivalence are ethically relevant (as described above), we had to deepen our understand-
ing of the relationship between ambivalence and ethical questions. What kind of ambiva-
lences are there? Why are they important? How do they relate to ethical questions? Does 
their acceptance harm humans and animals, and is the ambivalence in itself morally 
important? 
 The first ambivalence we encountered was that predicated upon utilitarian calcula-
tions relating to instrumental use of nature. As we saw, recolonizing animals bring with 
them both benefits and costs. It is often argued that benefits largely outweigh the costs. 
Still, such costs exist and need to be somehow accommodated or addressed, and that needs 
to be done in a just manner, so that both costs and benefits are distributed fairly among the 
relevant individuals. Who are these relevant individuals? While in chapter 3 I have dis-
cussed particularly human interests, and focused on the instrumental use of nature, we have 
also seen how the ethical concern with individual animals’ interests is commonly recog-
nized. This certainly broadens the scope of the consideration, but it also complicates 
matters. However, we need not arrive at a complete and exact account of costs and benefits. 
Rather, what we are directed towards here is, first, taking into consideration not just our 
interests; second, the awareness that recolonization will carry both costs and benefits, and 
that in our responses to recolonization we must be aware of both. 
 How do these considerations of scope relate to the ambivalence of the mixture of 
costs and benefits? Because some of our benefits might be someone else’s costs and vice 
versa, it might be appropriate in some instances to put up with costs for the sake of securing 
benefits to others. This might also involve animals – to put up with ecological discomfort 
might be a nuisance for us, but might at the same time be a matter of survival for the 
creature in question. 
 Ambivalence, on this account, might be simply an unfortunate, but partly unavoid-
able, consequence of living with wild animals, which we might want to tolerate due to the 
commitment to the universal ethical principles that call for respect for animals. But one 
important thing we have to consider here is that costs as such do not have any significance. 
In principle, if we could minimize or even eradicate costs, this would be better for all, and 
would constitute a desirable aim. 
 We met with the same sort of conceptualization of ambivalence in chapter 6, 
where we considered the mixture of admiration and dread we experience as we behold 
nature. The theory of Holmes Rolston III discussed there assumed that our appreciation of 
nature is based on values. Within that framework, the dreadful aspects of nature can only 
appear as disvalues that weaken our commitment to nature protection. As such, ambiva-
lence in face of nature can be even something that repels us from nature. Consequently, 
Rolston’s aim has been to provide a framework within which we can appreciate even the 
apparently disvaluable elements of nature as in fact valuable. While in the process Rolston 
illuminates some important meanings that can be part of our appreciation of nature (particu-
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larly the community-related meanings), I ultimately found his treatment rather limited, 
partly due to the way he approaches ambivalence. 
 My counterproposition, grounded in hermeneutic and aesthetic ideas on human 
comportment to the world, has been presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6. There, I have tried to 
show how, in many cases of contact with nature, ambivalence, far from being an obstruc-
tion, becomes a fundamental and enabling aspect of meaningful engagement with nature. I 
think I am fully justified in saying that experience of ambivalence in face of recolonization 
in itself becomes an important aspect of our appreciation of nature. There are several ways 
in which it is so. 
 First, ambivalence is linked to the very possibility of finding meaning in nature, 
particularly in the age and on a continent where so much nature is domesticated. This is 
because our search for meaning in the world is predicated upon contact with external 
reality, and the necessary correlate of contact with such reality is the possibility of the 
denial of meaning. I have shown how actual and potential threats or transgressions can be 
appreciated as such instances of ’hermeneutic resistance’ that ‘grounds’ the meaning we 
search for. 
 Second, the ambivalence of nature appears in some of the important meaningful 
experiences of the world, the primary example of which are moral experiences in which we 
are confronted with our tradition and self-understanding in terms of being shown their 
limitations and inadequacies. While hermeneutic engagement with moral experience 
ultimately leads to better understanding, the experience itself remains deeply disturbing 
because it confronts us with our own limitations, questions taken for granted meanings, and 
demands a difficult process of coming to terms with new insights. 
 Another important experience of nature in which ambivalence does play an 
important role is that of community building, particularly of community involving wildlife. 
As I suggested in chapter 7, we can see urban wildlife – the liminal animals – as suspended 
between the worlds of individual justice of rights and obligations, and the ecological justice 
of radical generosity, where individual beings are nothing more than temporary stages in 
the ongoing circle of life. We might recognize the appropriateness of both worlds with 
respect to liminal animals (perhaps even ourselves), and acknowledge they both carry their 
distinct sort of goodness leading to creation of things worthy of our appreciation (respectful 
society on the one end, magnificent ecosystems on the other). This appreciation, however, 
does not change the fact that these worlds exist in a very vexing tension and are irreducible 
to one another. The experience of such a tension becomes particularly difficult when we 
apprehend animals and ourselves as existing in both worlds at the same time. While we 
might try to separate these worlds, or reduce one to the other – both of which would highly 
reduce our unease with this tension – to my mind it is much more appropriate to fully 
recognize their parallel and incommensurable existence. As such, we are bound to retain a 
sense of confusion, ambivalence, unease, perhaps even internal conflict. But recognizing 
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and maintaining such unease might be the best way of honoring the radical duality in which 
we exist. 
 In general terms, as explored in chapter 6, ambivalent experiences give us access 
to the full scope of emotions, understandings, and appreciations, all of which would be 
missing in easy to appreciate experiences. In such events we come to experience the world 
in its full complexity, with its many faces, and as such come to be more fully alive. 
 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS AND GLIMPSES INTO THE FUTURE 
 
From the above two sections we can distill two important observations. First, that discom-
forts are tightly connected with many important ethical concerns; secondly, that they come 
to play a constitutive role in important ambivalent experiences of nature. What conclusions 
can we draw from these observations? 
 The various meanings linked to discomforts enrich our moral tradition of engage-
ment with nature. Apart from values, benefits, positive emotions, care, love etc. we might 
also productively speak about fear, respect, anxiety, threats, and costs. These latter, 
apparently negative, reactions and relations are real aspects of our engagement with the 
natural world and it will not do to ignore them, or see them as the kind of thing that people 
who hate nature would talk about. They are part of human engagement with nature and we 
should reclaim them for environmentalism – especially because we can do so and still argue 
for a need to protect nature and develop more adequate way of coexisting with the rest of 
life on this planet. 
 As a direct consequence of this, we need not speak about nature in clearly positive, 
easy to appropriate terms. In many ways nature is important precisely in being threatening, 
in resisting and escaping our appropriation. We need not forcefully argue that nature will 
benefit us, that recolonizing animals will bring nothing but positive developments. We can 
openly speak about the discomforting aspects of nature, while at the same time try to 
articulate more fully why and how such nature matters. This does not only mean arguing 
for respecting nature based on principles relating to some morally relevant properties. In 
many ways discomforting experiences of nature themselves become meaningful aspects of 
our life enriching our experience of the world. 
 The picture that arises from these pages is that human life, and a distinctly good, 
worthwhile human life, is possible in close coexistence with even highly disruptive and 
threatening wildlife. We cannot conceive of such life in hedonistic terms – such life will 
certainly not be purely pleasant or enjoyable, but it can be rich and worthwhile. Similarly, 
we cannot think of nature through binary evaluative terms: good-bad, desirable-undesirable, 
positive-negative. It seems more productive to speak about it as a meaningful context for 
our lives, opening multiple opportunities for leading a worthwhile life. 
 Finally, a word of caution. What I wrote in the last three paragraphs does not mean 
that we should expose ourselves more to wild, threatening nature. It does not even, in my 
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mind, argue strongly for actually welcoming wild nature very close to our homes. If 
anything, it shows that such exposure is extremely testing, and that we owe more respect 
and understanding to those who do have to engage with wild, discomforting nature on daily 
basis. Rather, as an illustration of the possibility, intelligibility, and worthiness of life in 
coexistence with wildness of the world, I imagine my contribution here as a voice that can 
add to the conversation on the topic of the place of wildness in our lives and in the land-
scapes we inhabit.  
 Such conversation should not be conceived only as a human and conceptual affair. 
While it must involve conversations between people on what is at stake in living with 
wildlife, it must also involve processes of negotiation with wildlife itself. An example of 
this was given in chapter 8, where I spoke about mutual learning. Finally, any engagement 
with wildness has to be both an individual and a communal task, in which we interpret and 
apply the ideas presented here to the specific situations in which we find ourselves.  
 In other words, this book opens up a possible world; now our task is to understand 
whether we can make this world our own and take it up in living our own lives. 
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 SUMMARY 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Europe has recently become a witness to a massive recolonization of the continent by 
wildlife. In the wake of nature protection regulations, agricultural land abandonment, and 
significant social, cultural, and economic changes, several species of mammals and birds 
have been growing in numbers, and are spreading into new territories. 
 This revival is welcomed by environmentalists, but also by a large proportion of 
the general public, for several reasons. It is a rare example of an environmental success 
story much needed in the age of global environmental meltdown. It brings opportunities to 
connect to nature. Last, but not least, it gives us a chance to develop new forms of coexist-
ence with animals, ones that can perhaps be less destructive than those of the previous 
centuries. 
 However, the development of such forms of coexistence proves to be a difficult 
task, as many of the recolonizing species turn out to be difficult neighbors. Animals, simply 
by living their lives and trying to exploit our infrastructure to their benefit, can create 
material damages and occasionally pose a threat to people and domesticated animals. 
Actual material losses or even the very possibility of them may evoke feelings of anxiety, 
fear, and anger. Some activities of wildlife, while not materially damaging, might have 
disturbing symbolic connotations. Finally, recolonization poses a threat to many, already 
marginalized, human communities. I call all these problematic aspects of nature ‘ecological 
discomforts.’ 
 In face of all these difficulties, we need an environmental culture of coexistence 
with wild nature – nature that can be disruptive, destructive, and threatening. The negative 
impacts that animal recolonization brings, and the variety of normatively motivated ideas 
on how to respond to the process of recolonization, demand that in developing such culture 
we pay particular attention to ethical questions. I propose to approach the challenge of 
developing such an ethics through environmental hermeneutical ethics. 
Hermeneutics claims that our engagement with the world is always already medi-
ated through interpretations. As such, the disturbing animal behaviors we are confronted 
with are never self-evident or obvious – they do not necessarily have one particular 
meaning. In each case, encounters and impacts need to be interpreted – indeed they always 
already are interpreted. However we experience them, whatever we can say about them, 
always already involves an interpretation. Some of these interpretations are so well-
established we do not even recognize them as such – this is simply how the world appears 
to us and we often take this appearance for granted. But even in such apparently obvious 
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cases, we always interpret the event, which can always be apprehended in different ways, 
from different horizons. One of the tasks of environmental hermeneutics, in this context, is 
to make us realize the limited and partial nature of specific interpretations, particularly of 
those which seem most obvious and self-evident to us. Further, a careful hermeneutic 
analysis can illuminate the prejudices on which such interpretations are based, explore the 
limits of such interpretations, and finally confront the most entrenched ones with those less 
well known. 
This study identifies meanings of ecological discomforts and experiences of am-
bivalence in face of discomforting nature, as the main subject of interpretative study. 
Consequently, in chapters 3 through 7, I engage with specific interpretations of discomforts, 
clarify the moral meanings that are at play in these interpretations, and finally place these in 
constructive dialogue with each other. 
 
Chapter 2: Ecological discomforts in environmental thought 
In chapter 2, I address some of the objections that can be raised against the project I outline 
in the Introduction. First of all, it might be questioned whether the focus on human vulner-
ability to nature is an adequate subject of reflection for environmental philosophy, given 
that the discipline has usually focused on the destruction and exploitation of nature by 
humans. By referring to some already existing scholarly work, I show that ecological 
discomforts are an important part of human experience of nature, and that a better under-
standing of them can contribute to development of a more adequate relationship with the 
natural world. Secondly, one may also question the novelty of the situation – after all, we 
have always lived with problem-causing animals. While this is true, current animal recolo-
nization does bring some novel features: we lack culturally established means of engaging 
with the recolonizing animals in terms of coexistence; the recolonizing species raise 
specific conservation dilemmas; their presence is often overwhelming and as such raises 
important questions of power relations. I argue that these features justify a reflection on 
current recolonizations in their own right. Thirdly, the relative rarity of some of the 
negative impacts of animals might be used to argue that we do not in fact need to pay 
attention to these discomforts. However, this argument rests upon the assumption that what 
matters most in the assessment of danger is risk: the severity and probability of that danger. 
I argue that we also need to take into account meanings of the discomforts. Since many of 
these meanings do not depend on the probability of these events occurring, but rather relate 
to the sheer possibility of them happening, we are justified to take ecological discomforts 
seriously even if they are relatively rare. 
 
Chapter 3: Interests, costs, benefits, and the social complexity of discomforts 
In chapter 3, I begin my examination of the interpretations of ecological discomforts by 
focusing on one of the most dominant approaches to these discomforts: the cost-benefit 
analyses which assess nature in terms of its instrumental usefulness for human ends. In this 
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perspective, ecological discomforts are interpreted primarily as the costs of coexistence. 
While such costs are openly acknowledged, they can be balanced out by the benefits that 
wild animals bring in the form of wildlife services, or by the immaterial psychological 
benefits that can contribute to our self-affirmation. This interpretation, however, is quite 
limited. First, it does not leave space for moral concerns with nature itself. Second, it fails 
to recognize that nature can be appreciated by humans as more than merely an instrument 
used to achieve pre-defined human ends. Third, it does not leave space for the recognition 
that an important part of the meaning of wildness is its resistance to human appropriations. 
 
Chapter 4: Wildness and the preconditions for meaningfulness of nature 
In chapter 4, I turn to those interpretations of nature that explicitly articulate its ethical 
significance. I focus particularly on those interpretations that perceive animals and ecosys-
tems as self-willed entities that pursue their own sort of good and self-realization. Such a 
conception of wild nature allows us to value it non-instrumentally, with naturalness, 
autonomy, and self-organization as core ethically relevant features. To illustrate the role 
discomforts play in this interpretation, I discuss the importance of nature’s autonomy in the 
context of seeking meaning in nature. Based on a discussion of philosophical ideas on the 
preconditions for meaning that claim the possibility of finding meaning is predicated upon 
the possibility of denial of meaning, I argue that the autonomy of nature – that which may 
lead to discomforting experiences on our part – is necessary for finding meaning in nature. 
We can find such a denial in the resistance of natural entities to our imputations of mean-
ing. Using this perspective, we can reinterpret discomforting activities of animals and 
symbolic transgressions by animals as preconditions for finding meaning in nature. 
 
Chapter 5: Discomforting encounters with nature as moral experiences 
In chapter 5, I propose to understand discomforting encounters with wild animals as moral 
experiences – events that confront us with ourselves and our ethical tradition in such a way 
that they reveal our prejudices, question them, and open up possibilities for new under-
standings. As such, contact with nature can lead both to deeper self-understanding, and at 
the same time can enrich our moral tradition. I illustrate this with an example of the near-
death encounter between environmental philosopher Val Plumwood and a crocodile. 
 
Chapter 6: Individual sacrifices and the flourishing of ecosystems 
In chapter 6, I turn to a discussion of the relationship between individual harms and the 
flourishing of ecosystems. As we come to care for individual animals, and recognize the 
beauty of nature, we also become more aware of the tension that exists between these two 
concerns: the flourishing of natural ecosystems is only possible through suffering and 
deaths of innumerable individual animals. I discus the ethical theory of Holmes Rolston III 
as an attempt to accommodate the discomfort that this tension provokes. His theory allows 
us to get a better grasp, particularly on the holistic, systemic values that allow us to 
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appreciate the ethical status of biotic communities. Unfortunately, it seems that Rolston’s 
theory does not pay sufficient attention to individual harms, and achieves accommodation 
of our unease by a reduction of our complex moral appreciation of nature. 
 
Chapter 7: Towards a wilder community 
In chapter 7, I engage with those ethical theories that focus on individual animal wellbeing 
and animal rights, and therefor seem better placed to take individual animal losses more 
seriously. Several ethicists working within this strand of ethics proposed to apply animal 
rights theory to questions concerning the construction of multi-species communities. While 
they do take into consideration individual animal wellbeing, my analysis shows that their 
treatment of such community-related concerns as common good, maintenance of relation-
ships, mutual influence, common identity, etc., is not satisfying. Moreover, animal ethics 
does not take into consideration the goodness of ecological processes like predation, which 
have been explored in chapter 6. I suggest that we need to understand the moral status of 
urban wildlife as a composite, which includes both a concern with ecological goodness, and 
with individual inviolability. I argue that this tension, which can be very disturbing, cannot 
be reconciled, but marks an ambivalence that is one of the key components of the moral 
experience at play in face of animal colonization of cities and rural areas. 
 
Chapter 8: Practicing coexistence 
In the chapter 8, I bring together the theoretical insights from chapter 2 through 7 in order 
to show how they can bear on our attempts to develop practices that could organize 
coexistence with wildlife. In discussing two concrete practices, I will show, first, how the 
meanings illuminated throughout this thesis can already be discerned in actual practices, 
secondly, how a better understanding of these meanings can help us understand how these 
practices can fail, and finally, how a hermeneutic re-interpretation of these practices, and of 
the moral experiences to which these try to respond, can help improve these practices. 
 
Chapter 9: Summary and general conclusions 
In the concluding chapter, I revisit the main questions that orientated this thesis. I summa-
rize the different meanings of ecological discomforts that we have come across, and discuss 
their relation to ethical issues. Next, I recapitulate the insights we have gained regarding the 
ambivalent experiences of nature. I claim that both ecological discomforts and the ambiva-
lent experiences of nature can and should be reclaimed by the environmentalist movement 
as experiences of the natural world that form an important aspect of the current and future 
coexistence with wildness that can enrich our relationships with nature. 
 OVERZICHT 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 1: Inleiding 
Europa is sinds kort getuige van een grootschalige terugkeer van natuurlijke fauna. Als 
gevolg van natuurbeschermende maatregelen, het steeds meer vrijkomen van 
landbouwgrond en grote veranderingen op sociaal, cultureel en economisch vlak, groeit het 
aantal soorten zoogdieren en vogels en betrekken deze nieuwe territoria. 
Deze opleving wordt niet alleen verwelkomt door milieubeschermers maar ook 
door een groter publiek en daar zijn een aantal redenen voor. Ten eerste is deze heropleving 
een zeldzaam voorbeeld van een succesverhaal op milieugebied. Daarnaast biedt het een 
mogelijkheid om zich opnieuw te verbinden met natuur. En tenslotte, geeft het de 
mogelijkheid een nieuwe vorm van samenleven aan te gaan met levende dieren, een vorm 
van samenleven die minder destructief is dan in voorgaande eeuwen. 
Echter, het ontwikkelen van zulke nieuwe vormen van samenleven blijkt een 
moeilijke opgave doordat veel van de terugkerende soorten geen gemakkelijke buren 
blijken te zijn. Wilde dieren kunnen schade veroorzaken of een bedreiging vormen voor 
gedomesticeerde dieren, simpelweg doordat ze leven binnen onze infrastructuur en deze in 
hun voordeel gebruiken. Materieel verlies of de dreiging van schade leidt tot onrust, angst 
en woede. 
Sommige gedragingen van deze wilde dieren leiden niet zozeer tot materiële 
schade maar hebben vooral verontrustende symbolische connotaties. Bovendien lijkt de 
rekolonisatie van lastige dieren een bedreiging te vormen voor kleinere, reeds 
gemarginaliseerde gemeenschappen. Al deze problematische aspecten van natuur noem ik 
ecologisch ‘ongemak.’ 
Om met dit ongemak om te gaan hebben we een cultuur nodig waarin we denken 
over de natuur in termen van samenleven, ook al is deze ontwrichtend en destructief. De 
negatieve gevolgen van de terugkeer van wilde dieren, en de verscheidene normatieve 
ideeën over hoe hierop te reageren, vragen van ons dat we eerst aandacht besteden aan een 
aantal ethische vraagstukken. Alleen op deze manier kan er een cultuurverandering 
plaatsvinden. Ik stel voor om deze uitdaging te benaderen vanuit de hermeneutische 
milieuethiek. 
De hermeneutiek vertelt ons dat onze betrokkenheid tot de wereld altijd al 
bemiddeld is door onze interpretatie. Zodoende, zijn confrontaties met storende 
gedragingen van een wild dier nooit vanzelfsprekend onbehaaglijk, deze hebben niet een 
vaste betekenis. Ontmoetingen met een wild dier en de gevolgen hiervan hebben 
interpretatie nodig – en zijn altijd al aan interpretatie onderhevig. Hoe we deze ook ervaren, 
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wat we hier ook over zeggen, het betreft altijd al een interpretatie. Een deel van deze 
interpretaties zijn zo goed gevestigd dat we deze niet eens als zodanig herkennen; dit is 
simpelweg hoe de wereld aan ons verschijnt en we nemen deze verschijning voor lief. Maar 
zelfs in deze vaak zo heldere gevallen, maken wij een interpretatie van een gebeurtenis die 
altijd op verschillende manieren begrepen kan worden, vanuit verschillende horizonten. In 
deze context is een van de taken van de hermeneutische ethiek ons te doen realiseren dat 
onze interpretaties eindig zijn en slechts partieel geldig zijn. Dat geldt met name voor die 
vanzelfsprekende en voor de hand liggende interpretaties. Een zorgvuldige hermeneutische 
analyse kan licht werpen op vooroordelen die ten grondslag liggen aan deze 
vanzelfsprekende interpretaties, kan de grenzen verkennen van deze interpretaties, en kan 
tenslotte de meest diepgewortelde interpretaties confronteren met de onbekende. 
Deze studie richt zich op de betekenis van dit onbehagen met de natuur, en op de 
dubbelzinnige ervaringen van een confrontatie met wilde natuur. Deze wilde natuur is het 
onderwerp van een interpretatieve studie. Daarom zal ik mij van hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 7 
bezighouden met specifieke interpretaties van ecologisch ongemak, ik zal verhelderen 
welke morele betekenissen aan het werk zijn binnen deze interpretaties, en zal tenslotte op 
een constructieve manier een dialoog vormgeven. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2: Het ongemak van de natuur in het milieudenken 
In hoofdstuk 2 zal ik mij richten op een aantal bezwaren. Ten eerste de vraag of de 
kwetsbaarheid van de mens ten opzicht van de natuur wel het juiste beginpunt is voor 
reflectie. De milieufilosofie richt zich doorgaans op het verwoesten en uitbuiten van de 
natuur door de mens. Door te verwijzen naar bestaand werk zal ik laten zien dat  ecologisch 
ongemak een belangrijk onderdeel is van hoe de mens natuur ervaart. Wanneer we deze 
beter begrijpen kan dit bijdragen aan een meer passende relatie met de natuurlijke wereld. 
Ten tweede dient de vraag zich aan of de terugkeer van de wilde dieren een 
wezenlijk nieuwe situatie betekent, we hebben immers altijd moeten samenleven met dieren 
en hun ongemakken. Toch zijn er wel wezenlijk nieuwe aspecten aan de recente terugkeer 
van wilde dieren: we hebben bijvoorbeeld geen gevestigde middelen meer om met deze 
dieren om te gaan in termen van samenleven; de verschillende diersoorten leiden ook tot 
allerlei dilemma’s wat betreft hun bescherming; bovendien is hun aanwezigheid vaak nogal 
intimiderend, hetgeen machtsrelaties ter sprake brengt. Ik stel dat deze specifieke aspecten 
een op zichzelf staande reflectie op ecologisch ongemak rechtvaardigen. 
Ten derde zijn een aantal van de negatieve gevolgen van de terugkeer van het 
wilde dier relatief zeldzaam en zou men daarom kunnen zeggen dat we daar geen aandacht 
aan hoeven te besteden. Maar deze argumentatie leunt op de aanname dat we gevaar 
kunnen beoordelen op basis van risico: namelijk de ernst en de waarschijnlijkheid van het 
gevaar. Ik stel echter dat we de verschillende betekenissen van dit ecologisch ongemak in 
acht moeten nemen. Veel van deze betekenissen zijn niet afhankelijk van 
waarschijnlijkheid van bepaalde gevaarlijke ontmoetingen met wilde dieren, maar gaan 
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over de pure mogelijkheid ervan, daarom is het gerechtvaardigd dat we deze serieus nemen, 
zelfs al zijn deze zeldzaam. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3: Belangen, kosten, baten, en de complexiteit van  ecologisch ongemak. 
In hoofdstuk 3 begin ik met het onderzoeken van interpretaties van ecologisch ongemak 
door mij te richten op een van de meest dominante benaderingen van ongemak, namelijk de 
kosten-batenanalyse die de natuur beoordeelt in termen van bruikbaarheid voor de mens. 
Door middel van dit perspectief wordt ecologisch ongemak geïnterpreteerd als de kosten 
van het samenleven met de wilde natuur. Ook al worden de kosten erkend, toch kunnen ze 
worden gecompenseerd door de voordelen die wilde dieren ook met zich meebrengen in de 
vorm van bepaalde ‘ecosysteemdiensten,’ of door de immateriële psychologische voordelen 
(o.a. een bevestiging van onszelf). Toch is deze interpretatie is erg beperkt. Ten eerste laat 
ze geen ruimte over voor morele bekommernis om de natuur. Ten tweede schiet deze 
benadering tekort omdat ze de natuur slechts instrumenteel beoordeelt ten opzichte van 
menselijke doeleinden. Ten derde laat ze geen ruimte voor de erkenning dat een belangrijk 
deel van de betekenis van ‘wildheid’ juist gelegen is in de weerstand ten aanzien van elke 
menselijke poging deze toe te eigenen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4: ‘Wildheid’ en de voorwaarden voor betekenisvolle natuur 
In hoofdstuk 4 richt ik mij op die interpretaties van de natuur die specifiek haar ethische 
betekenis benadrukken. Ik richt mij vooral op die interpretaties waarin dieren en 
ecosystemen als eigenmachtig worden begrepen en als entiteiten die elk een eigen ‘goed’ en 
zelfrealisatie nastreven. Een dergelijke opvatting van de wilde natuur geeft ons de 
mogelijkheid deze non-instrumenteel te evalueren,  met natuurlijkheid, autonomie, en 
zelforganisatie als de voornaamste moreel relevante eigenschappen. Om te laten zien welke 
rol ‘ongemak’ speelt in deze interpretaties, bespreek ik het belang van autonomie als 
eigenschap van de natuur wanneer we kijken naar betekenisgeving. Gebaseerd op een 
bespreking van een aantal filosofische ideeën over de voorwaarden van betekenis, die 
stellen dat ervaringen van betekenis gegrond zijn in de mogelijkheid dat deze betekenis 
wordt ontkend, stel ik dat de autonomie van de natuur- die ons een gevoel van onbehagen 
kan geven tegelijkertijd noodzakelijk is om betekenis te vinden in de natuur. We kunnen 
deze ontkenning vinden in de weerstand die natuurlijke entiteiten aan ons bieden wanneer 
wij ze proberen met betekenis te vullen. Vanuit dit perspectief kunnen we ongemakkelijke 
dierlijke gedragingen en dieren die onze symbolische grenzen overschrijden begrijpen als 
de voorwaarden voor het vinden van betekenis in de natuur. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5: Onbehaaglijke ontmoetingen met de natuur als een morele ervaring 
In hoofdstuk 5 stel ik voor om onbehaaglijke ontmoetingen met wilde dieren te begrijpen 
als een morele ervaring – gebeurtenissen die ons confronteren met onszelf en onze ethische 
traditie. Deze ervaring kan onze vooroordelen onthullen, deze helpen bevragen, en geeft 
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ons zo een nieuwe kans om deze te begrijpen. Zodoende kan de natuur ons leiden tot een 
dieper zelfbegrip, en  helpen onze morele traditie verrijken. Ik zal dit laten zien aan de hand 
van de bijna dodelijke ontmoeting tussen milieufilosoof Val Plumwood en een krokodil. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6: Individueel leed en de bloei van een ecosysteem 
In hoofdstuk 6 richt ik mij op de relatie tussen individueel leed en het floreren van een 
ecosysteem. Enerzijds geven we om bepaalde individuele dieren, en anderzijds geven we 
om natuurlijke schoonheid, maar tussen deze twee overwegingen kan een spanning bestaan. 
De bloei van een ecosysteem is uiteindelijk alleen mogelijke door het lijden en sterven van 
een aantal dieren. Ik zal de ethiek bespreken van Holmes Rolston III, als een poging het 
onbehagen als gevolg van deze spanning tegemoet te treden. Rolstons theorie stelt ons in 
staat om een beter begrip te krijgen van een (o.a. holistisch) systeem van waarden, 
waardoor we een waardering kunnen geven aan de ethische status van een biotisch systeem. 
Helaas lijkt Rolstons theorie onvoldoende aandacht te besteden aan individueel leed, en kan 
deze alleen ons onbehagen verlichten door onvoldoende oog te hebben voor onze complexe 
morele waardering van de natuur. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7: Richting een wildere samenleving 
In hoofdstuk 7 zal ik mij bezig houden met die ethische theorieën die zich richten op 
individueel dierenwelzijn en dierenrechten, en daardoor beter in staat lijken om het verlies 
van een individuele dieren serieus te nemen. Verscheidene ethici hebben voorgesteld om de 
theorie van dierenrechten te gebruiken voor de  vraag hoe om we intersoortelijke 
gemeenschappen kunnen vormen. Alhoewel deze theorieën goed in staat zijn om het 
individueel dieren in acht te nemen, blijkt uit mijn analyse dat hun manier van kijken naar 
gemeenschap – in termen van ‘common good’, gericht op het onderhouden van onderlinge 
relaties, gemeenschappelijke identiteit enzovoort – uiteindelijk onbevredigend blijft. 
Bovendien lijkt de dierethiek niet voldoende in staat om de ‘goedheid’ te erkennen van 
ecologische processen zoals predatie, zoals besproken in de vorige twee hoofdstukken. Ik 
stel voor dat we de morele status van ‘urban wildlife’ als een composiet moeten begrijpen, 
waarin de zorg om de ecologische ‘goedheid’ van predatie en de zorg om de individuele 
onaantastbaarheid samenkomen. De spanning tussen deze componenten is uiteindelijk 
onverzoenbaar; deze  ambivalentie is wellicht verwarrend, maar vormt tegelijkertijd juist 
een wezenlijk deel van de morele ervaring die zich presenteert wanneer wilde dieren 
terugkeren naar stedelijke gebieden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 8: het samenleven in praktijk brengen 
In hoofdstuk 8 breng ik de theoretische inzichten van hoofdstuk 2 tot en met hoofdstuk 7 
samen en laat ik zien hoe deze de huidige praktijk verder kan helpen bij het vormgeven van 
onze co-existentie met wilde dieren. 
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Door twee concrete voorbeelden te bespreken laat ik allereerst zien hoe de tot 
dusver ontrafelde betekenissen in dit proefschrift zijn waar te nemen in deze 
praktijkgevallen. Vervolgens laat ik zien dat we, door een beter begrip van deze 
betekenissen, kunnen begrijpen waarom deze veel van deze praktijkgevallen uiteindelijk 
mislukken. Tenslotte bespreek ik hoe een hermeneutische re-interpretatie van deze 
praktijkgevallen, en de morele ervaring die eraan ten grondslag ligt, ons kan helpen deze 
praktijken kunnen verbeteren. 
 
Hoofdstuk 9: Samenvatting en conclusie 
In dit laatste hoofdstuk kom ik terug naar de belangrijkste vragen die mijn proefschrift 
richting hebben gegeven. De verschillende betekenissen van ecologisch ongemak worden 
samengevat en ik bespreek hoe deze zich verhouden tot een aantal ethische kwesties. 
Vervolgens kom ik terug op de inzichten die we dusver hebben verkregen wat betreft 
ambivalente ervaringen van natuur. Ik stel dat zowel het ecologische ongemak als de 
ambivalentie van de natuur kunnen en zouden moeten worden toegeëigend door de 
ecologische beweging als een belangrijke ervaring van de natuurlijke wereld die wezenlijk 
is voor ons huidige en onze toekomstige samen leven  met ‘wilde’ dieren, en onze relatie 
met de natuur kan verrijken. 
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